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Previous literature on the relationship between the post-1949 Chinese state and 
Chinese intellectuals has emphasized its oppositional characters; specifically, the measures 
taken and extent to which the party-state placed intellectuals and their beliefs under 
surveillance and scrutiny. My dissertation takes a different approach, highlighting areas of 
cooperation and accommodation between the state and the intellectual class. The state, for 
example, took active steps to find employment for out-of-work intellectuals at the start of 
the 1950s and ensured that political study requirements were not particularly disruptive, 
and even less punitive. To the extent that there was disharmony in the relationship, it 
usually arose from low-ranking cadres, many of whom were not formally educated and 
took a more skeptical view of intellectuals than did the upper echelons of the party-state. 
This work also surveys the steps intellectuals took to advance their interests, through letter-
writing and petitions to government officials to advocate for themselves and their 
colleagues. As such, intellectual agency during the 1950s is the analytical centerpiece of 
vi 
vii 
this dissertation. I argue that many of the gains won by intellectuals possessed staying 
power, in contrast to previous scholarship which has focused on the disappearance of free 
speech rights during the Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1957. This work shows, instead, that 
early communist statebuilding was a collaborative process in which intellectuals helped 
actively set the tenor of their relationship with the new government. The logic of 
educational expansion, however, produced a new generation of intellectuals toward the end 
of the decade more radical than the one that came before, setting the stage for 
intergenerational conflict between intellectuals of various ages during the following 
decade. 
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 The 1957 spring semester was coming to a close at South China Normal University, 
meaning that sweltering summer temperatures in the city of Guangzhou were on the horizon. 
Intellectuals at the university, however, were feeling the heat in multiple ways. The government 
of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) had recently been tolerant of intellectuals expressing 
critical views of the state, although by mid-year this fleeting moment of liberality was drawing 
down. Professors at South China Normal, like their colleagues both in and outside of academia 
across the country, found themselves under considerable scrutiny from Communist Party (CCP) 
officials and cadres. At one meeting on June 1, CCP cadres gathered a small contingent of 
professors to describe the working situation at the university. While others used the meeting as 
an opportunity to air grievances with campus conditions—for example, one professor decried the 
unequal teaching load expected of professors without administrative roles, meaning they could 
not devote as much time to research as department heads; another complained of large class sizes 
and unmotivated students—one professor offered a more theoretical perspective. Xie Shuwu saw 
the decade thus far as a sort of negotiation between intellectuals and the state over the rules and 
regulations of the new society (in Mandarin, this idea can be expressed more concisely with the 
idiom yuefa sanzhang—literally, “agreeing on three laws”). He hoped that such cooperation 
might continue, with the ruling party soliciting the opinions and advice of the intellectual class.1 
 The case of Xie Shuwu is instructive in a variety of ways. First, the institution he taught 
at symbolized a number of dramatic changes that had taken place since the CCP came to power 
at the end of 1949. South China Normal University had originally been founded as an offshoot of 
 
1 This material was drawn from huanan shifan xueyuan jixu zuotan neibu maodun: jiaoshoumen tichu xuduo piping 
he jianyi, June 1, 1957, Chinese Anti-Rightist Campaign Database, 1957, edited by Song Yongyi, Universities 
Service Centre for China Studies, 2013, available at http://ccrd.usc.cuhk.edu.hk.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/Default.aspx 
[hereafter ARC]. 
2 
Xiangqin University in Guangzhou, with a curriculum that focused on training future educators. 
A broad package of education reforms enacted by the CCP in the early 1950s, however, 
reorganized the teachers’ college into a large university. South China Normal began drawing 
from an expanded body of students across the Chinese south. A litany of new schools—regional 
normal universities, or “people’s revolutionary universities” that explicitly focused on the 
offspring of peasants and workers—defined the new era. As the education system expanded, 
professors and university staff came into far more contact with state agents than ever before. 
Second, and more importantly, Xie Shuwu’s conceptualization of “hashing out the laws” 
with the Communist Party is highly representative of the political process as it actually played 
out between the state and the intellectuals. The notion that Chinese scholars should advise 
government officials was far from revolutionary. Indeed, harnessing intellectual expertise was a 
hallmark of Chinese politics extending centuries back throughout the dynastic era. Chinese 
intellectuals had long been politicized; prestigious private academies acted as siphons into the 
imperial bureaucracy, which remained largely in place throughout hundreds of years and endured 
even in the face of political upheaval. Chinese intellectuals before the twentieth century are 
therefore best seen as scholar-officials (shidaifu) or literati (wenren).2 Although the academies 
that churned out scholar-bureaucrats were nominally meritocratic, it is impossible to ignore the 
linkages between socioeconomic status and educational attainment. Invariably, a significant 
number of Chinese intellectuals came from the wealthiest families—a trend that continued into 
the modern era. As landed gentry moved from the countryside to the cities in increasing 
 
2 Timothy Cheek, The Intellectual in Modern Chinese History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 6, 
33. Indeed, the modern Chinese word for “intellectual”—zhishifenzi—did not arise until at least the 1920s, when the 
writer Lu Xun began using the term zhishi jieji to refer to the “knowledge class.” By 1949, however, the term 
zhishifenzi had become commonplace to refer to anyone with formal education, including medical professionals, 
engineers, technicians, researchers, academics, and artisans. The CCP used the term zhishifenzi ubiquitously after 
assuming power. 
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numbers, their children had the opportunity to attend the best schools in the empire and become 
competitive applicants to the academies.3 To be sure, there were options for lower-status 
individuals to make their way up through the academic system. But by-and-large, a class of 
scholar-officials was able to successfully reproduce itself. 
 As such, the status of intellectuals became something of a dilemma for the Communist 
Party as it came to power. Intellectuals, especially revolutionary youth, had become increasingly 
supportive of the CCP, and in some cases even gave their lives in service of the revolution. But 
the mere existence of the intellectuals was emblematic of a system of unequal status that the 
party sought to rectify. Even then, however, the CCP could only go so far; the regime’s 
immediate goals were focused on survival (with respect to the growing international crisis in the 
Korean Peninsula) and spurring industrial production. Intellectuals were critical to both. In 
addition, the party-state sought to create new opportunities for peasant and working-class 
communities to gain access to education, which would require an unprecedented expansion of 
the education system—and therefore more teachers. Even if intellectuals reminded CCP officials 
of the system they sought to upend, the pragmatic realities of governing meant that intellectuals 
were necessary, just as they had been to previous dynastic governments. But in order to exert 
control over the education system, the party-state relied on legions of low-ranking caders, who 
were often workers or peasants themselves and who had little formal education. Even if the 
government could generally ignore the generational inequalities that produced the intellectual 
class, cadres often could not.  
 The formal mechanisms of the state were not fully in place until the middle of the decade, 
but once new organs of bureaucratic governance like the danwei (work unit) had been 
 
3 See, for example, William T. Rowe, Hankow: Commerce and Society in a Chinese City, 1796-1889 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1984), 19-20. 
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established, intellectuals both inside and outside of academia found themselves with more 
avenues to voice their opinions on their living and working conditions.4 By the end of 1955, 
intellectuals began tentatively putting pressure on party officials to improve their livelihoods. 
Intellectuals’ complaints included poor housing, low wages, long working hours, and a lack of 
professional opportunities. Although the 1956 period of liberalization is typically thought of as 
the “Hundred Flowers Campaign,” a movement allowing intellectuals the freedom to criticize the 
state, I instead suggest that questions of free speech and expression were relatively tangential to 
intellectuals’ broader concerns. The majority of intellectuals were concerned with practical 
matters in their day-to-day lives, and it was these concerns that took center stage in the reformist 
efforts of 1956. The CCP’s central leadership made good-faith efforts to address intellectuals’ 
list of concerns. Even in this heyday of pro-intellectual policies, however, inequalities persisted. 
For example, while intellectuals employed as engineers in critical economic sectors (such as 
heavy industry) saw huge improvements to their daily living conditions, others (such as artists) 
saw only promises of future improvements.  
 These pro-intellectual reforms proved unsustainable. Cadres had been growing 
increasingly resentful of what they saw as intellectual privilege during the decade. Considering 
the socioeconomic background of the cadres, as well as the Communist Party’s mandate to 
correct a millennia-old system of generational inequality, their frustration is understandable.5 
 
4 For a more thorough investigation of the danwei, see Xiaobo Lü and Elizabeth J. Perry’s edited volume Danwei: 
The Changing Chinese Workplace in Historical and Comparative Perspective (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1997) and 
David Bray, Social Space and Governance in Urban China: The Danwei System from Origins to Reform (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2005). 
5 Scholars have advanced several different views of the cadres and their role in the modern Chinese political system. 
See Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China, second edition (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1968); Andrew G. Walder, Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese 
Industry (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986); Maurice Meisner, The Deng Xiaoping Era: An Inquiry 
into the Fate of Chinese Socialism, 1978-1994 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1996); and Ching Kwan Lee, “From 
Organized Dependence to Disorganized Despotism: Changing Labor Regimes in China’s Factories,” China 
Quarterly 157 (1999): 44-71. Suffice to say, I am less interested in advancing my own theory regarding the political 
5 
During 1952, when the Communist Party moved to assert control over the vast majority of the 
nation’s schools, top party officials often had to rein in overzealous cadres who sought to punish 
intellectuals severely or even remove them from their posts. Cadres bided the middle years of the 
decade in quiet resentment, but their frustrations emerged once again during the 1956 reforms. 
Cadres shifted from passive resentment to active resistance. In some cases, they simply refused 
to distribute the wage increases that the party center or their municipal government had 
approved; in others, they held up intellectual applications to join the Communist Party rather 
than passing them on to a review board. The CCP was therefore in an awkward position, and 
responded accordingly with a crackdown against “rightists” in mid-1957. But the campaign was 
far from the sweeping backlash the cadres wanted; only a small fraction of the nation’s 
intellectuals were targeted as rightists, and even then only a fraction of the fraction actually 
received any punishment.  
 Even still, the Anti-Rightist backlash transformed the previously cooperative relationship 
between the state and the intellectuals, meaning that the CCP jettisoned previous injunctions for 
thought rectification (which emphasized intellectual self-study) in favor of having intellectuals 
participate in hard labor, either in the countryside or in urban factories, to gain a “working-class 
consciousness.” Meanwhile, the state expanded its efforts to enroll working-class individuals in 
remedial education programs, even waiving admission requirements and lowering standards at 
China’s top universities in order to bring in more laborers and peasants. Coupled with the party’s 
attention to cultivating revolutionary zeal among the youth, these changes contributed to a sharp 
divide within the scholarly community between older intellectuals and the new generation. 
Moving forward, intellectuals increasingly began to view other intellectuals with suspicion. The 
 
role of the cadres as opposed to drawing attention to the cadres’ sense of collective grievance against the intellectual 
class.  
6 
kind of collective solidarity among intellectuals that had led to the gains of 1956 could not be 
replicated by the 1960s.  
 My narrative has emerged from extensive research both in and outside of China. The 
majority of my fieldwork was completed in Shanghai, a natural choice due to the city’s large 
population of intellectuals. The Shanghai Municipal Government was often at the cutting edge of 
passing policies designed to benefit the intellectual class, and as such kept extensive records on 
their views (for example, opinion surveys, letters written to the city, or minutes on political 
meetings involving intellectuals). In addition, People’s Daily, the Communist Party’s state 
newspaper, has provided a record of a number of editorials written by intellectuals. Although 
certainly censored, it is my belief that the paper can still provide a window into what intellectuals 
may have been thinking during the period, assuming that they doctored their writings to be 
acceptable to the regime. In recent years, however, the Chinese government has increasingly 
restricted access to state archives, proving problematic for research topics that may be deemed 
politically sensitive. Luckily, extensive digitized archives, in the form of the Database of the 
Chinese Political Campaigns of the 1950s, maintained by the Fairback Center at Harvard 
University, as well as the Chinese Anti-Rightist Campaign Database, have proved incredibly 
useful for my project. Documents from these databases include many intellectual “confessions,” 
apologetic documents regarding the writers’ reflections on their “ideological errors” that they 
were required to write especially during 1952 and sometimes afterward.  
Although some scholars have tended to read all documents written by intellectuals as 
having been produced under duress, I take the opposite view. When an intellectual writes that 
they were genuinely affected by the experiences in the 1950-1951 Land Reform Campaign and 
the plight of the peasantry, for example, I take them at their word—indeed, previous generations 
7 
of Chinese intellectuals came to similar conclusions organically (as I show in Chapter 1). 
Moreover, intellectuals were simply too large a population for the CCP to effectively control, 
especially at the outset of the decade. Plenty of intellectuals got out of writing confessions at all, 
but were never punished. Those that did usually had their documents filed away in a government 
archive, collecting dust. 
In tracing out the flow of intellectuals’ lives as well as intellectual policies during the 
1950s, I argue that intellectuals actually possessed a good degree of political agency during the 
decade. Moreover, intellectuals were generally supportive of the CCP (if perhaps more so at the 
beginning than at the end of the decade), and as such were not “brainwashed” by the party’s 
efforts at thought remolding. I see the reforms of 1956 as the consequence of pressure from 
below as opposed to shifting attitudes at the top of the political hierarchy. When the government 
shifted course in 1957 and launched the Anti-Rightist Campaign, I again argue that this change 
was driven in large part by the necessity of accommodating cadre frustration. The crackdown 
was a logical outcome of the contradictions at play in the 1950s—of a regime whose base was 
largely composed of underprivileged communities but that simultaneously sought to leverage 
intellectual power to transform China’s industrial capabilities. Even in the final months of the 
decade, when cooperation between intellectuals and the state began to subside, it did so only 
partially. The government was still responsive to the opinions and needs of the intellectual class; 
the problem, going forward, was that the intellectual class had been fractured between competing 
factions. The political drama of the 1960s, culminating in the Cultural Revolution, grew out of 
the changed class characteristics of the intellectuals. 
 
Charting the Historiography of Chinese Intellectuals and Education 
8 
 The status of Chinese intellectuals under the PRC state has long captivated Western 
scholars. The first major studies of intellectuals in Maoist China were published in 1960, barely a 
decade after the new government had come to power. These formative texts portrayed the 
relationship between intellectuals and the party-state as essentially oppositional: the state 
employed a set of draconian policies to bring intellectuals to heel, whereas intellectuals primarily 
resisted (both passively and actively) state encroachment on education.6 The tendency to view 
intellectuals as naturally opposed to the state reflects the general mood of the Cold War era, 
during which Western scholars as a whole tended to take a dim view of state socialist countries. 
Theodore Chen in particular tends to express skepticism that intellectuals in the 1950s were 
being genuine at all when writing positive articles about the CCP.7 Other scholars, such as Merle 
Goldman, took a different approach. Goldman examines the intellectuals who had been attacked 
as “rightists” at various points during the 1950s, and notes that many of these scholars were 
political leftists in fact. As such, Goldman concludes that the labels used by the party—leftist, 
centrist, or rightist—referred to an intellectual’s support for the CCP rather than any kind of 
consistent ideology.8 Although I agree with Goldman’s conclusion, the aim of the present work 
is to move beyond the framework advocated by scholars in the 1960s, which viewed intellectuals 
as fundamentally opposed to the state. In contrast, I suggest that the vast majority of intellectuals 
were at least somewhat supportive of the party-state, and utilized their cooperative relationship 
with the government to advance their interests. 
 
6 The two most significant studies of Chinese intellectuals during the 1950s are Theodore H. E. Chen, Thought 
Reform of the Chinese Intellectuals (Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 1960) and Roderick MacFarquhar, 
The Hundred Flowers Campaign and the Chinese Intellectuals (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960). Also see 
Fu-sheng Mu, The Wilting of the Hundred Flowers: The Chinese Intelligentsia under Mao (New York: Frederick A. 
Praeger, 1963). 
7 See, for example, Chen’s discussion of intellectuals’ participation in the Land Reform Campaign in Thought 
Reform of the Chinese Intellectuals, 21-24.  
8 See Merle Goldman, Literary Dissent in Communist China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967).  
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 Due to the nature of conducting historical research in China (or, rather, the general lack 
of the ability to do so during the 1960s and 1970s), scholarship did not return to the question of 
the Chinese intellectuals until the 1980s, at which point new paradigms emerged. Edited volumes 
by historians like Merle Goldman, Carol Hamrin, and Timothy Cheek have shown that Chinese 
intellectuals defined their identity both by their relationship with the state, as well as 
(contradictorily) their moral duty to criticize the state.9 In addition, other scholars began to 
consider that intellectuals’ support for the CCP may have been organic, rather than forced; for 
example, Wen-hsin Yeh has examined the plight of young students in Shanghai during the 
Republican Period, where rising costs of school tuition, living expenses, and a lack of stable job 
opportunities may have contributed to radicalization among young intellectuals in the lead-up to 
the CCP takeover.10 Scholarship in the 1980s and early 1990s tended to either look past the 
1950s (in the case of Hamrin, Cheek, and Goldman’s work) or before (in the case of Yeh’s). 
Although I do not have significant disagreements with any of these texts, I seek to return to the 
question of how intellectuals engaged the state during the formative 1950-1959 years while 
moving beyond a narrow oppositional framework as advanced by earlier scholarship. 
 Other works produced around this time focused their attention not just on intellectuals 
themselves, but on the wider education system. Theodore Chen’s pioneering work in the early 
1980s suggests that post-1949 Chinese education had two strands: an academic and revolutionary 
side, which were sometimes in conflict. During politically tense periods, such as the late 1950s 
or the Cultural Revolution, revolutionary education won out over academic education.11 Other 
 
9 See Carol Lee Hamrin and Timothy Cheek, editors, China’s Establishment Intellectuals (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 
1986) and Goldman, Cheek, and Hamrin, editors, China’s Intellectuals and the State: In Search of a New 
Relationship (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987).  
10 See Wen-hsin Yeh, The Alienated Academy: Culture and Politics in Republican China, 1917-1937 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1990). 
11 See Chen, Chinese Education since 1949: Academic and Revolutionary Models (New York: Pergamon Press, 
1981).  
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works have generally borrowed from Chen’s two-strands model, although scholars have taken 
the analysis in different directions. Ruth Hayhoe and Suzanne Pepper, for example, have shown 
how the CCP structured education along Soviet lines. Over the course of the 1950s, however, the 
inadequacy of the Soviet model became increasingly glaring, leading to attempts at “sinifying” 
Chinese education in the late 1950s and into the next decade.12 Although these works tend to 
focus on urban areas, other scholars instead look at the inadequacies in rural education during the 
1950s, which were generally ignored by the state until the late 1960s.13 All of these works give 
incredibly detailed perspectives on the extraordinary growth of formal education under the CCP. 
The scale of the education expansion in the 1950s thus leads into an important point regarding 
my own work: accelerating rates of enrollment meant that the demand for new teachers was 
always high during the decade, which meant in turn that the state was reliant on intellectuals to 
achieve its wider vision for the new society. These works on the education system thus provide 
another frame of reference for challenging the oppositional framework from the 1960s. 
 Scholarship in recent decades has returned to the intellectuals themselves, employing new 
methods of sociology and social history to understand intellectuals as a social class in their own 
right. Timothy Cheek had produced a landmark volume on intellectuals throughout the course of 
China’s twentieth century, focusing on their class characteristics as well as the ideologies and 
debates that defined intellectual discourse.14 Although groundbreaking in shifting the focus to 
intellectuals themselves, Cheek’s recent works still relies on the narratives first advanced by 
scholars in the 1960s—that intellectuals were by-and-large suppressed by the CCP state, 
 
12 See Ruth Hayhoe, China’s Universities, 1895-1995: A Century of Cultural Conflict (New York: Garland 
Publishing, 1996) and Suzanne Pepper, Radicalism and Education Reform in 20th-Century China: The Search for 
an Ideal Development Model (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).  
13 See Dongping Han, The Unknown Cultural Revolution: Educational Reforms and Their Impact on China’s Rural 
Development (New York: Garland Publishing, 2000). 
14 Cheek, The Intellectual in Modern Chinese History. 
11 
excepting a brief period of tolerance for free expression in 1956 and early 1957, followed by an 
even larger suppression after the Anti-Rightist crackdown. Although I borrow from Cheek’s 
methodology by centering intellectuals in this work, I disagree with his portrayal of the 1950s. 
Various works from the scholar Eddy U have been influential in the process of writing this 
dissertation. U argues that previous scholarship has been focused on high-profile intellectuals. In 
reality, the concept of “intellectual” under the PRC state expanded to encompass millions of 
people, many of whom were not as prestigious as those who had been targeted during the Anti-
Rightist Campaign.15 Whereas Eddy U’s work has focused on how “intellectual” became a social 
marker during the 1950s, I instead examine the ways in which intellectuals engaged with the 
PRC as a unified class. However, I share his conclusions about the importance of “ordinary” 
intellectuals. Lastly, Joel Andreas has examined intellectuals and cadres as, respectively, classes 
of cultural elites and political elites, which converged over the course of the 1950s and early 
1960s.16 Although I tend to focus on instances of opposition between intellectuals and cadres, 
this study links up nicely with Andreas’ work by concluding with an examination of efforts to 
“educate the working class” while “proletarianizing [laodonghua] the intellectuals.” 
 Even as the field has evolved over the past decades, little work has been done to 
challenge the basic narrative of intellectuals’ political engagement with the state during the 
1950s. It is my objective to do so with the study at hand. Although I acknowledge that some 
degree of antipathy for the Communist Party existed among the intellectual community, I instead 
 
15 See various articles by Eddy U, such as “The Hiring of Rejects: Teacher Recruitment and Crises of Socialism in 
the Early PRC Years,” Modern China 30, no. 1 (January 2004): 46-80; “The Making of Chinese Intellectuals: 
Representations and Organization in the Thought Reform Campaign,” The China Quarterly 192 (December 2007): 
971-989; “The Making of Zhishifenzi: The Critical Impact of the Registration of Unemployed Intellectuals in the 
Early PRC,” The China Quarterly 173 (March 2003): 100-121; and “Reification of the Chinese Intellectual: On the 
Origins of the CCP Concept of Zhishifenzi,” Modern China 35, no. 6 (November 2009): 604-631. 
16 Joel Andreas, Rise of the Red Engineers: The Cultural Revolution and the Origins of China’s New Class 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009).  
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suggest that intellectuals were broadly supportive, or at worst neutral, toward the new 
government. For its part, the state sought to cultivate intellectual support through policies 
designed to explicitly aid the intellectual class, thus rewarding their loyalty. I also wish to break 
away from previous portrayals of the 1950s as defined, largely, by a series of “rectification 
campaigns” designed to corral the intellectuals under the aegis of the party-state.17 Although the 
1950s-as-cycle-of-campaigns periodization scheme is certainly not without merit, I contend that 
the model misses an underlying logic behind the progression of intellectuals’ political 
engagement. I instead conceptualize the relationship between intellectuals, cadres, and the state 
as a sort of negotiative process, whereby each side possessed a good deal of agency. As such, my 
work lines up with the project of applying political “group theory” to a Chinese context.18 To the 
extent that the state moved to curtail intellectual privilege during the latter half of the decade, I 
see these moves as an inevitable response to budding resentment among the cadres, not as part of 
a larger political cycle.  
 
Perspectives on Intellectuals under Communism 
 Most Marxist organizations have grappled with the question of intellectuals’ class 
identity. Intellectuals fit awkwardly into the typical socioeconomic classification scheme of 
 
17 For one of the best accounts of CCP political history and the cycles of rectification campaigns, see Frederick C. 
Teiwes, Politics and Purges in China: Rectification and the Decline of Party Norms, 1950-1965, second edition 
(Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1993). Teiwes’ larger point—on which I agree with him—is that the CCP was actually 
relatively unified behind Mao Zedong until the onset of the Cultural Revolution.  
18 This scholarly project first originated with David S. G. Goodman’s edited volume Groups and Politics in the 
People’s Republic of China (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1984). The volume contains two chapters related to 
intellectuals—Gordon White’s “Distributive Politics and Educational Development: Teachers as a Political Interest 
Group,” and James Cotton’s “Intellectuals as a Group in the Chinese Political Process. In general, both White and 
Cotton confine their analysis to the post-Mao years, and do not challenge pre-existing studies of intellectuals under 
Mao. For a general view of group theory, see G. David Garson, Group Theories of Politics (London: SAGE 
Publications, 1978). For an early attempt at applying group theory in a communist political context, see Harold 
Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, Interest Groups in Soviet Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1971).  
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Marxism; it is undeniable that, across a variety of cultures, having a bourgeois background was 
conducive to educational attainment, thus inextricably linking the bourgeoisie and intellectuals. 
Marxist theorists have thus struggled with how to understand intellectuals’ role in society, as 
well as their revolutionary potential. Theorists have debated whether intellectuals are 
fundamentally progressive or retrogressive, how intellectual theory can be put into action, and 
how intellectuals might best be utilized by the socialist state.19 In cases where Marxist political 
organizations were successful in gaining political power, as in China, the victors struggled with 
adapting these theories to the practical realities of everyday governance. As successful Marxist 
organizations moved to establish new nation-states, they naturally evolved along technocratic 
lines in the pursuit of rational redistributionist policies.20 Intellectuals were vital to socialist-bloc 
bureaucracies, and as such played important roles through the communist world. The realities 
and demands of political power thus sidelined the theoretical debate on intellectuals’ class status, 
while opening up new pathways for intellectuals to navigate socialist political systems. It is 
worth briefly examining various examples of intellectuals under communist states in order to 
place China’s history in a wider context. 
 The experiences of intellectuals in the Soviet Union were quite unlike those of Chinese 
intellectuals three decades later. Even amid slight economic liberalization under the New 
Economic Policy of the 1920s, a large number of Russian intellectuals were deported by the 
Soviet government—primarily from big cities like Petrograd (later Leningrad, modern-day St. 
Petersburg) or Moscow, either to exile in the Russian far east or elsewhere in Europe. 
 
19 Suman Gupta’s Marxism, History, and Intellectuals: Toward a Reconceptualized Transformative Socialism 
(Cranbury: Associated University Presses, 2000) gives a good overview of the debate regarding intellectuals among 
Marxist theorists. 
20 George Konrád and Ivan Szelényi discuss the natural evolution of revolutionary socialist movements into 
technocratic party-states, as well as how intellectuals have engaged with these new regimes, historically, in The 
Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power, translated by Andrew Arato and Richard E. Allen (New York: Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich, 1979). 
14 
Intellectuals suspected of disloyalty were frequently arrested, intimidated by Soviet secret police, 
or even executed.21 In general, the Soviet government moved aggressively to corral the 
intelligentsia by establishing control over writers’ groups and the school system. Intellectuals 
attempted to band together in order to resist state encroachment, sometimes via mass strikes, but 
resistance was largely ineffective and often led to reprisals from security forces.22 In more recent 
years, scholarship of Soviet history has begun moving in a different direction, quite similar to the 
ideas that spawned this present work. Scholars like Kendall Bailes and Vladislav Zubok have 
suggested that intellectuals who survived the purges were able to exercise some degree of 
agency, and enjoyed special privileges meted out by the Soviet government designed to reward 
their loyalty. Particularly among the “technical” intelligentsia—engineers, technicians, and 
scientists—efforts to negotiate with the state as a class proved successful.23 Overall, however, the 
intellectual-state dynamic in the Soviet Union evolved in a highly different manner than in the 
People’s Republic of China, where intellectuals were quite politically potent at the outset. In 
addition, the repressive techniques applied by the Soviets against the intelligentsia were not 
matched in scope by the Chinese Communist government.  
 Much of East and Central Europe fell under Soviet dominance in the aftermath of World 
War II and the occupation by the Red Army. Intellectuals in these countries had gone through a 
wide array of social changes over the course of the nineteenth century, coming to oppose the 
practice of East European serfdom and embracing liberalism. In order to best combat what they 
 
21 Lesley Chamberlain covers the repression of Soviet intellectuals in Lenin’s Private War: The Voyage of the 
Philosophy Steamer and the Exile of the Intelligentsia (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2006).  
22 Stuart Finkel describes both the Soviet government’s policies toward the intelligentsia, as well as resistance from 
below, in On the Ideological Front: The Russian Intelligentsia and the Making of the Soviet Public Sphere (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2007).  
23 See Kendall E. Bailes, Technology and Society under Lenin and Stalin: Origins of the Soviet Technical 
Intelligentsia, 1917-1941 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015) and Vladislav Zubok, Zhivago’s Children: 
The Last Russian Intelligentsia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009).  
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perceived as social “backwardness,” East European intellectuals sought to enter newly-formed 
bureaucracies by the end of the century, making the region highly conducive to the imposition of 
rationalized, hierarchical Marxism from above.24 Beyond that, however, it is difficult to 
generalize about the political engagement of East European intellectuals. Differences between 
states were significant; for example, East Germany tolerated virtually no dissent from its 
intellectual class, whereas Poland was less repressive. Romania relied on an enormous amount of 
cultural control and propaganda to cajole its intellectuals, while Hungary instead offered the 
promise of material benefits in exchange for supporting the regime.25 Due to East European 
intellectuals’ history of service in state bureaucracies, many were able to adapt to life under 
technocratic communist regimes fairly well. Indeed, intellectual bureaucrats were essential for 
the distribution of propaganda and the creation of new nationalist narratives to support socialist 
governance.26 More recent scholarship, however, has instead focused on the growth of dissident 
culture among East and Central European intellectuals, particularly among writers. Over the 
course of the 1960s and the 1970s, intellectuals in countries like East Germany, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, and Hungary all began to challenge Soviet hegemony in the region.27 In 
Czechoslovakia (the modern-day Czech Republic), the post-Soviet government was headed by 
Václav Havel, himself a dissident intellectual, until 2003. The diversity of political situations in 
East and Central Europe under communism shows that it is impossible to draw out a single 
 
24 For a background on the historical trajectory of the intellectual class in East Europe, see Konrád and Szelényi, The 
Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power, especially 85-142. 
25 These differences are explored in András Bozóki’s edited volume, Intellectuals and Politics in Central Europe 
(New York: Central European University Press, 1999). 
26 See, for example, Katherine Verdery, National Ideology under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in 
Ceauşescu’s Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). Nicolae Ceauşescu rejected the use of 
material incentives to encourage loyalty to his government as mirroring capitalism too much. See pages 100-101.  
27 For a discussion of East German intellectuals, see Thomas W. Goldstein’s Writing in Red: The East German 
Writers Union and the Role of Literary Intellectuals (Rochester: Camden House, 2017); for a comparative survey of 
Polish, Czech, and Hungarian intellectuals, see Barbara J. Falk, The Dilemmas of Dissidence in East-Central 
Europe: Citizen Intellectuals and Philosopher Kings (New York: Central European University Press, 2003). 
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generalization of intellectual political engagement in the region; as such, the region serves as a 
microcosm of the larger communist world order.  
Intellectuals in Cuba followed a relatively similar revolutionary trajectory as their 
Chinese counterparts. Widespread frustration with the authoritarian Fulgencio Batista regime led 
to an embrace of the Cuban communist movement by intellectuals, who continued to offer their 
support for the new government after Batista’s defeat. Like Chinese intellectuals, Cuban scholars 
connected with each other through magazines such as Lunes de Revolucίon or Pensamiento 
Crίtico, similar to newspapers like Guangming Daily in China. Cuban intellectuals also enjoyed 
a decade of relative freedom during the 1960s. They developed new school curricula 
independently from the state in an effort to better articulate Marxist theory and values to 
students. However, there were few efforts to dramatically expand Cuba’s pool of highly-
prestigious scholars, contrasting with China’s drives to promote mass education; in general, 
Cuban intellectual activity was centered around the prestigious University of Havana. Although 
Cuba experienced what intellectuals called the “grey years” of 1971-1976, where the state began 
taking a heavy hand in censoring intellectuals and stifling free expression in academia, the 
generally close and cooperative relationship between Cuban intellectuals and the state continued 
afterward. In the modern era, Cuban intellectuals have been active voices in calling for political 
and cultural reforms, and have developed new theories on political socialism in the twenty-first 
century.28 Although the Cuban experience mirrors the intellectual-state cooperation we see in the 
People’s Republic of China, two distinct differences emerge: (1) the lack of a significant 
 
28 The information in this section was drawn from Kepa Artaraz, “Constructing Identities in a Contested Setting: 
Cuba’s Intellectual Elite during and after the Revolution,” Oral History 45, no. 2 (2017): 50-59 and Rafael 
Hernández, “Intellectuals, Civil Society, and Political Power in Cuba,” translated by Jackie Cannon, Social Research 
84, no. 2 (2017): 407-428. In general, surveys of the Cuban intelligentsia after 1959 are somewhat uncommon in the 
literature. Also see Antoni Kapcia, Cuba: Island of Dreams (Oxford: Berg, 2000) for an account of revolutionary 
culture in Cuba.  
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program to dramatically expand the intellectual class, which ultimately transformed the class 
characteristics of Chinese scholars, and (2) a high degree of political continuity in Cuba, in 
contrast to the fundamental abandonment of Maoism in China after 1976.  
In neighboring North Korea, intellectual production received a welcome boost from the 
occupying Soviet Union at the end of World War II. The Soviet military actively supported 
endogenous artists, writers, and other producers of culture after the war, leading to a flourishing 
cultural scene north of the 38th parallel. Although the total number of intellectuals in the US-
occupied South was greater than those living in the North, intellectual migration between the two 
Koreas actually went in favor of the North during the immediate postwar period. The North 
Korean government also moved to expand the education system dramatically, and instituted new 
guidelines making it easier for poor, rural North Koreans to attend school.29 If anything, North 
Korea’s anti-illiteracy drive was accomplished faster than in China; in some rural North Korean 
counties, over 92% of illiterate peasants gained the ability to read and write within three years of 
the end of the Japanese occupation. Aiding the campaign were the People’s Committees, organs 
of local governance that doubled as community recreation centers, which organized free classes 
for illiterate peasants.30 Although North Korea’s approach to mobilizing intellectuals was quite 
comparable to China’s, North Korea did not have the long history of intellectual political 
engagement as in China. The long-surviving Korean Joseon Dynasty had been dominated by 
powerful lineages known as yangban, rather than by scholar-bureaucrats as in various Chinese 
dynasties. As such, North Korean intellectuals did not have the historical legacies or class 
cohesion to draw on that their Chinese counterparts did. The North Korean government 
 
29 See Charles K. Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 
166-190.  
30 Suzy Kim, Everyday Life in the North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), 
98-104. 
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ultimately was able to exercise a much greater degree of oversight over its education system than 
in China, where intellectuals were able to push for political engagement on terms more amenable 
to them.31 
It is therefore impossible to describe a singular model of intellectual political engagement 
in the communist bloc. Although communist governments in the Soviet Union, East Europe, 
Cuba, North Korea, and China all emerged from a Marxist theoretical nexus, each had to chart its 
own course in discovering what role intellectuals would play in the new society. Intellectuals in 
these societies too had different strategies of political engagement, although a general 
willingness to cooperate with the state pervades all these case studies. Ultimately, the 
peculiarities of history played a more deterministic role on the outcomes of intellectual-state 
relations than theoretical Marxism. In both China and North Korea, for example, a shared legacy 
of the scholar-bureaucrat led these governments to aggressively expand the intellectuals’ ranks 
and eliminate the distinctions between the intellectual and proletarian classes. Even then, 
Chinese intellectuals were ultimately able to influence PRC politics to a greater degree than their 
North Korean counterparts, who had not enjoyed quite the same degree of political influence as 
in Chinese history. As such, China represents a unique case study among communist states for a 
survey of the intellectual-state relationship—one where intellectuals had the greatest degree of 
agency to effect political change. 
 
Totalitarian Politics from Below 
 The twentieth century saw the rise of new forms of autocratic states whose political 
legitimacy involved a belief that only heroic, all-out efforts from a governing body could reshape 
 
31 For a discussion of North Korean education, see Hyung-chan Kim and Dong-kyu Kim, Human Remolding in 
North Korea: A Social History of Education (Lanham: University Press of America, 2005). 
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society in order to bring about needed change. Of course, authoritarian regimes themselves were 
far from new; what was different was a fervent belief in the necessity of total mobilization, 
accomplished by the state (usually dominated by a single political party), in the interests of 
transformation. Although the usage of the term “totalitarianism” to refer to a variety of such 
states, from Italy to Nazi Germany to the Soviet Union, dates back to the early decades of the 
1900s, serious academic attention to the phenomenon of political totalitarianism did not begin 
until after World War II, with the publication of Hannah Arendt’s pioneering work The Origins 
of Totalitarianism. Arendt drew attention to the structural similarities between totalitarian 
regimes, focusing primarily on the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany: a reliance on secret police 
to enforce order, the assumption of total political and social power by a single party, and an 
intense effort at promoting the regime’s values through mass mobilization and extensive 
propaganda.32 Arendt’s work, coming out just as the United States was shifting its focus from 
winning a world war against fascism to containing the spread of communism, helped establish an 
academic justification for shifting American foreign policy objectives. Her work invited 
structural comparisons between fascism, Nazism, and communism while ignoring ideological 
differences. To the extent that other scholars have criticized Arendt, they tended to focus on her 
neglect of ideology. Les Adler and Thomas Paterson, for example, suggested that communist 
regimes were examples of humanism gone awry, whereas fascist regimes rejected humanism 
from the outset.33 
 As the Cold War deepened, however, the study of political totalitarianism increasingly 
became intertwined with the study of communist states. Studies such as those by John Armstrong 
 
32 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1951).  
33 Les K. Adler and Thomas G. Paterson, “Red Fascism: The Merger of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia in the 
American Image of Totalitarianism, 1930s-1950s,” The American Historical Review 75, no. 4 (April 1970): 1046-
1064. 
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showed how Arendt’s theories played out in the context of Stalinist Russia.34 By the 1960s, new 
evidence had emerged regarding the bloody nature of Stalin’s rise to power, the purges against 
the Soviet intelligentsia and other party members, the use of terror, and the presence of Soviet 
gulags. Unlike fascism, which had seemingly collapsed with the defeat and surrender of the Axis 
Powers at the end of World War II, communist totalitarianism seemed to possess stronger 
staying power and accordingly spawned more academic attention. By the 1980s, Arendt’s thesis 
of a basically comparable fascist and communist totalitarianism had been eclipsed. Jeane 
Kirkpatrick, appointed by Ronald Reagan as US Ambassador to the United Nations, wrote a 
study of totalitarianism commissioned by the conservative think tank American Enterprise 
Institute, in which she argued that the US should ally with right-wing authoritarian governments 
and oppose left-wing authoritarian governments. Her rationale was that right-wing 
authoritarianism might gradually give way to democracy, whereas left-wing authoritarianism had 
no track record of doing so.35 Kirkpatrick’s take on totalitarianism coincided nicely with 
institutional shifts in US foreign policy and the rise of Reagan’s “evil empire” rhetoric in 
reference to the Soviet Union. Communist totalitarianism was no longer simply structurally 
comparable to Nazism, as Arendt had alleged in the 1950s; it was the single greatest obstacle to 
the spread of democracy. 
 However, events at the end of the decade again affected scholarship. With the 
independence movements in East Europe, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and a set of 
 
34 John A. Armstrong, The Politics of Totalitarianism: The Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1934 to the 
Present (New York: Random House, 1961).  
35 Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Dictatorships and Double Standards: Rationalism and Reason in Politics (New York: 
American Enterprise Institute, 1982). Kirkpatrick suggests that we should be patient with right-wing authoritarian 
governments, noting that the road to liberal democracy in the West took centuries (see pages 31-32), although she 
neglects to mention that the oldest left-wing dictatorship (the Soviet Union, at the time of her writing) had only been 
established a little over six decades before her book was published. In addition, Kirkpatrick’s book seems to gloss 
over the problem of right-wing totalitarianism in the form of Nazism, or fascist Italian and Japanese governments. 
21 
marketization reforms in China after Mao’s death, left-wing totalitarianism seemed to be in 
retreat. During the 1990s, scholars like Abbott Gleason began to write histories that localized 
totalitarianism as a twentieth-century phenomenon. Gleason’s history of totalitarianism and the 
Cold War generally affirmed Arendt’s take and retreated from Kirkpatrick’s focus only on left-
wing totalitarianism, while expanding on Arendt’s thesis by including new research on Chinese 
“totalitarianism.”36 By treating totalitarianism as a historical problem, however, Gleason’s work 
suggests that the phenomenon had largely disappeared by the turn of the millennium. Scholars 
since have begun re-evaluating previous scholarship on totalitarianism, questioning whether any 
political entity could achieve “total” control. Slavoj Žižek has, for example, argued that 
totalitarianism as has been understood in the literature is largely a myth. Instead, Žižek notes that 
even liberal capitalist societies encourage some degree of “total” embrace of the reigning 
ideology.37 Žižek’s work thus revives the concept of totalitarianism while criticizing its 
application only to a certain set of authoritarian governments. 
 The present study does not seek to advance its own theory of totalitarianism, but the 
implications of my findings do shed light on the debate. Scholars like Gleason and Kirkpatrick 
have generally portrayed China, particular during the Maoist period, as a form of totalitarianism. 
To the extent that “totalitarianism” implies total, uncontested political control by the state, 
however, I take issue with the term. To be sure, Maoist China represents a period of intense, 
energized authoritarianism, where the state spread copious amounts of propaganda and asserted 
unprecedented oversight of the education system. But Chinese intellectuals were not necessarily 
opposed to these changes; some radical students, and even some older scholars, were supportive 
 
36 Abbott Gleason, Totalitarianism: The Inner History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
37 See Slavoj Žižek, Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism? Five Interventions in the (Mis)use of a Notion (New York: 
Verso, 2001).  
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of the party takeover of education. Considering the sheer number of schools the state attempted 
to take control of, it is doubtful that the Communist Party’s efforts would have been successful 
without cooperation from the intellectuals. Moreover, intellectuals cannot best be described as 
passive recipients of state “brainwashing” attempts. Rather, they navigated the new political 
environment relatively successfully, even securing new privileges over the course of the decade. 
The findings of this study suggest that applying the totalitarian label to 1950s China tends to 
distort our understanding thereof rather than advance it.  
 
Structure of this Dissertation 
 The focus of my work is on charting the evolution of intellectual, cadre, and state 
politicking in China during the 1950s, especially regarding the status of intellectuals in the new 
status. As such, this dissertation is organized chronologically. Chapter 1 serves as a background 
on the role of intellectuals in Chinese politics, beginning with the Qing Dynasty in the eighteenth 
century. I discuss how intellectuals had long formed a close partnership with successive Chinese 
governments, using their energies and influence to promote the regime to the masses while 
enjoying favorable positions in the imperial and municipal bureaucracies. The chapter shows 
how intellectuals were affected by educational reforms toward the end of the dynasty, which 
afforded them with new opportunities to study abroad or in Westernized schools while also 
stripping away the traditional academy-to-bureaucracy career pipeline. Intellectuals after the fall 
of the Qing Dynasty were adrift, and sought to establish a new identity for themselves as public 
scholars, often publishing radical political critiques in new media or leading organizing efforts. 
Scholars as a whole experienced a severe loss of job security, however, which—when coupled 
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with intellectuals’ embrace of political radicalism—explains the affinity of intellectuals for the 
Communist Party. 
 Chapter 2 focuses on the 1950-1951 period and shows how fragile the early Communist 
government really was. Plagued by manpower shortages and a severe lack of governing 
experience, the party-state did not have the capability to exert full top-down control over the 
intellectual class. Luckily, it did not have to; intellectuals remained broadly sympathetic to the 
CCP statebuilding project and assisted in carrying out early political campaigns such as Land 
Reform. Although intellectual opinion was split over the Korean War, a number of patriotic 
students offered a strong endorsement for China’s intervention and even enlisted in the military. 
The CCP survived these early years in no small part due to the critical support of the 
intellectuals, and it rewarded them accordingly with work assignment programs focused on 
intellectuals. In the schools, students and professors began to embrace a form of spontaneous 
ideological refashioning in advance of formal thought reform efforts from above. 
 Chapter 3 then shows how the formal Thought Reform Campaign of 1952 achieved 
success by building on these efforts already underway. Intellectuals were required to produce 
“confessions” (although not all did), wherein they reflected on the socioeconomic advantages 
they experienced as well as their reactions to new political texts they read. These confessions 
show that many intellectuals reflected sincerely on their unequal advantages. Meanwhile, the 
state launched an ambitious drive to bring the vast majority of the school system under 
government control, thus placing cadres in charge of school administrations. The takeover of 
education relied on cooperation with pro-CCP student groups and faculty. Although successful in 
cementing the state’s position, the education takeover produced tensions when cadres showed a 
strong willingness to punish intellectuals for the ideological errors they had “confessed” to. The 
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state, which saw the confessions as part of its rehabilitative approach to justice, had to spend a 
good deal of time reining in the zealous cadres during the second half of the year.  
 The tripartite relationship between intellectuals, cadres, and the state takes center stage in 
Chapter 4, which shows how both intellectuals and cadres were able to influence politics from 
below in opposite directions. Whereas intellectuals pushed for reforms to their working and 
living conditions, cadres pushed back against most of these reforms and used their newfound 
administrative powers to keep intellectuals down. In addition, cadres voiced concerns that 
intellectuals had been let off too easy by the Thought Reform Campaign. Contrasting pressure 
from both intellectuals and cadres forced the party to adopt a middle-of-the-road approach. The 
party promoted a brief study movement focusing on historical materialism (and rejecting 
bourgeois idealism) in early 1955, expecting both intellectuals and cadres to participate as 
equals. Ultimately, however, the state failed at bridging the gap between intellectuals and cadres.  
 Chapter 5 shows how the state came to side with the intellectuals, initially. The broad 
efforts to improve intellectuals’ standards of living take center stage in this chapter. Intellectuals 
saw a huge range of livelihood improvements, including but not limited to exclusive transit 
options, wage increases, reductions in the length of the work week as well as time spent in 
political meetings, and housing improvements. Meanwhile, the CCP advanced a new vision of 
the role of expertise in a socialist future, whereby intellectuals could drive further production 
increases and social advancement through practical research. As such, the state invested in new 
libraries and museums, imported vast quantities of books and scientific instruments from abroad, 
and diverted state funds into research subsidies. At the same time, the CCP opened its doors to 
intellectuals through plans to dramatically increase the rate at which intellectuals would be 
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accepted into the party. Cadres did not take any of these changes lying down, however, and put 
up roadblocks to reform where possible.  
 Chapter 6 assesses the scale of the anti-intellectual backlash in 1957. A year on from the 
start of the reform efforts, many intellectuals had become disillusioned by the pace of reforms. 
As such, many intellectuals continued pressuring the party for more action to improve their 
situations. The CCP was already caught between intellectuals and cadres, however, and 
recalculated at least in part due to pressure from the rank-and-file. Even then, however, national 
officials tried to keep the scope of the resulting Anti-Rightist Campaign limited. Although 
frequent thought rectification work continued, only a small minority of intellectuals were 
actually targeted as “rightists.”. Some intellectuals were actually able to solidify the gains of 
1956 in spite of the Anti-Rightist backlash; although some reforms were scaled back, housing 
improvements remained constant, as well as state investment in research and academic materials. 
In addition, the CCP continued its efforts to increase party membership among the intellectual 
community.  
 Even if the Anti-Rightist Campaign was ultimately limited in scope, however, it did sour 
the close relationship between the intellectuals and the state heading into the end of the decade. 
The CCP embarked on a radical new attempt at encouraging intellectuals to develop a working-
class consciousness: having them participate in physical labor, either in a nearby factory or 
through being “sent down” to the countryside, the topic of Chapter 7. The state simultaneously 
invested in remedial education programs designed to turn workers and peasants into intellectuals. 
The CCP expanded the number of “spare-time schools,” and in some cases transitioned them into 
formal degree programs. Meanwhile, a younger generation of intellectuals had come of age 
during the 1950s that had relatively little memory of China’s pre-communist past. State efforts to 
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ensure that students found good jobs, as well as using recent graduates to fill teaching positions 
at newly-opened schools and universities, meant that young intellectuals had a wealth of career 
opportunities available to them. For the CCP, generational change had become a more desirable 
alternative to thought rectification as a means of producing revolutionary intellectuals. Among 
intellectuals, however, generational change contributed to a cultural rift between age groups, thus 
fracturing the intellectual solidarity that had been crucial to the gains of the 1950s. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTELLECTUALS AND THE CCP 
 Intellectuals were a staple of modern Chinese history, acting as symbols of the state’s 
authority and legitimacy.38 The use of scholar-bureaucrats as the backbone of bureaucratic 
governance engendered a resilient political system in late Medieval and early modern China, 
which survived two alien invasions and three dynastic overhauls.39 But this same political 
structure was not fated to survive the upheavals and tumult of the late Qing period, when 
intellectuals increasingly took an interest in political activism. Shedding their identity as literati-
bureaucrats, a generation of Chinese intellectuals became public scholars and even political 
activists. After the May Fourth Movement and the resulting “Chinese Enlightenment,” Chinese 
with a formal education began to join and even create new political movements with the goal of 
saving China.40 One such organization was the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), founded in July 
1921 by disgruntled, educated youths like Chen Duxiu, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, Liu Shaoqi, 
and Mao Zedong.41  
 The affinity between the CCP and intellectuals did not last. The Communists suffered 
great repression by the Guomindang (GMD) after helping them seize power. After retreating to 
 
38 Even in the wider regional context, Chinese intellectuals were unique; the rise of scholar-bureaucrats in China led 
to a divergence in governance patterns between medieval China and neighboring Korea, for example. Whereas both 
empires’ administrations had hitherto been dominated by powerful lineage clans, the system of generational 
privilege in Tang China eroded over the course of the dynasty while continuing in Goryeo Korea. Rebellions in the 
provinces provoked the Tang state to increase avenues for social mobility by attaching greater importance to 
performance on the civil service examinations. Men of talent found themselves with easier paths to rise through the 
ranks by China’s early modern period than elsewhere in the East Asian region. See John B. Duncan, The Origins of 
the Chosǒn Dynasty (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000), 52-54. 
39 For a discussion of how the Qing conquerors seamlessly adopted the literati-dominated bureaucracy of Ming 
China, see Ping-ti Ho, “The Significance of the Ch’ing Period in Chinese History,” The Journal of Asian Studies 26, 
no. 2 (February, 1967): 191-192 
40 Huaiyin Li, Reinventing Modern China: Imagination and Authenticity in Chinese Historical Writing (Honolulu: 
University of Hawai’i Press, 2013), 6. 
41 For information on the foundation of the Chinese Communist Party and the social background of its early leaders, 
see Maurice Meisner, Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1967), Lee Feigon, Chen Duxiu: Founder of the Chinese Communist Party (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1983), and Arif Dirlik, The Origins of Chinese Communism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). For an 
examination of the role played by the Soviet Communist International (Comintern) in the CCP’s founding, see 
Robert North, Moscow and Chinese Communists (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963). 
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the Chinese northwest, the social character of the Communist Party base quickly changed from 
radical, educated youths to peasant populists. After a decade of war and bloodshed between the 
CCP and the Guomindang, with a brief truce allowing them to fight the invading Japanese 
Empire together, the Communists gained the upper hand. CCP forces swept back into the same 
urban areas along China’s eastern seaboard that had birthed the Communist Party back in the 
1920s. However, both party and intellectuals had changed greatly since their separation. Their 
reunion spawned the political drama and negotiative process at the heart of this work. This 
chapter contexualizes the relationship between the Communist Party and the intellectual class, 
examining intellectuals’ beliefs and class identity changed over the course of China’s pre-1949 
history.  
 
A Background on Intellectuals in Modern Chinese History 
During China’s modern period, literati and their families inhabited different spaces and 
obeyed divergent social norms. Whereas peasant families lived in small, multigenerational 
households in rural areas, literati tended to inhabit China’s urban centers in the lower Yangzi 
Delta. They lived in walled compounds with immediate family members and obeyed a strict 
policy of gender separation inapplicable to a farming context. The wives and daughters of literati 
were generally confined to the inner chambers of these compounds, where they practiced textile 
work and cooking. The practice of footbinding extended mostly to these women from elite 
families; it would have made little sense for female village laborers to compromise their physical 
mobility as such.42 As the flow of literati to China’s cities and urban expansion increased during 
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the early and mid-Qing years, the social gap between literati families and peasant families 
widened. 
 A number of challenges, both foreign and domestic, shook the Qing state in the 
nineteenth century. After the Taiping rebellion, where both the rebel leader Hong Xiuquan and 
one of its primary antagonists, Zeng Guofan, were degree-holders, scholar-bureaucrats played a 
major role in the revitalization of the Qing state.43 They set about re-staffing state bureaus 
hollowed out by rebellion and war, and constructed new bureaus like the zongli yamen.44 
Additionally, these reformist, educated officials constructed new libraries, invested more public 
funds in provincial academies, and promoted learning in the peripheries of the empire, such as in 
the heartlands of the Miao or Hakka peoples.45 New literati engaged with Western learning and 
missionaries, and played a significant role in establishing new naval academies and shipyards, 
constructing modern warships, training a new generation of engineers, and translating Western 
scientific manuals.46 
 After a devastating military defeat in the Sino Japanese War (1894-1895), a new group of 
literati took charge in Beijing. For scholars such as Liang Qichao and Kang Youwei, the political 
objective was no longer the restoration of civil administration, but the transformation of Chinese 
political and social institutions: provincial assemblies, Western-style schools, and a modernized 
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military. Although both Kang and Liang ultimately went into exile, Empress Dowager Cixi 
ultimately embraced many of these reforms under the label of the Qing “New Policies” 
(xinzheng). By requiring provinces and villages to fund local public schools, the reforms 
engendered an unprecedent access to formal education, especially for rural children.47 Young 
women were some of the foremost beneficiaries of the new schools, as access to education 
became universal for both boys and girls. The numbers are quite staggering: from 1908 to 1913, 
the number of female students in China grew from 20,557 to 141,130.48 Additionally, some 
parents enrolled their daughters in private, girls-only schools.49 These changes culminated in the 
abolishment of the civil service exams in 1905. With one of the last vestiges of the old literati 
order wiped away, educated Chinese increasingly functioned as public scholars. Many turned to 
journalism work, spurred on by the advent of Chinese “print capitalism.”50  
Both in China and abroad (usually at Japanese schools), a new generation of students was 
coming of age in the early twentieth century. A student-organized boycott of American goods in 
Changsha heralded a new era of scholarly activism, usually led by educated youths.51 Women 
were an important party of the growing radical mood among intellectuals; the scholar Zhen 
Heyin, for example, argued that attacking the economic work that contributed to female 
subjugation—low-paid factory work and prostitution, most significantly—was the only hope for 
real equality. Additionally, the revolutionary Qiu Jin founded a military training school for 
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women.52 After the overthrow of the Qing Dynasty, China saw intellectual activism in the form 
of the New Culture Movement, which encompassed both major cities, with the publication of the 
magazine New Youth by Beijing University dean Chen Duxiu, as well as inland areas. For 
example, school administrators at Zhonghua University in Wuhan began to publish the Brilliant 
China School Journal (guanghua xuebao). Both publications began in 1915.53 
 Protests over the Japanese seizure of the Shandong Peninsula, ratified by the Treaty of 
Versailles at the end of World War I, spawned the May Fourth Movement.54 In the wake of May 
Fourth, political philosophies among Chinese intellectuals gradually coalesced around liberal and 
radical strands, exemplified, respectively, by Li Dazhao and Hu Shi.55 The latter began to 
explore Marxist-Leninist thought, culminating in the official founding of the Chinese Communist 
Party in 1921 at a meeting in a Shanghai lake house, attended by intellectuals such as Li himself, 
Chen Duxiu, and Mao Zedong. The CCP became a vehicle for intellectual activism in its early 
years, encouraging educated members to travel to working-class areas, educate workers and 
peasants, and engage in labor organizing.56 Additionally, the CCP established a Women’s 
Bureau within its structure to focus specifically on appeals to female intellectuals. However, the 
party leadership remained exclusively male, and women were often denied when they tried to 
push for a higher position in the CCP’s hierarchy.57  
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The CCP was not the only political party to utilize intellectuals. By the 1920s, the 
Guomindang (established by Sun Yat-sen, an intellectual who played a prominent role in the 
overthrow of the Qing) had established a foothold in southern China. The GMD put intellectuals 
to work, often in publishing magazine articles in support of the party’s agenda. Many magazine 
writers employed by the GMD were also CCP members.58 This alliance of convenience did not 
last, however. After Sun’s death in 1925, the Guomindang fell under the leadership of Chiang 
Kai-shek, a military general with far less tolerant views of the Communists than his predecessor. 
The Communists were forced to retreat into the Chinese hinterland, where they eventually settled 
in Yan’an. Far away from China’s urban centers where intellectuals congregated, the CCP’s 
relationship with the intellectual community had been broadly severed by the 1930s. With the 
political alternatives to the GMD narrowing, some prominent intellectuals vigorously defended 
the policies of the Nanjing government.59  
 However, Japanese aggression proved to be an existential challenge both to the 
Guomindang state as well as intellectual support for Chiang. Although some intellectuals 
continued to defend the GMD, and others still collaborated with the Japanese, a sizable 
contingent of intellectuals chose resistance. Literati living in the occupied littoral zone, for 
example, formed anti-Japanese organizations and sought to establish covert links to the CCP.60 
However, the social character of the Communist Party had undergone a dramatic change over the 
previous half-decade. Locked in the rural hinterland away from the cities, major universities, and 
publishing presses, the CCP had transformed into a peasant party. Additionally, World War II 
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provided a major recruiting pportunity for the CCP, as cadres entered the villages to promote 
education and organize military resistance against the invaders.61  
 
Intellectuals and the Communist Takeover, 1945-1949 
 As the civil war between the Guomindang and the Communist Party began anew after 
World War II and the Japanese defeat, intellectuals tried to take center stage in the conflict. 
Intellectuals of a liberal, democratic bent formed the Chinese Democratic League (CDL) in 1941 
under the direction of a noted liberal intellectual, Liang Shuming, in an attempt to bring the 
Communists and the Guomindang to a compromise and usher in a new era of parliamentary 
democratic politics.62 Over time, other famous liberals like Hu Shi, Wu Han, or Luo Longji 
joined the League. Although the CDL held a decent amount of sway, especially in China’s 
coastal cities, the worsening political situation made a third way untenable without a military 
force backing the party. Moreover, Chiang Kai-shek forcibly disbanded the CDL in 1947.63 Only 
a year into the last stage of the civil war, intellectuals were unable to form a rival political party 
on their own, and the Guomindang was involved in actively suppressing or assassinating 
intellectuals seen as disloyal to the regime. Only one option was left. 
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 Leading intellectuals—even liberals—reversed their position on neutrality in 1947 and 
1948. The Guomindang had assassinated two prominent liberals—Wen Yiduo and Li Gongpu—
in 1946, and the state began making mass arrests of intellectuals living in GMD-controlled China 
by 1948. That year, a prominent CDL member Wu Han narrowly escaped capture by state 
security forces in Beijing and fled to the Communist-controlled city of Shijiazhuang in Hebei 
Province. There, he was placed in charge of the CCP’s United Front Bureau, which focused on 
making alliances with the now-defunct Democratic League, as well as other minor democratic 
parties that represented liberal intellectuals. The United Front attempted to make common cause 
with non-communist scholars and urged them to offer their skills in support of the CCP’s war 
effort.64 The United Front was successful in bringing support from other intellectual-dense minor 
parties, such as the Jiusan Society or the Association for Promoting Democracy.  
 The military situation had also changed by late 1947. The Communists had secured 
former Manchuria and much of north China, and had begun planning offensives into GMD base 
areas. The first domino to fall was the great plains region along the Yellow River, comprising 
poor, rural areas like Hebei Province and northern Anhui. The military wing of the CCP—the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA)—swept through the plains and forced the Guomindang into an 
increasingly perilous position along the coasts and southern China.65 These victories changed the 
political calculus of the Communist leadership; from here on out, the practical realities of 
governing received just as much attention as military strategy and revolutionary ideology. The 
party turned toward solidifying its gains among the intellectuals in the second half of 1947. 
Aided in part by the Guomindang’s bloody suppression of intellectuals, the CCP memorialized 
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slain intellectual activists like the aforementioned Wen Yiduo and Li Gongpu, in addition to Zuo 
Taofen and Tao Xingzhi, in the party magazine Masses on July 13, 1947. Although none of the 
four were active CCP members, the Communists still claimed them as martyrs for the cause.66 
 The Communist Party generally relied on party magazines to communicate with 
intellectuals during the final years of the civil war. Although the party had greatly transformed 
during its years of exile in northwest China, a contingent of committed revolutionary 
intellectuals remained. The intellectual feminist Ding Ling had joined the party in Yan’an in the 
1940s, where she was placed in charge of the women’s branch. In addition, she served as the 
chief editor of Liberation Daily, a party newspaper that grew out of the Yan’an years. Some 
CCP-affiliated intellectuals, such as Wang Shiwei, urged caution in dealing with other scholars. 
Wang wrote articles criticizing the famous writer Lu Xun, who lived an extravagant lifestyle on 
the urbanized coast far removed from the hardships of life in rural Yan’an.67 In late August of 
1947, the party published an article in the magazine World that laid out the CCP’s vision for 
intellectuals under a revolutionary government. The party envisioned three objectives for 
intellectuals: (1) spurring production through the introduction of new scientific techniques, (2) 
promoting CCP ideology to the masses, and (3) raising the cultural level of the Chinese people.68 
The CCP had at last carved out a new, defined role for intellectuals, building off of the legacy of 
literati-bureaucrats in the imperial age. The diverse ways in which intellectuals had sought to 
engage in public life since the end of the Qing Dynasty could now coalesce around a set of goals.  
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 Communist victories on the battlefield were turning more and more of China red by the 
day. As such, the party had the opportunity to begin implementing their desired policies. 
Intellectuals who joined the CCP’s ranks (or the various aligned parties under the United Front 
umbrella) were able to have some effect on setting policy and advising the Communist 
government. Hu Shi, for example, wrote an article on September 15, 1947 that described the 
stimulation of agricultural production as the most pressing issue facing China. In addition, Hu 
showed a general openness to the land reform policies proposed by the Communists, and called 
on intellectuals as a whole to learn how to better communicate with the peasantry and focus on 
improving access to education in rural areas.69 The Communists published the document 
“Outline on Agrarian Law” (tudifa dagang) in October, partly through consultation with 
intellectuals who had come from a rural background. These advising intellectuals moreover 
wrote articles defending the CCP’s program of land redistribution.70 Intellectuals began to take a 
leading role in conducting early land reform efforts, drawing on previous experiences of political 
organizing. Trusted figures like Deng Tuo moreover had some ability to push the CCP in a more 
moderate direction. Based on his work in the Shaan-Gan-Ning border region (the general 
geographic area between Shaanxi, Gansu, and Ningxia Provinces), Deng wrote articles in 
Jinchaji Daily calling for cadres to rein in excessive redistribution and violence against 
landlords, and in particular to halt the antagonization of the “middle peasant” class. Party 
documents from early 1948 seem to suggest that the leadership had taken Deng’s advice 
sincerely. Land redistribution efforts from 1948 on were moderate in scope in comparison to 
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leftist excesses of 1947.71 Lastly, proposals from intellectual organizations like the China Society 
for Economic Research were circulated within the CCP ranks.72 
 In addition to land reform, the Communist Party was also responsible for transforming 
education in territories captured from the Guomindang. Non-communist teachers posed a 
problem to the CCP, who viewed them as tainted on account of their education having come 
from the Guomindang school system. There was considerable anxiety on the part of the 
leadership that these teachers might transmit their problematic ideology to a new generation of 
scholars. Nevertheless, the CCP was more of a military than a government at this point; it did not 
have the resources to commit to taking control of every school in captured territory. As such, it 
generally left schools to themselves during the early and middle years of the civil war. Party 
cadres were instructed to conduct chihui: informal meetings with local teachers where food was 
provided.73 In other cases, party-affiliated intellectuals were tasked with conducting “training 
classes” (gong xun ban) for anyone interested in CCP base areas. These classes were not hugely 
popular; class sizes rarely exceeded 30 individuals. However, the classes offered a good degree 
of social mobility to enrollees, who could often find jobs in the CCP state apparatus. In one class, 
25 out of 30 enrolled students were able to find work in the local government.74 
For committed revolutionaries, the convergence of the CCP and the intellectual class 
proved somewhat awkward. Through their cultural influence, intellectuals had brought a sizable 
number of rich peasants and landlords into tentative support for the Communists. Plenty of 
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longtime CCP members feared that the expansion of the party would allow new members—
particular those from a bourgeois class background—to transform the revolutionary character of 
the movement. Moreover, many CCP members still felt that they had been betrayed by China’s 
intellectuals after the Guomindang had forced them inland in the 1930s, given that so few 
intellectuals made the trip from their coastal city of residence to Yan’an. This “betrayal” was 
called a “grievous harm” (zhongda sunhai) by some cadres.75 By the end of 1948, party 
documents had begun to take seriously the idea of conducting a Yan’an-style rectification 
campaign among its new converts in order to ensure the continued health of the revolution. 
Intellectuals without proper ideological credentials would have to be “scrubbed clean” (xishua).76 
The first step in the CCP’s new program for intellectuals was a systematized classification 
system. Although the Chinese term for “intellectual,” zhishifenzi, was already in use, the CCP 
adopted the term as a formal system of classification for anyone with formal schooling, including 
“cultural workers” like artists, performers, and journalists.77 
Intellectuals, as a distinct class of people, were always somewhat out of place in the 
Marxist class scheme. Although scholars themselves earned wealth through intellectual labor—
writing or teaching, primarily—the linkage between the intellectuals of today and the wealthy 
landlords of yesterday was well-recognized by the CCP.78 As such, the party introduced its own 
classification system for different types of intellectuals. Feudal intellectuals, according to party 
documents, were those who had leveraged generational wealth to attain positions of power, 
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either in the imperial or Guomindang governments. Capitalist intellectuals were those who had 
instead benefited from economic and social transformations in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries; they were the class of intellectuals with the most cosmopolitan worldviews, 
usually acquired while studying abroad. “Petty-bourgeois intellectuals” were those who had 
leveraged wealth from mercantile activities for an education. Working-class intellectuals referred 
to a small, but growing number of children of peasants or industrial laborers who benefited from 
an expansion of educational access across China. “New democratic” intellectuals were those like 
Yun Daiying, who had participated enthusiastically in activist politics despite their class 
background. Lastly, revolutionary progressives were intellectuals trained either in the Soviet 
Union or educated directly by the CCP.79 
Rectification followed classification. During July 1948, schools and universities in the 
northeast (old Manchuria, which was the epicenter of CCP power by this point) began taking 
preliminary steps toward a wider rectification campaign. The faculty employed at these schools 
and colleges were directed to write self-assessments of their class background, work style, and 
ideological beliefs—a precursor to the “confessions” written by intellectuals in the 1950s. 
Moreover, the local party administration placed a moratorium on schools hiring new teachers or 
professors from a landlord or rich peasant background. Each school had to submit a small list of 
faculty for participation in agricultural or industrial labor, in order to forge a better connection 
between intellectuals and the working class.80 By 1949, the CCP had begun introducing 
censorship policies in full across their territory. Books, magazines, and journals were either 
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placed under party control or were disbanded entirely, replaced instead by literature produced by 
the party itself. Popular novels like the story Coal were taken out of circulation at libraries and 
bookstores, under the rationale that exposure to “harmful” materials could have a profoundly 
negative effect on the next generation of Chinese intellectuals.81 Party-affiliated journalism was 
centralized around a new party newspaper, People’s Daily (renmin ribao), which was first 
published in mid-1948 but moved to Beijing in March 1949, where it greatly expanded its 
publishing activities. By late 1949, after the Communists had effectively won the civil war and 
established the People’s Republic of China (PRC), articles in People’s Daily were dealing 
directly with the question of thought reform. One People’s Daily editorial proposed yet another 
classification for intellectuals undergoing thought reform: (1) “sick” intellectuals who were 
greatly infected with bourgeois ideology, and who required the greatest attention from the 
authorities, (2) intellectuals who seemed to change suspiciously quickly (yanjing yisha, lao muji 
bian ya; literally, “in the blink of an eye, changing from hens into ducks”), and therefore 
required further scrutiny from the CCP, (3) those who understood that thought reform would be a 
long, arduous process that could not be completed in “one easy step” (yi cu er jiu), and (4) 
enthusiastic, zealous intellectuals who made real attempts at transforming their beliefs and 
behavior in accordance with the times.82 At the outset of the PRC era, intellectuals and the CCP 
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 Intellectuals living in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries generally had stable career 
paths, although that did not mean that the overall situation for Chinese scholars was unchanging. 
Although the wider political context changed dramatically in the first half of the nineteenth 
century, between cataclysmic rebellions across China, exploding population numbers, and 
foreign invasion, it took time for the imperial education system to catch up. A generation of 
reformers in the mid-century saw the restoration of the civil service as their goal, not 
transformation. The number of intellectuals steadily increased over the latter half of the 
nineteenth century, culminating in a series of changes at the turn of the century. More and more 
Chinese intellectuals were going abroad and coming into contact with new, sometimes radical 
political ideologies. In the early 1900s, the Qing state abolished the civil service exam. From 
then on, the long-lasting academy-to-bureaucracy pipeline was closed off as a career path for 
intellectuals.  
 Chinese scholars—especially the increasing number of those with strong beliefs in 
liberalism or radicalism—played a formidable role in the overthrow of the Qing Dynasty. 
Intellectuals as a whole, however, found the transition to the Republican Era somewhat 
awkward. Regular employment was difficult to find, with many forced to rely on unstable jobs 
like journalism or freelance writing to make ends meet. On the whole, intellectuals in the 
Republican Era experienced one of the largest declines in standards of living among any social 
group. Although the number of intellectuals had never been bigger, the pool of stable, 
knowledge-based jobs (such as teaching at a school or university) had not grown accordingly. 
One intellectual said bitterly that the only effect of his education was to cause his life to hit “rock 
bottom” (saodi).83 Especially as market forces transformed China’s biggest cities, some 
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intellectuals formed the basis of a white-collar workforce. Others, both along the coasts and in 
the hinterland, participated in political organizing. In their view, activism was the logical 
extension of their mandate in the absence of stable employment in the state bureaucracy. The 
Chinese Communist Party grew out of and built on the tradition of intellectual activism. After the 
Guomindang took power in late 1926—and the Communists were nearly wiped out over the 
course of the next few years—some intellectuals took jobs with the new government. But few 
were thrilled with the Guomindang, and negative feelings intensified after the Japanese attacked.  
 In the aftermath of World War II, intellectuals seized on the moment to try and negotiate 
a settled peace between the Communists and the Guomindang state—one that would 
simultaneously encourage liberal democratic norms like popular elections. These negotiations 
proved futile, however, and intellectuals were forced to choose between the CCP and the 
Guomindang. While Mao and his colleagues were making overtures to intellectuals, Chiang Kai-
shek was ordering the execution or imprisonment of intellectuals deemed disloyal. The CCP 
capitalized on the moment by lionizing these “martyrs” in memorials in party journals and 
magazines. Over time, more intellectuals—even liberals like Hu Shi—saw the CCP as their 
natural ally. Minor democratic parties that represented intellectuals joined with the Communists 
under the United Front Bureau. The Communist Party, however, had changed dramatically in its 
years spent in the Chinese hinterland. The party now was far more beholden to poor peasants 
rather than radical intellectuals, and adjusted its perceptions of the intellectual class accordingly. 
The party could no longer ignore the relationship between family wealth and educational 
attainment—indeed, the existence of intellectuals was a testament to the profound material 
inequalities the Communists sought to redress. Nonetheless, the party generally preferred 
transformation through “thought rectification” rather than outright suppression. After the military 
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victory of the Communists, intellectuals were forced to choose between staying in the new PRC 
state or fleeing to Taiwan with the remnants of the Guomindang.84 For the majority of 
intellectuals who stayed on the mainland, the next decade spawned a vigorous negotiation with 
the Communist party-state over issues ranging from war, to freedom of expression, to 
professional treatment.  
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CHAPTER 2: BUTTRESSING THE FRAGILE STATE, 1950-1951 
 There was no doubt that the CCP had won a significant victory in the Fall of 1949. Their 
longtime rivals were forced to the neighboring island of Taiwan, whereas PLA battalions were 
quickly bringing the rest of the mainland—including old Qing territories in the far west—under 
Communist control. At the same time, the new state faced an enormous slate of problems, 
including previously unseen challenges such as the rapidly deteriorating security situation on the 
Korean Peninsula. Chinese society had been wracked by war for decades, and social divisions 
ran deep. The same problems that dogged both the Qing Dynasty and the Guomindang 
government continued to plague the Communists. Even if Mao had wanted to set up a totalitarian 
political system overnight, conditions would not allow it. Particularly in urban areas, of which 
most party cadres had little knowledge of or experience, the path to solidifying the new 
government’s grasp on power was clear: it would have to work with established institutions and 
public figures, rather than attempting to exert sudden, sweeping controls over society.85 In 
particular, the Communist Party paid close attention to younger intellectuals and students, who 
they thought might be swayed more easily to support the regime than their older counterparts. 
 The victory of the CCP also provided an opportunity for intellectuals to formulate a new 
approach to their lives and roles in the People’s Republic.86 The number of intellectuals living in 
China grew significantly in the early 1950s, due to three primary factors. First, the CCP’s 
definition of “intellectual” and officialization of the term meant that those with even minimal 
school experience became conflated with advanced university professors. Second, the 
 
85 Kenneth G. Lieberthal covers the culture gap between peasant soldiers and cadres and China’s urban megacities in 
Revolution and Tradition in Tientsin, 1949-1952 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1980), particularly 30-31.  
86 Revolutions have often led to new informal “experiments” in new patterns of social life, from dress to cultural 
consumption to living arrangements. The Soviet Union saw similar “utopian visions” from below before the advent 
of Stalinist totalitarianism in the 1930s; China was hardly unique in this fashion. See Richard Stites, Revolutionary 
Dreams: Utopian Vision and Experimental Life in the Russian Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). 
45 
government made strides in expanding access to education in villages and among the smaller 
urban working class. Thirdly, there was a huge influx of Chinese scholars who had been living 
abroad for decades that returned to help build New China.87 As such, intellectuals did not 
passively accept CCP state-building in the first two years of the People’s Republic; instead, they 
were active participants, advising the political elite from above and transforming the education 
system from below. Well in advance of the formal beginning of the Thought Reform Campaign, 
intellectuals were discussing the importance of breaking down the barriers between themselves 
and the working classes. As such, the notion of ideological refashioning—central to the story of 
intellectuals and the party-state in the early PRC era—was the preoccupation of both intellectuals 
and government officials.  
 Despite the party-state’s reservations about the intellectuals, the CCP was generally 
responsive to their needs and concerns during 1950 and 1951. Similarly, intellectuals offered key 
support for the CCP’s governing agenda. The successes of Communist state-building in 1950 and 
1951 included early attempts at introducing formal mechanisms of local and municipal 
governance, deepening the state’s control of the education system, mobilizing the populace for 
China’s intervention in the Korean War, and establishing a nationwide work-assignment program 
to provide relief for the unemployment crisis. In all of these areas, the party-state was forced to 
work alongside the intellectual community, who in turn had a generally favorable attitude toward 
these policies. Toward the end of 1951, intellectuals increasingly began to discuss the 
importance of thought rectification in a variety of contexts, such as school meetings or through 
editorials in state media. As the party-state turned toward a formal program of thought work at 
the end of 1951 and especially in 1952, it built off of the movement already underway among 
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intellectuals as opposed to introducing something new entirely. As such, Communist rule in the 
first two years of the PRC era was generally fragile and tenuous; support for the new regime 
among intellectuals was one of the factors that allowed for further state entrenchment over the 
course of the decade.  
 
The Early Organs of Communist Governance and Intellectuals 
 At the beginning of 1950, Communist rule looked much more like a military occupation 
as opposed to a formal, developed system of government. CCP control over the urbanized 
eastern Chinese littoral zone was relatively new, and brought about a tense meeting of rural 
soldiers and cadres with urban professionals and intellectuals. The party’s power base was 
strongest in northern cities like Beijing and Tianjin, which had been captured many months 
before the final victory in late 1949. Most other cities were directed to “follow the central 
government’s correct line”—that is, policies developed in Beijing or Tianjin.88 Outside of the 
northern cities, the military generally took the lead in early 1950 and framed educational policy 
(as well as the state’s dealings with intellectuals) under the lens of national security. Over time, 
however, this changed; municipal government gradually took over, including a variety of local 
committees and offices tasked with overseeing the education system and the unemployment 
crisis. The Chinese government tried a variety of strategies aimed at increasing state supervision 
of the education system, which included both setting up rival public universities to challenge 
private academies as well as passing administrative regulations in pre-existing schools. Although 
 
88 Shanghaishi dierju diyici gejie renmin daibiao huiyi kaimuci; shanghaishi xieshang weiyuanhui gongzuo baogao; 
guanyu shanghaishi jiuji shiye zhigong shiye zhishifenzi de baogao; Shanghai wenjiao gongzuo gaikuang yu jinhou 
gongzuo renwu; guanyu tiaozheng gongsi guanxi yu Shanghai gongshangye qingkuang; guanyu muqian Shanghai 
laozi guanxi de baogao: shanghaishi dierju diyici gejie renmin daibiao huiyi zhuankan, November, 1950, L1-1-9-8, 
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference Shanghai Municipal Committee, SMA. 
47 
the state clearly meant to set up monopoly control over a variety of public institutions, including 
both education and the media, these takeovers produced a number of job openings seized on by 
desperate, out-of-work intellectuals. 
 China was placed under a set of military regions soon after the Communist victory. Some 
of the earliest policies toward intellectuals from local government thus came from regional 
military offices. In Shanghai, for example, which part of the broader East China Military Region, 
battle-hardened officers examined the “problem” of intellectuals through a security lens. Before 
a formalized national policy could emerge from Beijing or Tianjin—the epicenter of CCP 
political power—local military offices had to piece together policies toward urban intellectuals 
on the fly. Most cities were placed under martial law after liberation (that is, takeover by the 
CCP), with military personnel put to work clearing debris and battle casualties from the streets. 
For many Chinese urbanites, their first contact with the Communist Party came from interactions 
with common soldiers—interactions that were not always positive or respectful.. Previously, the 
PLA had experienced intense disciplinary issues in other Chinese cities, were soldiers 
spontaneously seized industrial machinery and distributed it evenly among factory workers (and 
themselves).89 In early 1950, the military identified young intellectuals as key to securing the 
cities—or, in the language of the PLA, “defending the work of the military.” Army documents 
suggest that many in the officer corps saw winning over young intellectuals as one of the most 
pressing issues in the immediate aftermath of victory.90  
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 The PLA’s suspicions of the cities—labelled in internal documents as “enemy territory” 
(diren qu)—gave urgency to the earliest programs designed at winning over young intellectuals. 
The military in Shanghai issued a set of directives calling for the teaching of Marxist historical 
materialism in the school system as a means of promoting the Communist Party’s views among 
the students. In newspaper articles and public pronouncements, the military administration urged 
young intellectuals to “overcome the laziness of a liberal style of thinking” (kefu qi sanman de 
ziyouzhuyi de sixiang zuofeng) by adopting new virtues of “discipline” (jilu) and “toughness” 
(duanlian). Not all policy was designed to cajole these young scholars however; plenty of 
incentives were offered in the form of favorable job assignments. The military government 
placed current students and recent graduates at the top of the queue for unemployment 
assistance, which may have included enrollment in a higher-level educational institution. Even 
after assignment to a new job position, however, young intellectuals had to undergo a three-
month probationary period before they could receive a fixed wage from the state. In the interim, 
the military would conduct background checks to ensure that no young intellectuals were 
Guomindang spies (tewufenzi).91 The first foray of the new state into intellectual policymaking 
was colored by military necessity—documents couched pronouncements about young 
intellectuals in the language of national security, with phrases like “supporting the work of the 
military” or “combatting the education of the enemy” used frequently. Nevertheless, the PLA’s 
policies toward intellectuals in these first critical months of 1950 foreshadowed the general 
trends of the decade: a mix of carrots and sticks, with a focus on the possibility of transformation 
instead of punishment. Moreover, the military’s focus on young intellectuals foreshadowed the 
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growing usage of the Communist Youth League by the broader party-state to attract young 
scholars to the cause.92 
 A number of problems—inflation, mass unemployment, and lingering damage from 
decades of warfare—forced the fledgling government to triage their urban agenda. Even while 
Communist cadres were dutifully carving up the countryside under the auspices of the Land 
Reform Campaign, the party exercised much more tepid control in urban China. In cities like 
Tianjin or Shanghai, inflation and public bankruptcy from the outgoing local Guomindang 
administrations had wrecked the lives of urbanites—including intellectuals. One of the earliest 
issues the CCP faced was a severe shortage of manpower to staff their newly-captured municipal 
bureaucracies. The most readily available pool of talent were GMD cadres, who were better 
suited temperamentally than CCP members to governing the cities. Although the party made note 
that former GMD administrators were expected to “study” (xuexi) the political ideology of the 
new regime, enforcement was practically nonexistent. What political study that occurred among 
former Guomindang cadres was done voluntarily, with city administrators informally reading 
Maoist and Marxist documents at their offices.93 In the early PRC years, city administrators were 
composed primarily of individuals who had lived in a city their entire life (although not 
necessarily the same city in which they worked), and who had received a formal education from 
an urban educational institution. Although only a small percentage were women, there were 
increases in the number of female city administrators in the first few years of the Communist 
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period.94 The CCP found itself turning away from its previous base of support—rural cadres—
and forced into an alliance of convenience with educated urbanites. 
 As such, early CCP policies did little to heal the fractured relationship between urban and 
rural China at the beginning of 1950. As the Land Reform Campaign intensified, however, the 
state seized upon the opportunity to expose intellectuals to the realities of life in the countryside 
by organizing professors, students, and artists into work teams to provide assistance to their 
cadres working in the villages. Although agrarian adjustment had been carried out haphazardly 
by zealous PLA soldiers in captured villages, the central government took steps to systematize 
agrarian policy by mid-1950. Party leaders debated the proper objectives of the Land Reform 
Campaign; some wanted to disrupt or outright seize the holdings of the rich peasant and 
landowning classes, others simply wanted to spur rural production.95 Either way, the CCP 
required a far bigger workforce than they had access to in order to conduct land surveys and 
categorize peasants into income-based classes. During the summer break, many university and 
school personnel, including both faculty and students, provided help in Land Reform work. For 
many intellectuals, these were no doubt formative experiences; many had probably spent little 
time outside of the cities, and had come from families that had lived in urban enclaves for 
generations.  
Lei Haizong, a Qinghua professor, described his participation in the campaign as “the 
turning point of my life. It was only then that I understood the bitter class conflict and cruel 
oppression that poisoned the life of these seemingly peaceful and harmonious villages.” This was 
quite an about-face for Lei, who had previously written off the Communists as 
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“adventurist...hunger-stricken peasants.”96 The writer Xiao Qian, similarly, wrote that “to 
participate in land reform is the most intensive type of study of revolutionary experience, 
because land reform is the most complete reflection of the struggle of revolutionary truth against 
feudalism.”97 While it is certainly possible that Lei or Xiao may have been writing their 
experiences disingenuously—perhaps in an effort to ingratiate themselves with the new regime, 
or perhaps under duress from a supervising CCP cadre—it is likely that many intellectuals were 
genuinely affected by their experiences. As discussed in Chapter 1, intellectuals across China 
gradually became more supportive of the Communists and their revolutionary political agenda 
over the course of the 1940s, with even committed liberals like Hu Shi arguing in favor of CCP 
agrarian proposals. A likelier explanation of these accounts would be that urban-based 
intellectuals were genuinely affected by their experiences. 
By the middle of 1950, moreover, the CCP had accomplished tentative successes in urban 
areas, further securing the support of the intellectuals. On the eve of liberation, the Communists 
had generally attempted to spur urban production by any means necessary to support the 
continuing war effort. After victory, however, wartime production figures coupled with severe 
new tax rates from the incoming Communist administrations led to rapid inflation in coastal 
urban areas like Tianjin. Intellectuals living in these cities found to their dismay that many 
consumer goods’ prices doubled in the timespan of a few months in early 1950, leading to public 
rationing of staples like wheat. In response, the national government centralized the nation’s 
finances in the spring of 1950. This move quickly turned rapid inflation into a sharp economic 
recession, however, and failed to alleviate the economic woes of intellectuals. The CCP 
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calculated that it was necessary to ally with the urban bourgeoisie—although financial assistance 
from the government usually came with the caveat that factories and businesses had to allow 
trade unions among their workers to form.98 These reforms did much to stabilize the national 
economy, at least in the short time. By July 7, grain rationing had officially ended after the 
government reported a production increase of 3 million to 20 million tons of wheat from 1949 to 
mid-1950.99 Although the standards of living for intellectuals improved significantly, these 
economic policy changes had the side effect of increasing state control of the economy. The 
trade unions that formed during and after mid-1950 were generally controlled by the Communist 
Party. The unions furthermore used consultative committees between labor and capital to 
exercise control over company policy—which, in effect, gave the CCP a pathway into direct 
management of urban corporations.100 Nevertheless, the Communists had effectively brought an 
end to China’s urban crisis through responsive policymaking. With intellectuals experiencing 
progress at home and seeing firsthand the conditions of the countryside through participation in 
the Land Reform, they began to look more favorably on their new government. 
It therefore made sense that the state turned toward establishing a foothold in China’s 
sprawling education system in the second half of 1950. Many schools had seen attendance drop 
sharply toward the end of the civil war, especially in the GMD base areas of south China. The 
reasons were numerous: Guomindang bankruptcy combined with the rising price of tuition made 
it unaffordable for students to return to school, the previous governments blacklists had 
effectively intimidated left-of-center teachers and students—sometimes even forcing them into 
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hiding or exile, and the political fallout from the Land Reform Campaign had sent many 
intellectuals from a landlord family home to deal with the fallout.101 Much like with the broader 
urban crisis, the CCP was unable to accomplish a sweeping revolution in education in one fell 
swoop, and instead had to triage afflicted schools. The government focused on financial 
assistance to public schools and universities first in late July 1950, whereas private institutions 
were generally left alone. Much like with corporate reform, the state attached strings to financial 
assistance; schools had to expand hiring to include more working-class staff and faculty, and 
moreover had to organize some form of thought rectification activities.102 Although these early 
moves placed more of the education system under government control and expanded the reach of 
its thought reform efforts, an important precedent was established: any ideological remolding 
efforts in the early PRC years were generally made by school administrations themselves.  
Having gotten past the worst of the economic crisis, the government turned toward 
institution-building in the second half of 1950. The party was keenly aware of the importance of 
media in determining national opinion; a media renaissance in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries had transformed the opinions of the intellectuals, and had at least some kind 
of influence on mass movements. Moreover, the CCP had already taken steps to clamp down on 
non-official media publishing and distribution in the late 1940s in captured territories. As such, 
the new state was well positioned to establish a new nationwide, party-controlled media 
enterprise. A national broadcasting institution was first established in later 1950, and provided a 
key outlet for intellectual job-seekers.103 In Beijing, the party turned its attention to the mass 
publishing of the primary party newspaper, People’s Daily. The state expanded the staff—
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primarily intellectuals—and purview of the paper in 1950, although work conditions were 
harrowing. Many journalists reported having to essentially live in their office in downtown 
Beijing for the first several years of the PRC era. The editor-in-chief of the paper, Deng Tuo, did 
not formally move in with his wife until 1952 due to his workload.104 Although in many ways 
People’s Daily and the national broadcasting service are simply sources of propaganda, there 
was pushback from intellectuals and journalist staffers against party control. Deng Tuo, for 
example, railed against official dictums that People’s Daily should replicate the layout and 
content of the Soviet party newspaper Pravda. Even though Deng’s views ultimately did not win 
out, his vision led to significant increases in the popularity and reach of People’s Daily, which 
grew its readership by a factor of five over the course of 1950.105 
For the Communist regime, “propaganda” (xuanchuan) was an all-encompassing term. 
1950 saw a huge increase in resources devoted to propaganda production. The first year of the 
PRC era saw a good deal of sophistication of the Central Propaganda Department, which was 
divided between various sub-organizational bureaus: the Propaganda Bureau, the Theoretical 
Education Bureau, the Culture and Art Bureau, the Science Bureau, the Newspaper and 
Broadcasting Bureau, and the Cadre Administration Bureau.106 By necessity, these agencies had 
to hire intellectuals (albeit those with impeccable ideological credentials), who had the literacy, 
educational history, and writing skills required to accomplish the party’s ambitions.107 
Nonetheless, the actual reach of the Propaganda Department was still relatively limited in 1950. 
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State control of the education system had to be exerted indirectly, often through the publishing of 
new textbooks on history and the importance of Marxism-Leninism.108 For the intellectuals 
employed in new media organizations or the sprawling Propaganda Department, the PRC era 
initially seemed to promise a return to the golden years of imperial China, where literati-
bureaucrats exercised a significant degree of control over policy and held sway over most levers 
of official power. Much as Qing reforms in the early 1900s had de-linked intellectuals from 
bureaucracy, the Communist Party had tentatively rebuilt the connection.  
The similarities between the height of Qing China and the early PRC period only extend 
so far, however. Whereas the Qing were generally content with working around mass illiteracy 
through traveling lecturers—the xiangyue system—the Communists realized that mass illiteracy 
imposed severe limits on the reach of the party-state’s media. As such, the government began 
efforts to expand and popularize education starting in late 1950. In Beijing, the state established 
Renmin University and announced a full takeover of the previously-private Fu Jen Catholic 
University in late October.109 Renmin University was explicitly designed to attract students from 
a working class background and train them to become party cadres or government officials. The 
university enrolled a total of 3000 students in its fall semester—two-thirds of which came from a 
working class background, and over half having membership in the Youth League.110 The party 
also established a series of “People’s Universities” in each military region. In 1950, about 
500,000 intellectuals—students and faculty—were affiliated with one of these universities. 
Classes practiced “democratic grading” from the group, and students were generally tasked with 
performing physical labor in nearby factories or villages alongside their studies.111 Most of the 
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new people’s universities or revolutionary universities were organized around Soviet educational 
principles, much to the chagrin of older Chinese intellectuals.112 
Although the state’s wider unemployment assistance programs were in full swing by this 
point, the establishment of People’s Universities provided a convenient way to provide 
employment for out-of-work intellectuals, as well those who were returning from lengthy forays 
abroad. The People’s Universities were specifically directed to prioritize hiring unemployed 
intellectuals to staff the faculty (as opposed to hiring from pre-existing universities). However, 
there were several classes of intellectuals categorically denied from employment in the People’s 
Universities: (1) counterrevolutionaries, (2) those coming from a landlord family, (3) anyone 
“expropriated of political rights” (boduo zhenzhi quanli), (4) anyone who had been found guilty 
of a crime post-1949, and (5) anyone who had failed to comply with previous work assignments 
(tongyi fenpei).113 The state also made moves to ensure that education was more accessible, even 
for adult workers. The state imposed price controls on tuition, which had risen steadily across 
China in the first half of the twentieth century. For those who could not enroll in a university, the 
party encouraged schools to provide short-term job training classes. Many of these classes were 
held at night in factories or villages.114 Although the growth of new public universities was 
impressive in 1950 and 1951, the state was generally unsuccessful in offering a truly competitive 
model to established and prestigious universities. In Shanghai, for example, major universities 
like Fudan, Tonji, or Jiaotong University maintained their dominance well into the 1950s.115 The 
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state had made impressive strides in education in 1950 and 1951, both in expanding access and 
winning over intellectuals, but plenty of obstacles remained.  
On the whole, however, the party had successfully established control over the organs of 
governance by the end of 1950. Moreover, there were signs that the overall political situation in 
urban China was changing. In Shanghai, for example, the East China Military Command turned 
power over to the local education bureau in February 1951. One of the last actions of the military 
government was a set of instructions on providing unemployment assistance to intellectuals 
published on January 26, 1951. After that, local intellectuals’ fates were in the hands of the 
civilian municipal government.116 By the end of 1951, day-to-day affairs were increasingly 
decentralized. The Shanghai Municipal Bureau of Education had briefly managed the work-
assignment program for several months in mid-1951, but ultimately turned to district-level 
committees to do most of the work.117 The state integrated intellectuals into the workforce 
through increasingly decentralized political organs, which applied local circumstances in concert 
with national directives. Moreover, intellectuals enjoyed a steady stream of positive coverage of 
the new regime in new state-run media; for example, an exuberant editorial in People’s Daily on 
December 9, 1951 written by a businessman named Zhu Jicheng, who praised the party’s work 
in 1950 and 1951 with “stabilizing prices” (wujia de wending) and “ensuring the steady flow of 
goods” (wuzi de chang liu).118 The relationship between intellectuals and the state was not 
always friendly during the course of the decade, but early state-building efforts were generally 
successful at winning over the intellectual class. 
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Beyond Mobilization: Intellectuals’ Support for the Korean War 
 Scholars have articulated a wealth of reasons behind China’s entry into the Korean War. 
Chen Jian, for example, has argued that a growing sense of anti-Americanism, particularly 
among CCP members, made some form of conflict between the two nations inevitable.119 Shu 
Guang Zhang, meanwhile, suggests that the personality of Mao Zedong himself—specifically, 
his “romantic” views on warfare and militarism—was instrumental in pushing China to enter the 
conflict.120 Others have instead focused on the relationship and politicking between the three 
communist heads of state: Mao, Josef Stalin, and Gim Ilseong.121 What links these various 
approaches is a focus on the Chinese leadership. To be sure, Mao and his colleagues ultimately 
made the decision to enter the Korean War. It is far from clear if the intervention enjoyed mass 
support, especially at the outset of the conflict. Nevertheless, scholarship has generally looked 
past domestic support for the war effort.122 To the extent that scholarship has treated public 
opinion about the war, it has generally been to highlight the role of top-down mobilization efforts 
in the Resist America, Aid Korea Campaign.123 Although it is certainly true that many 
intellectuals—especially those who had recently returned from abroad—held pro-American 
views, other intellectuals became increasingly supportive of the war effort over the course of 
1950 and 1951. Young intellectuals even joined the military in a wave of patriotic enlistments. I 
suggest that far from only being “mobilized” by the party-state, intellectuals generated a good 
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deal of grassroots enthusiasm for intervention in the Korean War, far more so than other 
socioeconomic groups. 
 The Communist Party had never enjoyed particularly warm relations with the United 
States, although anti-American belief was generally less prevalent until the waning years of the 
civil war, when the US made little secret of its preference for Jiang Jieshi and the Guomindang. 
The relationship between the CCP and the US deteriorated over the course of 1948 and 1949 as 
American diplomats’ refusal to recognize the legitimacy of the Communist government (as well 
as the pressure they applied on their international allies to do the same) became a major sticking 
point. Even after the founding of the PRC, the United States maintained that Taiwan was the 
legitimate representative of the Chinese people, not the new regime in Beijing. As such, anti-
Americanism rose to a fever pitch by 1950 within party circles.124 On the other hand, 
Intellectuals were not as quick to grow wary of the US. America had played a major role in the 
Chinese education system for decades, investing resources and people into building up China’s 
university system. Many intellectuals had studied abroad or even lived in the US, sponsored by 
American scholarships.125 However, intellectuals—especially students and recent graduates—
grew critical of the American military’s actions in Korea in 1950 in advance of China’s 
intervention. 
 A survey of secondary school teachers in the city of Changde, in Hunan Province, found 
majority support for Chinese intervention in the conflict in August of 1950. At the same time, 
support for interventionism did not translate to wider anti-American sentiments among Changde 
teachers, at least at this time. Many still had broadly favorable views of the United States, even if 
they had become increasingly critical of the widespread American bombing campaign in North 
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Korea.126 The specific focus of intellectuals on the indiscriminate American bombing of North 
Korean targets seems to have been influenced in party by state media, which devoted 
considerable attention to the killing of North Korean civilians by US airstrikes. Moreover, the 
PRC government claimed, without evidence, that American bombs had even fallen north of the 
Yalu River, thus presenting a threat to the lives of the Chinese citizenry.127 Although the state’s 
claims about the deaths of Chinese civilians appear to have been erroneous, it proved to be a 
powerful narrative with Chinese intellectuals, who generally stayed well-informed of current 
events through media consumption. Even beyond the fabricate bombing of Chinese targets, 
intellectuals had plenty of reasons to be critical of the American war strategy in Korea, which 
ended up dropping more bombs on North Korea than were dropped in the entirety of the Pacific 
theater during World War II.128 The heavy coverage of American airstrikes demonstrates the 
Communist government’s keen attention paid to winning over the support of the intellectuals, 
who were the primary consumers of print media such as the People’s Daily. Moreover, the 
working classes tended to view possible intervention with skepticism; at planned demonstrations 
for the Resist America, Aid Korea Campaign in Chongqing, protesting workers interrupted the 
festivities with chants of “what about my empty belly?”129 Moving forward, intellectuals would 
form a key bloc of support for the PRC’s first war.  
 As the Fall of 1950 wore on, the government diverted much of its attention from agrarian 
reform to war mobilization. Inside Zhongnanhai, there were still raucous debates over whether 
China should actually intervene or not.130 But outside of the halls of power, Chinese intervention 
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seemed all but certain. The public was making donations for arms procurements, workers were 
signing “production pact” pledges, and Christian churches were being forced to renounce any 
ties to the Western “imperialists.”131 Intellectuals who also identified as Christians invited plenty 
of suspicion from party cadres, although they became fervent supporters of intervention, at leas 
in public. Christian universities and colleges became epicenters of some of the most energetic 
activism in support of the Resist America, Aid Korea Campaign.132 Some intellectuals—
specifically, traveling operatic performers—played a major role in the mobilization of Chinese 
commoners. Artists staged plays in rural China for a peasant audience promoting the war 
effort.133 In the cities, activist students might hang up official propaganda posters, share writings, 
or even produce their own propaganda writings and visual media to support the war.134 The state 
continued to attempt to win over the intellectual class through appeals to the United Nations. In 
the final days before Chinese troops crossed the Yalu, Beijing made formal complaints to the UN 
that the United States Air Force had bombed a Chinese airstrip in Andong and had violated PRC 
airspace in the broader northeastern region, a move that resonated most heavily with an 
intellectual audience.135 For the majority of Chinese not shipped off to the front lines, the first 
few months after intervention looked a lot like the ones right before. And although state-led 
mobilization efforts certainly played a leading role in promoting the war effort in public life, 
intellectuals’ early support for the war as well as active participation in spreading propaganda 
meant that they too owned the intervention. 
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 Intellectual opinions on the war, particular those of young intellectuals and their older 
colleagues, diverged after Chinese troops began fighting in earnest. At a meeting of intellectuals 
from all age groups in Nanjing during mid-November, there was generally a high degree of 
support for the war. Students, recent graduates, and young faculty expressed a wide variety of 
anti-American sentiments, whereas older professors and teachers still regarded the United States 
and Americans as fundamentally good. One older intellectual, for example, said that “there is no 
need to spend all day cursing America” (hebi zhengtian ma meiguo).136 Only about a week later, 
however, student zeal in Resist America, Aid Korea protests in Beijing forced schools to shut 
down for two additional weeks plus the original week planned to hold the demonstrations. 
School and universities within traveling distance of the capital often closed too, or gave students 
excused absences for the purpose of attending the demonstrations in Beijing.137 There were also 
geographic dimensions to whether intellectuals were more or less supportive of the war in Korea; 
students and faculty living in the northeast were mostly likely to have a favorable opinion of 
Chinese intervention, which may have been exacerbated by the state’s narrative of collateral 
damage north of the Yalu. Nationwide, intellectuals tended to be swayed by the party-state’s 
more academic justifications for the intervention, which cited the case of the Spanish Civil War 
as an example of military intervention that international law might justify. For others—perhaps 
in particular for intellectuals with some tie to Japan—the American general Douglas 
MacArthur’s role in prosecuting the war may have invoked ire. A number of intellectuals had a 
negative opinion of the American occupation of Japan (also headed by MacArthur), which was 
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seen as imperialist.138 Clearly, there was no such thing as a unified intellectual response to the 
Korean War. The issue exposed the same fault lines—age and geographic location—as other 
contemporary issues. Nonetheless, China entered 1951 with a nationwide cohort of intellectuals 
generally primed and willing to support the ongoing war effort.  
 Perhaps the costs for intellectuals simply were not as apparent as they were for peasants, 
workers, and military personnel, who did most of the front-line fighting during the three-year 
war. Although the Resist America, Aid Korea Campaign certainly disrupted life in the school 
and university system, villages were far more uprooted. PLA recruiters entered the villages, 
quotas in hand, to find volunteers for military service.139 Although the military showed little 
desire to place intellectuals in the line of fire, recruiters did attempt to sign up young university 
students for logistical work in the PLA beginning in early 1951. Despite the fact that the military 
believed that intellectuals’ know-how was key to ensuring the logistical success of the Korean 
option, officers were generally skeptical of intellectuals. Reports frequently referred to student 
enlistees as “urbanites” first and foremost (and indeed, it appears that the majority of enlistees 
grew up in a city), and noted problems integrating them with the rest of the rank-and-file, which 
mostly came from a rural orientation. The PLA experienced few difficulties finding willing 
intellectuals, however, with patriotic enlistments surging during the first few months of the 
war.140 Official media intended for young intellectual consumption, such as the magazine 
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Zhongguo Qingnian, focused primarily on the importance of nationalism to the broader project 
of socialist state-building. For the first half of 1951, nearly 50% of articles in the magazine were 
either explicitly written about the Korean War or discussed the importance of patriotism more 
broadly. Pressing domestic issues like the Land Reform Campaign of the Suppress the 
Counterrevolutionaries Campaign received only cursory attention in the magazine.141 The 
general enthusiasm of young intellectuals for military service serves as an indicator of the 
popularity of the intervention among the educated youth. But although both young intellectuals 
and villagers alike signed up to go to Korea, their shared experiences ended there. Intellectual 
enlistees worked behind the scenes in logistics bases whereas villagers were thrown into the meat 
grinder of war.  
 The PLA leadership made several reforms over the course of the war to improve morale 
and increase solidarity among soldiers and logistical staff. A “political officer” was assigned to 
each unit, whose task was to conduct semi-frequent meetings to improve morale and inculcate 
loyalty to both the regime and the war effort. These ideological sessions were generally led by 
soldiers and military staff, however, who were encouraged to discuss their experiences in the 
face of Japanese and Guomindang atrocities. Political officers—many of whom had received 
formal education—were quick to note that the Guomindang military’s arsenal was either 
provided directly by the US, or paid for with American dollars.142 Political officers also took bi-
weekly reports from squad leaders, although individual soldiers were allowed to bypass their 
squad leaders and report directly to their unit’s squad leader if they felt their squad leader was 
not accurately representing their concerns.143 For enlisted intellectuals and literate soldiers, the 
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military produced the Volunteer Army Newspaper (zhiyuanjun bao), which described the heroic 
deeds and great victories of the Chinese fighting force.144 Enlisted intellectuals experienced their 
fair share of danger, moreover, even if they were not deployed to the front. Logistical bases still 
were under threat from American airstrikes; indeed, Mao Zedong’s son Anying was killed by a 
US bomber while working in one such rear command hub.145 Although these reforms alone 
could not erase the class divide between intellectuals and commoners in the army, the PLA was 
keenly aware of the gap and took steps to promote solidarity and integrate intellectuals into the 
ranks. 
 As the war went on, the military continued to expand its efforts at recruiting intellectuals, 
providing a variety of outlets for intellectuals to advance their careers and future prospects 
through military service. By April 1951, the East China Military Region alone had enlisted 2083 
young intellectuals from cities like Shanghai and Nanjing, and the provinces of Fujian and 
Shandong. The region planned to enlist another 1600 in the immediate future.146 Military service 
tended to attract young intellectuals with a general sense of discontent with their lives and 
pessimism about future prospects (qiantu). As such, the PLA guaranteed enrollment in a cadre 
training school (ganxiao) upon completion of a tour of duty, which could then fast-track these 
intellectuals to a career in the growing CCP bureaucracy.147 While the military was beginning to 
develop an intellectual policy of its own abroad, young scholars at home were showing signs of 
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internalizing the anti-American sentiments of the moment. During the May Day celebrations in 
Beijing, students gave speeches that criticized not just American aggression in Korea, but also 
the wider aims of American foreign policy. The militarization of Japan in response to the Korean 
War, for example, was denounced by students as “neo-colonial.”148 During the middle months of 
1951, the role of intellectuals in the war effort deepended, both at home and abroad. For 
intellectual youths, serving in logistical roles for the PLA was increasingly looking like a way 
out of a still-dismal economic situation.  
 China entered the second half of 1951 with broad-based public support for the war. Part 
of the Resist America, Aid Korea Campaign was soliciting donations from the Chinese people. 
By mid-July, the state had collected the equivalent of 2000 aircraft’s worth of donations.149 
Moreover, young intellectuals were flocking to the military training schools set up over the 
course of the past year. Previously, both workers and current students were allowed to apply for 
enrollment in the military training academies; however, the state announced plans during the 
summer to limit enrollments only to current students, considering the high number of 
applications.150 Although the popularity of military service among intellectuals was no doubt 
attractive for patriotic and ideological reasons, there were pragmatic benefits as well. Although 
the military did not directly pay enlisted intellectuals (it was instead handled by the intellectuals’ 
individual danwei, or work unit), an internal report from late October showed that the PLA 
believed logistical officers were being under-compensated, and encouraged all affiliated danwei 
to increase salaries for enlisted intellectuals. At the same time, the PLA noted that danwei should 
pay attention to the “political histories” (zhengzhi lishi) of employees. Intellectuals who had 
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demonstrated the most loyalty generally saw greater salary increases, naturally.151 The increase 
in pay for enlisted intellectuals may explain in part the surging popularity of enlistments and 
enrollment in military training academies back home. 
 During the first two years of the PRC era, intellectuals—particularly younger ones—
became increasingly supportive of intervention in the Korean War, and eventually of the Chinese 
war effort. Although the state certainly invested plenty of resources in popularizing the war 
through the Resist America, Aid Korea Campaign, the success of mobilization depended on the 
actual support given from intellectuals to the war effort. At home, activists hung flyers and 
posters, wrote editorials and articles, performed dramas and operas, and in some cases even 
signed up for military service. Not all enlistments were purely driven by patriotic zeal; military 
service was clearly one way to increase one’s career prospects by guaranteeing entry into a cadre 
training school, and intellectuals were generally kept well away from the front lines (although 
that did not mean that a deep bombing run might still prove lethal to some). And of course, not 
all intellectuals were so eager to support the war. At a political meeting in December 1951 at 
Tianjin University, for example, a cohort of older professors expressed displeasure at the 
intervention. One argued that China was not strong enough to beat the US in the 1950s, and had 
“confronted America too early” (kangmei tai zao).152 Nonetheless, these frustrations appear to 
have been in the minority. For both practical and ideological reasons, the majority of intellectuals 
were willing to throw their weight behind the war effort.  
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Solving the Intellectual Unemployment Crisis: The Work Assignment Program 
 Urban China faced an unemployment crisis of nearly epic proportions during the first two 
years of Communist rule, which engulfed tens and sometimes hundreds of thousands of 
individuals (sometimes between ten and twenty percent of various cities’ populations). As such, 
practical necessity demanded that the state find unemployed workers jobs as quickly as possible, 
to benefit both them as well as the wider project of national reconstruction. Intellectuals in 
particular were seen as having crucial skillsets that might help alleviate low industrial production 
figures and technological capacity. As such, all levels of government—national, municipal, and 
even district-level committees—embarked on an ambitious work assignment program. This 
campaign has generally not received as much attention from Western scholarship, which has 
instead focused on the various ideological campaigns, such as Thought Reform, the Three-Anti, 
and the Five-Anti campaigns. The scholarship of Eddy U has, however, shed considerable light 
on the problem.153 U has argued that the state’s efforts to register unemployed intellectuals and 
subsequently find them employment institutionalized the nebulous category of zhishifenzi 
(“intellectual”) and revealed a significant gap in the life experiences of Communist cadres and 
intellectuals, thus increasing official suspicion of the intellectual class.154 I see no issue with 
either argument; however, I take a slightly different analytical approach to the work assignment 
program. I focus instead on the role of the work assignment program within the larger project of 
socialist statebuilding, and the ways in which intellectual’s endorsement of the project proved 
crucial to ensuring the stability of the regime.  
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 The unemployment crisis was mostly not one of the new government’s choosing, 
although a series of purges in late 1949 certainly did not help the matter. Official 
pronouncements made through public media and streetside posters blamed the bombing 
campaigns undertaken by the Guomindang regime (and paid for by the United States, these 
announcements emphasized) for destroying much of the urban infrastructure needed to provide 
employment for the masses.155 Although these propaganda announcements were probably more 
correct than not to blame the civil war, they ignored the role of the CCP in exacerbating the 
unemployment crisis. In the heady months of late 1949, right after liberation, local cadres in 
urban areas had purged the schools of teachers suspected of severe reactionary political leanings, 
as well as those who were strongly disliked by students or who had engaged in immoral or 
criminal behavior. In Shanghai, for example, about 300 teachers were ultimately purged from the 
city’s school system by the end of 1949. A handful of others left in protest.156 Zealous cadres 
were even more extreme in their handling of public officials, who they viewed with abject 
suspicion. Although the national government stipulated that all but the most reactionary of 
political servants be allowed to keep their jobs, local cadres purged thousands from their jobs. In 
the cities of Shanghai, Nanjing, and Hangzhou, over 27,000 previous officeholders were fired in 
contravention of the official CCP line.157 In 1950, however, the government rapidly recalculated 
when it realized the extent of the crisis. No longer could the state afford to purge those it found 
repugnant; instead, the survival of the new regime would depend on finding work for everyone—
including those it had just fired.  
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 The state’s response to the unemployment crisis was haphazard at first throughout 1950, 
before maturing into a formalized bureaucratic process in 1951. In early 1950, the government 
sought to promote another mass campaign alongside the Land Reform, Suppress the 
Counterrevolutionaries, and Resist America, Aid Korea campaigns: the “Let’s Donate a Day’s 
Wages” Campaign (juanxian yiri gongzi yundong). The campaign actually proved to be quite 
successful; in Shanghai alone, the city government collected 8,366,051,624 RMB’s worth of 
“day’s wages” for distribution among the unemployed. Of course, the crisis enveloped more than 
just the intellectual class, and scholars would not have seen the majority of this 8 billion. Still, 
the success of the campaign demonstrates that, for the majority of urbanites, there was a great 
deal of concern for their “unemployed brethren” (shiye xiongdi).158 Meanwhile, local organs of 
governance were placed under significant pressure to rectify the mistakes of late 1949. In 
Shanghai, the local Ministry of Education set about to rehire the teachers that had been fired. 
Although almost 200 of the original 300 who had lost their jobs were ultimately rehired, they 
were required to undergo political training classes that foreshadowed the formal Thought Reform 
Campaign of 1952.159 Although generally haphazard, these early policies helped alleviate the 
burden of unemployment facing intellectuals. 
 The state could hardly afford to devote much attention to the unemployment crisis in late 
1950, when it became occupied with sending troops to fight in Korea. Nevertheless, the war 
offered some opportunities for alleviating unemployment; the state created military training 
academies (as has already been discussed in this chapter) and cadre schools designed to attract 
enrollment from unemployed intellectuals. Although demand for the traditional private higher 
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education institutions would ultimately eclipse that for PLA or cadre training, it appears that 
these alternative schools managed to outpace the traditional school system for a brief time period 
in late 1950.160 Moreover, the central government took steps at formalizing the process of finding 
work for the unemployed. Although the crisis was not as severe in Beijing (with only about 
10,197 persons without work), the issue of having a large slate of out-of-work intellectuals was 
increasingly difficult for the state to ignore. Intellectuals who had left to return to their rural 
places of birth (often to help manage their families’ finances in the wake of the Land Reform 
Campaign) returned to Beijing, causing an influx of newly-unemployed intellectuals. In 
response, the CCP established the Emergency Unemployment Committee to formally assign 
work to the unemployed.161 The Beijing committee became a model for other Chinese cities, 
which moved to create their own work assignment committees in late 1950 and throughout 1951. 
In general, the government urged urban work assignment committees to prioritize staffing 
factories with technical experts. Any intellectuals assigned to work or study at a state-run school 
was expected to undergo some kind of political study program, although as already discussed 
such study programs tended to be largely self-directed at this point.162 
 The siphoning of unemployed into state-run universities, as opposed to private colleges, 
was formalized through official regulations in late October that state-run universities had to fill 
quotas for hiring unemployed intellectuals. In addition, municipal governments were expected to 
shoulder the costs of job training programs to turn academics into technical advisers to assist in 
industrial production. In some cases, local education ministries might assign unemployed 
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intellectuals to conduct classes in the rural areas outside of their city, in order to promote literacy 
among the peasantry and, perhaps, foster a new generation of working-class intellectuals. In 
general, however, local cadres typically found intellectuals lacking a “public-service viewpoint” 
(quefa wei renmin fuwu guandian), and as such put pressure on higher levels of government to 
organize formal political study.163 Although the later Thought Reform Campaign was no doubt 
planned from the start, it should be noted that the campaign’s launching appears to have been at 
least partially in response to pressure from local cadres.  
 In November, Shanghai followed Beijing’s lead in creating an emergency committee of 
its own to handle the problem of unemployed workers and intellectuals. Overall, the 
unemployment crisis had forced the state to reconsider its priorities in dealing with the private 
sector; ultimately, most cities settled on tackling unemployment before fully dismantling the 
private ownership of capital. Indeed, in Shanghai at least, the Let’s Donate a Day’s Wages 
Campaign came out of a consultative meeting between Shanghai officials and private business 
owners. Businesses generally concurred with the government’s argument that having a large 
populace of unemployed individuals was detrimental to the social order, and as such relinquished 
hiring responsibility over to the municipal government.164 One problem faced by the work 
assignment committee in Shanghai was a lack of public knowledge about the program; as such, 
one of its first duties was to popularize its own existence. Some of the first job assignments for 
the unemployed in Shanghai were actually for the emergency committee itself; they were hired 
to hang fliers (gua xinjian) around Shanghai advertising the work assignment program and 
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encouraging others to register.165 It is unclear if any intellectuals were hired to hang fliers for the 
committee, although they would have almost certainly come into contact with these 
pronouncements—and more than a few may have even registered for the work assignment 
program thanks to its popularization. Even intellectuals who had jobs or were enrolled in a 
school or university still came into contact with the committee, which picked up where the Let’s 
Donate a Day’s Wages Campaign left off by soliciting charitable donations for unemployment 
relief. As of November 1950, students in Shanghai had donated a sum of 103,216,632 RMB 
toward unemployment relief (or about 10,322 new RMB, after the government’s currency 
reform). Local artists (who were also classified as intellectuals under the state’s classification 
norms) donated a sum of 35,397,799 RMB (3,540 new RMB).166 
 The work assignment program in 1951 underwent a variety of changes. The moves to 
popularize the program in 1950 bore fruit, and soon cadres overseeing the program could not 
keep pace with demand. As such, the program transferred from the purview of municipal and 
provincial governments to specific, formal committees designed to process unemployment 
applications. Over time, these work assignment committees had to rely on the advice of district-
level governments as well as non-Party organizations, such as the minor democratic parties, and 
the Women’s Federation.167 In the beginning of 1951, the central government made official 
requirements that every major city establish some kind of work assignment program in the mold 
of the Emergency Unemployment Committee in Beijing. Moreover, the world of intellectuals 
experienced a seismic shift as the central government mandated that cities accept job 
applications from both male and female intellectuals, thus opening the door to good academic or 
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industrial jobs for educated women almost overnight.168 Indeed, a slight majority of the 
applicants in Shanghai—57 percent—were women.169 
Cities like Shanghai took tentative steps at introducing a more formal process to work 
assignment by instructing overseeing cadres to balance both the unique strengths of the 
unemployed intellectual in question alongside the general needs of the public. Although officials 
expressed plenty of concern about “reactionary defects” (fandong quexian) among out-of-work 
intellectuals, the government had learned the lessons of late 1949 and early 1950. Although a 
handful of applications were still denied, the overwhelming majority of unemployed intellectuals 
were given job assignments—even those coming from a liberal or right-wing political 
background.170 Although the work assignment program did not entirely ignore the problem of 
staffing schools and universities, cities tended to prioritize assigning intellectuals with an 
engineering or technical background to serve as advisors in the factories. In order to determine 
whether an applicant had the requisite scientific know-how for assignment to a factory 
production team, cadres would use aptitude tests (zhaokao). It appears that this change caused 
confusion among applicants, who expected the process to be quick and easy as in 1950. Because 
the use of aptitude tests was new in 1951, work assignment boards had to spend a good deal of 
effort clarifying the new application procedures in propaganda and advertisements.171 
Urban work assignment programs were laboring under enormous demand by mid-1951. 
The use of aptitude tests were highly beneficial to some intellectuals, particularly with scientific 
or economic expertise. Moreover, the first wave of job assignments gave intellectuals coveted 
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roles in new organs of governance. Many of the first job assignments went to labor safety 
supervision teams (laobao) or factory democratic management committees (minzhu guanli 
weiyuanhui). To aid the war effort, other intellectuals were pressed into service producing public 
media in support of the Resist America, Aid Korea Campaign.172 Municipal work assignment 
boards were forced to become more discriminating around the same time. For example, any 
applications from elderly or physically weak intellectuals were marked shenti shuairuo (“frail-
bodied”), and they were assigned only to posts that did not involve any physical labor—or, more 
likely, they simply could not find employment at all.173  
If an intellectual’s work application forms were denied, they were generally allowed to 
stay inside their city of residence, however, unless they applied to work in a city despite living in 
a suburb or a rural area nearby. In those cases, intellectuals with denied applications were 
allowed to reside in the city where they applied for just a full 24 hours before they were required 
to leave for their point of origin.174 Although the official residence permit—hukou—system was 
not introduced until later, the local guidelines for the work assignment program suggest that the 
CCP was well aware of the problem of rural-to-urban migration, and took steps at clamping 
down on intranational migration. That being said, municipal governments generally had much 
fewer qualms about sending local intellectuals away from their city. As more and more posts 
became filled, work assignment boards generally turned toward school assignments in less 
developed regions of the country, such as the northeast. A number of Shanghai intellectuals were 
reassigned to the faculty at Northeast People’s Revolutionary University.175 
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Although the work assignment program was first envisioned by the central government, 
the process of consolidation suggests the rapid maturation of municipal governance across the 
country (or at least, in intellectual-dense cities and provinces). Moreover, local governments in 
close proximity engaged in a form of mutual supervision. The provincial government of 
Zhejiang, for example, wrote a letter to the municipal government of Shanghai dated May 29, 
1951 in response to a solicitation from Shanghai for neighboring local governments to offer 
appraisals of its work assignment policies. Although broadly supportive of the Shanghai 
government’s policies, the letter from Zhejiang did offer some criticism regarding a lack of 
adequate attention to young intellectuals and recent graduates. In addition, the letter suggested 
that Shanghai might turn its attention toward alternative career paths from either education or 
industrial management; for example, work in a research institute.176 As such, Shanghai continued 
to implement changes in the second half of the year to its work assignment policies. The 
municipal government turned control of the program over to the Office for Handling 
Unemployed Intellectuals (OHUI) in October 1951—previously, most of the directives regarding 
work assignment had come from either the local Ministry of Education or the upper levels of 
municipal government themselves.177 The new OHUI was headed by a local intellectual and 
Party affiliate named Dai Baitao, who sought to ensure that intellectuals’ representatives had a 
voice in the program.178 In November, the city government transferred staff from a variety of 
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other government departments—Civil Affairs, Labor, Human Affairs, and Culture—to the 
OHUI.179 
Dai and the OHUI began working more closely with the local chapters of the democratic 
parties—primarily, the China Democratic League—and local teachers’ unions.180 In addition, the 
office incorporated the suggestions from the Zhejiang letter by holding a number of conferences 
with local Party organizations, such as the Youth League and the Women’s Federation, in order 
to better accommodate the needs of young and female out-of-work intellectuals.181 In addition, 
the OHUI began to pay more attention to students who had to drop out of school for financial 
reasons or other hardships. These former students—who were seen as perhaps less “tainted” by 
the pernicious influence of a non-socialist education than those who already had degrees—were 
able to find new opportunities to continue their education through the OHUI.182 As such, the 
office, like government policy more broadly, was generally responsive to the needs of 
intellectuals as well as their suggestions. The relationship between the CCP and China’s 
intellectuals still was not devoid of tension—in particular, local cadres and intellectuals were 
often at odds—but the overall thrust of the work assignment program suggested a sharp break 
from the model of Stalinist purges tried briefly after liberation.  
The expanded role of the OHUI invited a number of other bureaucratic changes. 
Although Dai Baitao had a good deal of agency in managing the day-to-day affairs of the work 
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assignment program, the city government still held monthly conferences to place the OHUI’s 
work under review and correct any serious errors.183 Although intellectuals were asked to direct 
their applications directly to the OHUI, the office’s work assignments were subject to a “check-
and-ratify” (heding) process by the municipal government.184 It is unclear, however, how much 
oversight the city ultimately choose to exercise over the OHUI’s work. The OHUI was subject 
not only to oversight from above, but also influence from below. As more and more intellectuals 
signed up for the program, Dai turned to district-level committees to process the flood of 
applications. District governments in Shanghai would provide a list of approved names to the 
OHUI, which would then provide in turn a list of assignments within that district. Assignments 
for any given district had to be approved by both the director and deputy director of the district 
government.185 The usage of district governments was probably convenient for the applicants, 
who wouldn’t have had to make a trip into the downtown area to submit their required materials. 
At the same time, the move tended to lock applicants into whatever district they currently 
resided—it appears that district committees tended to prefer that unemployed intellectuals be 
assigned work positions in the same district where they resided.186 
By the end of 1951, requirements for application to the program became stricter. 
Although cities did not ban non-residents from applying, municipal governments began to place 
more of an emphasis on official residence (zhengshi huji) when considering applications. By 
1952, one of the only surefire ways of getting a job assignment for non-resident intellectuals was 
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to be related to someone who was already an official resident—most likely, a spouse.187 The city 
of Shanghai published an official handbook for the local OHUI, which detailed a new set of 
guidelines for administering the work assignment program. With industrial production churning, 
many cities began to prioritize the expansion of the local education system in late 1951. At the 
same time, city governments encouraged work assignment boards to subject applicants to more 
scrutiny of their personal politics than before. In Shanghai, for example, the city proposed a 
vague classification system—progressive, centrist, retrogressive, or counterrevolutionary—for 
the OHUI to use. Even right-wing intellectuals were not rejected outright, however, unless they 
had been guilty of serious crimes in addition to their political leanings.188 In order to combat the 
problem of fraudulent applications, Shanghai also stipulated that applicants provide a certificate 
proving their level of educational attainment (wenhua chengdu zhengmingshu). By December, 
the amount of information that unemployed intellectuals had to provide in their applications was 
much greater than before, and included their place of birth, years of residence in Shanghai, and 
information about the school or university where they had gotten their highest degree. In 
addition, applicants were asked to describe the “political situation” (zhengzhi qingkuang) at the 
school.189 Anticipating the advent of the Thought Reform Campaign, applicants also had to write 
“autobiographies” (zizhuan) regarding the political beliefs, activities, and affiliations.190 
By the end of the first two years of the PRC era, urban intellectuals were on track to 
achieving full employment. As discussed in Chapter 1, intellectuals’ career prospects generally 
suffered after the elimination of the civil service exams in the early 1900s. Fewer intellectuals 
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were able to find stable employment, and many grew to resent the lack of opportunities presented 
by a formal education by the 1940s. As such, the CCP’s work assignment programs provided 
crucial relief to the intellectual class and perhaps helped calm the tensions that existed between 
the state and the scholarly community. At all levels of government, the state invested heavily in 
the livelihoods of intellectuals, often assigning them prestigious jobs in schools or factories. 
Moreover, the work assignment program represented a sharp departure from the Soviet model 
briefly enacted with the purges of late 1949. Even during the repression of the Thought Reform 
and Anti-Rightist Campaigns in the later 1950s, the Communist Party rarely abandoned the 
ultimate goal of political rehabilitation and transformation—not solely punishment—entirely. 
 
Incipient Ideological Refashioning 
 The idea of thought rectification—as well as its political importance—was long-standing 
within the Communist tradition in China, dating back to the wartime years. As was discussed in 
Chapter 1, the CCP undertook tentative steps toward thought rectification work in captured areas 
as they marched toward Beijing, and ultimately south China, during the civil war. After taking 
over the country, however, the government realized they simply did not have the resources to 
commit to instituting a formal campaign of thought reform across the country, and accordingly 
relied instead on voluntary participation in study sessions. As such, Chinese intellectuals already 
affiliated with a university (in contrast to those suffering from unemployment, discussed 
previously) were generally given free rein in imagining the role that intellectuals could play as 
thought leaders in the new nation for much of 1950 and 1951. 
 Older scholarship, on the other hand, has generally not taken such a positive view on the 
agency of intellectuals during these years. In his seminal text on thought reform in the 1950s, 
81 
Theodore Chen writes, “to avoid undue harshness at the beginning for fear of arousing violent 
reaction, the Communist method is to introduce changes gradually. Later, moderation gives way 
to more stringent measures, and ‘methods of persuasion’ assume a coercive character. Increasing 
pressure is brought to bear on individuals to ‘persuade’ them to conform ‘voluntarily’.”191 I take 
a different stance; I see the Communist Party’s hesitation at enacting formal thought reform 
policies as a matter of necessity based on the realities of limited resources and a lack of uniform 
control over the university system rather than a form of calculated strategy. Moreover, I disagree 
that intellectuals were mainly “coerced” by the party at the outset of the PRC era. Examining the 
editorials and documents produced by intellectuals during 1950 and 1951, I see these works as 
far more invested in a passionate discussion of the problems of the education system and 
opportunities for improvement as opposed to cynical rehashing of government slogans. Before 
there could be formal Thought Reform among intellectuals, there first had to exist a genuine 
interest in ideological refashioning from below. 
 To be sure, there was a barrier of entry to publishing anything during this period. 
Intellectuals who wanted to publish articles levying severe criticism at the party would have been 
unable to find an outlet in state media for their writings, and simply trying may have invited 
attention from the authorities. At the same time, the intellectuals who were able to find a 
platform for their views cannot be simply written off as having been “coerced.” Rather, their 
writings reflect the general interest of intellectuals during the Republican Era in reforming and 
even revolutionizing the education system, and in expanding the reach of the academy to better 
incorporate the commoner classes. The first two years of Maoist China thus allowed for the 
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blossoming of intellectual activism that had been budding for decades, even alongside the growth 
of an increasingly authoritarian political culture. 
 The period was also marked by significant geographic variance. At the epicenter of 
Communist power—mostly the greater Beijing-Tianjin area—party influence was much greater 
than elsewhere. Intellectuals living in Beijing, especially, tended to be the most supportive of the 
state (and also had the greatest access to publishing venues via the conveniently nearby People’s 
Daily headquarters), and faced little resistance in organizing voluntary study sessions. Feng 
Youlan, for example, then the president of Qinghua University, organized a year-long study 
session with several senior colleagues in the philosophy department.192 At Beijing University, a 
faculty member named Luo Changpei chaired the Joint Committee of Faculty and Staff in order 
to promote self-study and engage in public scholarship.193 At the other end of the spectrum, 
intellectuals far removed from the northeast were able to implement a number of barriers to any 
attempts at instituting thought rectification policy. In Lintao County, Gansu, for example, the 
local People’s Assembly was dominated by intellectuals, who made up more than 70% of all 
representatives. As such, cadres had difficulty making any inroads to the local education system, 
and the county government shut down any attempts at carrying out self-study programs.194 Until 
the launching of the actual Thought Reform Campaign, it was impossible to talk about any 
national attempt at ideological refashioning.  
 Indeed, the ideal of engaging in “self-study” was vague enough that in took a variety of 
forms. In some areas, offices that employed intellectuals (usually government bureaus) asked 
employees to arrive to work a half hour earlier than usual for the purpose of engaging in study 
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sessions. Some universities experimented with having a formal “political class,” taught by a CCP 
cadre, who would explain various Marxist concepts such as historical materialism, dialectics, and 
the history of social development via loudspeaker in school auditoriums. At Qinghua, 
meanwhile, traveling opera performers staged plays about the importance of thought 
rectification. One such production, Sixiang Wenti (“Thought Problems”), was about a number of 
intellectuals who were able to combat a number of personal failings—naive pro-Americanism, 
obsession with high social status, allegiance to the Guomindang, or a lack of a political activist 
spirit, for example—through collective discussions and self-study. After the play was finished, 
professors and students engaged in small-group discussions about how to apply these lessons to 
their own lives.195 The common thread linking these strategies of conducting informal, voluntary 
ideological refashioning was a general lack of heavy-handed involvement from the state. Study 
sessions tended to be relatively informal, and cadres only very rarely attended.196 To the extent 
that the national government got involved, it was to rein in overzealous cadres. In Hunan 
Province, for example, the state accused local cadres of engaging in several “erroneous 
tendencies” (pianxiang): without consulting the opinions of rural peasants, cadres had instead 
subjected intellectuals to harsh criticism on their own. In addition, cadres had rushed the process 
of thought rectification by mechanically applying the party’s teachings without ensuring that the 
lessons had truly been absorbed by local intellectuals. Ultimately, the national government 
recalled several Hunan cadres in late July of 1950.197  
 Intellectuals, for their part, seem to have seized on the moment to advance their own 
opinions on how education might be reformed. One anonymous editorial (although the writer did 
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make public their affiliation with a university) published on June 24 criticized the lack of a 
cooperative spirit among intellectuals. The author suggested that school faculty might engage in 
increased intellectual collaboration, or even participate in group sports drills. The author also 
criticized the tendency for intellectuals to only talk with others within their own academic 
department. In order to best assist the project of national rejuvenation, the author suggested that 
economists and scientists might engage in joint research projects.198  
 The relatively relaxed climate of 1950 changed somewhat heading into 1951, although 
the fundamental characteristics of ideological refashioning were not altered until the following 
year. For one, the exigencies of wartime made for a different political calculus of the national 
government. Instances of sabotage increased state paranoia, which responded harshly through a 
crackdown on “counterrevolutionary” behavior. State media turned toward the publication of 
“confessions” by intellectuals, although the practice certainly was not widespread until 1952.199 
Intellectuals generally escaped being targeted by the Suppress the Counterrevolutionaries 
Campaign, although executions of Guomindang “agents” in Beijing and Tianjin received 
considerable attention in state media.200 Considering that many intellectuals, especially older 
professors, may have had some form of relationship with the old regime—if they had not joined 
the GMD outright—the executions almost certainly could have had some coercive element. 
Moreover, some intellectuals began to capitalize on the political climate by leveling accusations 
of right-wing thought or behavior at colleagues they resented—a strategy that would persist 
through the Maoist period. At Shengfangji Middle School in Shanghai, for example, a number of 
teachers published an accusation of the principal, Bai Yuheng, for harboring reactionary political 
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beliefs on July 25, 1951.201 Although the accusation was short and vague, it foreshadowed a shift 
to a new culture of academic infighting during the later 1950s and beyond. At the same time, the 
Suppress the Counterrevolutionaries Campaign and the early use of ideological accusations seem 
to have had little effect on the broader state of intellectual speech. Plenty still continued to write 
and publish editorials, and the general character of intellectual writings—focusing on educational 
reform instead of affirming loyalty to the government—stayed consistent.  
 Especially as the government began to draw up plans for a formal program of thought 
rectification heading into 1952, state media published more and more intellectual writings in late 
1951. On November 19, for example, an editorial from Ma Dayou built off of earlier criticisms 
over departmentalism in academia. Ma suggested that academic departments at Beijing 
University (Beida for short, after beijing daxue), where he taught engineering, “had become little 
cliques, so much so that there are independent blocs within the school.” He painting a bleak 
picture of the political situation at Beida, where departments were engaged in a heated 
competition over funding and expenditures. Ma expressed a general openness toward greater 
state control over higher education, noting that the CCP might provide a better semblance of 
leadership to bring the warring departments into line.202 Meanwhile, a mathematics professor at 
Qinghua, Hua Luogeng, criticized the elitist nature of his institution, arguing its sole purpose, 
historically, had been to provide “education for the gifted” (tiancai jiaoyu).203 As such, Hua and 
others’ complaints about higher education’s lack of mass appeal dovetailed nicely with the 
CCP’s wider program of expanding access to education. A primary school teacher in Jiangxi, 
Xiao Jiajian, drew attention to the poor career prospects of primary school teachers, who usually 
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had few prospects (meiyou qiantu de) before taking low-paying work at a primary school. Xiao 
argued that better pay for teachers could reduce the tendency of the school system to attract 
“wrong-thinking” (bu zhengque de sixiang) individuals.204 Although Ma, Hua, and Xiao’s views 
were generally supportive of the government and its education policies, the main thrust of their 
writings was the reform of the academic system. They grew out of the tradition of reformism that 
had been growing for decades. 
 Nevertheless, the effect of these writings may have convinced the national government 
that the time was ripe to abandon the relatively laissez-faire oversight of education that had taken 
root during the previous two years. The government undertook a number of surveys of primary, 
secondary, and higher education in later 1951. These studies generally revealed weak party 
control over the education system. For example, a survey of the Beijing school system revealed 
that the overwhelming majority of teachers and professors had not undergone any sort of 
political training as of November 1951.205 For most schools, the only exposure students had to 
party oversight was through textbooks, which were published by the Propaganda Department.206 
In nearby Tianjin, a review of the self-study program at local universities  revealed significant 
weaknesses. Because department heads typically organized study sessions, the quality of these 
reformative meetings variety wildly. The survey suggested that generally, department heads were 
too willing to criticize others while immodestly promoting themselves. Even when groups were 
comfortable airing criticism, professors were often quick to defend close colleagues (huxiang 
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tanhu).207 Of course, this was only true of professors who had actually attended a study session. 
The survey also said that, of Party-affiliated faculty at Tianjin University, only half had ever 
attended a study session by December 1951. That number was even smaller for non-Party faculty 
(about 40% had attended a study session). Meanwhile, a tenth of the faculty had neither attended 
a study session nor expressed any desire to do so in the future. These faculty argued that they 
simply did not have time to cover the vast amounts of Marxist-Leninist literature the party asked 
them to study. One professor, Deng Yuemo, for example, said, “The government is already 
telling me to implement a plan for designing steelmaking furnaces. Now they’re telling me to 
study on top of that.”208 These surveys—conducted in the generally party-friendly cities of 
Beijing and Tianjin, highlight the weak control of the state over the education system even in late 
1951.  
 The state’s response to a lack of control was the Thought Reform Campaign, officially 
announced as far back as September.209 In some ways this is misleading, however; foreign 
observers did not note the beginning of the campaign until late November, and state media did 
not draw attention to the campaign’s plans until around then as well.210 The campaign began in 
Beijing and Tianjin in the last few weeks of 1951, and would not spread to the entire nation until 
the following year. Professors in these cities were expected to stay on campus during the 
upcoming holiday season and participate in official study sessions. Attendance was no longer 
voluntary, and cadres took over leadership positions from department heads. Even still, the state 
proceeded with caution. One of the earliest initiatives of Thought Reform was to “thoroughly 
confess one’s past with honesty and fidelity” (zhongcheng laoshi jiaoqing lishi de yundong) 
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rather than to instill a broader Marxist-Leninist worldview.211 Because the party’s influence on 
university campuses was still low, however, it was forced to rely on cooperation with a variety of 
sources in order to achieve its Thought Reform program. Students, for example, may have been 
more amenable to the Communists than their older professors. At Qinghua, a student activist 
named Wei Chenguan energetically helped organize the students to assist in the Thought Reform 
Campaign, arguing that “our teachers’ thorough though rectification can best help us advance.” 
Wei and other activist students wrote big-character posters (dazibao) in support of the campaign, 
organized campus broadcasts, published editorials in campus newsletters and magazines, and 
distributed political texts to the teaching staff.212 
 Although student zeal for reform may have been high, the party could not rely on young 
activists alone. The government realized that the organizations that held the most sway over 
intellectuals were the minor democratic parties. As such, the government typically allowed minor 
parties like the Democratic League to take the lead in promoting the campaign. In Guangzhou, 
the city chapter of the CDL organized a conference for local university professors in December 
1951. At the conference, the CDL organized a mock criticism session of a local writer named 
Qin Mu. Although criticizing Qin’s work, the Democratic League also affirmed his righteous and 
good character quality, thus suggesting that ideological criticism was not tantamount to a 
personal attack.213 In an editorial published on December 24, Huang Yaomian, the deputy 
director of the propaganda committee of the CDL’s national branch, argued in favor of the 
Thought Reform Campaign, and committed the resources of the party to helping intellectuals 
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navigate the campaign. Huang noted that the CDL party leadership had voted unanimously to 
support the Thought Reform Campaign (as well as the other mass mobilization movements) at a 
recent conference.214 Although the support of the democratic parties probably helped improve 
popular acceptance of the Thought Reform Campaign, intellectuals still pushed back against too 
much oversight. At a conference in Shanghai, for example, delegates unanimously approved a 
proposal by the president of Beida, Ma Yinchu, to allow universities to maintain ultimate 
authority over the organization of study committees.215 It is unclear how effective the proposal 
was at keeping cadres out of the school system (in fact, it probably was not effective, at least in 
the long term), it showed that intellectuals were a powerful bloc the state would have to reckon 
with in its quest for control over the schools. 
 The scope of the Thought Reform Campaign widened over the course of the month. On 
December 10, the government announced plans to expand the campaign to include writers and 
artists, although it pledged to work through the democratic parties much as it had with teachers 
and professors.216 Only five days later, an editorial in People’s Daily called on medical 
professionals to follow the emerging Beijing/Tianjin model of Thought Reform.217 And on 
December 23, an editorial from Lin Shiba called on fellow artisans and craft workers to engage 
in self-criticism and combat arrogance (zigao zida; literally, “thinking of oneself as tall and 
great”).218 By the end of the year, the Thought Reform Campaign was in full swing, 
encompassing all kinds of intellectuals all over the country. Nonetheless, the state’s successes in 
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initiating the campaign were based on the cooperation of student groups, professors, and the 
democratic parties. Moreover, the campaign built off of a burgeoning desire for genuine reform 
and transformation among intellectuals. Entering 1952, the state still faced resistance, especially 
outside of its strongholds in the northeast. In Shanghai, for example, a survey conducted at 
Jiaotong and Tongji Universities revealed that intellectuals were not wholly unsupportive of the 
Thought Reform Campaign, but they also did not see political study as particularly urgent. One 
elderly professor encouraged his younger colleagues to attend study sessions while neglecting 
them himself; “being old,” he said, “I cannot reform myself very well” (nian lao le, gaizao 
buhao le).219 In Beijing, meanwhile, over 80% of high school teachers had completed thought 
rectification work by the end of the year. Cadres had achieved the most successes by praising 
intellectuals’ roles as “thought leaders” in the new era.220 For the government, the challenges of 
expanding the Thought Reform Campaign were significant heading into 1952. 
 
Conclusion 
 The practical realities of governing China forced the Communist Party to work alongside, 
rather than fully in opposition to, the intellectual class. The state’s efforts at expanding the 
education system relied on recruiting more teachers and providing new sources of employment 
for those facing upheaval after over a decade of warfare. Intellectuals were one of the only 
classes to offer genuine support for a military invention in the Korean War, especially in the face 
of protests from commoners. Moreover, the military’s logistics department swelled after a slew 
of patriotic enlistments by young intellectuals. Back at home, the government sought to redress 
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the unemployment crisis, especially among intellectuals, through urban work assignment 
programs. Although the program took months to formalize, and initially focused only on job 
assignments to the factories, it ultimately became a major source of relief for intellectuals by the 
end of 1951. Intellectuals themselves did not take the epochal changes of 1950 and 1951 lying 
down; instead, they participated in a robust national conversation about the importance of 
educational reform. They saw opportunities to expand the reach of the education system as well 
as reform problematic practices, such as department in-fighting, via the leadership of the 
Communist Party. Toward the end of 1951, as the state turned its attention to the launch of the 
formal Thought Reform Campaign, it sought to ally with intellectual organizations like the 
democratic parties and build off of the ideas presented in intellectuals’ writings. 
 As such, two significant conclusions can be drawn about the first two years of the PRC: 
(1) the central government’s position was generally weak, and therefore reliant on genuine 
support from intellectuals, and (2) state policies were typically designed to promote cooperation 
rather than conflict with the intellectual class. Over time, the fragile alliance between the state 
and the intellectuals would bend—although never break entirely—under the weight of mutual 
suspicion and more aggressive state efforts at imposing controls on the thoughts and behaviors of 
intellectuals. Nonetheless, events in 1950 and 1951 still set the tone for the rest of the decade. 
Intellectuals found their voice and participated energetically in the processes of state-building. 
The new society would belong to them just as much as it did the Communist Party. 
  
92 
CHAPTER 3: THE FORMALIZATION OF THOUGHT REFORM, 1952 
 The intellectual class, and the nation at large, were both in the throes of great 
transformation by the beginning of 1952. Many unemployed persons with an education had 
found work thanks to the state’s work assignment program. The program had also changed the 
face of the intellectual class; in Shanghai, for example, 78.9% of work assignments went to 
intellectuals below 35 years of age. Over a fourth of applicants were women.221 The archetype of 
the older, male scholar had undergone serious revision. Meanwhile, the leadership of the 
Communist Party had seemingly brought the nation back from the brink of collapse, leading to a 
growth in production figures unseen for over a decade.222 The state had successfully halted the 
advance of the American military toward the Yalu River, increased opportunities for and granted 
rights to women, and combatted inequality in the countryside. It is unsurprising that the regime 
would therefore be popular heading into 1952, as it moved to expand the Thought Reform 
Campaign (sixiang gaizao yundong) from its stronghold in the Beijing-Tianjin region to the 
nation as a whole. Moreover, these moves could be accomplished without significant resistance 
or resentment from the intellectuals under scrutiny from the campaign. Indeed, the previous 
years had seen an outpouring of intellectual activism regarding the necessity of a class-wide 
transformation in order to best adapt to the new era. The Thought Reform Campaign built off of 
previous, spontaneous practices and self-directed study sessions already underway in the 
universities, thus formalizing and institutionalizing the idea of ideological refashioning. 
 This is not to imply that the Thought Reform Campaign was not transformative, however. 
Perhaps more so than any other policy initiative thus far, the campaign provided cover for the 
 
221 Shanghaishi chuli shiye zhishifenzi weiyuanhui guanyu song fa gequ dengji renshu tongjibiao de han, 1952, B1-
1-1121-93, Shanghai Municipal People's Government, SMA. 
222 Wheat production was growing at a rate of about 10% annually, for example, thus improving access to food and 
an end to rationing in the cities. See Lamb, Telegram No. 10, May 28, 1952, CPR9, 345. 
93 
state assumption of authority over the schools and universities. By the end of the year, party 
cadres enjoyed top administrative roles in academies across China. As such, the links between 
the masses and the intellectuals had never been greater. On the other hand, expanded contact was 
not always for the better. Cadres and party loyalists took charge in the schools and interfered 
more directly with academics’ daily schedules than before. Meanwhile, the Thought Reform 
Campaign—in particular, the publication of intellectuals’ “confessions” in media—popularized 
the party’s one-size-fits-all portrayal of the intellectual class as bourgeois, elitist, disloyal to the 
regime, and even hedonistic.223 Especially in subsequent years, the relationship between 
intellectuals and uneducated cadres became badly fractured. Moreover, the party’s ambitious 
aims in establishing a beachhead in the school system required further reliance on young students 
and activists, thus widening the generation gap in education. Some changes were less deleterious, 
however; the confessions revealed institutional problems of waste and corruption, cleaning up 
during the Three-Anti Campaign (conducted concurrently with the Thought Reform Campaign; 
in some areas, the two melded into a single mass movement). And although intellectuals faced 
unprecedented scrutiny from the state and wider society, actual punishments or career setbacks 
were extremely rare.  
 The year began with a nationwide collection effort of confessions: documents written by 
intellectuals that shed light on previous behaviors or thoughts seen as problematic. For some, that 
meant financial corruption; for others, that meant normal participation in capitalist profiteering. 
Although a number of these confessions were published in state media, many more were 
collected and kept by the party, thus increasing intelligence-gathering on the intellectual class. 
Over the course of the year, the state began to emphasize cutting waste, corruption, and 
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“bureaucratism”with the Three-Anti Campaign. Universities and schools tackled many of these 
problems alongside Thought Reform; indeed, many confessions focused on the writer’s 
participation in some kind of profiteering racket or scheme. Behind the scenes, the state worked 
furiously to establish government control of the school system under the cover of Thought 
Reform. By the end of the year, the state had made dramatic cuts to the number of private 
institutions, although some still survived. Lastly, the state wrestled with the question of 
punishment. In almost every case, even intellectuals who confessed to fairly serious errors, such 
as loyalty to the old Guomindang regime or militant anti-communism, were left alone. That said, 
cadres on the ground often took a harder line that the national government may have wanted. 
Over the course of the year, the government had to continue issuing directives to rein in zealous 
cadres. These four developments show the progression of the Thought Reform Campaign and the 
alteration of the relationship between intellectuals and the state. 
 
The Rehabilitative Model and the Use of Confessions 
 Although the immediate origins of the “confessions” (jiaodai) were probably the 
informal “study conclusions” mandated by the Communist Party during previous rectification 
work in Yan’an, the idea behind them has a long genealogy.224 Since around the turn of the 
twentieth century, reformers from across East Asia became interested in new options for prison 
reform that focused on transformation rather than through punishment alone. For the next fifty 
years, intellectuals in China, Japan, and Korea proposed new ideas that transformed ideas of 
incarceration and criminal punishment.225 The Communists grew out of this tradition, and had a 
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chance to apply their rehabilitative goals in the aftermath of World War II. While the 
Guomindang carried out a significant number of executions of Japanese prisoners of war 
convicted of war crimes, the CCP sought a different approach. Although a good number of 
Japanese were executed by the Communists in the immediate aftermath of the war, the party 
changed course before taking power in 1949. Instead, it would promote the idea of reform 
through imprisonment and physical labor for Japanese POWs—the goal being to turn “devils 
back into men.” Confessions were to be extracted at a later date.226 For the Communists, 
rehabilitation seemed like a humane alternative to punitive justice. They structured their 
approach to intellectuals around the idea that, through sincere reflection on the past, intellectuals 
might genuinely be able to shed their old characteristics. 
 As such, confessions became the modus operandi of the Thought Reform Campaign. 
Confessions were first used by the party-state informally during a separate mass movement, the 
Five-Anti Campaign, which targeted the capitalist class. Cadres and inspection teams began to 
use confessions on an ad hoc basis with Beijing business owners concurrent with the 
nationalization of the Thought Reform Campaign. The initial response from business owners was 
panic and alarm (huangkong buan); many even fled Beijing and Tianjin for southern cities like 
Guangzhou. Some even committed suicide rather than submit materials to an inspection team.227 
That said, there was considerably less consternation among intellectuals when asked to submit 
their own confessions. Theodore Chen speculates that intellectuals wrote confessions with little 
protest for a variety of reasons: opportunism, patriotism, although most likely simply a sense of 
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having to do so in order to keep their heads low.228 For many intellectuals, however, the process 
would have seemed familiar; indeed, reformist intellectuals had been pushing for rehabilitative 
justice for decades. And for many, wrestling with a sense of unease about their own privileges 
was sincere. As described in Chapter 2, many intellectuals seem to have been genuinely affected 
by their participation in the Land Reform Campaign and their firsthand experience of rural 
poverty. Even in memoirs written well after the Thought Reform Campaign, intellectuals like the 
overseas returnee Zhou Yiliang expressed a sense of “sin” or guilt when meeting the 
impoverished face-to-face.229 As such, I tend to read the intellectuals’ confessions as sincere 
reflections on inequality, class privilege, and the transformative possibilities of a new era. 
 One of the most common points of self-criticism made in confessions was the 
“commodification of knowledge” (chumai zhishi), as described by Deng Chumin, a member of 
the Central Operations Committee of the national branch of the Democratic League. Deng wrote 
a number of editorials urging intellectuals to devote serious energy and attention to the Thought 
Reform Campaign; indeed, the crucial support of the CDL may have helped the government, 
which still did not have the kinds of reach that the League had among intellectual communities. 
Deng Chumin argued that intellectuals had been producing and profiting off of education, 
writings, and art for “reactionary governments”—the Qing Dynasty, the warlords, and the 
Guomindang—for decades.230 Only an intense devotion to the party-state’s mass mobilization 
efforts could help intellectuals wash away their problematic behavior of the past. Perhaps in a 
testament to the enduring leadership of the CDL among intellectuals, many early confessions 
would echo Deng’s point about the commodification of knowledge.  
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 A Shanghai professor named Gu Xiegang described his background as having come from 
a middle-class family, which gave him the opportunity to move to Beijing and attend the 
prestigious Yanjing University. At the time, the school was a private institution run by Christian 
missionaries. As such, Gu said he developed an uncritical acceptance of American 
imperialism.231 During World War II, Gu fled Beijing along with many other intellectuals to 
inland areas unoccupied by the Japanese. He moved around between cities like Chengdu, 
Kunming, and Chongqing in an effort to start a new magazine, which focused on topics such as 
Chinese literature and history. As readership of his publication increased over the course of the 
war, Gu raised the subscription price. As such, Gu confessed to using his knowledge as a source 
of capital, having profited off of the nationalist sentiments evoked by the war.232  
 Like Gu, many intellectuals confessed that their backgrounds had exposed them to 
foreign influence. Wang Guoxiu, the vice-principal at Zhendan University233 in Shanghai, 
described his extensive travels in the United States as part of a multi-year study abroad program. 
Upon returning to China, Wang accepted a job at St. John’s University in Shanghai, another 
missionary-run school.234 His classes featured the use of English-language textbooks which 
portrayed the US and Britain in a favorable light.235 A professor in the Chinese department at 
Fudan University, Zhao Jingshen, describes a similar professional experience. Through his time 
spent abroad, Zhao had become fluent in English, and worked to publish Chinese translations of 
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foreign texts prolifically back in China. Most notably, Zhao was involved in the translation 
project of Hans Christian Andersen’s fairy tales. Over time, however, Zhao says that he became 
status-obsessed, seeking to “publish prolifically without regard for quality” (cuzhi lanzao). All 
three intellectuals—Gu, Wang, and Zhao—showed an increasing awareness of the confluence of 
economic privilege and educational attainment, which could then be leveraged to maintain one’s 
social status during the Republican Era.  
 Not all early confessions were as reflective and remorseful as Gu’s, Wang’s or Zhao’s, 
however. A confession published in People’s Daily by a Beijing professor, Jin Kemu, sought to 
deflect criticism from the author and toward the intellectual class as a whole. Jin spent little time 
discussing his own “errors,” and instead criticized the broader traits of arrogance and 
individualism among intellectuals. Although many of his colleagues expressed concern about 
submitting confessions due to potential repercussions to their careers or reputations, Jin argued 
that dutiful participation in Thought Reform had to take precedence over these anxieties.236 In 
another published confession, the scholar Lan Gongwu focused more on championing the 
Communist Party instead of reflecting on his own shortcomings. Lan had spent most of his life 
living abroad in Britain, although he said that he had slowly developed a “revolutionary outlook 
on humanity” (geming rensheng guan). However, his support for the government came out of a 
largely conservative mindset; he said that the CCP alone had been able to bring an end to the 
cycles of chaos and disorder unleashed by the collapse of the Qing Dynasty.237 Another People’s 
Daily editorial was written by a Beijing intellectual, Wang Shutang, who moved to the city after 
growing up in a rural village. Wang spent little time discussing his ideology, but instead 
criticized his “luxurious” life in the city: buying clothes from shopping centers and living in a 
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comfortable apartment, for example. Wang pledged to devote more time to physical exercise and 
communal well-being.238 These public confessions may have been intended to create a certain 
image of the intellectual in the public’s eye. Nevertheless, they show little of the genuine self-
reflection of other documents from the same period. 
 The earliest confessions came out of major cities like Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai. 
However, the state put significant effort into expanding the campaign nationwide by February of 
1952. An editorial by Deng Chumin on February 3 presaged the expansion of Thought Reform. 
Unlike his editorial from January, the February piece portrayed the need for ideological 
rectification work in much starker terms. Deng spent a considerable amount of space repeating 
Maoist slogans and making sharp injunctions against “Western capitalist and imperialist 
traditions” that continued to plague China’s intellectual community.239 Although plenty of 
intellectuals may have still had concerns about the campaign, the forceful defense of Thought 
Reform by the CDL helped the campaign migrate. Moreover, intellectuals quickly learned that 
the Thought Reform Campaign presented opportunities for school reform. In nearby Shandong 
Province, for example, school faculty were encouraged to freely criticize figures in the 
administration in addition to self-criticizing and writing confessions. Cadres and provincial 
government representatives generally made an effort to attend these study sessions, and therefore 
gained a better understanding of teachers’ perspectives.240 
 By mid-February, the campaign had arrived at the southwest, considerable number of 
confessions were collected from Southwest People’s Revolutionary University in Yunnan from 
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both faculty and students alike. Because of the dynamics of the new public people’s universities, 
many students were older, having only been assigned to these schools during the work 
assignment program of 1950-51 in order to continue their education. As such, students at the 
university may have felt that they had more baggage in their personal histories that they needed 
to confess. At the outset of the campaign, students were generally fearful about the campaign. 
Zeng Chao, for example, feared that writing a confession might get him expelled. And having 
lived in a five-member household, he worried that expulsion might harm his family’s capability 
to make a living. Despite his misgivings, Zeng saw his fellow classmates dutifully submitting 
confessions of their own. He wrote that he “tried to come up with something so that my 
classmates wouldn’t doubt me.” However, in reviewing the confessions of his classmates, he 
came to appreciate the extent of wastefulness at the university, which had misappropriated funds 
to the tune of 152,000 yuan (15.2 new RMB) and wasted 200 catties of surplus rice. Over the 
course of the campaign, Zeng changed his views and began to inform on other instances of 
wrongdoing.241  
 The university took these reports of wastefulness and corruption seriously, and combined 
its conduct of the Thought Reform Campaign with the Three-Anti Campaign (the Three-Anti 
Campaign and its overlap with Thought Reform is treated more fully in the following section of 
this chapter). Provost Su announced in a university-wide convention that small-group meetings 
and large assemblies would be held after the dinner hours to tackle both Thought Reform and the 
Three-Anti Campaign. The school used a combination of carrots and sticks to elicit confessions 
from students and faculty. Provost Su announced, for example, that anyone coming forward with 
relevant information about waste or corruption would be given a special “award” (Su was not 
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specific about what the award would be) from the provost’s office. At the same time, the provost 
also said that the campaigns would not end unless they had been “thorough,” and threatened that 
“[the university] will not issue graduation certificates until the campaign has succeeded.”242 This 
seemed to serve as a powerful motivation for student section leaders, who urged others to ignore 
the traditional demands of “face”—that is, to avoid shame or embarrassment by refusing to 
submit confessions.243 One student, Lü Peiyan immediately confessed to having engaged in a 
smuggling operation for Kunming businessmen during 1950, where he ran both gold and opium 
into the city.244 True to form, Lü was not punished for his confession. 
 Other students were far more circumspect. Moreover, it appears that many students had 
not kept up with the shifting tides within the political realm; Qian Sixun, for instance, did not 
understand that the Three-Anti Campaign was meant to apply to society as a whole. Having 
originally thought it only applied to party cadres, he described suffering from bouts of anxiety 
when he realized that everyone at Southwest People’s Revolutionary University would be placed 
under scrutiny.245 Qian ultimately did confess to having engaged in corrupt business practices 
before enrollment. In his confession, he wrote that he helped the owners of a small shop he 
worked for hide the extent of their reported income in 1950 to avoid a higher tax rate from the 
government. And in November of the same year, after he had transferred to work in a cotton 
factory, he accepted a bribe from the foreman to falsify a report of the factory’s annual yield, 
thus leaving an extra 50 catties of cotton untaxed by the state. The foreman then used the surplus 
cotton to undercut cotton supplies from official state-approved sources.246 
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 The situation at the university became more serious by the end of the month. On February 
25, Provost Su announced that a student had committed suicide rather than submit confession 
materials.247 The somber announcement may have helped relax the tense atmosphere at the 
school, with some students realizing that submitting confessions produced little to no 
punishment. Chen Yongxi, for example, had previously “turned a deaf ear” (zhiruo wangwen) to 
the administration’s call for confessions and self-criticism. After the provost’s announcement, 
however, he said that he realized this was not the outcome that Mao Zedong or the Communist 
Party would have wanted. Chen was convinced that the party earnestly wanted to help care for 
the student populace, and believed that engaging in self-criticism was the best way to prepare 
students for life in the new society. As such, Chen resolved to “atone for his sins” (shuzui). He 
confessed to stealing from a grain office in Yanshan County, Hebei in order to provide enough 
money for a childhood friend to return home (Chen’s friend was serving in the PLA). Chen also 
ratted out a classmate who had stolen money from their own workplace in order to host a dinner 
party in Xichou County, Yunnan.248  
 Other students came forth with their own confessions after the February 25 
announcement from Provost Su. Pu Zhongyun, for example, confessed that he had skimmed 
funds off the top of production figures along with his colleagues while working as a secretary in 
an agricultural cooperative in Hekou County, Yunnan.249 Another student, Ding Zhifu, described 
his experiences working on socialist construction projects in the countryside. He had secretly 
hoarded supplies like rice and firewood for himself, sometimes exchanging these commodities 
with villagers for favors. He cultivated a relationship with the local landlord, for example, and 
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traded rice and firewood for the landlord’s private supply of alcohol and meat.250 The increased 
participation in Thought Reform after February 25 may have also affected other students who 
were previously content to watch the campaign from the sidelines. Long Jian, for example, 
described having little emotional attachment to the Communist Party before the start of the 
campaign. Long was a member of one of the recognized ethnic minorities—the Miao people—
and only wanted the campaign to end so he could visit relatives in Myanmar over the holiday. 
However, Long described developing an intense zeal for the campaign and a deepening 
allegiance to the Communist Party after witnessing the extent of the corruption and waste 
revealed by the confessions.251 
 It is difficult to say how genuine these confessions were. To be sure, practices such as 
skimming funds off the top were no doubt widespread, but students—especially Zeng Chao and 
Qian Sixun—described an intense pressure to confess to something. Others may have 
intentionally inflated the extent of their illegal activities in order to satisfy the administration’s 
desire for a spectacular, cathartic process of self-criticism. Qian ultimately confessed to hiding 
over 10 million yuan’s worth of taxable revenue (1,000 new RMB) from the government, for 
example. Even if the content of the confessions might invoke some skepticism, however, the 
broad effects are less doubtful. The practice of engaging in self-criticism and submitting 
confessions seems to have built upon itself; the more students participated in the campaign, the 
more popular the campaign became. This led to even more confessions in the long run, and the 
cycle repeated. Although perhaps some students may have only participated opportunistically, 
the broad thrust of the confessions reveal a widespread wrestling with the ideas of status and 
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intellect. And, moreover, these confessions demonstrate a desire for a new era—one marked by a 
more harmonious, cooperative relationship between intellectuals and commoners.  
 By March, the campaign was in full swing at Southwest People’s Revolutionary 
University. The vast majority of the student body had submitted confessions. Zhang Bingming 
confessed to relatively minor crimes in his document, describing his tenure as section chief at 
Yaolong Electric Company in Guangdong Province. About a dozen workers left to join the PLA, 
and many experienced fighting in Korea. Upon returning home, the electric company could not 
afford to give them their old jobs. However, Zhang illicitly stole enough money from the 
company to give each returning soldier 300 yuan.252 Wang Zhengyao, meanwhile, expressed 
remorse for his haughty actions toward fellow villagers back on his family’s plot. One night, 
Wang was out hunting with his dog, who he let run free without a leash (luanpao). That evening, 
however, the dog spotted another villager’s calf and killed it. The other peasants promptly 
reported this incident to the local Public Security Bureau, although it is unclear if Wang or his 
family ever received much punishment.253 These later confessions reveal a collective reckoning 
with the idea of a fractured relationship with the masses. Moreover, they appear in a climate 
much different than in previous months, where few students were even willing to submit 
confessions. As one student described, the prevailing attitude in previous months was “you 
criticize yourself, I’ll criticize myself.”254 By the end of March, however, the campaign had 
blossomed into a nationwide, all-encompassing movement of transformation. 
 Confessions continued to come in throughout the rest of the first half of 1952. Many 
subsequent confessions, having drawn on the model of earlier documents from February and 
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March, described a renewed vigor for activism among the intellectual class. In some cases, 
confessions not only led to no punishment, but could even serve as a conduit for career 
advancement. Yu Deyuan, for example, confessed to seeking “status” and “celebrity” through 
academic publications alone pre-liberation. After 1949, however, Yu had been swept up in mass 
enthusiasm for the new era, and signed up to serve as an adviser to a natural resource survey 
team. In thanks for his service, he was appointed to the position of vice-principal at Northeast 
Geological University.255 Xu Zhilun, head of the Irrigation Department at Jiaotong University in 
Shanghai, had a similar career path that diverged after liberation. Unlike Yu, Xu refused the 
opportunity to work at a hydroelectric engineering bureau in Sichuan. He said that he preferred 
his “cozy, carefree lifestyle” (shushi he anxian de shenghuo) in the city. However, his own 
teaching assistants criticized him during the Thought Reform Campaign, leading to Xu 
submitting a formal confession.256 More so than many other confession documents, Xu’s 
demonstrates the power of young, politically-engaged scholars who found unprecedented 
freedom to criticize their elders.  
 As the Thought Reform Campaign died down over the course of the year, a number of 
university administrators reflected on the campaign. Chen Yuan, president of Furen University 
(which was merged a number of other Beijing schools, like Renmin University, Beijing 
University, and Beijing Normal University before the end of the year), praised the Communist 
Party for “accomplishing a decade’s worth of national construction in under three years.” He also 
expressed extreme confidence that “everyone” at his school had completed their duties in the 
Thought Reform Campaign, leading to a campus-wide transformation. Whereas one professor 
had previously argued that “in order to make a living, self-interest must come first” (wo yiqie 
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weile fanwan, geren liyi diyi), faculty and students were now committed to public welfare.257 The 
president of Renmin University, Wu Yuzhang, echoed these comments in November. Wu said 
that students and faculty at his school were learning from the model of Soviet intellectuals. Wu 
also noted that students who had participated enthusiastically in the Thought Reform Campaign 
were better able to find good jobs in government bureaus around the country.258 In Wu’s 
analysis, the campaign had begun to parallel the civil service exams from the imperial era—a 
barrier of entry to state service. Perhaps intellectuals could once again regain their previous role 
as scholar-bureaucrats, but they would have to undergo significantly different patterns of 
preparation and study to do so. 
 The confessions served as the bread and butter of the Thought Reform Campaign. These 
documents represent a more formal approach at expressing the ideas that had been growing 
among academic circles since before liberation, however—in particular, the idea that scholars’ 
primary goal should be establishing a connection with their communities and working in the 
public interest. Through the campaign, these ideas passed from a few committed activist scholars 
to the wider intellectual community. At the same time, the confessions created a certain stigma 
around intellectuals by defining their class character as out-of-touch or arrogant. And within 
universities, the pressure to confess may have exacerbated tensions between generations of 
scholars, as was the case with Xu Zhilun. Both for better and for worse, the campaign and the 
confessions turned the idealistic vision of ideological refashioning into a formal, government-
directed mass project that encompassed all corners of the academic world. 
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Combatting Waste and Inefficiency during the Three-Anti Campaign 
 The Three-Anti Campaign (sanfan yundong), which officially targeted waste, corruption, 
and “bureaucratism” (guanliaozhuyi) initially had little to do with the Thought Reform 
Campaign. Indeed, the first seeds of the campaign were planted in mid and late 1951, when Mao 
Zedong began to fear that the seizure of urban China had led to a dampening of the revolutionary 
enthusiasm of the cadre class. For Mao, the capture of political power was “only the first step in 
a march of 10,000 li” rather than an end unto itself. The chairman became despirited as reports 
from urban China rolled in that described the extensive favor-trading and brokering taking place 
between urban cadres and local businesses and intellectuals. Fearing that urban cadres had begun 
to mirror the same the corrupt practices the CCP had criticized Guomindang state administrators 
for, the government launched the Three-Anti Campaign in December 1951.259 In other cities, 
especially southern areas like Shanghai or Guangzhou, the CCP had been forced to recruit 
heavily from populations initially wary of the Communist Party, and who had extensive contact 
with foreigners. These cadres too were seen as potentially disloyal and in need of rectification.260 
 Early Three-Anti Campaign meetings usually were either classified as “criticism 
sessions” or “struggle sessions.” During criticism sessions, cadres would confess their own 
shortcomings before a small audience of coworkers. Usually, self-criticism was sufficient; 
however, if their colleagues felt they did not fully own up to their mistakes, they would chime in 
with their own criticism. Struggle sessions were far more serious, however, and usually involved 
intense denunciations from a mass audience. Although not permitted by official guidelines, there 
were reports of physical abuse occurring during struggle sessions.261 As such, the Three-Anti 
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Campaign was conducted, initially, in a far different environment and with far different methods 
than the Thought Reform Campaign. However, in the time span of only a few months, the two 
began to overlap. Many of the confessions submitted by intellectuals, envisioned to focus mostly 
on ideological errors, also revealed instances of corruption and waste within the school system. 
As such, these instances of wrongdoing prompted a more thorough state supervision of schools 
and universities to root out corruption under the auspices of the Three-Anti Campaign.  
 Although the Thought Reform and Three-Anti Campaigns were still distinct programs in 
early 1952, the state began to turn to the mobilization of student activists in late January. The 
government mandated that end-of-semester exams would be cancelled for the Fall Semester. 
Cadres on the ground would capitalize on students’ time off to encourage them to conduct 
discreet investigations into any wrongdoing on behalf of their teachers, local government 
officials, or the business community.262 In Beijing, these student-led investigations revealed 
widespread waste at schools and universities. A total of 684 teachers and professors were 
identified as “corrupt” in a report submitted in early February. Moreover, it appeared that 
universities had stockpiled far too many materials for use in scientific laboratories. Beida, for 
example, had secretly been letting a large quantity of vitamin B sit in a storeroom. At Qinghua, 
students uncovered a trove of unused copper sulphate.263 The February report spawned a 
renewed effort to investigate waste in the school system, and revealed an effective strategy for 
doing so: reliance on pro-CCP student activists. 
 By the end of the month, schools and universities around China had begun conducting the 
Three-Anti Campaign. As discussed in the previous section, student confessions from Southwest 
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People’s Revolutionary University reveal a good deal of corrupt dealings. Students confessed to 
financial crimes like smuggling, misrepresenting a business’ finances as a form of tax evasion, 
and stockpiling of luxury items. These confessions too may have influenced the central 
government to press further with the Three-Anti Campaign in an academic context. Theodore 
Chen has shown that, in previous months, universities transformed the Three-Anti Campaign and 
the tangentially-related Five-Anti Campaign into broader struggles against “bourgeois ideology,” 
which became a defining feature of the reorganization of the education system. Teachers and 
professors constantly had to grapple with previous support for anything that could be labelled 
“bourgeois”—which was seen as fundamentally retrograde or reactionary.264 Over time, 
however, the campaign crystallized around more concrete objectives, perhaps partly in response 
to the actual instances of waste being reported in government investigations and the confessions. 
An editorial in Guangming Daily (a newspaper aimed at an intellectual readership) signals this 
change, describing the extent of waste in China’s education system. Ultimately, the waste in 
Beijing was calculated to be equivalent to about 34 jet fighters—the contextualization of the 
costs of waste in a military sense may have been more effective for an audience well aware of 
the intense fighting in nearby Korea. Around the same time, an exhibit on the Three-Anti 
Campaign revealed the systemic problems of waste in the capital. The Beijing College of 
Engineering had wasted hundreds of millions of yuan on scientific instrument sets simply to 
match the supply cache at Qinghua.265 Ultimately, the national government came to see the 
Three-Anti Campaign as relevant within an academic context.  
 A full government report on the state of waste in the education system came out on 
March 15. The report suggested that the norm at many schools and universities was that the 
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administration lacked any real oversight authority over spending and acquisitions, which were 
generally handled by individual academic departments.266 In this regard, the report echoes many 
of the criticisms intellectuals themselves were making of the education system. It was not 
uncommon for university faculty to complain about inter-department competition, which in turn 
may have had financial repercussions for the school as a whole. Moreover, departments that 
spent more were generally able to attract better talent from across the country; the state report 
expresses a general cynicism about intellectual careerism, criticizing professors for “running 
wherever there are higher wages and better jobs” (kandao nali xinshui gaojiu xiang wang nali 
pao). The national government thus noted that students would have to be mobilized in order to 
effectively carry out the Three-Anti Campaign on college campuses.267  
Less than two months later, however, the government went further. During March and 
April, local propaganda departments had increasingly turned toward combining the Thought 
Reform and Three-Anti Campaigns in schools and universities. Local bureaus ultimately 
possessed more authority in handling the day-to-day affairs of carrying out the campaigns, 
although they were still subject to oversight from the national government. In May, the 
government officially directed bureaus to expand the Three-Anti Campaign by merging it with 
the already-underway Thought Reform Campaign.268 Prominent intellectuals like Li Da, 
president of Hunan University, voiced strong support for the merger.269 The first official 
directives regarding the merger of the two campaigns came out later that month, when the 
national government issued a set of instructions to schools after having submitted their 
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confessions for review. The next step was to “check inventories and materials” (qingdian 
zicai).270 In the second half of 1952, the lines between the two campaigns blurred considerably in 
schools and universities. 
 Unfortunately, less data exists on the conduct of the Three-Anti Campaign than the 
Thought Reform Campaign. Unlike the latter, with a wealth of evidence coming from 
confessions and government surveys, there is less of a rich body of source material on the 
former. As such, it seems likely that the national government exercised little oversight over the 
process after its initial steps to merge Thought Reform and the Three-Anti Campaign. As such, 
schools and universities might have had little incentive to undergo a thorough process of rooting 
out waste and corruption. Teachers, meanwhile, were likely exhausted by the frantic pace of 
mobilization campaigns. Many had foregone a vacation to assist in carrying out Land Reform; 
nearly everyone had not taken vacation time to undergo Thought Reform and prepare confession 
materials. As such, many intellectuals had the first opportunity to take a genuine break from 
work in years during the summer of 1952.  
The evidence that exists describing the Three-Anti Campaign tends to support the idea 
that objectives were completed quite quickly. At the Central Arts School in Beijing, for example, 
reported that all rectification work relating to both Thought Reform and the Three-Anti 
Campaign had been completed by July. The report notes that the college identified 103 million 
yuan’s worth of waste, and that the administration had cut the budget accordingly. Moreover, the 
college described the frequent practice of outright plagiarism from American magazines. As 
such, the administration urged faculty and students to realize that “art could not be separated 
from politics” and to reject ideas emanating from the United States.271 Campaign activities also 
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did not take particularly long at Jiaotong University in Shanghai, for example, which completed 
rectification work in three months. The university did admit to serious overstocking issues; the 
chemistry department, for example, had acquired 300 years’ worth of metal antimony (according 
to 1951 rates of usage).272 These reports do suggest that waste was a significant problem 
nationwide, although it appears that university administrations took steps to quickly resolve the 
problem without requiring faculty to sacrifice yet another vacation period. By the start of the fall 
semester, the government’s attention had turned to the question of how to deal with the errors 
and crimes exposed by Thought Reform and the Three-Anti Campaign.  
Ultimately, the Three-Anti Campaign was a relatively minor chapter within the broader 
story of Thought Reform. That being said, the conduct of the campaign reveals a number of key 
conclusions. First, it shows that state policy was multifaceted; that is, government initiatives 
responded to conditions on the ground just as much as imposing ideological dictums from above. 
Second, the campaign demonstrates the continuing reliance of the state on young intellectuals in 
order to accomplish its objectives vis-a-vis education reform, thus accentuating and maybe even 
widening the generation gap among scholars. Third, the publicization of findings on waste and 
corruption in the school system further helped promulgate the party’s vision of the intellectual 
community and the problems within the school system. For many commoners, the reports on 
millions of yuan going to supplies left unused in university stockrooms no doubt soured them 
further on the intellectual community. The party’s efforts to establish direct control over the 
school system thus became further justified in light of these findings. 
 
The Expanding Reach of the State on Campuses 
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 Upon taking control of the country, the Communist Party had far too much on its plate to 
effectively govern the school system. By 1952, however, the party had made strides in a number 
of other areas, from marriage law reform to agrarian policy to the military intervention in the 
Korean War. As such, the time was ripe for the state assumption of power in the nation’s schools 
and universities by 1952. Moreover, the Thought Reform Campaign gave impetus to the 
takeover efforts. In order to ensure that intellectuals adequately fulfilled their required duties or 
studying, criticizing themselves and others, and submitting confessions, cadres would have to be 
installed in the schools; previously, without much enforcement authority, participation in study 
sessions was mostly voluntary and not near universal. The confessions exposed a need for 
transformation in the party’s view—and perhaps the view of the working classes as well. Cadres 
would be needed in order to ensure that intellectuals’ work reflected the catharses reporting in 
the confessions. Moreover, the party would need a say in school administrations in order to cut 
budgets and provide leadership for recalcitrant departments. The government’s goal was to 
establish a rational, hierarchical system of national education along Soviet lines, thus dividing 
the nation into six major education regions (North, Northwest, Northeast, Central South, East, 
and Southwest), each with its own fair share of high-quality institutes of learning. The state 
hoped to prioritize the study of heavy industry in China’s schools to stimulate the 
industrialization of the Chinese hinterland.273 Although the takeover of education remained 
unfinished by the end of the year—and the expansion of state authority was hampered by plenty 
of resistance from below and hesitation from above—the CCP enjoyed a dramatically enlarged 
say in the affairs of China’s schools and universities by 1953. 
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 Until 1952, the biggest contribution of the CCP to the education system was through the 
work assignment program, discussed in Chapter 2. The program ultimately led to an expanded 
faculty roster at schools and universities, where many newcomers had reason to express gratitude 
for the state. In Shanghai, for example, local work assignment bureaus provided teaching 
assignments for thousands of female scholars. Many of these women were previous housewives, 
but had husbands who worked in the city. As such, they tended to stay at home with their 
children and live in one of the suburbs or villages around Shanghai. The party’s work assignment 
program not only provided them with jobs of their own, but allowed housewives to relocate to an 
area convenient for both them and their husbands, thus facilitating better childcare.274 The work 
assignment program was a key first step in the process of asserting control of the education 
system. Without the goodwill the party had built up among previously-unemployed scholars, 
academic workers might not have been as willing to accept the state’s directives and reforms. 
 During the first half of 1952, the state focused more on the expansion of the Thought 
Reform Campaign instead of establishing control of the schools. Although the campaign was 
well underway among academics, other non-academic intellectuals (such as artists or 
professionals) generally remained unaffected by the campaign at the start of the year. Often, the 
party used favorable coverage or critiques from party-friendly intellectuals to justify an 
expansion of the campaign into other professional circles. An editorial in People’s Daily from 
January 9, for example, provides support for party authority over the arts. Chang Xiangyu, a 
professional actor, said that his acting troupe was able to perform productions that they wanted to 
put on (namely, Mulan and Tale of the White Snake) thanks to government support. Chang also 
noted that many of his colleagues had learned to read and write thanks to the state’s literacy 
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campaigns.275 Less than two months later, the party also expanded the Thought Reform 
Campaign among filmmakers in partnership with the Shanghai Filmmakers’ Alliance.276 At the 
end of April, the state seized upon a scathing editorial written by Dai Nianci, an architect 
frustrated with the general practice of shoddy workmanship (tougong jianliao). Dai argued that 
poor construction and a lack of architectural standardization were the result of “old bourgeois 
values.” The government agreed, and actively pushed the Thought Reform Campaign among the 
architect community.277 Although the primary focus of the campaign was always the education 
system, the government similarly used the campaign to solidify its control of other professions 
during the first half of 1952. 
 During the second half of the year, however, as the campaign began to wind down, the 
party turned its attention to a comprehensive takeover of the school system. These efforts began 
in earnest in May, when the national government distributed a set of instructions to local and 
provincial bureaus throughout the country. Each private university or school had to work with a 
party-affiliated work team in order to carry out the Thought Reform Campaign. However, the 
new instructions greatly expanded the agenda of these work teams. Per the report, the work 
teams were tasked with setting up “base-level committees” (jiceng weiyuanhui) and “core 
groups” (hexin zu) within the school, each staffed with party members or party-allied 
intellectuals. These groups and committees would in turn accept the “practical leadership” (shiji 
lingdao) of the overseeing work team.278 Work teams were responsible for reviewing all the 
findings submitted by the core groups and base-level committees, and had to mediate any 
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conflicts that arose within. If a group or committee uncovered any serious political errors or 
crimes, the work teams would then have to forward any relevant information to the local Public 
Security Bureau office. Although submission of materials to the police was serious, work teams 
appeared to have taken this step very rarely. In Yanjing and Furen Universities in Beijing, for 
example, the affiliated work teams only submitted a combined amount of 50 cases to the Public 
Security Bureau out of thousands. Moreover, very few intellectuals were removed from their 
jobs due to a police investigation.279 These administrative reforms explain the effectiveness of 
the Thought Reform Campaign, especially when compared to the informal study sessions of 
1950-51. Even still, there were limits to the reach of the state. At Yanjing and Furen, for 
example, about 10% of faculty managed to escape submitting confessions.280 Nonetheless, the 
government had created a method for infiltrating the school system by the middle of the year. 
 Intellectuals were divided over how receptive they were to the party’s intrusion into the 
education system. Although intellectuals appear to have broadly accepted the party’s directives 
on thought reform, the state takeover of the schools provoked less consensus. Government 
reports blasted older intellectuals for “thinking of themselves as extraordinary” (ziju teshu) and 
“putting on airs” (baijiazi), using these characteristics as explanations for why some intellectuals 
may have opposed the nationalization of education.281 It is unnecessary to accept the 
government’s prejudices, however, to understand why many may have been more skeptical of 
the state’s education policies. For many older professors, they were raised in an environment 
when the path to academic attainment was relatively exclusive and difficult—as such, a system 
of mass education almost certainly would have led to a reduction in status, coupled with an 
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intense increase in workload. Even with the work assignment program, it is unclear if the hiring 
of new education professionals kept pace with enrollment increases. Outside of major coastal 
cities, intellectuals tended to put up greater resistance to the state’s efforts. Although the 
overwhelming majority of intellectuals in Beijing or Shanghai submitted confessions, the rate of 
submissions across China was only between 60% and 70% by mid-1952.282 Even in Shanghai, 
moreover, government documents indicate a noticeably lower inflow of submissions in Beijing 
(although exact figures were not given).283 Unlike with the launching of the Thought Reform and 
Three-Anti Campaigns, the party-state had to confront the geographic limits of its power as it 
moved beyond the campaigns and sought to bring the majority of China’s schools under the 
purview of the state. 
 As was common in other avenues of policy implementation, the government turned to 
building alliances on the ground in order to accomplish its objectives. Allying with student 
groups or other organizations often forced the state to moderate its approach or provide 
incentives to encourage cooperation. In the Chinese Academy of Sciences, a research institute in 
Beijing, for example, the state had minimal influence on the inside. As such, it could only 
coordinate campaigns within the academy through cooperation with the democratic parties, 
which had much more influence among high-ranking scientists. On the other hand, the minor 
parties argued that there could be harmful “counter-effects” (fan xiaoguo) from Thought Reform, 
and persuade the state to adopt a more moderate line: scientists should not reject all previous 
scientific theory, but rather work to understand the relationship between theory and practical 
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utility.284 In the northeast, similarly, the party found itself with a relatively limited influence 
among most schools in the region. The best option, the government concluded, was to 
incentivize students to inform on their teachers by offering admittance into the Youth League in 
exchange for relevant information on others.285 Even then, a severe shortage of cadres in the 
region meant that the local propaganda department had to work through independent school 
administrations and teachers’ unions.286 These alliances allowed the government much greater 
influence outside of its centers of power, but there was a cost. Some intellectuals could moreover 
seize upon the climate to advance their own careers, whether they were students who could gain 
easy admission into the Youth League or democratic party members who could trade a stake in 
policymaking in turn for providing influence among intellectuals.  
 As the state continued to implement its takeover policies throughout the summer, it fine-
tuned its appeal to intellectuals. Although there was a sizeable contingent of intellectuals 
identified as “progressives”—those who supported the party and were committed to socialist 
ideology, the party’s popularity in the schools also depended on winning over some classified as 
“centrists” or even “retrogressives.” At Yanjing University, only recently nationalized, party 
cadres came in with instructions to focus on emphasizing nationalism over socialist ideology in 
winning over the faculty. Rather than discussing class or capital, cadres instead focused study 
sessions on patriotic zeal, criticizing the common belief that “America is number one in the 
world, while nothing works in China” (meiguo shijie diyi, zhongguo yiqie buxing).287 One of 
Mao’s personal advisers, Chen Boda, made an appeal to scientific experts through a speech at the 
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Academy of Sciences, noting that the new era was “an opportunity for the extensive application 
of scientific knowledge” in order to promote national reconstruction efforts. Chen also used his 
connections within the party to press the leadership to acknowledge that the revolution could not 
have succeeded without key support from intellectuals.288 Chen also made a pragmatic pitch for 
the party-state, arguing that the CCP alone provided the security necessary to industrialize—a 
feat that neither the Qing Dynasty nor the Guomindang could accomplish. In other words, 
according to Chen, now was the intellectual’s chance to contribute to a real national 
transformation.289 These various efforts from the party realized that it had to adopt new strategies 
to convince intellectuals that the nationalization of education would be beneficial. Influence also 
went both ways; just as the state changed the national environment scholars operated in, scholars 
mediated the state’s approach and policy priorities.  
 During the fall semester, the state continued to press forward with efforts to expand its 
control of the education system, while still working with academic workers on the ground. These 
efforts were generally successful, particularly in cementing the loyalty of student activists. At 
Shandong University, for example, professors remained broadly supportive of the American 
model (even if they supported the Resist America, Aid Korea Campaign). Previously, the extent 
of party influence had been through textbooks; cadres would criticize the usage of “out-of-date” 
materials in the classroom, and then require professors to use texts produced by the Central 
Propaganda Department. However, hundreds of applications were streaming in from students 
eager to join the Youth League, allowing cadres to harness young scholars to promote the party 
line.290 The central government doubled down on its appeal to young intellectuals by instructing 
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work assignment bureaus across the county to assist recent graduates in finding employment, 
alongside those suffering from long-term unemployment.291 Moreover, the state promoted an 
overall expansion of the work assignment program for intellectuals. In Shanghai, the Office on 
Handling Unemployed Intellectuals had added 116 new cadres since its inception in late 1951. 
Many of these cadres had been temporarily assigned from other bureaus, such as Work Affairs, 
Human Affairs, or the Labor Employment Office. The objective was to distribute talent 
optimally by relying on the specialized knowledge of these cadres.292 Work assignment bureaus 
became increasingly willing to assign intellectuals to work in other parts of the country in order 
to guarantee fulfilling employment; in Shanghai, for instance, the work assignment office began 
deploying out-of-work intellectuals to the northeast or Inner Mongolia by the end of 1952.293 As 
such, intellectuals could generally expect to find fulfilling, good careers where they could apply 
their expertise most optimally. The favorable climate for intellectuals did much to soften the 
blow of the state’s education policies. 
 The state also reviewed the conduct of the Thought Reform Campaign and encouraged 
policy changes to better address the concerns of the participants. In Shenyang, the capital of the 
northeastern Liaoning Province, a report analyzed the shortcomings of Thought Reform efforts 
during the previous summer. Although the state had opened the door to the employment of 
female scholars in the school system, party cadres were sometimes insensitive to the needs of 
women while conducting thought rectification work. Many women employed by the Shenyang 
school system were expected to shoulder the burden of childcare during the summer in their 
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families, and could not do so adequately while they were on campus participating in Thought 
Reform. As such, the city government provided free nursery care for the children of female 
intellectuals so they could study.294 Although these policies met approval from the central 
government, the state also criticized the insistence of local cadres on long study sessions, which 
were taxing on pregnant women, women who had recently given birth, or professors of advanced 
age.295 The Shenyang report also described successes in improving the day-to-day lives of 
intellectuals; campaigns to eliminate pests like bed bugs or mosquitos were seen as a means of 
improving intellectuals’ sleep.296 Ultimately, the report demonstrated the successes of working 
alongside intellectuals and the drawbacks of cadre inflexibility. 
 On October 17, the national Ministry of Education released a report on developments 
within the school system thus far, as well as a five-year plan for deepening state control of the 
education system. The report is a testament to the rapid changes that had occurred over the 
course of the previous few years—many of them during 1952 itself. University enrollments had 
increased by 218.2% since the Communist victory in late 1949, with 95 new colleges or 
universities having been constructed. Enrollments in secondary school were relatively similar, 
increasing by 230.4%. However, the number of newly-constructed secondary schools vastly 
exceeded the number of new universities, with the government building 3500 new secondary 
schools around the country.297 The Ministry of Education agreed with the central government’s 
initiatives to find work for unemployed intellectuals, and argued that the construction of new 
schools would open up more jobs for intellectuals. At the same time, the new hires would be 
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subject to increased scrutiny. The Ministry of Education instructed all local government branches 
to periodically review the work and research of intellectuals, as well as direct the practical 
application of intellectuals’ talents through cadre-training and promoting mass literacy.298  
Over the next five years, the Ministry described a plan to achieve near-full state control 
of the education system. First, foreign-owned private schools would be prioritized for 
nationalization, followed by domestically-owned academies. In general, the Ministry also 
prioritized the takeover of schools with poor achievement and/or funding over those in a better 
situation. Moreover, secondary schools would be nationalized before primary schools. In the 
case of private schools catering to ethnic minorities, the Ministry pledged to hold off on full 
nationalization, although the state would provide supplemental financial assistance and assume 
control over any schools that “volunteered.” Lastly, although the plan ultimately left few schools 
outside of the state apparatus, the Ministry did pledge to not discriminate against or ignore 
schools that remained private.299 This ambitious agenda was feasible due to the expansion of the 
education system, the work assignment program, and the formalization of the Thought Reform 
Campaign. 
The state of education had thus changed dramatically by the end of 1952 in contrast with 
the beginning. Enrollments in both secondary and higher education had more than doubled over 
the past three years, with thousands of new institutions under construction. The state also 
approved a method for establishing control of the school system that relied on infiltration 
through contacts and alliances with party-friendly sources on the inside. This meant that school 
institutions’ autonomy all but disappeared by the end of the year. Intellectuals’ salaries and 
benefits were now directly under the state’s purview. The kind of self-directed study system that 
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had thus far predominated would have been impossible after 1952. Although scholars would face 
nearly unprecedented scrutiny over their professional lives, thoughts, and work after 1952, not all 
effects of the state takeover of education were negative. Intellectuals were able to gain a seat at 
the policymaking table through strategic alliances with cadres on the ground. Those identified as 
“activists,” particularly students, could expect rewards and favorable career prospects in 
exchange for service to the party. Lastly, it would be a mistake to assume that the nationalization 
of education also implied a standardization of experience. Outside of Beijing, the party faced 
more challenges in extracting confessions and asserting control. Cadres thus were even more 
reliant on cooperation from intellectuals on the ground. The options for intellectuals to have a 
say in the future of their school and the nation as a whole did not disappear alongside school 
autonomy during the course of the year. 
 
A Question of Punishment: State Responses to the Confessions 
 With the state exercising an unprecedented degree of control over the schools, and a 
litany of “wrongdoings” exposed via the confessions as well as the Three-Anti Campaign, the 
question of what to do about wayward behavior among intellectuals naturally became a focus of 
the party center during 1952. Ultimately, the state settled on a policy of doing very little beyond 
carrying out the Thought Reform Campaign. The most severe cases—intellectuals labelled as 
“reactionaries” or “counterrevolutionaries”—were generally handled by submitting biographical 
information to the local Public Security Bureau, although few if any corrective actions were ever 
taken. At the same time, there was no nationwide universal standard for handling problematic 
intellectuals. The national government had to rely on cadres to enforce discipline in the school 
system outside of Beijing, and many of these cadres had significantly worse personal or working 
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relationships with the intellectuals they oversaw than the national government did. As such, 1952 
saw the beginnings of a divide between policy from the center and implementation on the 
ground. In almost all cases, any gaps usually came from cadres being harsher than the state may 
have wanted them to be. A number of government instructions from the year appear to have been 
in direct response to cadre overreach, sternly telling party workers on the ground to back off 
from an overly confrontational approach to managing the schools. Overall, the question of 
punishment reveals a relatively lenient climate for intellectuals at this juncture.  
 Of course, there were also geographic differences between standards of punishment as 
well. It was not uncommon for intellectuals critical of the CCP to flee from the eastern littoral 
zone inland after 1949, suggesting that cadres in western China may have been confronted with 
far less amicable scholars than their colleagues along the coast. A report from the Northwest 
Bureau at the beginning of 1952, for example, suggests a climate of severe paranoia among local 
cadres about intellectuals. Having surveyed 775 universities and schools in the region, cadres 
noted that 53.3% of teachers and professors had previously held membership in a “reactionary 
political party”—most likely, the Guomindang. As such, cadres painted a dire portrait of the 
situation, saying that there were reactionaries “hiding in the dark” (anzhong qianfu) throughout 
the northwest region.300 Since local work teams also had the final authority in setting an agenda 
for Thought Reform, northwest cadres settled on a significantly more thorough program of 
rectification work that would last the entire year (some schools on the coast, by contrast, 
completed Thought Reform duties in a matter of months). During the first half of the year, 
intellectuals in northwestern schools would be required to participate in individual study 
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programs. Group study sessions would be held throughout the second half of 1952.301 The report 
from northwest demonstrates both the authority given to local administrators in carrying out the 
campaigns, as well as the willingness of cadres on the ground to go beyond the instructions of 
the party center. 
 Requiring a year-long commitment to rectification work was highly irregular, however. 
In May, as the state made plans to cement control over the school system, the party center 
published a set of guidelines for taking over private universities in Beijing. The document 
proposes a “don’t pursue, don’t compel” (buzhui bubi) policy with regards to getting intellectuals 
to attend study sessions or submit confessions.302 It would be a mistake to say that the state’s 
approach was non-coercive, however; it is clear that plenty of pressure, perhaps from peers just 
as much as cadres, fell on intellectuals to perform their Thought Reform duties. At the same 
time, there were at least some limits to the extent of coercion the national government was 
willing to tolerate. In Beijing, for example, about 11% of intellectuals ultimately refused to 
submit confessions—a small number, but not insignificant.303 The party was also careful to not 
alienate intellectuals even as it leveled criticism at them. In a publicized case from April of a 
right-wing scientist at the Academy of Sciences, Le Tianyu, cadres suggest that Le may have 
been insulated from the problems of the masses due his landlord background. Moreover, the 
party gave explicit instructions that Le would have a chance to stay at the academy and reflect on 
his political positions rather than being cast out.304 Ultimately, the response favored by the state 
was to promote rehabilitation rather than punish or imprison wrongdoers or those with 
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“incorrect” ideologies. Although the overwhelming majority of intellectuals were willing to 
cooperate, those that refused to do so probably did not face serious backlash until later in the 
Maoist period.  
 In some cases, party cadres were more concerned with rewards than punishment. A report 
from a number of schools in the southwest—Chongqing University, Southwest Normal 
University, and Southwest Work Specialization University—praised the diligence of the 
professoriate in carrying out Thought Reform work. As such, regional cadres proposed that these 
universities be allowed to “rapidly go through” (xunsu guoguan) rectification work, completing 
the campaign in a couple of months.305 The report also said that no explicit punishment would be 
recommended for those with “serious problems” in their political histories. Indeed, cadres held 
out an olive branch to right-wing intellectuals, describing the case of the professors Wu Mi and 
Liu Pu. Although both were extremely opposed to the CCP at the outset of the Maoist period, 
both gradually shifted their views over the course of the next three years.306 As such, Wu and Liu 
served as models for the possibility of genuine transformation. Although it is unclear if this 
climate of leniency persisted throughout the wider southwestern region, it is clear that some 
schools and universities had relatively painless experiences of the Thought Reform Campaign. 
 A report from Nanjing University from around the same time describes a different 
approach cadres took under different circumstances. Nanjing cadres expressed a general sense of 
wariness about the university’s faculty, 29% of whom had materials that were ultimately 
submitted to the Public Security Bureau. Cadres were apparently concerned that the apparent 
progress made during Thought Reform was transient, and thus instructed professors to keep 
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personal diaries detailing their old habits and patterns of thinking. The idea was that these diary 
entries could help “overcome the forgetting of old habits” (kefu danwang de jixi).307 Unlike in 
Beijing, Nanjing cadres had difficulty getting a majority of professors to submit confessions; 
roughly 30% of campaign participants ultimately refused to provide biographical materials to the 
authorities.308 Even still, it is unclear if many of these intellectuals were punished or removed 
from their jobs. The case of Nanjing University represents a sort of middle road, where cadres 
remained wary of intellectuals but only carried out relatively benign corrective actions—in this 
case, the writing of diary entries. 
 The national government took a few steps to rein in overzealous activity at the local level. 
In a memorandum submitted on July 25, the state laid out new guidelines expressly prohibiting 
the incarceration or physical torture of any intellectuals, no matter the extent of their 
counterrevolutionary history.309 It is difficult to know whether there were many instances of 
torture or imprisonment used against scholars. The report itself cites no specific cases, nor do 
academic studies from the time.310 To be sure, those identified as “counterrevolutionaries” 
outside of an academic context may have faced incarceration, torture, or execution (especially if 
they were found to have committed crimes against the state, such as sabotage). It is possible that 
some intellectuals may have been caught up in the concurrent Suppress the 
Counterrevolutionaries Campaign, and punished accordingly. That said, available source 
material at the time cannot confirm how widespread the use of physical punishment was for 
intellectuals. Either way, it is significant that concrete protections for intellectuals were 
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established as a result of the July 25 guidelines. The government established similar guidelines 
with respect to medical personnel in particular, noting that they could not be considered the same 
as “general intellectuals” (yiban zhishifenzi) due to the critical nature of their work. Although 
less specific than the July 25 guidelines, the Central Propaganda Department told local branches 
to “avoid agitation” (buyao gudong) when pushing for medical professionals to undergo Thought 
Reform.311 Although little to no evidence exists of severe punishments being levied against 
intellectuals, both academics and non-academic intellectuals enjoyed expanded legal protections 
from local cadre overreach by the second half of the year. 
 As the Thought Reform Campaign came to a close at the end of the year, regional 
bureaus submitted work reports detailing how local intellectuals responded to the campaigns as 
well as whatever further corrective steps provincial or municipal governments were planning to 
take. In the northeast, most evidence indicates a generally successful implementation of the 
Thought Reform Campaign. As previously indicated, the regional bureau successfully recruited a 
number of students to assist in carrying out both Thought Reform and the Three-Anti Campaign, 
leading to a speedy process; rectification work was completed in only 45 days.312 The Northeast 
Bureau released guidelines on punishment for intellectuals by the end of October, although these 
instructions were extremely vague. In cases where an intellectual may have “committed great 
evils” (zuida eji) or those who possessed “blood debts” (xuezhai) could be subject to 
incarceration—although no specifics are given about what specific actions might constitute a 
“great evil” or “blood debt.”313 More likely, these stipulations may have become more relevant in 
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the future, when old actions could come back to haunt intellectuals, for example, during the Anti-
Rightist Campaign of 1957. Ultimately, the state gained critical information over the vast 
majority of intellectuals, which could then be used as leverage or even to discredit them at a later 
date. At the time, however, there is no record of active steps taken against right-wing 
intellectuals in the northeast. As long as intellectuals were willing to “confess” their previous 
ideological errors (even if the authorities suspected that intellectuals were not sincere in these 
confessions), the most they might deal with in the short term was increased supervision.314 
 Reports from other regional bureaus echo the Northeast Bureau’s insistence on the 
highly-subjective standard of sincerity. In the southwest, records show that intellectuals “capable 
of being honest” (nenggou tanbai) about any previous shortcomings or flaws would not be 
punished in any form. Similar to the northeast, the Southwest Bureau adopted a wait-and-see 
approach with intellectuals who were deemed unrepentant, which involved allowing them to 
keep their jobs.315 The central government was quick to use this lenient policy as a model for 
other regional bureaus; the party center forwarded the report from the southwest to other regional 
bureaus, praising their wait-and-see approach for “not raising the masses’ misgivings” (yimian 
zengjia zunzhong yilü) and instructing other bureaus to “take note” (jiayi zhuyi).316 In areas 
where intellectuals were generally seen as in need of further thought rectification, party officials 
would rely on simply extending the Thought Reform Campaign instead of using punishment. In 
Shaanxi, for example, the provincial party committee was unsatisfied with the rate of progress in 
carrying out Thought Reform, and established special study branches (xuexi fenhui) that would 
continue rectification work through the end of the year and into 1953 if necessary. The provincial 
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government exerted active oversight over the special study branches by deploying section chiefs 
(kezhang zhuanmen) from the provincial state apparatus to oversee meetings.317 Although these 
moves may have continued the overall disruption of intellectuals’ lives, it was clear that regional 
party branches could not stray too far from the national government’s line, which emphasized 
leniency and a conservative approach to dealing with problematic intellectuals. 
 The Thought Reform Campaign was ultimately an exercise in self-reflection and self-
criticism, and involved few real consequences at this juncture. There is scant evidence that any 
significant number of intellectuals lost their jobs, faced incarceration, or were subjected to 
physical torture as a result of the campaign. Communications between regional party branches 
and the state do suggest that local cadres may have had a dimmer view of the intellectuals under 
their charge, although in every documented case the regional, provincial, or municipal party 
branches acquiesced to the central government’s instructions to pursue a lenient approach in 
dealing with intellectuals. The worst a local government branch might do was usually just to 
extend the duration of the Thought Reform Campaign within its area, which is indicative of an 
overall bloodless—if also disruptive and inconvenient—method of handling problematic 
scholars. In the long term, however, the relationship between local cadres and intellectuals 
soured. The memory of Thought Reform fresh in their minds, where student activists were 
critical to the successful implementation of the campaign, cadres increasingly grew to suspect 
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 Compared to the first two years of PRC history, 1952 was significantly more eventful. 
Confident after overcoming the worst crises of 1950-51, the CCP launched steps to transform the 
education system and enshrine party rule in the schools. A necessary precondition for 
institutional transformation was transformation of the individuals within first—and thus, the 
Thought Reform Campaign was spawned. Intellectuals had been engaging in self-directed study 
and even some group criticism for some time, but the campaign made these meetings mandatory. 
And intellectuals had to go much further than the past, writing and submitting confessions that 
detailing their class background, political history, and any crimes or ideological mistakes they 
had committed. These confessions tend to suggest a willingness to wrestle with the ideas of class 
inequalities and their own privilege. Moreover, they informed the state of genuine problems of 
corruption and waste within the education system, prompting the party to expand the concurrent 
Three-Anti Campaign into the schools. Over the course of the year, implementing these 
campaigns required greater formal authority over the schools. Slowly, campaign teams infiltrated 
school and university administrations, gradually taking control of the majority, if not all, of 
China’s schools in just a year’s time. With the nationalization of education accomplished, the 
state could then begin to think about what punitive measures might be taken against intellectuals 
in light of the errors and crimes revealed in the confessions and in the Three-Anti Campaign. The 
central government consistently urged subnational branches to take a lenient approach; the worst 
an intellectual might face would be having their information forwarded to the local Public 
Security Bureau and facing increased supervision from party cadres. But—perhaps to the chagrin 
of local cadres, who grew an increasing distaste for intellectuals—no intellectuals faced any 
meaningful, officially-sanctioned punishment. 
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 The year thus saw huge changes with respect to the education system and the daily lives 
of intellectuals, although nothing like the excesses of the later Anti-Rightist Campaign or, 
especially, the Cultural Revolution in the next decade resulted. The party had managed to nest 
itself inside institutions of learning, but the lesson of the past years had not yet been forgotten: 
succeeding in policy goals required the government to work alongside intellectuals rather than in 
opposition. Cadres on the ground would have been unable to collect confessions or establish 
control of school administrations without the willing support of some intellectuals, especially 
student activists. Often, young intellectuals who cooperated had to be enticed with the promise of 
Youth League membership, which could bolster long-term career prospects. Arguably, the entire 
idea of the Thought Reform Campaign could never have been implemented without the 
spontaneous popularity of ideological refashioning in previous years. All this being said, 
however, the year fundamentally changed the dynamics of the relationship between intellectuals 
and the state. Moving forward, the government would be far more visible to China’s scholars, 
who now worked for local cadres in the school administrations. And no matter what the central 
government’s broader plans were for intellectuals, the relationship would be mediated by cadres 
on the ground, who showed signs of desiring to take a harder line with intellectuals than the 
national government may have been comfortable with at the time. The year thus saw the sowing 
of the seeds of conflict that would continue to grow over the rest of the decade.  
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CHAPTER 4: CRISSCROSSING AGENDAS, 1953-1955 
 In theory, everything should have calmed down after 1952. The Communist Party had 
reshaped society in a few short years, transforming both urban and rural spaces along socialist 
lines. Party cadres exercised unprecedented authority over the school system, effectively ending 
the long predominance of private academies in Chinese history. Intellectuals, who had suffered 
from a long decline in standards of living and a severe unemployment crisis, found stable jobs 
both in and outside of academia. However, the 1953-1955 years were far from calm. The party-
state continued to deal with the fallout of the Thought Reform Campaign, and it slowly began to 
realize how deeply-rooted the conflict between cadres and intellectuals truly was. For 
intellectuals, who had generally been supportive of—or at least open to—the CCP’s policies 
began to chafe under the harsh regimens of their new administrations. Scholars who had been 
greatly affected by their experiences in campaigns like Land Reform, offered support for 
intervention in the Korean War, and who had organized spontaneous study sessions in advance 
of the formal Thought Reform Campaign, gradually soured on the state. As the organs of state 
governance expanded and deepend, intellectuals sought out new avenues of voicing their 
discontent. 
 The mid-1950s thus represent a critical juncture in the decade, as all three primary 
actors—the party-state, cadres on the ground, and intellectuals—increasingly became aware of 
the divergences in their interests. Government policies in the second half of the decade would 
have to grapple with cadre resentment of what they perceived as disproportionate privilege 
among the intellectuals, as well as intellectual dissatisfaction with workloads and standards of 
living. Ultimately, the turmoil bubbling beneath the surface in the 1953-55 years spawned a 
number of widely different attempts by the party-state to deal with the “problem” of 
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intellectuals—from appeasement in 1956, to repression in 1957, and ultimately to a strange 
synthesis at the end of the decade. A view from the top would suggest that the party’s policy 
shifts were planned from the start; as Mao Zedong described in an early 1957 speech, the 
Communists’ favored format for resolving issues between the state and the people was “unity—
criticism—unity” (tuanjie—piping—tuanjie).318 In reality, however, this formula belies the 
ambiguities exposed during the 1953-55 period, during which the party-state had to wrestle with 
the crisscrossing priorities of both its cadres on the ground as well as the intellectuals it identified 
as key to national reconstruction.  
 The Communist Party, its cadres, and intellectuals—both inside and outside of 
academia—all went through significant changes from 1953 to 1955. The CCP initially backed 
off of its intense focus on establishing supervision of intellectuals’ lives of 1952, preferring a 
more hands-off approach. For 1953 and much of 1954, the CCP continued to try and rein in the 
excesses of the Thought Reform Campaign, all the while taking stock of the actual political 
ramifications of rectification. Over time, however, the state came to grips with the worsening 
relationship between cadres and intellectuals, to the extent that it felt that it had to act. The 
government did so awkwardly, promoting criticism campaigns against “rightist” intellectuals like 
Hu Feng or Hu Shi before shifting gears and attempting to bring cadres and intellectuals closer 
together in 1955. Overall, the party-state realized that it would have to take a proactive approach 
to education and intellectual policy in order to ameliorate the tensions on the ground. Cadres, 
meanwhile, grew increasingly resentful of intellectuals, who they saw as elitist, out-of-touch, and 
recalcitrant. As intellectuals’ standards of living did improve in the aftermath of Thought 
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Reform, cadres began to express frustration at the advantages scholars had over commoners—
particularly in light of the linkages between generational wealth and intellectual status, as 
discussed in Chapter 1. Intellectuals, meanwhile, seized upon the more lenient climate and began 
to push for improvements in their livelihoods. Through petitioning government offices or 
working through their danwei (work unit), intellectuals engaged in a new bout of activism with 
the intent of improving their and their families’ standards of living.  
 
The Maturation of the State’s Policies toward Intellectuals 
 From the beginning, the year 1953 showed signs of significant changes from the previous 
ones. A government memorandum from the beginning of the year, addressed toward cadres 
working in the school system, indicated that the Thought Reform Campaign was only 
“temporary” and “should not become a universal facet” (buyi pubian jianli) of college life.319 
Although the Thought Reform Campaign was never meant to last forever, the January 
memorandum shows a willingness of the party center to confront overly punitive cadres, who 
may have extended the rectification movement as a sort of punitive measure (see Chapter 2). 
There were probably two major reasons for this policy shift. First, the state had good reason to 
feel confident at the outset of 1953. It had nearly fought the United States, the most powerful 
military in the world, to a standstill in Korea, and national reconstruction was proceeding 
spectacularly. Overall production figures had at last surpassed those from 1936, just before the 
Japanese invasion at the outset of World War II. Landholdings were equalized, and the currency 
was stable.320 Second, the state had come to grapple with the dark ramifications of the Thought 
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Reform Campaign. Although the CCP had generally encouraged cadres to punish intellectuals 
sparingly, and had in most cases prohibited violence or incarceration, the central government 
was not all-powerful. Reports from the northwest in February 1953 indicated that two professors 
from the region, Ding Xinwu and Li Xiaomin, had died from stress-induced illness and suicide, 
respectively. Alarmed by these reports, the central government issued instructions that all 
municipal and provincial branches should ensure the material well-being of the intellectual 
class.321 The state’s attention had been roused to the plight of the intellectual class, although it 
saw little need for transformative policy changes at this point. 
 Nevertheless, the government still made an effort to rein in sub-national organs of 
government. On the heels of the report from northwest regarding the deaths of Ding and Li, the 
CCP Central Committee released a more detailed set of instructions of February 2, calling on all 
party members to “attentively listen” (qingting) to the “shouting” (husheng) of the intellectuals. 
The Central Committee then suggested that local party members ought to “resolve the reasonable 
demands” (jiejue heli yaoqiu) of scholars.322 The February 2 memorandum represents a shift in 
the state’s policies toward intellectuals, although not necessarily a sea change. The government 
had consistently maintained that one of the most effective ways of transforming the class 
consciousness of the intellectuals was through generational change, and the February 2 
instructions reaffirmed that approach. The report called on all local branches to admit young 
intellectuals into the Youth League en masse, barring any findings of serious political errors.323 
This report led to institutional changes on the ground. In Shanghai, for example, where the 
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Office on Handling Unemployed Intellectuals was wrapping up its work, a separate Youth 
Committee was established within the office to focus on providing for young intellectuals and 
channeling their energies into the Youth League. The Youth Committee had expanded into every 
municipal district by the end of March.324 The first few months of 1953 suggest that the party 
center was willinging to recalibrate its short-term policies toward intellectuals, although less so 
its long-term strategies. The extent of the problem had yet to reveal itself. 
 One critical change at this juncture was the promulgation of the work unit (or danwei) 
system. Danwei refers to a social organization based on one’s area of employment that was in 
turn responsible for meting out benefits like food, salaries, and housing. Although historical 
scholarship on the origins of the danwei is inconclusive, it seems that they were formally 
established at some point in the first few years of the PRC.325 In February 1951, the architect of 
early PRC labor laws, Li Lisan, passed a series of provisions regarding medical care, disability 
pay, and retirement pensions. These reforms likely led to the formation of the danwei system.326 
In terms of my own research, the historical record shows no mention of danwei representing 
intellectuals until 1953. The danwei produced a unique interplay of state, small organization, and 
the masses unlike the system that existed in the Soviet Union. In Communist China, municipal 
governments rarely owned more than 10% of the housing in the cities they governed; instead, the 
 
324 Shanghaishi chuli shiye zhishifenzi weiyuanhui guanyu yu guohua tongzhi linshi diaolai de han, March 26, 1953, 
B23-4-549-13, Shanghai Municipal Human Affairs Office, SMA. 
325 Xiaobo Lü argues that the danwei emerged out of supply pooling groups among PLA units during the civil war as 
well as World War II in “Minor Public Economy: The Revolutionary Origins of the Danwei.” Elizabeth J. Perry 
argues that the danwei emerged out of labor union cells in “From Native Place to Workplace: Labor Origins and 
Outcomes of China’s Danwei System.” Wen-hsin Yeh instead draws attention to the role of white-collar work 
associations (such as the one in the Shanghai branch of the Bank of China in the Republican Era) as a possible origin 
source in “The Republican Origins of the Danwei: The Case of Shanghai’s Bank of China.” Kenneth M. Straus 
suggests that the Chinese Communists looked to the factory management organizations in the USSR as a source of 
inspiration for the danwei in “The Soviet Factory as Community Organizer.” All are in Danwei, edited by Lü and 
Perry. 
326 Perry, “From Native Place to Workplace,” in Danwei, 45.  
138 
danwei controlled the other 90% and took on the responsibilities for housing their employees.327 
For the state and its municipal sub-branches, the danwei were a convenient answer to the 
problems of governance. Danwei allowed for the state to forego expenditures on costly bureaus 
(such as a national housing administration), centralize economic planning objectives, and ensure 
a simplified mechanism of purchasing and distributing foodstuffs.328 For intellectuals in 
particular, the formation of the danwei was beneficial in creating an organ of governance with a 
responsibility, in theory, to be responsive to their needs. Over the course of the 1950s, 
intellectuals increasingly turned to their danwei to voice their concerns and express frustrations 
with their standards of living. 
Municipal governments began to wrap up their work assignment programs in the second 
half of 1953. As time had wore on, unemployed intellectuals were able to have more of a say in 
the process of finding a job, although only indirectly. The rise of the danwei allowed for 
representatives to provide some degree of oversight over the assignment process.329 As cities had 
begun to fill up, however, municipal work assignment bureaus began deploying intellectuals to 
the nation’s peripheral areas. In Shanghai, for example, hundreds of intellectuals were assigned 
to work posts in Inner Mongolia during 1953. The danwei representing intellectuals could 
influence assignments through submitting information about an unemployed intellectual’s 
“expected personnel use” (yongren) and “requested work conditions” (yaoqiu tiaojian).330 At the 
same time, danwei requests were not necessarily honored. Still, the process shows that 
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intellectuals at least were able to exercise more indirect on the process of work assignment than 
they had during the previous several years. Moreover, the Office on Handling Unemployed 
Intellectuals in Shanghai increasingly turned to danwei in order to administer the aptitude tests 
that were used to determine an intellectual’s career prospects.331 This would have been both 
more convenient for intellectuals, and moreover might have allowed them to fudge test results 
without the municipal office knowing. Although no documentation of such fudging exists, it 
does appear that the Shanghai government had become increasingly concerned with fraudulent 
applications to the work assignment program. As such, the city required intellectuals who had 
older degrees to renew their credentials, which often involved participation in formal political 
study courses.332 As such, one of the hitherto hardest demographics to reach during Thought 
Reform had been brought under the purview of the state. 
 By June 1953, over 500 unemployed intellectuals from Shanghai had been assigned to a 
work post in Inner Mongolia—usually, for work in secondary education, teaching subjects like 
chemistry, history, or biology.333 As such, intellectuals became part of the wider story of the 
changing ethnic politics in China. Although the CCP had promised an equal say in politics to the 
nation’s numerous ethnic minorities, the government’s policies in power proved quite different. 
The state had moved to aggressively change the demographic character of ethnic minority 
regions like Inner Mongolia, where ethnic Mongols dropped from 20% to 13% of the population 
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within a few years of liberation.334 In general, qualifications for a job in Inner Mongolia were 
much laxer than for a job in the city. Even intellectuals who had not finished a secondary or 
university degree program were eligible for assignment to Inner Mongolia. Moreover, it appears 
that a large number of these assignments went to those who were deemed ideologically 
problematic. Of the 500 intellectuals sent to Inner Mongolia, a full 191 had previously belonged 
to a “reactionary” political party like the Guomindang. Of those 191, 44 had gone through 
special, intensive background screenings by the local Public Security Bureau.335 Perhaps because 
these intellectuals felt that their only real career prospects was to take jobs in far-out Inner 
Mongolia, many were dissatisfied with their assignments. Some of this may have come from a 
lack of knowledge about the region. A common belief was that “the entire province is covered in 
deserts, steppes, and yurts.” Others seemed to be under the impression that almost no one lived 
in the province (renyan xishao).336 Although some intellectuals could influence their assignment 
through working with their respective danwei, those with low levels of political influence 
generally had to take whatever they could. 
 The work assignment program came to an official close at the end of the year. In 
Shanghai, the program had been enormously successful, finding about 30,000 unemployed 
intellectuals jobs or enrolling them in an advanced degree program.337 The party-state began to 
back off from the intense management of intellectuals’ lives it had insisted on over the past three 
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years. To the extent that intellectuals had any kind of formal contact with the state, it was 
generally through the government’s efforts to improve standards of living in urban China. The 
national government had made improving educational facilities and expanding housing options a 
priority in mid-1953.338 Moreover, the state finally dealt with the flood of complaints from 
intellectuals that political study took up too much of their time by making study sessions 
voluntary. However, it is unclear whether this had much of an immediate effect, with social 
pressure still proving a powerful motivator to attend these study sessions.339 In a People’s Daily 
editorial on July 2, the CCP attempted to defend the Thought Reform Campaign by comparing it 
to the Red Scare in the United States; specifically, the hearings and subpoenas issued by the 
Senate Subcommittee on National Security, which tended to target American intellectuals. The 
article argued that the CCP’s policies were far less draconian than the Red Scare; even the 
famous Albert Einstein had been brought before the subcommittee under suspicion of having 
connections to American communists. The editorial looked favorably on Einstein’s call on other 
US intellectuals to refuse to testify against colleagues or friends.340 It is unclear if the editorial 
changed any minds, although it certainly had an intellectual audience in mind. Chinese 
intellectuals had it much easier than their American counterparts, the piece argued. Moreover, 
the editorial signalled a shift in the party’s attitudes toward Chinese intellectuals; instead of 
imposing thought rectification responsibilities, it would instead seek to convince them that 
ideological reform was in their own interests. 
 The government’s recalculation in 1953 led to a generally calmer climate in education 
during 1954. The national mood was focused more on socialist construction rather than 
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ideological rectification, a shift reflected in many institutes of higher learning. At Tongji 
University in Shanghai, reports from early 1954 suggest that the professoriate were focused, first 
and foremost, on providing “excellent education” (gaohao jiaoxue). Moreover, the day-to-day 
affairs at the university had mostly returned to the pre-Thought Reform norms.341 Still, some of 
the changes from the Thought Reform era could still be felt. At Nanjing University, for example, 
the centralizing efforts of the new party administration had led to more cross-department 
conferences and meetings.342 Intellectuals began to get a feel for the shifting political winds of 
the era, often abandoning their memberships in the minor democratic parties in an effort to apply 
for membership in the Communist Party. At the Shandong School of Agricultural Science, 172 
applications had come in from professors for CCP membership. 36 had already been accepted as 
of January 1, 1954.343 And students around the country began to take their studies more 
seriously, reflecting on the career possibilities offered by currying favor with the party-state. At 
Zhendan University, one study, Zhang Zhici, noted that he was taking his studies far more 
seriously than in the past, when he preferred “going to dance halls” or “pursuing girlfriends.”344 
The survey of higher education institutions reveals that things were not the same as before 
Thought Reform; however, the climate had cooled considerably from fever pitch. 
 The idea of thought rectification hardly disappeared in 1954, however. The party-state’s 
strategy had changed from 1952; instead of focusing on comprehensive reform among all 
intellectuals, both inside and outside academia, the state instead targeted a small number of 
famous intellectuals for views that were deemed problematic. This practice began somewhat 
haphazardly in late 1954, when a work of literary criticism on Dream of the Red Chamber (a 
 





famous eighteenth-century work of Chinese literature), written by Yu Pingbo, came under 
criticism from two radical students. The students charged that Yu’s analysis promoted “art for 
art’s sake,” instead of (correctly, in the view of the CCP) arguing that literature should be seen as 
a vehicle for ideology. People’s Daily published a supportive editorial regarding the students’ 
criticisms; afterward, a number of conferences were held to criticize the “idealism” and 
“subjectivity” of Yu Pingbo.345 When activists discovered that Yu had been trained by none 
other than the famous liberal intellectual Hu Shi, they began to attack Hu in turn for his 
“bourgeois idealism.”346 The brief campaign extended briefly into the first few weeks of 1955, 
and claimed another two targets: Hu Feng, a professor at the Central Literary Research Institute, 
and Liang Shuming, a delegate in the People’s Political Consultative Congress and occasional 
independent publisher.347 In the case of all four scholars, the campaign involved frequent, 
scathing criticism from People’s Daily and party-affiliated magazines, as well as in-person 
struggle sessions. Some, such as Liang, had to write new confessions.348 Although these men 
certainly faced savage criticism, it is unclear how much everyday intellectuals were affected by 
these movements. Indeed, it is unclear if criticism sessions were held outside of Beijing. The 
campaign to criticize Yu, Hu Shi, Hu Feng, and Liang showed that thought rectification had not 
disappeared. But it also showed that the party-state’s strategy was significantly different than in 
1952, when it attempted to encourage all intellectuals to engage in self-criticism. In 1954, the list 
of targets would remain small. 
 Moreover, the government began to further its program of improving the everyday lives 
of intellectuals. A report from the Shanghai Municipal Bureau of Education reflected on the 
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various strategies the city had employed to achieve “unity” (tuanjie) with its intellectuals. In 
Shanghai primary schools, the city government engaged teachers via conferences with municipal 
representatives (daibiao huiyi). In local secondary schools, the government instead focused on 
promoting study sessions. At universities, the city relied on the fallout from the various mass 
mobilization campaigns: Three-Anti, Suppress the Counterrevolutionaries, Thought Reform, and 
Resist America, Aid Korea.349 The Shanghai government also pledged to take steps at further 
“adjustment and reorganization” (tiaozheng zhengdun) of education by expanding services for 
“sparetime education” (yeyu jiaoyu) for workers and nearby villagers, providing more support 
for private schools, and increasing salaries for local intellectuals (although later records suggest 
that most pay increases did not come through until the following year).350 The national 
government also took steps at increasing intellectuals’ livelihoods. For example, in one of the 
new “worker-peasant accelerated secondary schools” (gongnong sucheng zhongxue) in Beijing, 
the state pledged an expanded budget to cover more supplies, books, and scientific equipment 
over the next few years.351 Municipal governments also made an effort to reduce rents in October 
1954, which tended to outpace any decreases in salary urbanites may have experienced during 
previous economic reforms. As such, urban leisure commodities like movie tickets were more 
affordable for intellectuals.352 Although the most dedicated efforts the state would take at 
improving intellectuals lives would not come until 1955 and especially 1956, developments in 
1954 show that the government had begun to sympathize with intellectuals and take action 
accordingly. 
 
349 Guanyu zai zhixing tuanjie faxing zhishifenzi zhengce fangmian jinxing de gongzuo, April 30, 1954, B105-5-
1035-1, Shanghai Municipal Bureau of Education, SMA. 
350 Ibid. 
351 Guo Dekui, Wei zuguo peiyang xinxing de zhishifenzi—ji Qinghua daxue fushe gongnong sucheng zhongxue, July 
6, 1954, RR. 
352 Shanghai Fortnightly Summary No. 2, October 8-October 21, 1954, CPR9. 
145 
 Although the government was interested in improving conditions for all intellectuals, it 
left little ambiguity with regards to the intellectuals seen as most critical: educated youths. The 
CCP was pleased with increasing applications for and enrollments in the Youth League; a full 
45.8% of the graduating class of 1954 nationwide were Youth League members. 21.2% of 1954 
graduates were full-fledged CCP members, by contrast.353 The party center also issues a set of 
instructions to education cadres, calling on them to better facilitate the integration of Youth 
League members into the Communist Party. Moreover, cadres were criticized for “obtaining 
confessions [from students] under duress” (bigongxin).354 For educated youths, membership in 
the Youth League could open real doors for their postgraduate careers. Over the course of 1954, 
the city of Shanghai made it a priority to hire 100 recent graduates for high-profile positions 
(either in education or the city bureaucracy), and pledged to double that number in 1955.355 
Although it is true that the institutional changes the party made in 1954 represented a rising tide 
that lifted all boats, metaphorically, it lifted some boats more than others. Young intellectuals—
especially those who had demonstrated acceptable loyalty to the party and the reigning 
ideology—could find ways of fast-tracking their careers after graduation. For older intellectuals, 
they would have to be content with modest salary increases and promises of further “attention” 
from municipal governments in the future.  
 The party also developed a more concrete plan for the Youth League around this time. In 
early 1955, a report emerged detailing the League’s three-step plan at inculcating “communist 
ethics” (gongchanzhuyi daode) among its members. First, the Youth League would organize 
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physical training drills and cultural enrichment activities during academic breaks (starting during 
the winter break for the Spring Festival in 1955). Second, the League would would hold more 
serious study sessions, when cadres would correct any ideological problems and “vague 
understandings” (renshi mohu) in the young scholars’ mentalities. The national government 
promised to provide appropriate propaganda materials for this second step. Third, the League 
would help members reflect on their experiences in the program, and encourage them to model 
and promote their newfound values outside of official Youth League spaces.356 The program 
shows an increasing attention being paid to the cultivation of educated youths, in line with a 
more hands-off attitude toward the education system more generally during this period. 
Ultimately, however, developments inside the school system would again draw the attention of 
the party-state. 
 As the government continued to collate reports of a worsening relationship between 
administrative cadres and the intellectuals they oversaw, it changed tactics in February 1955. 
Moving forward, the party-state committed itself to taking a more active managerial role in the 
schools and bureaus that employed intellectuals. And it laid plans for trying to help the divide 
between cadres and intellectuals. The first step in mending ties would be a nationwide study 
campaign focusing on the differences between Marxist “materialism” (weiwuzhuyi) and 
“bourgeois idealism” (zichanjieji weixinzhuyi). In cities, the municipal party governments began 
to hold weekly meetings for both cadres and intellectuals on the topic; the frequency was limited 
to once per week so as to not detract too much from intellectuals’ other duties.357 In Shanghai, 
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the local propaganda bureau took charge of the campaign. The bureau employed similar 
strategies as the Thought Reform Campaign: the use of speeches and having intellectuals and 
cadres study documents like People’s Daily editorials.358 The campaign was concurrent with the 
campaign to criticize Hu Shi (who himself was seen by the regime as a proponent of bourgeois 
idealist views).359 At the same time, however, the movement to criticize Hu Shi only partially 
explains the reasons for carrying out the wider campaign to promote materialism and reject 
bourgeois idealism. The foundations of the campaign grew out of the growing distaste 
intellectuals and cadres had for each other, which forced the state’s hand. 
 The mechanisms of carrying out the campaign had been formalized by March. Political 
“experts” would travel to factories or schools in order to present speeches on the correctness of 
materialism, emulating the traveling scholar of the Qing-era xiangyue system. Although the 
campaign targeted intellectuals and administrative cadres, these speeches attracted a wider 
audience. People’s Daily reporters and other media personnel often attended, who publicized the 
campaign through summaries or transcriptions of the speeches in their papers. At the conclusion 
of the lectures, intellectuals and cadres had to break off into small discussion groups to reflect on 
what they had learned.360 All levels of government appear to have been heavily invested in the 
campaign, with documents from mid-March describing promoting Marxist materialism as “the 
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most fundamental objective of the regime at this time.”361 The problem of bridging the gap 
between intellectuals and cadres preoccupied the state, which emphasized that, in attending the 
lectures, cadres might “raise their own level of understanding regarding Marxism-Leninism.”362 
The idea was that, in recognizing that even cadres still had something to learn, they might 
develop a greater sense of camaraderie with the intellectuals they oversaw, particularly older 
ones who had only undergone partial thought rectification. 
 The campaign to promote materialism and reject bourgeois idealism was over almost as 
soon as it began; no documents after March 1955 explicitly refer to the campaign as still being 
underway. Nevertheless, the campaign led to a sea change in terms of the state’s approach to 
education. Both the national government as well as municipal governments would develop more 
of a presence on campuses and attempt to actively affect the environment. Starting on March 17, 
the Shanghai government began sending representatives to local universities in order to sell 
construction bonds.363 The symbolism was meaningful; previously, one of the main reasons 
behind intellectuals’ support for the CCP had been a faith that the party and the party alone could 
deliver on its promises to provide the right environment for national reconstruction. The selling 
of municipal construction bonds thus returned to the roots of the relationship between the party 
and intellectuals. On Shanghai campuses, representatives of the city government convened 
“promote-and-support meetings” (tuixiao zhihui) that encouraged administrative cadres, students, 
and faculty alike to buy bonds. In addition, the city showed an increasing awareness of the 
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previous modes of student activism—big-character posters and blackboard advertisements—and 
instructed its representatives to appropriate these methods in support of the campaign. The city, 
perhaps optimistically, hoped that about half of the total contributing funds to municipal 
construction might come from selling bonds at local higher education institutions.364 Although 
far different from the campaign to support materialism, the selling of construction bonds again 
tried to treat cadres and intellectuals as a single, unified group. And the effort moreover reflected 
a revitalized attempt at promoting aspects of the government’s agenda (construction) seen most 
favorably by intellectuals. 
 The national government too was starting to pay attention to schools once again. In April 
and May, the central party commissioned a series of reports and surveys on conditions on 
campuses around the country in advance of a number of policy changes in the latter half of the 
year. The reports, at first, were disheartening. A nationwide survey cast serious doubt on the real 
effectiveness of the Thought Reform and Three-Anti Campaigns, despite rosy reports from 
cadres on the ground. It was revealed that almost 80% of primary schools and 30% of secondary 
schools around China had not undergone any kind of “tidying up” (qingli) reforms. Although the 
Central Committee called for more direct action to extend its influence over the education 
system, it reaffirmed the “don’t pursue, don’t compel” approach from 1952.365 A report from 
around the same time from Yingde County, Guangdong revealed that the local party had 
contributed to educational workforce shortages by requisitioning 70 primary teachers (about 6% 
of the total intellectual workforce in the county) for work in public enterprises. The Central 
Committee criticized this practice and instructed all local branches to address shortages in 
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education.366 In late May, the Central Committee published a criticism of cadres in Northwest 
Normal University in Lanzhou, Gansu. The state had discovered that cadres had demoted staff 
and cut wages (jiangzhi jianxin), thus raising the ire of older intellectuals in particular.367 In 
response to intellectual outcry, the party-state had begun to change its approach to the 
management of the school system. These early instructions presage the heyday of improvements 
in intellectuals’ lives of 1956 and early 1957. 
 At the same time, the education system continued to remain in a state of flux. Previous 
chapters have shown the scale of expansion in terms of enrollments in all levels of schools. The 
1955 fall semester saw some of the biggest enrollments as of yet. Part of the cause was the shift 
away from short-term training classes, as cities like Shanghai increasingly looked to enroll 
workers and peasants in full-time courses of study. This had a big effect in Shanghai, where the 
1955-1956 academic year saw an increase in enrollments of 30,000 when compared to 1954-
1955, with a projected increase of 100,000 students for the 1956-1957 academic year.368 
Although these numbers refer only to primary and secondary schools, universities too 
experienced growth. In total, Shanghai universities enrolled 3000 additional students in the fall 
of 1955. Significantly, the majority of new admittees were either full-fledged CCP members or at 
least belonged to the Youth League.369 Although the rest of the country may not have seen 
enrollment increases as sharp as Shanghai, data suggests that urban schools across the country 
were enrolling more students. In Beijing, the 1955-1956 academic year saw a 7.5% increase over 
the previous year, for example.370 Unlike Shanghai, however, where the municipal government 
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had begun shifting from short-term, accelerated programs to formal education, spare-time 
schools around the country saw the highest rate of increase in enrollments. Nationwide, 
enrollments in a spare-time study program increased by 110,000.371 The state had achieves its 
goal of popularizing education, especially for the working class, which tended to gravitate 
toward the spare-time schools. Even as the government began to reassess its policies toward 
older intellectuals, the stage had been set for generational transformation. 
 Sweeping changes in state policy toward intellectuals (including the famous airing of free 
speech and free criticism of the CCP during the Hundred Flowers Campaign) did not come until 
the following year. Nevertheless, policies in late 1955 laid the groundwork for the most 
significant changes to come. For one, the government brought its intentions to raise the standards 
of living for intellectuals into the public realm. A bulletin from Xinmin Evening News in 
Shanghai on the night of October 28 laid out the city government’s plans to improve the lives of 
intellectuals, from wage increases to better housing to reduced work hours.372 Moreover, cities 
were instructed to recalculate their approach to right-wing or non-party intellectuals. The CCP 
had long applied a classification scheme of progressive/centrist/retrogressive/reactionary (or 
counterrevolutionary) to intellectuals. Starting in late 1955, municipal governments began to call 
out “errors” in the treatment of centrists and retrogressives; however, reactionaries would still be 
disciplined harshly.373 Moreover, cities revised their classification rationales, noting that “the 
most important [criterion] is whether or not there has been progress.” This marked a shift from 
the classification scheme applied during Thought Reform, where an ideological labels was 
 
371 Shanghai Political Summary No. 23, September 9-October 6, 1955, CPR10, 56. 
372 Xinminbao dang zhibu guanyu 1956-1957 nian zhishifenzi gongzuo de guihua, October 28, 1955, G21-1-176-1, 
Xinmin Evening News, SMA. 
373 Guanyu xuexiao xingzheng zhixing dang dui zhishifenzi tuanjie, gaizao zhengce de yixie qingkuang, November 
22, 1955, B105-5-1354-1, Shanghai Municipal Bureau of Education, SMA. 
152 
applied based on submitted materials (like confessions). In addition, non-ideological 
characteristics, such as “professional skill” (yewu shuiping) and “inventiveness and innovations” 
(faming chuangzao) might affect which category and intellectual belonged to.374 A report from 
the Shanghai government on December 10 suggested that there had been an erroneous tendency 
of “listening to only one side” (pianting pianxin); that is, having more confidence in younger 
scholars than older scholars, and also favoring Soviet intellectuals over Chinese intellectuals. 
The city government also announced plans to review problems with wages (daiyu) and an 
increasingly common frustration among intellectuals in “having a position without any real 
authority” (youzhi wuquan).375 The last few months of 1955 saw the most explicit 
acknowledgement yet from all levels of government of the issues plaguing the intellectual 
community. 
 The Communist Party began 1953 with the intention of backing off from the nation’s 
schools, easing the attention that it had paid education reform during 1952. This approach led to 
a more relaxed national climate during 1953 and 1954, with the government encouraging more 
leniency toward intellectuals but doing little else beyond vague pronouncements. To the extent 
that the state still focused on thought rectification, it focused more on high-profile scholars like 
Hu Feng or Hu Shi instead of the entire national community of scholars. Over time, however, the 
Chinese government began to realize that the schools had fostered a growing resentment between 
intellectuals and cadres, prompting a recalculation. The state pushed for a new campaign to unite 
the cadres and intellectuals: criticizing bourgeois idealism while promoting Marxist materialism. 
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In the aftermath of the campaign, the government committed itself to taking direct steps to 
improve the lives of intellectuals—reforms that would be carried out the following year.  
 
The Growth of Resentment for Intellectuals 
 Although the government’s policy changes in the 1953-1955 years were generally 
favorable for intellectuals, not everyone greeted these policy shifts enthusiastically. As Chapter 3 
has shown, cadres on the ground sometimes took more punitive actions toward wayward 
intellectuals than the central government (or even their overseeing municipal government) 
necessarily endorsed. For many cadres, especially those who had been a part of the communist 
movement for a long time, it would not have been hard to harbor some sense of resentment for 
intellectuals. Scholarship had always been linked with economic privilege (see Chapter 1); in 
theory, the CCP’s mandate was to equalize the kind of socioeconomic imbalances that had 
produced the intellectual class in the first place. Moreover, the majority of older intellectuals had 
been educated in Guomindang schools. Some had even supported the old regime before 
switching allegiances to the CCP. Although the central government had desired to rectify the 
thinking of intellectuals through the Thought Reform Campaign, it had shown less initiative in 
attending to the privileged status of older intellectuals. As such, the state’s calls to improve the 
lives of intellectuals and for cadres to adopt a more lenient approach no doubt irked cadres. Just 
as the 1953-1955 years saw a recalculation from the government, the same time period saw the 
growth of resentment for intellectuals among their overseeing cadres. 
 One of the first organs of governance to experience problems with intellectuals was the 
military. The PLA had recruited a number of intellectuals (especially youths) for the Korean 
War, although they were generally confined to logistics roles. Even then, only the most 
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ideologically-committed were admitted into the ranks in the first place; military officials tended 
to be suspicious of the “bourgeois” intellectual class, and limited enlistments as much as 
possible. As the war died down and the PLA began to assess its logistics capabilities, however, 
there was a push to recruit more intellectuals in mid-1953. The General Political Department of 
the military issued a set of instructions in June calling for an end to the differential treatment of 
intellectuals. Still, the military pledged to conduct “prudent inspections” of all prospective 
enlistees.376 Documents from the East China Military Command suggest that the PLA was in 
general skeptical that the background checks conducted during the Thought Reform Campaign 
were thorough and sweeping. They may have been right—only about 27% of young intellectuals 
(2899 individuals) in the East China military region had undergone a thorough investigation as of 
mid-1953.377 Even as the central government was undergoing shifts in terms of how it perceived 
intellectuals and how it would enact responsive policy to the needs of intellectuals, other organs 
of governance—particularly subnational bodies such as the East China Military Command—
expressed considerably more skepticism about prospects of intellectuals. To the extent that 
subnational governing organs were willing to work with intellectuals, they tended to focus on 
youths, especially Youth League members. 
 The military’s skepticism may have been borne out by studies done of the effectiveness 
of its intellectual enlistees during the Korean campaign. In the second half of 1953, the PLA 
commissioned a number of studies on how intellectuals serving during the Korean War had 
 
376 Junwei zongzhengzhiwu pizhuan zhongnan junqu dangwei hui guanyu jiuzheng yayi zhishifenzi de pianxiang de 
zhishi, June 1, 1953, LR-SPP. 
377 Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun huadong junqu houfang dongwu bu weiyuanhui guanyu tongpan shencha zhongdian 
chuli qingnian zhishifenzi jibie de zhishi, June 4, 1953, A39-2-214-2, East China Rear Military Command Military 
Supplies and Political Bureau, Chinese Communist East China Military Supply Production and Administrative 
Office Committee, Shanghai Municipal Military Supply Industry Union, Chinese Communist Party Shanghai 
Municipal Military Supply Industry Committee, Youth League of the Shanghai Municipal Military Supply Industry 
Work Committee, SMA. 
155 
performed. In general, the reports revealed a litany of problems and issues in terms of 
intellectuals interacting well with other enlistees. Overall, a little less than a third (31%) of all 
intellectuals deployed to Korea had been written up by their superiors for exhibited some form of 
attitude problem. For some units, that number was as high as 50%.378 The most common 
problems for enlisted intellectuals were exhibiting a “dejected” (xiaochen) attitude or “neglecting 
their duties” (gongzuo pita). Both represented a drain on overall unit morale.379 Moreover, young 
intellectuals were quick to complain about a lack of advancement opportunities within the 
military; however, an internal investigation suggested that young intellectuals had not been 
categorically denied for promotion (thus suggesting that these complaints held little water). The 
military’s reports concluded with an overall condemnation of the intellectual class, describing 
enlisted scholars as generally “proud and arrogant” (jiaoao) and “self-satisfied” (ziman).380 As 
the PLA reports circulated among other subnational government bureaus, other low-level cadres 
began to pick up on the military’s critical view. In some cases, the specific terminology of the 
PLA were echoed; for example, the South Central Bureau wrote a scathing summary of 
intellectuals in the region, referring to them as “jiaoao ziman” much as the PLA had.381 The 
military had, deliberately or not, given cadres around the country a vocabulary with which to 
express their frustration with intellectuals’ attitudes. 
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 Attitudes continued to fester among the cadres. A speech by Chen Xiuliang (the wife of 
the governor of Zhejiang Province) to the Shanghai municipal government on November 5, 1954 
demonstrates continuing frustration with the slow rate of “progress” for intellectuals.382 Chen 
argued that “in order to achieve well-managed schools...we must expose and criticize the 
influence of [older] thinking.” She said that, in her experiences, intellectuals in Zhejiang’s level 
of understanding of Marxist-Leninist theory remained quite low, and that the most important 
thing for intellectuals to learn was how to stay “committed to the course” (yuanfeng budong).383 
Whereas the central party was starting to rein in some of the excesses of the Thought Reform and 
Three-Anti campaigns, Chen praised both, suggesting that they were both highly successful in 
exposing “the boundary between us and the enemy” (diwo jiexian).384 It is striking to hear a party 
official allude to intellectuals, at least in part, as “the enemy,” considering the more lenient 
climate that had developed nationally since the end of 1952. Even still, Chen could not entirely 
escape from the changing national circumstances. She acknowledged that the government could 
do more to better facilitate working conditions among intellectuals, specifically by investing in 
research opportunities, necessary supplies, and funding.385 Even still, the broad thrust of her 
speech is clear: intellectuals’ thought reform was far from complete, despite the central 
government’s desire to move away from the policies of 1952.  
 Surveys taken in 1954 and 1955 of administrative cadres working in the Shanghai school 
system reveal similar resentful attitudes, all the way down to the lowest levels of government. 
 
382 For a background on Chen Xiuliang and her husband Sha Wenhan, see Sha Wenhan Chen Xiuliang nianpu 
(Shanghai: Shanghai shehui kexue chubanshe, 2007). 
383 Shanghai ge dazhuan xuexiao guanche sizhong quanhui jueyi yu zhishifenzi zhengce wenti: Chen Xiuliang zai 
zhonggong Shanghai gaodeng xuexiao weiyuanhui huiyi shang de fayangao, November 5, 1954, A26-2-281-31, 
Chinese Communist Municipal Government of Shanghai Higher Education Committee, SMA. 
384 Ibid.  
385 Guanche tuanjie gaizao zhishifenzi zhengce wenti: Chen Xiuliang zai zhonggong Shanghai gaodeng xuexiao 
weiyuanhui huiyi shang de fayangao, November 5, 1954, A26-2-281-19, Chinese Communist Municipal 
Government of Shanghai Higher Education Committee, SMA. 
157 
Surveys of Yan’an Secondary School, Qixiu Girls’ Secondary School, and Weiyu Secondary 
School suggest significant problems between the administration and the teaching staff were 
common in Shanghai at this time. The survey of Yan’an Secondary suggested there was a severe 
lack of mutual understanding between teachers and cadres, with both sides highly suspicious of 
the other. Although the school administration had made diplomatic overtures to the teachers by 
inviting them to meetings in order to express their views on working conditions more freely, only 
9 teachers showed up—and most of them were affiliated with the CCP.386 Most administrators at 
the school saw the teaching staff as ideologically backward. Whereas teachers showed little 
willingness to engage in voluntary political study after the end of the Thought Reform 
Campaign, the staff saw further rectification as an “urgent requirement” (paoqie yaoqiu) given 
the prevailing political mood at the school. Administrative cadres and teachers were also at odds 
over the proper role of the school’s party branch; cadres saw their main responsibility as 
investigating problems with the teachers’ political histories and beliefs, whereas teachers saw the 
branch as a conduit for relaying their views to the municipal government.387 The report thus 
spoke to a fractured working environment at the school, with cadres and intellectuals almost 
constantly at odds. 
 The situation was similar at Qixiu Girls’ Secondary and Weiyu Secondary. Qixiu in 
particular occupied a nebulous space within the government’s education policy, considering its 
status as a private school in an era when most institutions had been nationalized. By 1955, there 
were some signs that the state was in the process of taking over the school. Like other Shanghai 
institutions, the school had an assigned party branch. Moreover, the school had to follow the 
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same regulations (such as the teaching staff’s duties during the Thought Reform Campaign) as 
public schools did. In some ways, however, the ambiguous status of the school may have been 
bad for the teaching staff. A number of intellectuals expressed concerns about an inability to 
communicate with the administration. However, overseeing cadres’ attitudes made the matter 
worse; they saw the teaching staff as backwards. In their view, Qixiu teachers could not even 
wrap their heads around “basic” Marxist concepts like materialism.388 At Weiyu Secondary, the 
teaching staff won a major concession out of the administration in the form of a newly-formed 
“teaching and research group” (jioayanzu). Although the name may not imply it, Weiyu teachers 
saw the group as a means of bridging the gap between the staff and the administration. However, 
the party branch would simply ignore or stonewall any of the recommendations the group tried to 
make.389 Much like at Yan’an Secondary, teachers were sharply divided from the administrative 
party branch. Any victories the teachers might have won (such as the teaching and research 
group at Weiyu) were hollow at best. 
 Although the previous examples highlighted problems within education, cadres in 
government bureaus that employed intellectuals were equally critical of their new employees. At 
the Shanghai Sea Shipping Management Office, for example, cadres were skeptical that 
employed intellectuals had really managed to accomplish any real transformation during 
Thought Reform. A report from these cadres said that none of their employees had demonstrated 
any real zeal or enthusiasm for thought rectification. The bureau suggested that its intellectual 
staff had an overly “aloof” (qinggao sixiang) attitude toward politics.390 Similar attitudes could 
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be found in the national Construction and Engineering Department in Beijing, which attributed 
delays in project timetables to deliberate sabotage on behalf of reactionary “enemies” within the 
bureau. An investigation revealed that the department was responsible for 200,000 yuan’s worth 
of waste, although it is hardly clear what role the department’s assigned intellectuals may have 
played.391 One reason for these attitudes may have been an overall decline in wages for 
government workers, including cadres. In Shanghai, state employees had to pay out-of-pocket 
for rent, food, and utilities. The highest-paid party official was the director of Public Works, who 
only made about 2000 yuan per month.392 Concurrently, the national government had begun 
publicizing its plans at reforming policies toward intellectuals, which would include potential 
salary increases. Although no municipal workers were well-off at this juncture, low-level cadres 
may have understandably chafed against what they perceived as the party center’s preferential 
treatment of intellectuals at their expense. 
 At the end of 1955, the state had committed itself to a course of action that would treat 
intellectuals more favorably, going forward. On the ground, however, cadres both in and outside 
of the education system expressed a general sense of wariness about the new national climate. 
Several officials in the Shanghai Bureau of Education said that the Thought Reform Campaign 
had been “neither deep nor penetrative” (bushen butou), and had “come in like a lion and left like 
a lamb” (hutou shewei).393 They feared that the government was simply empowering bourgeois 
or rightist elements through its reforms. In one of the city’s commerce bureaus, cadres were 
likewise skeptical. Party officials derided intellectuals for “expecting preferential treatment” 
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(lingyan xiangkan). According to one cadre, “intellectuals are only interested in fame and profit, 
attach too much importance to skill, possess weak politics, enjoy flattery, fear criticism, and have 
liberal, lazy attitudes.” It was a common belief among cadres that they worked longer and harder 
than intellectuals for less pay.394 Reforms had also emboldened intellectuals to criticize their 
overseeing cadres; within the Shanghai textile industry, 439 out of 2747 technicians had 
achieved party membership by the end of 1955 (about 16%).395 These technicians would tell 
cadres, “You have said we have a purely technical point of view; you, on the other hand, have a 
purely political point of view.” Cadres responded that intellectuals “stressed technical matters 
but not politics,” and denounced them in the same terms as the PLA did at the start of the period: 
jiaoao ziman.396 Whereas government policy had changed dramatically over the past three years, 
the attitudes of cadres on the ground had only hardened. 
 Jeremy Wallace has argued, provocatively, that the PRC government—which won 
power, essentially, through peasant revolt—has maintained control through an “urban bias,” 
using policies that favored China’s biggest cities at the expense of the countryside in order to 
quell urban unrest.397 Although Wallace focuses his analysis on the advent of the household 
registration (hukou) system, his broader analysis reflects an important dynamic in the 1953-1955 
years. The state—especially the national government—expressed an early willingness to 
recalibrate its policies to favor intellectuals, who were by and large an urban population. For 
cadres, many of whom lacked a formal education, or may have grown up in a village, it would 
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have been hard to see this as anything other than a betrayal.398 Cadres experienced the same 
hardships as intellectuals did—rationing, food shortages, long work hours—but whereas the 
plight of intellectuals had become a cause for national concern, cadres toiled away in the dark. 
The growth of resentment for intellectuals, from military officials to school administrators to 
bureau chiefs, was natural. The attitudes of low-level cadres showed little signs of softening; 
often, it was the opposite. As such, cadres would grow increasingly suspicious of intellectuals 
after 1955. The sharp divide between the classes would eventually force the government to 
undergo a second recalibration of policy. 
 
The Lives and Working Conditions of Intellectuals in Academia 
 Intellectuals who remained in the Chinese school system after 1949—or those who were 
assigned to work at a school through the nationwide work assignment program—experienced a 
conflicting set of changes in the early PRC years. 1952 saw the effective dismemberment of the 
old system of private academies, the advent of party-controlled school administrations, and the 
imposition of mandatory study sessions and confession-writing. The government seemed to 
perform a sudden volte-face in 1953, calling for an end to cadre excesses on the ground and 
demonstrating a sincere interest in raising intellectuals’ standards of living. Such a shift was no 
doubt whiplash-inducing. Nonetheless, intellectuals in academia rallied in 1954 and took 
advantage of the shifting climate. Discussing the role that intellectuals played in seizing upon the 
national government’s new priorities shows that the culture of permissiveness in 1956—most 
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famously, the Hundred Flowers Campaign—did not only come from the whims of the party 
leadership. Indeed, the advances made by intellectuals during the second half of the decade were 
hard-fought by intellectuals themselves. Even as the party became further entrenched itself in the 
school system and promoted the formation of the danwei, intellectuals used these new 
institutions as conduits for voicing discontent.  
 An editorial written on July 27, 1954 symbolized the growth of a new boldness among 
academics. Li Guocai, a chemistry professor at Wuhan University, wrote to Beijing describing 
conditions for older intellectuals at the university. Li described the growth of professors’ 
working hours, which he described as equivalent to “physical exercise” for those of advanced 
age.399 Li’s report also shows how different departments experienced different rates of work hour 
growth, based on the extent to which the state prioritized their speciality. The mathematics 
department at Wuhan, for example, saw an increase of 120% of their workdays, whereas some 
departments only saw a 30% increase. The new regimen was tough enough on professors that 
some voluntarily entered a graduated retirement program, accepting salary cuts of 40% just to 
cut down on working hours.400 Over the next few months, more intellectuals became increasingly 
comfortable with speaking out. In discussions with their supervisors, professors in Shanghai 
scoffed at the party’s ambitions for education reform. “After all,” they said, “whom does 
educational reform rely on for success?” Professors often held concurrent positions inside 
campus administrations, but few besides party members had any real power—thus engendering 
one of the more frequent phrases of the period, youzhi wuquan (having positions but without 
much authority).401 
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 As discussed earlier in this chapter, the final months of 1954 and the beginning of 1955 
saw a series of brief criticism campaigns directed against notable “rightist” or “bourgeois” 
elements like Hu Shi or Hu Feng. It is thus striking that intellectuals became increasingly 
comfortable with speaking out during these campaigns, although it also reveals the changed 
national environment. Even as the government showed a continuing desire to combat 
“wrongthink” among high-profile intellectuals, everyday intellectuals found their collective 
voice and will to push for changes. As such, the focus gradually shifted from the famous scholars 
to the common ones. A People’s Daily report in late October 1954 presaged this shift by 
describing the plight of young intellectuals in rural Shaanxi, where few were able to find job 
opportunities that allowed them to use the skills and knowledge they picked up in school. 
Although the hukou system had yet to appear in late 1954, there were still clear barriers to 
geographic mobility; if anything, the net flow of intellectuals was out from, rather than into, the 
cities. This was certainly true in rural Shaanxi, where the most educated youths might hope for 
was teaching literacy classes to older peasants.402 As the dust settled from the early PRC years, 
the “face” of the Chinese intellectual had changed. The elitist, famous scholars of yesteryear had 
faded from public. Increasingly, the everyday intellectuals were beginning to demand their own 
moment in the sun. 
 Although urban intellectuals no doubt fared far better than their rural counterparts, their 
lives were not as privileged as the resentful cadres might have imagined. It is true that 
intellectuals in urban areas tended to earn more in wages than the working class—in Shanghai, 
for example, reports suggest that intellectuals out-earned workers at a 4:3 ratio403—but they still 
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nevertheless faced their fair share of hardships. In early 1955, for example, schools had to 
stomach lower rations for goods like husked rice, cooking oil, and cotton cloth due to production 
shortages. Some at the school made an effort to support these cutbacks, through big-character 
posters or other advertisements around campus, but it is unclear if these messages of support 
reflected the popular will, or whether just the viewpoint of the zealous activist crowd. To be sure, 
however, progressive students did see the shortages as an opportunity to promote their views to 
their classmates. One student at Tongji University called on their classmates to “do more 
laundry” instead of buying more clothes so often.404 On the other hand, older professors seemed 
to chafe under the new rationing quotas, griping that “their family members never had to queue 
up to buy cloth” in previous eras. Some even compared rationing to the shortages experienced 
under Guomindang rule.405 Around this time, cadres were railing against the inequalities in favor 
of intellectuals. In a technical sense, the cadres were correct—intellectuals generally received 
higher wages and worked more comfortable jobs than the working class. But this picture is 
hardly complete. Intellectuals experienced their fair share of hardships. By 1955, they had gained 
the confidence to do something about it. 
 As the central government insisted on better treatment for the intellectual class, municipal 
education bureaus carried out surveys of local school systems in order to better understand the 
working and living situations of intellectuals. These surveys were also careful to describe the 
political situation within the schools. At Yan’an Secondary in Shanghai, for example, levels of 
fealty to the CCP were relatively low; among teachers, only 8% were party members, while only 
6.3% of the student body were Youth League members. On the flip, 26.6% of the school 
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population—faculty and students included—had some sort of ideological problem exposed 
during the Thought Reform Campaign. 10% on top of that were described as having a “serious 
problem.”406 Individual teachers also expressed a wide array of opinions on their working and 
living conditions. Ding Guifen, for example, charged the party administration for making empty 
promises—for example, a consultative committee that had been promised two years earlier, but 
had never actually been formed. Ding moreover argued that the administration overly prioritized 
teaching as opposed to research. Yang Yunzhan, meanwhile, expressed frustration at being 
unable to live with the rest of her family because the housing provided by the Yan’an danwei 
was too small. Ultimately, she and her husband decided to send their children to live with their 
grandparents in the countryside to receive better full-time care and attention. Jin Chengzhang had 
hardly been convinced by the CCP’s anti-Western sentiments, favoring French culture and 
imported products. He argued that the CCP had yet to solve the unemployment crisis fully. Some 
teachers, like Zhang Rumin, were more supportive of the party, however. Zhang described 
throwing herself into her work after her only daughter died. Zhang had become politically 
involved during Thought Reform.407 
 At Qixiu Girl’s School, another secondary school in Shanghai, the political situation was 
broadly similar; only 6.3% of the teachers were CCP members. 34.75% had been described as 
political “progressives,” whereas 45.65% were considered “centrists,” 13% “retrogressives,” and 
6.5% “reactionaries.”408 A number of reforms had left Qixiu teachers better off than their 
colleagues at Yan’an Secondary; for example, the school had seen across-the-board wage 
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increases in the months leading up to 1955. Moreover, the Qixiu danwei had managed to acquire 
new housing units, which were distributed on the basis of residence and marital status. Teachers 
with spouses, in addition to those who were living outside the Shanghai city limits, were the 
most likely candidates for new, bigger housing closer to campus.409 At the same time, other 
aspects of the working situation at Qixiu were far more problematic for the teaching staff. An 
average workday tended to last as long as 10 or 11 hours, and most felt compared to work every 
day of the week. Perhaps due to the strenuous workload, medical problems among the teaching 
staff were rampant. The school in total employed 46 intellectuals, and a full 10 of them had 
contracted pulmonary tuberculosis during the first four years of the PRC. Many of the female 
teachers reported having some sort of gynecological disease, and two women had gone through 
miscarriages in the fall semester of 1954.410 
 Weiyu Secondary School was found to have, again, a political situation consistent with 
reports from Yan’an Secondary and Qixiu Secondary. 6.6% of the teaching staff at Weiyu were 
affiliated with the CCP. 36.6% were progressives, 46.4% were centrists, 10.9% were 
retrogressives, and 6.1% were reactionaries. A number of teachers at this school expressed a 
particular fear of having to submit confessions during the Thought Reform; many had cooperated 
with the old Guomindang regime. However, no one had reported any kind of visible punishment 
for the errors they had confessed to.411 Of the three schools surveyed in Shanghai, Weiyu may 
have been in the worst spot. Despite wage increases coming through in the others, Weiyu had not 
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seen any salary increases. Most monthly stipends were quite low, with some teachers making 
only 50 yuan per month. Moreover, there were severe imbalances in the wages of newer and 
older faculty. Medical issues were also highly prevalent, with a full two-thirds of the teaching 
staff having had some form of serious illness in the fall of 1954. A handful had contracted more 
than a single serious illness; one teacher was essentially bedridden for the entire semester, having 
contracted four different serious illnesses.412 The Shanghai Education Bureau made a number of 
recommendations for the administration at the school to help improve the intellectuals’ working 
conditions. First, the bureau advised the administration to allot more time for rest and relaxation 
during the workday. In addition, the bureau recommended giving the Weiyu teaching staff more 
holiday leave. Since many teachers had expressed frustrations regarding being kept away from 
their children, the city also suggested that the school consider admitting teachers’ offspring as 
students.413 Although the particular situations were different at each school, the overall findings 
of the surveys in Shanghai paint a reasonably consistent picture. Moreover, they showed an 
increasing willingness of intellectuals to push for improvements in their livelihoods—albeit 
through official channels. 
 Although intellectuals had a number of problems unique to their status, they were also 
urbanites more generally. As such, they faced the same issues as other middle class city-
dwellers. Although some economic reports from the period were positive (see, for example, the 
discussion about increasing affordability for certain forms of cultural consumption earlier in this 
chapter), others were less so. Even if goods had become cheaper, quality was not necessarily 
very high. Around the middle of 1955, urban markets had short supplies of staple foods like 
meat, vegetables, and noodles—all of which would likely have been important parts of an 
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intellectual’s diet. The food supplies that existed were often of poor quality.414 Middle-class 
Chinese urbanites continued to express disillusionment—if not in public, than privately to the 
few foreign correspondents still allowed in the PRC—about their standards of living in June of 
1955. Some even speculated that the current crop of “rightist,” like Hu Feng, had been 
emboldened by the struggles the party was facing at helping middle-class families make ends 
meet.415 Even as the government had pledged to tread with a lighter step in the school system, 
intellectuals were facing frustrating conditions in their everyday lives.  
 For many intellectuals, the answers to their problems was further integration with the 
CCP—by trying to join their ranks. Historically, the Communist Party was generally skeptical of 
admitting intellectuals, especially older ones, as members. That changed over the course of 1955, 
however, as new enrollments from older intellectuals increased dramatically. In Shanghai, for 
example, 2400 intellectuals had gained party membership during the first half of the year. The 
majority of these new admittees were not intellectuals teaching or studying at the new people’s 
revolutionary universities, but rather long-established institutions like Fudan, Jiaotong, and 
Tongji Universities. East China Normal University was a distant fourth in terms of new party 
admittances.416 Journalists in Beijing, meanwhile, where quick to publicize new stories of older 
intellectuals who had managed to gain entrance into the CCP. One profile was published on 
December 4, describing the successful party application of the professor Liu Xianzhou, who was 
over 60 years old. His new party membership demonstrated that intellectuals of all ages had 
political prospects (zhengzhi shang you qiantu).417 Increasingly, intellectuals in the Beijing area 
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began to covet CCP memberships, and turned away from joining the minor parties that used to 
attract intellectuals, like the CDL. A professor at Beijing Normal University, Zhong Jingwen, 
argued at the time that older intellectuals’ expertise could be as helpful to the state as the energy 
and vitality of educated youth.418 To be fair, it is unclear if these new party admittees were able 
to change much of official policy. They certainly were not able to stop the state’s moves against 
intellectuals in the Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1957. At the same time, the admittance of older 
intellectuals is an important juncture in the overall story of party-state and scholar, who became 
increasingly intertwined over the course of the decade. Their influence over other party officials 
was certainly non-zero. It is telling, for example, that relatively few intellectuals who were 
admitted in 1955 and 1956 lost memberships as a result of the Anti-Rightist Campaign.  
 On December 9, various cities and provinces convened conferences between local 
governments and intellectuals. In Tianjin, intellectuals called for better jobs; for example, they 
argued that most factory directors had been promoted from the working ranks, rather than trained 
engineers. Intellectuals with academic training and experience could better stimulate production, 
in their view. Attending scholars also called for relaxed restrictions on older intellectuals joining 
the CCP, as well as higher wages and better housing. At the same time, intellectuals noted their 
continuing loyalty to the CCP and Mao Zedong personally.419 Intellectuals in Shanghai echoed 
these concerns, calling for greater assistance from the city in improving their standards of living. 
They argued that local school administrations had, moreover, largely abandoned anyone labelled 
as a “retrogressive” (as opposed to a full-fledged reactionary or counterrevolutionary). The city, 
in their view, should “patiently strive” (naixin zhengqu) to help even right-leaning intellectuals, 
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demonstrating something of a class solidarity attitude.420 In Hunan Province, intellectuals 
claimed that the CCP had “many uses for them, but provided comparatively little assistance” 
(shiyong duo, bangzhu shao). Perhaps emboldened by reports of party admittances, Hunan 
intellectuals criticized the provincial government for not having admitted a single intellectual by 
that point as a CCP member. Others said that the state had not invested enough into vital 
research, such as pest control. Many described bleak living conditions, having to take 
supplemental jobs just to keep their family’s finances afloat. Others found themselves without 
enough time to take a second job; an electrical engineer named Liu Longshi, for example, said, 
“For the past few years, almost no Sundays went by without a meeting, such that it is almost like 
Sunday doesn’t exist in my memories.”421 These instances demonstrate the active role played by 
intellectuals in changing the political atmosphere. 
 The intellectual-dense city of Shanghai took the lead in continuing to make overtures to 
local intellectuals. A number of conferences were held after the one on December 9, which 
allowed the municipal government to get a better sense of the condition of intellectuals in the 
city. Shanghai had 203 secondary schools at the time, which employed a total 8,168 intellectuals; 
these numbers were dwarfed by primary schools, which numbered 1,367 and employed 18,656 
intellectuals. In sum, Shanghai intellectuals were broken down as 42% progressive, 38% centrist, 
14% retrogressive, and 6% reactionary. There were some marginal differences, however, with 
primary school teachers generally being further left than secondary school teachers. Although the 
city had undergone a successful campaign to renovate classrooms, both primary and secondary 
school teachers reported not having enough to eat and struggling with low incomes. The situation 
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at private schools had become much worse, moreover; a number of teachers in these institutions 
had still not received wages for the previous month’s work, for example.422 Intellectuals 
complained about the arbitrary process of meting out political labels; attendees of these 
conferences described six cases where even intellectuals who had been described as “activists” 
(huodongfenzi) during the Thought Reform Campaign had their applications for CCP 
membership denied. Meanwhile, there were also cases where intellectuals were labelled 
“retrogressive” simply because they did not know enough Russian.423 Although these 
conferences represented an important shift in the city’s policies, they were still fraught with 
problems. One conference only had five attendees—two progressives, two centrists, and only a 
single retrogressive.424 It is hardly clear if the small number of attendees could expect to speak 
for the thousands of intellectuals living and working in Shanghai. 
 Nonetheless, the city took active steps at offering formal means to rectify intellectuals’ 
living situations. Shanghai set up a Municipal Office for Intellectuals’ Problems (shiwei 
zhishifenzi wenti bangongshi), which focused first on housing problems. Intellectuals were 
allowed to apply for either new housing accommodations or rent reductions on their current 
units. The Municipal Office collected information on applicants’ overall conditions, the state of 
their living quarters, the number of family members living with them, and how many rooms they 
would need. In terms of applications for rent reductions, the city made an effort to reduce overall 
rents by about a third.425 After tackling housing, the Municipal Office’s next objective was to 
offer improvements for intellectuals’ means of transport (jiaotong gongju) to and from work. At 
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the same time, the specter of political rectification was not completely removed from the 
process; the bureau also collected information on the intellectuals’ party memberships (whether 
they had belonged to the CCP, a minor democratic party, or had any previous ties to the 
Guomindang), and asked for their opinions on the political situation at their school.426 At least in 
Shanghai, intellectual activism had already produced concrete results. These official means of 
assistance would only increase the following year. 
 When the central government instituted new policies in 1956 aimed at assisting 
intellectuals and relaxing restrictions on expressing their opinions, it was a victory for the 
growing cacophony of intellectual activists who had dared to speak up in the critical 1953-1955 
years. Academics were hardly cowed by extent of state penetration into the school system in 
1952 during Thought Reform; indeed, many still professed genuine support for the CCP and 
Mao (if not always for the cadres directly overseeing them). Nevertheless, intellectuals as a 
whole had become willing to speak out on issues ranging from salaries, to the obstacles they 
faced in joining the CCP, to housing, to work hours. The state’s agenda in the following year was 
largely set and influenced by intellectuals speaking out. At the same time, the strategies 
intellectuals used tended to implicitly acknowledge the legitimacy of CCP rule. By attending 
conferences, working through their danwei, and seeking to gain admittance into the party itself, 
intellectual activists reaffirmed the mechanisms of Communist control. 
 
Outside the Ivory Tower: Intellectuals in the Military, Factories, Hospitals, and Arts 
 Thanks to the work assignment program, an increasing number of intellectuals found 
work outside of the school system. Moreover, thanks to the standardization of the CCP concept 
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of what it meant to be an intellectual—essentially, to have any sort of formal education—the 
number of individuals identified as intellectuals naturally expanded. Educated factory workers, 
like technicians or engineers, were also considered to be intellectuals, just like nurses, doctors, 
and anyone involved in the arts. Moreover, thanks to a surge of patriotic enlistments in the PLA 
for the Korean War (see Chapter 2), a non-insignificant number of intellectuals were employed 
in military logistics. The story of these intellectuals during the 1953-1955 years diverges from 
that of academic intellectuals, however, in that they tended to shy away from political activism. 
They also faced somewhat different problems. Often, intellectuals employed in “critical” 
industries such as heavy industry enjoyed far better standards of living than others involved in 
other professions, causing resentment. In general, non-academic intellectuals benefited from the 
hard-won gains made by academic intellectuals. By the end of 1955, cities and provinces were 
looking for concrete ways to improve the lives of all intellectuals, both in and outside of 
academia. As such, the story of the intellectuals during this period would not be complete 
without a discussion of intellectuals working outside the ivory tower. 
 Although the state was far more invested in education instructors at the start of 1953, 
reports occasionally emerged describing the situation of non-academic intellectuals. A survey of 
hospitals in Shanghai in early 1953 reveals that they had severe issues of workforce shortages. 
Demand for nursing jobs was drying up, thanks to drastic cuts in benefits; nurse pay had been 
consistently cut, and many hospitals stopped providing free food for nurses during their shifts 
(although no cuts were mentioned for feeding doctors). The Shanghai government incentivized 
hospitals to increase pay for nursing staff by offering to include hospital cadres in the work 
assignment bureaus, thus giving hospitals a voice in capturing skilled, educated workers.427 The 
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work assignment program, meanwhile was wrapping up its duties by mid-1953. The last bastion 
of unemployed intellectuals received increasingly inconvenient posts, such as jobs with urban 
oceanic trade offices, which could involve long stretches of time spent away from home for 
meager pay.428 Working for an ocean trade bureau was significantly less lucrative than working 
for a heavy industrial factory or management office.429 Not everything was bleak, however; the 
CCP put genuine effort into offering educated women opportunities for good non-academic jobs. 
The director of the Shanghai Telephone Company was a female intellectual at this juncture, for 
example.430 Educated, urban women may have found the new era to offer better economic 
opportunities than had previously existed. In general however, intellectuals outside academia had 
to deal with low wages, unequal treatment for “non-critical” workers (nurses as opposed to 
doctors, for example), and inconvenient jobs. 
 By mid-1953, the military was working to demobilize the intellectuals it had enlisted for 
the Korean War. As covered previously in this chapter, many in the military were highly 
suspicious of intellectuals, and felt that they had not performed their duties satisfactorily. 
Intellectuals in the PLA, however, had their own fair share of complaints about military life. In 
general, most intellectuals had been employed in the PLA logistical departments, which tended 
to involve mostly unsatisfying—if less dangerous—clerical work.431 Intellectuals in the military 
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had a number of complaints. For one, they found that job performance had no bearing on their 
ability to advance in their careers or be promoted. Poorly-performing intellectual enlistees fared 
the same as those who had served with distinction. Moreover, intellectuals chafed under the 
military’s demobilization plans, which moved them to the back of list for rehiring. Intellectuals 
who had left formal job positions were the last to reenter the civilian workforce. Intellectuals 
serving in Korea during 1952 had not escaped thought rectification work; many educated 
enlistees were just as busy with political study sessions in the field as their colleagues were back 
on the mainland.432 The military’s insistence on political study may have actually improved these 
intellectuals’ job prospects after they had been demobilized, however—even if it was another 
source of stress while on deployment.  
 Over the course of the Korean War, enlisted intellectuals were not stagnant. Because 
there was so much dissatisfaction with clerical work, the PLA had shifted around its intellectuals 
to field hospitals, the post which seemed to generate the most job satisfaction. From 1952 to 
1953, the number of intellectuals employed in field hospitals had grown from 16% to 46%. The 
majority of this increase was due to internal “adjustments” (tiaozheng) of military personnel as 
opposed to new enlistments.433 Despite the willingness of the PLA to adjust their assignments, 
intellectuals were generally unhappy with military life. Many expressed intense feelings of 
homesickness, and wished that they had never left their previous jobs or schools to enlist. Others 
felt that their fellow enlistees who had come from a working-class background looked down on 
them. A good number of enlisted intellectuals reported “faking a happy attitude” (pi xiao rou bu 
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xiao) while on the clock, but having negative thoughts in private.434 After being demobilized, 
intellectuals found that the military had not adequately provided them with transferable skills for 
work in or outside of academia, since most of their training in the field was ideological as 
opposed to practical (although, as we have seen, ideological credentials were in fact just as, if not 
more, important than technical know-how in this period).435 There is little mention in military 
documents of intellectuals who desired to continue in the military after the end of the conflict, 
suggesting that the overwhelming majority of educated enlistees were more than happy to be 
done with the PLA after returning home from Korea. 
 Unlike academic intellectuals, engineers, technicians, medical personnel, and artisans 
rarely engaged in political activism over the next few years. Nonetheless, the shifting climate in 
late 1955 heralded changes for their lives just as much as for their academic brethren. Cities like 
Shanghai undertook extensive reviews of intellectuals’ working and living conditions in state 
bureaus that oversaw municipal industries, commerce, and arts production. Although the surveys 
reveal a similar set of a problems as those that plagued academic intellectuals, some were unique 
to these alternative professions. A survey of the Shanghai First Committee for Light Industry, 
which employed 116 intellectuals in total, revealed the importance of age. 80 out of those 116 
were recent graduates, having graduated within the past two years. An additional 29 on top of 
that had graduated within the past three or four years, suggesting that the bureau prioritized 
intellectuals who had received degrees during the PRC Era. Young technicians expressed 
frustration with the few older intellectuals in the bureau, saying that they thought of themselves 
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as superior and refused to engage in join research projects with their younger colleagues.436 The 
political situation was not unusual, with 37 out of 116 intellectuals having Youth League 
membership. Only 9 were full-fledged CCP members. Conservative political opinions, 
meanwhile, seemed to cross gendered lines. An unnamed female technician had previously been 
described as a “conservative retrogressive element,” but had improved her standing with the 
bureau administration by vigorously participating in the study sessions held at the end of the 
workday.437 
 Reports from the Third Bureau of Commerce in Shanghai demonstrate some of the 
unique problems faced by non-academic intellectuals. The bureau employed only 31 
intellectuals, with 5 being classified as progressives (1 of which had been accepted into the 
CCP), 11 as centrists, 9 as retrogressives, and 6 as reactionaries. Dissatisfaction with their work 
was widespread among all intellectuals, however. “Compared to the rest of my graduating class,” 
one staff member said, “I advanced in my career much slower than they did and got paid less—
all because I work in the Commerce Bureau and they work in the Industrial Bureau.”438 Others 
said that they felt trapped by a poor performance on the aptitude tests used for work assignment 
relative to their classmates. Those with the best scores invariably ended up in heavy industry, 
therefore earning better pay. Like academic intellectuals, however, these bureaucrats remained 
broadly supportive of the CCP. “The Communist Party genuinely represents the people’s 
interests,” one said. “Regardless of how the cadres or party members act contrary to our 
interest,” they added, however.439 Even still, it was difficult for these intellectuals to gain party 
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membership. At the First Bureau of Commerce, only 1 out of 40 intellectual employees was a 
CCP member. Many felt that their supervising cadres were exerting a negative impact on their 
careers, and criticized them for having an overly leftist mentality (zuo de qingxu).440 
 Some bureaus, such as the Yangzi Shipping Management Office, had already undertaken 
wage reforms by late 1955 that led to better pay for intellectual employees. Nevertheless, 
intellectuals involved in trade and transportation—about 480 in total, in Shanghai—were still 
dissatisfied with their seeming inability to make successful applications to join the CCP. 
Although 23 employees were already party members at the time of their hiring, only 2 additional 
intellectuals had gained party membership during their tenure at the bureau. As such, there was a 
good deal of frustration about barriers to potential career advancement.441 The bureau’s 
overseeing cadres, however, told a different story. Only 25% of intellectuals in the Yangzi 
Shipping Management Office were classified as progressives, which was somewhat lower than 
the numbers from other bureaus and schools. Moreover, a great deal of intellectual staff members 
were loathe to participate in political study when it was not mandatory. Many simply said that 
they were “too busy,” and neglected to attend study sessions.442 
 A survey of the First Committee for Heavy Industry paints a very different picture, 
considering the prioritization of heavy industrial production by the new regime. A full half of 
engineers employed in heavy industry were classified as progressives, which was a decent 
amount higher than national averages. 37.5% were classified as centrists, while 12.5% were 
classified as retrogressives. The bureau reported no reactionaries, which was already an anomaly, 
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and implies that the most privileged positions (in terms of salary) were reserved for those with 
the best ideological credentials.443. Intellectuals in heavy industry also reported being quite 
enthusiastic with Communist rule; one said “the government and the party have resolved a 
number of great difficulties in our lives.” Others were impressed with the dramatic rise of 
industrial output in just a matter of years after 1949. It appears these engineers had been won 
over by the return to—and overtaking of—pre-war production levels.444 Despite a rosy picture 
overall, heavy industry engineers still voiced possible areas for improvements in their standards 
of living. Many were frustrated by a sense of “closed-doorism” (guanmenzhuyi) from the CCP, 
implying that they had difficulty getting membership applications accepted. Others described 
issues with housing; one reported living in an extremely small housing unit alongside 9 family 
members. Most had to sleep on the floor (dadipu shui) at night.445 
 The Shanghai Literature and Arts Office reported a decent amount of dissatisfaction, on 
the other hand, among intellectual employees. Many described having a job that they derived 
little personal satisfaction from (youye wuwu). A major source of fatigue among artisan 
intellectuals were the constant political meetings. Over the course of the past several years, many 
artisans engaged in passive resistance, claiming to be sick in order to avoid political study 
sessions. They were hardly ever truly sick—just “sick of meetings!” in the language of an 
investigative report.446 Artisans dealt with a significant number of financial hardships, often 
having to spend between 30 and 40% of their monthly income on rents. At the same time, some 
of their financial hardships may have been self-inflicted; it appears that many intellectuals tended 
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444 Ibid. 
445 Ibid.  
446 Ge Zhicheng, Jin Zhonghua, Zhou Gucheng deng guanyu shanghaishi gaoji zhishifenzi gongzuo, shenghuo xuexi 
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to favor sending their children to the few private schools that still existed, where tuition costs 
were a major loss of income.447 
 Although non-academic intellectuals may not have been as active politically as their 
counterparts, they still struggled from similar issues of meager incomes and inadequate housing 
assignments. A sort of institutional inequality had settled in, with intellectuals employed in vital 
industries—like heavy industry—enjoying better standards of living than those involved in 
commerce or the arts. Intellectuals assigned to the most coveted positions usually performed 
better on aptitude tests, and also demonstrated more conviction in state ideology than others, 
suggesting that a combination of deficiencies in skill and politics could hold an intellectual back 
in their career—even if they had taken steps to improve. As the government moved to address 
the concerns of intellectuals more forcefully in the coming year, non-academic intellectuals were 
central to the reform efforts. It is impossible to have a comprehensive understanding of the 
history of intellectuals in the 1950s without factoring in the experiences of these professionals. 
 
Conclusion 
 The 1953-1955 years were some of the least dramatic in the grand scope of the first 
decade of Communist rule. Gone were the fervent mobilization campaigns of the early years, and 
the epochal strife of the Anti-Rightist Campaign and the cataclysmic Great Leap Forward had 
not yet come to pass. Nonetheless, the intervening three years exposed the fault lines at the heart 
of the political drama that bookended them. The government, initially satisfied with its progress 
at establishing control over the nation’s schools in 1952, encouraged cadres to adopt a more 
lenient approach at the outset of the period. In addition, the state encouraged cadres to be more 
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attentive to the issues facing intellectuals—a meaningful, if vague, pronouncement. Even as it 
targeted individual scholars like Hu Shi, Hu Feng, or Liang Shuming, the national government 
backed off its policy of focusing on intellectuals collectively. Cadres on the ground, meanwhile, 
grew resentful of what they perceived as intellectual arrogance and privilege. For cadres, who 
had undeniably lacked the opportunities afforded many urban, middle-class intellectuals, the 
national government’s plans to rehabilitate most intellectuals must have felt like a betrayal of its 
egalitarian objectives. Evidence suggests that intellectuals tended, despite their issues, to enjoy 
better standards of living than most workers. Intellectuals, meanwhile, grew increasingly willing 
to complain about poor treatment from cadres, food shortages, low wages, inadequate housing 
supply, and other issues. These concerns were echoed by intellectuals working outside academia. 
The national government responded to the growing enmity between cadres and intellectuals with 
a brief campaign to study Marxist materialism and reject bourgeois idealism, which focused on 
bringing the two groups together. Nevertheless, the campaign had little effect on cross-class 
unity. 
 All three entities therefore had crisscrossing agendas—the government wanted to 
stabilize the state of China’s education system and promote unity, cadres wanted policies 
designed to further level the playing field, and intellectuals wanted the state to improve their 
standards of living. This placed the national government in the unenviable position of having to 
choose. It ultimately decided to side with the intellectuals, and took further steps to improve 
intellectuals lives and solicit their opinions in the coming years. This chapter has argued for two 
crucial conclusions about the path toward pro-intellectual policy. First, intellectuals themselves 
played a major role in securing better livelihoods for themselves. Although the central 
government ultimately had decision-making authority, intellectuals—especially in academia—
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had become increasingly willing to speak out and demand better working and living conditions. 
As such, the favorable policies of 1956 were just as much won by intellectuals as they were 
granted by the state. Second, cadres were considerably unenthused about these changes. An 
expansion of privileges for intellectuals sounded a lot like institutional inequality to working-
class cadres, many of whom had joined the Communist Party out of conviction for its message of 
egalitarianism. The protests of cadres would ultimately influence the state to turn back against 




CHAPTER 5: THE HEYDAY OF THE INTELLECTUALS, 1956 
 The years leading up to 1956 saw a sharp spike in politicking from below, as intellectuals 
increasingly grew restless from declining or stagnating standards of living and were inclined to 
speak up about their hardships. 1956 saw a massive, wide-ranging reckoning with the status of 
Chinese intellectuals across the country (or at least in urban areas, where most intellectuals 
tended to congregate). The Communist state had accomplished a sweeping transformation of 
society by 1956, having taken steps toward the total collectivization of agriculture in the 
countryside and the near-elimination of private businesses and education in the cities.448 The 
government could now look to a future in which technological progress might be used to build 
upon the policies laid down in the first half of the decade, helping the country fully realize the 
socialist dream.449 In the government’s view, intellectuals were linchpins in the dream of a 
technologically-advanced, socialist utopia that could exist in a world of nuclear-armed 
superpowers with ambitions to travel the stars. As such, many trends lined up to produce the 
energetic reforms of 1956. 
 I diverge somewhat from the literature on this period. Previous scholars have typically 
examined 1956 under the lens of the Hundred Flowers Campaign: a mass movement during 
which the government encouraged its people (especially intellectuals) to criticize government 
policy in an effort to bolster the state’s agenda.450 Free speech certainly was a pressing issue for 
 
448 The final stage in agrarian collectivization—the foundation of advanced cooperatives—had begun at the start of 
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450 Roderick MacFarquhar’s landmark volume The Hundred Flowers Campaign and the Chinese Intellectuals (New 
York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1960) places the question of free speech and free criticism of government policy at 
the heart of his text. Theodore Chen, meanwhile does devote some space to the question of intellectuals’ standards 
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many intellectuals, and paeans to Chinese scholars chafing under the suppression of free speech 
by the authoritarian CCP have captivated Western audiences for some time, especially during the 
Cold War. That being said, however, there were numerous other issues at stake for intellectuals, 
as the previous chapter has shown. In fact, free speech often took a backseat to more practical 
concerns with housing, salaries, and the ability to gain membership in the CCP. While I do not 
dispute any of the previous accounts of the critical year of 1956, I instead focus on these 
practical concerns instead of free speech. As such, I see 1956 as much more than simply the 
story of the Hundred Flowers Campaign; rather, it was the heyday of the intellectual class more 
broadly, when their litany of concerns was addressed most comprehensively by the state. Even 
when the state moved to crack down on intellectuals who used the opportunity to speak out 
against Communist rule the following year, the improvements in living standards were often 
there to stay. And it is this issue, perhaps more so than anything any right-leaning intellectual 
may have said to criticize the CCP, that provoked the ire of the cadres. Moreover, it was unusual 
for an intellectual to challenge the basic legitimacy of CCP rule; instead, many were content with 
the reforms undertaken by the government to assist them. 
 I approach the 1956 heyday with four angles. First and most significantly, intellectuals 
saw successes in their efforts to improve their standards of living. This process was far from 
centrally-directed, however; government documents from the era note the long-standing party 
doctrine of “implementing the most effective policy in accordance with local conditions.”451 As 
such, the intellectual-dense city of Shanghai represents one of the best vantage points to view the 
changes of 1956. I treat the city as a primary case study of broader trends that spread outward 
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451 Zhonggong shanghaishi dong jiaoqu weiyuanhui guanyu zhishifenzi gongzuo wenti de fayangao, February 23, 
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during the year. Even in Shanghai, however, the municipal government oversaw but did not 
manage the movement to improve intellectuals’ lives. Rather, individual danwei were most 
directly in charge of implementing the reforms jointly promulgated by the national government 
and the city.452 As such, the process was messy, chaotic, and plagued by differences. Even as 
intellectuals had previously complained about inequalities within their professions—for example, 
those involved in commercial industries feeling less well-off than their colleagues in heavy 
industry (see Chapter 4)—the usage of danwei to implement reforms meant that institutional 
inequalities often persisted. Moreover, different age groups of intellectuals experienced different 
types of gains. For example, older intellectuals who were classified as “high-level” (gaoji; as 
opposed to “general,” or yiban) saw more significant gains during 1956 than their younger 
colleagues. Nevertheless, it is possible to draw out a number of universal ways in which 
Shanghai intellectuals saw livelihood betterments: greater access to food and transportation, 
better housing accommodations, and higher salaries.  
 Other ways in which the government responded to intellectuals’ concerns reveal my 
second approach to understanding 1956. One document from the period speaks about the idea of 
entering a “new era,” marked by the full harnessing of electricity and atomic power.453 The 
state’s plans for the future increasingly relied on the expertise of intellectuals, as politicians 
envisioned a socialist society based on knowledge capital. As such, cities like Shanghai invested 
enormous sums in research, libraries, book collections, and scientific materials. Intellectuals 
were expected to play an active role in the new era by popularizing education to the masses. A 
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third facet of the year was the party’s opening of its own doors to intellectuals. Whereas some 
intellectuals had previously managed to gain membership in the CCP, 1956 saw a dramatic 
expansion of admittances for scholars. Many local bureaus received quotas for party membership 
applications among intellectual staff members that they had to pass on to superiors. In the wake 
of all these changes, however, non-intellectuals grew increasingly frustrated at the preferential 
treatment given by the government to scholars. This represents the fourth and final key aspect of 
the year: the shift from passive resentment to active resistance to pro-intellectual reforms. Cadres 
in charge of forwarding intellectuals’ party membership applications, for example, might stall 
out the process. And some danwei showed little willingness to actually implement the reform 
policies proposed by the state. As such, the events of 1956 paved the way for the crackdown of 
1957.  
 
From Flower Gardens to Bus Services: Livelihood Improvements for Intellectuals 
 Shanghai intellectuals experienced across-the-board improvements to their standards of 
living over the course of 1956. These gains were at least somewhat hard-won, thanks to the 
activism of especially academic intellectuals during the preceding three years. Beyond that vague 
generalization, however, it is hard to draw concrete conclusions about how intellectuals’ lives 
changed during 1956. The most common reforms were related to housing issues, salaries, access 
to food, and better transportation options. Nonetheless, different kinds of intellectuals saw 
different levels of improvement. Intellectuals in vital economic sectors like heavy industry saw 
perhaps the most preferential treatment during the year; affiliated danwei, for example, went so 
far as to undertake a beautification project for heavy industry engineers’ apartments by planting 
flowers in a communal plot. For intellectuals in less vital industries, however, reforms might be 
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limited to just meager salary increases. Moreover, many of these reforms focused mainly on 
high-level intellectuals, such as tenured professors, advanced engineers, specialized doctors, or 
famous artists. It is likely that older intellectuals well into their careers thus benefitted 
disproportionately from many of the state’s proposed reforms. Livelihood improvements came 
from a variety of sources, although they were usually spearheaded by the danwei. In some cases, 
however, municipal governments would step in to provide better health care options for 
intellectuals. Perhaps one of the most intriguing commonalities, however, was the disregard for 
intellectuals’ political backgrounds when meting out standard-of-living reforms. In general, all 
intellectuals—progressives, centrists, retrogressives, and even reactionaries—saw improvements 
over the year. As such, 1956 truly represented a heyday for a wide swath of intellectuals, even if 
institutional inequalities persisted. 
 Some of the earliest efforts at reforms for intellectuals came, unsurprisingly, from heavy 
industry. Even though the iron and steel sector of the Shanghai economy only employed 589 
intellectuals in total (3.75% of the total workforce), these intellectuals, primarily technicians, 
were vital to the city’s emerging strength as a steel-manufacturing powerhouse. Public iron and 
steel companies found that one of the most effective ways of securing more free time for 
intellectual staff members was to hire assistants. In early 1956, the Shanghai municipal 
committee overseeing iron and steel made plans to hire 300 students from local schools to assist 
the overworked technical staff.454 Less vital industries, such as textiles, made less ambitious 
plans. The municipal committee overseeing textile production called for more conferences with 
industry intellectuals to better solicit their viewpoints. The committee did take concrete steps to 
encourage individual mills to reduce the “routine responsibilities” (shiwu xing gongzuo) that ate 
 
454 Shanghai gangtie gongsi guanyu zhishifenzi de gongzuo guihua, 1956, A46-1-13-3, Chinese Communist 
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up intellectuals’ working hours.455 Moreover, the committee called for need-based wage 
increases and for longer meal breaks during the workday so that older intellectuals could avoid 
the “push-and-squeeze queues” (yongji paidui) that characterized the lunchtime rush.456 These 
early reforms represent a testament to the uneven nature of the livelihood improvements to 
follow.  
 Intellectuals in academia, meanwhile, experienced divergent reforms as well. There is 
some evidence to suggest that the Shanghai Education Bureau took the city’s directives to better 
care for intellectuals more seriously at the start of the year than non-academic management 
bureaus. One major effort among universities was to reduce “concurrent administrative work” 
(jianren xingzheng gongzuo) for professors to allow for more spare time. In addition, school 
administrations agreed to promote and support campus newspapers that might serve as forums 
for professors to share their research work and solicit feedback.457 The Education Bureau called 
for across-the-board wage increases for teachers and professors, even explicitly stating that 
intellectuals ought to receive favorable treatment (youhou daiyu).458 Wage increases came to 
academic individuals of all political classifications, thanks to the city’s initiative to standardize 
wage criterion (tongyi gongzi biaozhun). This did not remove inequalities, however; wage 
increases were simply applied on top of existing salaries, which tended to favor progressive and 
sometimes centrist intellectuals at the expense of retrogressive or especially reactionary ones. 
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The city Education Bureau sought to assist intellectuals in saving their wages by expanding 
benefits, moreover; a full 2500 yuan was allotted in the yearly budget to cover medical 
procedures specifically for intellectuals, from surgery to therapy.459 As such, net increases in 
individual intellectuals’ revenue came from expanded benefits in addition to salary hikes. 
 Intellectuals naturally greeted these early reform efforts with considerable support. It is 
important to note that, for many intellectuals, the period probably solidified their support for 
CCP rule instead of representing an opportunity to speak out as some did during the Hundred 
Flowers Campaign. A survey of several intellectuals in the First Bureau of Commerce in 
Shanghai reveals a good deal of resilient support for the government. Liang Zuhou, for example, 
was a 35-year-old engineer who was employed as a secondary school science teacher before 
liberation. Thanks to Shanghai’s work assignment efforts, he had gotten a more prominent 
position as a technical engineer. Lu Xin (37 years old) credited the CCP’s policies for rising 
from an assistant engineer position to a full-fledged engineering job after liberation. Zhu Kuai 
(42 years old) echoed these sentiments; he too saw a promotion shortly after 1949.460 Despite 
their general levels of support for the Communists, they still had suggestions for practical 
improvements. Liang asked for more standard guidelines and policies on conduction specialized 
commodity research. He echoed academic intellectuals in calling for a reduction in 
administrative work. Lu, meanwhile, asked for better transportation means—such as a bus 
service from the bureau’s housing units to the office. Although the bureau administration 
promised to take these ideas into consideration, the first step taken was a 5-yuan increase to all 
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intellectual employees’ monthly wages.461 These cases suggest that “speaking out” was not 
tantamount to rejecting the leadership of the CCP—indeed, anti-party sentiments among 
intellectuals may have been more of a marginal view at this juncture. Additionally, these cases 
show that the state was aware of gaps between the treatment of older, high-level intellectuals and 
younger, “general” intellectuals. 
 Things were moving much more slowly outside of academia and vital industries. The 
Motor Transportation Office in Shanghai, for example, had to triage demands for better living 
accommodations. The office pledged to provide better housing for all intellectuals, but first 
prioritized its 6 engineers and 69 “most important” technicians.462 Within the resource-strapped 
municipal Ministry of Culture, administrators could do little but acknowledge the problems 
facing intellectuals. The ministry was divided into a number of sub-department “systems,” such 
as the Opera System or the Socialist Culture System. More than 200 intellectuals (primarily stage 
performers) had jobs in these two systems. They complained about a lack of adequate time to 
fulfill their work responsibilities, much less actually discuss their work with colleagues or the 
administration. Most reported having to take their work home with them by practicing lines (bei 
taici) at home, which interfered with their family life. Performing intellectuals noted that they 
had to take time away from their spouses and children to work, and rarely got any days off.463 
For intellectuals outside of vital industries and academia, it would take months for the reforms to 
have any real transformative effect on their lives. 
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 Medical professionals occupied a strange middle ground during the year. On one hand, 
doctors and nurses were expected to increase their responsibilities in order to accommodate 
demand for better health care among other intellectuals. On the other, medical personnel were 
almost as important for the broader reformist agenda as vital engineers. As such, danwei 
overseeing hospitals and clinics made a strong effort at improving the lives of their staff—except 
any reduction of working hours. Yili Hospital had already provided better housing units for 19 
out of a total 37 intellectual staff members who had reported problems—a rate of 47.22%. The 
municipal Ministry of Hygiene had also requisitioned an additional 19,000 yuan for the entire 
year for the purchasing of better medical instruments and the funding of medical research. 
Hospital administrations made efforts to reduce administrative work, and allotted more time 
during the workday for rest and relaxation while on the clock (even if overall workday hours 
stayed consistent).464 Shanghai hospitals and clinics took a more methodological approach to 
disease treatment, investing resources into combatting the diseases most widely seen among 
other intellectuals, such as haemolysis (rongxue). At the same time, hospital administrators were 
also cognizant of repairing the gap between medical professionals and commoners. Cadres asked 
that doctors previously trained in Western medicine (xiyi) learn traditional Chinese medicine 
(zhongyi) in order to provide the kind of care that commoners were more familiar with. At the 
First Workers’ Hospital in Shanghai, for example, roughly 50% of the staff was in the process of 
studying traditional Chinese medicine. Each danwei affiliated with a hospital or clinic promised 
to give roughly 30 doctors time to study and learn Chinese medicine.465  
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 According to intellectuals, one of the more pressing reforms was increasing state 
investment in critical research projects. A Shanghai intellectual named Shi Ximin lobbied the 
municipal government in early 1956 to consider diverting more funds to research. Shi’s speech 
also heaped praise on the city government, however, noting intellectuals’ positive reception of 
the work assignment program.466 A report emerged out of the Number Five Cotton Factory, 
which had experienced successes in promoting production research and offered suggestions to 
other danwei. The factory had started its first small research group in 1953. The group was so 
successful at increasing outputs that management had expanded the number of research groups to 
15 by the start of 1956. The factory also noted that reducing time spent in political study 
sessions—which were rescheduled so as to not interfere with intellectuals’ workdays—improved 
productivity.467 On the surface, the factory was unremarkable despite its record of successes; it 
employed 82 intellectuals (16 of which were women). Nearly a quarter of these engineers and 
technicians had previously belonged to a reactionary political organization. However, factory 
management noted that the political leanings of the staff had shifted, remarkably, after 
overseeing cadres had improved wages and housing conditions.468 The experiences of Number 
Five Cotton Factory thus served as a pragmatic justification for the overall slate of reforms 
underway, and provided a strong example of the efficacy of research investments. 
 Intellectuals outside Shanghai were clearly aware of developments in the city, and had 
begun seizing upon the reforms underway to put pressure on their own municipal governments. 
In Chongqing, for example, older intellectuals complained about the city’s focus only on 
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younger scholars as well as the necessity of working on the weekends.469 Wuhan intellectuals 
described a feeling of “panic” (konghuang); they felt that the country as a whole had a bright 
future whereas they had few prospects. Researchers, doctors, and medical school students 
reported a lack of adequate instruments to provide care and do their jobs properly. Frustrations 
with low wages were widespread, and there was a prevailing sentiment in Wuhan that local 
intellectuals were paid less than their colleagues in Beijing or Shanghai.470 Intellectuals in 
Shaanxi Province, meanwhile, complained about a lack of a good working relationship with their 
overseeing cadres; they were “revered friends” (weiyou) to Shaanxi intellectuals, but not “close 
friends” (miyou). Similar supply problems were intense in Shaanxi. One doctor, for example, had 
to donate some of his own blood to a patient because of a lack of supply. Wages in Shaanxi 
ranged from 108 yuan to 566 yuan per month.471 In the province of Yunnan, meanwhile, 
intellectuals were extremely unhappy with an overly hostile relationship with provincial officials. 
They described feeling “left behind” by the CCP, and asked for a reduction of administrative 
duties and more research funding.472 These instances demonstrate the geographic scope of the 
kind of influence that the Shanghai reforms had. Across China, intellectuals felt that a better 
stake was attainable. 
 Overall, urbanites' standards of living showed signs of stabilization in early 1956, which 
would have affected the overall sense of livelihood stability among intellectuals. In the 
countryside, infrastructure projects such as land reclamation, irrigation, and flood control had 
done a good deal to ensure a more continuous supply chain of food to the cities, perhaps leading 
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to some of the food-based reforms cities took regarding intellectuals.473 Many intellectuals felt 
that the Thought Reform Campaign had never really ended, considering the continuance of 
political study meetings. Nevertheless, these “rituals” of life in the PRC were rarely as intrusive 
as during the height of the campaign back in 1952.474 On January 23, the Shanghai government 
announced plans for reductions on land taxes, which was a major source of expenditures for 
intellectuals (alongside high rents). These tax deductions included privately-owned dwellings 
that were leased out, which further affected intellectual tenants.475 It does seem that rising taxes 
were a concern for some intellectuals; one Shanghai violinist reported having to sell his 
instrument just to meet tax hikes.476 Although intellectuals experienced a plethora of reforms 
aimed at them specifically, they also enjoyed modest improvements in overall urban standards of 
living. In other cases, however, the picture was far from rosy.  
 By February, a new vocabulary had emerged regarding the intellectuals’ conditions. The 
national government had identified “bureaucratism” (guanliaozhuyi) as a problematic trend, 
whereby intellectuals were given the run-around by complicated and inaccessible administrations 
unresponsive to their needs.477 In Shanghai, the assistant director of the municipal Ministry of 
Culture, Chen Yusan, suggested that party bureaucrats showed an erroneous tendency to let 
intellectuals “be as they please” (fangren ziliu). Chen argued that the real focus of the 
conferences and meetings in 1956 should be to “simplify the bureaucratic process” 
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(guanliaozhuyi de jiandanhua) by engaging intellectuals directly. Chen cited the example of the 
Shanghai Symphony Orchestra, in which members had tried to file complaints regarding housing 
for several years. Their overseeing cadres simply stonewalled them.478 Cadres overseeing 
meetings and conferences often tried to express more conciliatory attitudes towards intellectuals; 
at a meeting during the month in the First Committee for Heavy Industry, for example, one party 
bureaucrat said that “we would never want to forbid any intellectuals from assisting in the 
construction of socialism.” The speaker then asked intellectuals for patience, noting that their 
work was often poorly understood by cadres without a formal education.479 For their part, 
attendees seemed willing to express their views on problems with their standards of living, while 
still insisting on support for the CCP. At the First Committee for Heavy Industry meeting, for 
example, engineers generally expressed optimism about the state of national economic 
construction. One explained that he felt vindicated in his decision to return from living abroad in 
the US.480 Meetings were held in other cities as well, with similar results; at a conference in 
Beijing, Academy of Sciences president Guo Moruo spoke on behalf of patriotic, older 
intellectuals in declaring his support for the CCP. Still, Guo argued, China would do well to 
learn from the rest of the world—not just the Soviet Union.481  
 In most cities, the municipal culture ministry was tasked with organizing meetings and 
conferences for intellectuals. In some cases, non-party intellectuals were even permitted to attend 
party conferences as non-voting delegates.482 Official pronouncements regarding intellectuals’ 
livelihood reform was usually dispatched to all local organs of government via the culture 
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ministry, which would then organize a set number of meetings. Individual danwei had to 
nominate between two and five representatives from their intellectual staff to attend. 
Representatives were expected to give speeches regarding their living and working conditions 
that could be transcribed by and disseminated within the wider municipal government. 
Intellectual representatives were asked to keep their remarks to under 2500 characters.483 As in 
the meetings already held, attendees tended to express a mix of positive and negative feedback 
regarding CCP governance. At a meeting of the Shanghai First Bureau of Commerce, for 
example, attendees complained that they had few to no opportunities to learn new skills while on 
the job, thus further stagnating their future career prospects. They argued that colleagues in other 
bureaus generally had more opportunities to pick up vocational skills.484 It seems that many 
intellectuals feared that criticism was not welcome, and shied away from speaking out. Cadres 
argued to the contrary however, citing an example of an engineer who had made several 
criticisms regarding a lack of efficiency in the production process (jiagong chengpin). To the 
engineer’s surprise, his concerns were taken seriously by management, and his factory enjoyed 
increasing outputs soon afterward.485  
 Not every bureau or industry held formal meetings. The Shanghai Railroad Bureau used a 
more relaxed setting to connect cadre administrators with intellectual employees: tea parties. At 
one such gather, intellectuals seemed generally invigorated by the national changes underway. 
Commenting on Zhou Enlai’s remarks regarding intellectuals’ issues, one railroad employee said 
it was as though the Premier’s words “could’ve come from my own heart.”486 At the same time, 
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these intellectuals were discouraged by problems in their living situation. In many cases, 
intellectuals described living in a single-room housing unit alongside three other adults. They 
also experienced problems with electrical outages and poor lighting, which affected their ability 
to study political texts or technical manuals needed for their work.487 Whether through letter-
writing, formal conferences, or informal tea ceremonies, intellectuals had a wide array of options 
for communicating with their overseers and expressing their views—both positive and 
negative—about their situations. 
 By March, the Shanghai government had therefore collated a good deal of information 
about intellectuals’ livelihoods. The city decided to focus on two key issues: administrative work 
and health care improvements. The city announced the “one person, one post” principle (yiren 
yizhi yuanze), which was violated when intellectuals were tasked with administrative duties on 
top of their actual job duties.488 This was a highly achievable goal for all professions that 
employed intellectuals, especially in comparison to expensive reforms such as housing or salary 
increases. The Shanghai Children’s Press, for example, committed to reducing concurrent posts 
and administrative work for its writers, illustrators, and editors. At the same time, the publishing 
agency, far from the most “vital” agency in the city, made no mention of wage raises.489 The city 
also focused on health care, promising more treatment options and greater affordability. At the 
same time, the municipal government managed expectations by noting that reforms would take 
time; officials said that a full expansion of health care coverage might not be completed for at 
least two years.490 Even heavy industry engineers were frustrated by the lack of concrete wage 
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increases by March, arguing that they had contributed to production increases to a 
disproportionate extent compared to compensation.491 
 The city sought to discover new ways at promoting channels for intellectuals to air their 
views in mid-March. The local Liberation Daily publishing office launched a new effort to focus 
on intellectuals outside of heavy industry, which the chief editor described as having been 
“looked down on” (qingshi). In addition, the paper would pay more attention to reporting on the 
cultural and educational lives of intellectuals, as opposed to just professional successes.492 For 
academic intellectuals that could not attend conferences, moreover, the local Higher Education 
Bureau encouraged professors to write letters. As of the beginning of the month, the bureau had 
already received 47 such letters. One such letter came from Liu Yongye, who was living abroad 
in America during 1949. She stayed in the US until 1952, although illness had prevented her 
from finding steady employment. Even as she dutifully participated in the mass campaigns, she 
bounced around from temp job to temp job.493 Another letter came from Zhang Yuanfeng, who 
had a similar story to Liu. Zhang too was living in America during the revolution, but returned to 
Beijing shortly after liberation. Zhang dealt with chronic illness that made it difficult to keep a 
job. His family had ultimately decided to move from Beijing to Shanghai in the hopes that he 
might find a tenured academic job.494 The experiences of Liu and Zhang may have added 
urgency to the city’s initiatives to improve health care access for intellectuals.  
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 During the second half of March, bureaus around Shanghai began to submit reports 
regarding the livelihoods of the intellectuals they employed, giving us a further glimpse into the 
issues facing the knowledge class. Some industrial engineers registered complaints regarding the 
importation of Soviet texts and technical manuals, which were often difficult to process for 
intellectuals not fluent in Russian. To the extent that intellectuals in Shanghai were bilingual, 
English was by far the most common second language, not Russian.495 Cadres from heavy 
industry were in general more accommodating toward engineers, who cadres saw as being 
perhaps more diligent in their ideological reform than colleagues in other industries. Heavy 
industry administrations pledged to try to eliminate the boundaries between them and their 
engineering and technical staff.496 Meanwhile, a report from the Inland Shipping Administrative 
Office revealed that many employed intellectuals (33 in total; 4 engineers and 29 technicians) 
were frustrated by a seeming lack of relevance of their duties to their academic training. Many 
had worked in very different careers before 1949. Few possessed relevant academic degrees. 
Data on the political leanings of the Inland Shipping staff reveal that they were still at least 
broadly lukewarm toward CCP rule, however; with 14 progressives, 14 centrists, and only 4 
retrogressives.497 
 Perhaps in response to some of these reports praising the genuine ideological reform 
among intellectuals, various levels of government began to shift to a discourse of praise 
regarding intellectuals’ collective political beliefs. An editorial in People’s Daily on March 21, 
for example, extolled the “successes” of intellectuals in undergoing genuine thought 
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rectification. Even retrogressive elements, according to the author, had come to have a grudging 
respect for the party’s practical accomplishments.498 Other papers like Liberation Daily 
continued to try and better capture the lives of intellectual and convey their opinions to a mass 
audience. At a meeting in the Liberation Daily publishing office on March 28, the chief editor 
suggested that the paper move away from quoting the views of national officials (namely Zhou 
Enlai) regarding intellectuals, and instead conduct actual interviews of local scholars.499 These 
examples suggest a culture of conciliation promoted by state media, far removed from the 
skeptical view of the intellectual class that had been promulgated earlier in the decade. The 
Communist Party was increasingly interested in challenging the portrait of the intellectuals that it 
had itself created. A more conciliatory national climate built upon policy changes already 
underway, leading to more tangible benefits for intellectuals. The Shanghai government, for 
example, had begun seizing foreign-held properties, such as an apartment complex owned by 
British diplomats. The property owners were told that they had to lease vacant rooms to Chinese 
intellectuals.500 
 A number of changes in the world of academia in early April brought benefits to scholars 
in the ivory tower. The Shanghai branch of the Academy of Sciences led the way in promoting 
healthier work schedules. The academy announced a new policy whereby political study and 
meetings would only occur on Saturdays, whereas the Monday through Friday workweek would 
be reserved for actual job duties. Moreover, evening hours every Thursday were cut to allow 
researchers more free time. The academy proposed to cut the overall time spent in meetings for 
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intellectuals from 4-6 hours to 2-4.501 Moreover, the academy argued that extra administrative 
work was “a waste of professors’ time,” and pledged to reduce such responsibilities. Perhaps in 
an effort to improve access to political study materials, the academy also announced funding for 
a new “Marxist-Leninist Materials Reading Room” in the library.502 The municipal government, 
meanwhile, had been studying the problem of food supply for schools and universities. Many 
campuses were built far away from food markets, making it difficult for school representatives to 
purchase an adequate amount of food. The city mandated that a dedicated amount of food at all 
Shanghai markets be reserved specifically for education institutions.503 Individual intellectuals, 
meanwhile, could acquire new “purchasing cards” (goumai zheng) for their personal food 
consumption. The Shanghai government announced plans to steadily increase the funds for these 
cards.504 For schools lying further away from downtown Shanghai, the problem was more 
complex. Teachers in these schools complained that the food they were able to consume in their 
cafeterias was insufficient, and as such they had to supplement their diets with gruel at home. 
The city government encouraged its education bureaus to establish better lines with its grain 
management bureaus in order to ensure that basic foodstuffs could be dispatched in greater 
amounts to suburban schools.505 
 Thus far, numerous documents mentioned the need to reduce inefficient “administrative 
work” for intellectuals. A report from the Shanghai Medical Workers’ Union gives an insight 
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into the kinds of administrative work that intellectuals might be required to do. Technicians in 
the union were expected to attend a variety of meetings, usually centered around four topics: (1) 
productivity (shenchang hui), quality of service (yewu zuotanhui), exchange of experiences 
(jingyan jiaoliu hui), and small group discussions (xiaozu taolun). The union pledged to reduce 
or eliminate these meetings.506 In addition, the union took on responsibilities to offer better life-
enrichment activities to its intellectual staff. For example, the union promised to arrange for 
weekend transportation to nearby Suzhou, where many employees had family. The union also 
announced investment into local “culture clubs,” pending a review of intellectuals’ hobbies and 
interests to see what kinds of activities would be most suitable.507 Other businesses, such as the 
Shanghai Cement Plant, built off of these reforms and introduced new facilities for free time and 
relaxation at the work site. The plant administration announced plans for a billiards table, a 
tennis court, and a volleyball court on-site for intellectual staff members.508 Outside academia, 
bureaus and public corporations began to look at ways to offer new experiences during the 
workday in addition to broader livelihood reforms. 
 Problems still existed surrounding intellectuals’ wages, however. A study of differences 
in compensation between intellectuals and chauffeurs employed by foreign embassies revealed 
that chauffeurs usually made more than an entire intellectual household; in one case, a professor 
and his wife were living on 100 yuan per month combined, whereas the chauffeur (working for 
the British Consulate-General) made 120 per month.509 Although 100 yuan per month is 
probably on the low end of what most intellectuals made around the country, there certainly are 
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cases of pitifully low salaries. An art scholar in Beijing, Chen Banding, had to make ends meet 
on a salary of 80 yuan per month—and he calculated his monthly expenses at 800 yuan! Chen 
was reliant on selling his own art and leasing out his housing unit to make up the difference.510 
Intellectuals reliant on selling their own work, such as artists or writers, faced difficulties finding 
publishers who were willing to publish their work for political reasons (or based on the 
intellectual’s age).511 The Shanghai government, building off of its successes with food 
purchasing cards, instituted a new system for health care cost reimbursements for intellectuals on 
April 6. Previously, intellectuals were allotted a flat stipend that could be spent on medical 
expenses. After the new policies, however, intellectuals simply had to write “public expense” 
(gongfei) on their medical receipts, and their treatments would be paid for in full.512 Even as high 
costs and low salaries continued to plague scholars, the Shanghai government continued to 
pursue creative policies to increase the amount of cash in an intellectual’s pocket. 
 Intellectuals with greater reputations had a wider array of strategies available in order to 
secure higher salaries than the average scholar. In one odd case, a semi-famous opera performer 
Ge Jiaotian managed to get the Beijing Opera and the Shanghai Opera into a bidding war over 
his contract, which was ultimately won by the Shanghai Opera. After moving to Shanghai in 
May, Ge received a salary of 800 yuan per month. Although no data exists regarding the average 
pay for all intellectuals in Shanghai (much less nationwide) at this point, other documents 
suggests that Ge’s salary was between two and eight times what most intellectuals were making 
per month.513 Later on in June, the director of the Shanghai Historical Documents Library, Gu 
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Yanlong, was able to negotiate a raise. The city’s Ministry of Culture oversaw both Ge and Gu’s 
contracts, thus showing a degree of prioritization on behalf of the ministry—most intellectual 
employees did not see salary increases until later in 1956. For both Ge and Gu, the ministry was 
more responsive to improving salaries and finding better housing accommodations in part due to 
their stature.514 For non-vital agencies, any reforms undertaken during the first half of the year 
may have exacerbated inequalities among intellectual staff members. 
 The city followed up new policies regarding food and health care with stipulations 
regarding work hours. A speech in the municipal Political Consultative Congress called for a 
new “Five-Sixths Policy” (liu fenzhi wu zhengce) which meant that five out of six working days 
should be reserved for actual job duties as opposed to meetings or political study (thus 
resembling the new policies at the Shanghai branch of the Academy of Sciences). In addition, the 
speech called for a standardized 40-hour work week for intellectuals.515 The government also 
directed the Municipal Real Estate Management Office to help find space around Shanghai for 
the construction of scientific laboratories, and approved the construction of 500 new housing 
units. Intellectuals would be given priority when assigning new housing. The speech also 
encouraged local scholars to pursue study abroad options in “friendly” countries (xiongdi 
guojia)—presumably, those in the socialist bloc.516 In order to facilitate better “recuperation” 
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(liaoyang) during work hours, the city also approved the delivery of 31 bed units to local 
schools, hospitals, and bureaus for intellectuals to take naps while at work.517 
 In mid-April, heavy industry factories began leading the way in providing more benefits 
in response to intellectual employees’ needs. Affiliated bureaus would haphazardly conduct 
surveys of employed intellectuals, which included their political histories, the quality and 
quantity of their work, and their living situations outside of work. In heavy industry factories, the 
most common reported problems were related to diet, means of transportation, and housing.518 
For diets, many factories had begun a new regimen whereby a corner table was reserved in the 
factor mess hall specifically for intellectuals, who could “come and eat as they please” (sui dao 
sui chi) at any point during the workday. This policy proved highly popular among surveyed 
engineers. For transportation, the factory danwei commissioned a number of bus shuttles to 
travel between the danwei residencies and the factory. In some specific industries, intellectuals 
experienced better transportation accommodations while on the job. At the Post and 
Telecommunications Company, for instance, part of intellectuals’ jobs was to inspect various 
sites around Shanghai to ensure proper flow of both electricity and mail. Often, the distances 
between sites were so great that inspectors could only visit two sites per day. However, their 
overseeing danwei announced plans for a bus service to shuttle inspectors from site to site, 
allowing for two sites to be visited every three hours.519 Although the report promised to provide 
better accommodations for intellectuals living in cramped quarters, affiliated danwei also 
focused on housing beautification. One engineer, Zhang Jueya, had complained about a generally 
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unattractive living environment. As such, the factory management planted a new flower garden 
outside of his house.520 From flower gardens to bus services, intellectuals were seeing their 
livelihoods improve in a multitude of ways. 
 Although the majority of the reforms underway at this point benefitted older intellectuals, 
the CCP did not abandon its hope for a generational change within the scholarly community. The 
government maintained its interest in fostering a communist ethos among rising intellectual 
youth. The national government had established May 4 as “Youth Day,” commemorating the 
May Fourth Movement of 1919. Municipal governments in Beijing, Tianjin, Shenyang, and 
Shanghai all held extravagant festivals to commemorate Youth Day and the May Fourth 
anniversary in 1956. The events, which included movie screenings and competitive athletic 
events, catered to current students.521 In Shanghai, the municipal government went a step further 
by holding a young intellectuals’ representative conference (qingnian zhishifenzi daibiao huiyi) 
shortly after May 4, which was attended by about 1900 young scholars. Overall, young scholars 
represented a growing percentage of the intellectual workforce in Shanghai, with 60% of 
scientific researchers and about half of educators being considered “young” (usually, this meant 
35 or younger).522 These events show that the Communist Party never moved away from its 
vision of a future generation of ideologically-committed experts. The slate of reforms for older, 
more experienced intellectuals represented a shift in tactics but not overall strategy. 
 In July, the Shanghai Municipal Government began taking more active steps at 
improving local intellectuals’ lives. The government called on all danwei employing intellectuals 
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to supply more consultation materials like books or scientific instruments for their staff. For 
intellectuals who may have had older degrees, danwei were encouraged to facilitate them taking 
“refresher courses” (jinxiu) at local universities to improve their job performance. The city also 
called on danwei to invest more resources into hiring research assistants and offered the services 
of the city’s zoning committee to find housing spaces for danwei seeking to improve the living 
situation of its intellectuals.523 The Shanghai government acknowledged that many intellectuals 
still had not seen improvements, only slogans (kouhao). The city attempted to rationalize the 
process by submitting the following questionnaire to all intellectual-employing danwei: 
a. How many intellectuals were employed in the danwei, and what were their work 
conditions like—i.e., how many were Party members, what was their pay, what 
were their ideological backgrounds, etc.? 
b. What steps had been taken to identify and reduce administrative work? 
c. In what ways have the danwei provided the necessary supplies—books, 
instruments, and facilities—for research?  
d. Have danwei provided an adequate number of assistants (fuzhu renyuan) to assist 
intellectuals in their numerous duties? 
e. What have the danwei done to improve the transportation and living situations 
facing intellectuals? 
f. Are there any ways in which the Real Estate Management Bureau could assist 
companies and/or schools in providing research facilities, student/teacher housing, 
or other necessary buildings? 
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g. Had libraries, museums, cultural sites, and archives made themselves more 
accessible to intellectuals, providing better service and improving material 
quantity and access? 
h. What other steps have been taken to improve the lives of intellectuals?524 
The form, which danwei had to fill out and submit to the city government, helped to rationalize 
what had hitherto been a chaotic and uneven process. 
 The result of the city’s intervention was that many of the haphazard reforms underway—
such as the Five-Sixths Policy, for instance—became standardized. During the second half of the 
year, most intellectuals in the city saw their standards of living increase substantially. At the 
Harbor Administration, intellectuals saw a reduction of working hours and an increase in 
salaries. In addition, the administration agreed to purchase a series of Japanese medical texts that 
were especially sought-after among the medical personnel employed in the agency.525 Medical 
personnel more generally saw a dramatic improvement in their livelihoods by August, with 
almost two-thirds of their housing problems having been fixed. In addition, the city had set up 99 
new “culture clubs” (wenhua julebu) to provide entertainment for the educated. Many hospitals 
had set up “relaxation rooms” (xiuxishi) for doctors to take short breaks during the workday.526 
Intellectuals in the Shanghai Film Studio were given the ability to move into new housing units 
outfitted with stages or other rehearsal venues that allowed them to work from home.527 
Intellectuals in the school system were allotted a “rice fund” (mi kuan), where rice markets 
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527 Shanghai dianying zhipianchang guanyu jiancha gaoji zhishifenzi gongzuo tiaojian de baogao, August 2, 1956, 
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would sell a larger amount of rice to housing units where intellectuals tended to live at the 
beginning of the month; this amounted, essentially, to an advance fund (dianfu). The city would 
pay for the increased rice procurement at the end of the month.528 Intellectuals in Shanghai’s 
burgeoning pharmaceutical industry saw increased procurements of good-quality instruments 
and better support for medical research.529 Despite the uneven nature of the reform efforts during 
the first half of the year, intellectuals from all sectors of the economy saw livelihood 
improvements in the second half. The heyday had arrived for all. 
 Housing was one of the issues that probably showed the least amount of general 
improvement, although this is perhaps due to the structure nature of the problem. Danwei were 
assigned various numbers of housing units around the city, although the number of assigned 
units varied significantly based on the number of intellectuals employed and the perceived 
importance of the industry; the Literature and Art Office, for example, only had 15 housing units 
around the city.530 Without more supply, the danwei’s hands were tied. The city tried to rectify 
this problem by constructing a total of 4500 new housing units in 1956, with another 2000 
planned for construction in 1957; however, financing the construction often required that official 
rent reductions for intellectuals were more temporary than permanent.531 Fixing the housing 
situation put an enormous strain on the Public Works Office, which was flooded with requests 
from agencies, workplaces, and schools to improve housing during the second half of 1956. This 
made the lives of the 29 intellectuals working for Public Works considerably more stressful. All 
 
528 Guanyu gaishan gaoji zhishifenzi gongzuo tiaojian qingkuang de baogao, August 8, 1956, B105-5-1643-27, 
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529 Guoying Shanghai yiyao gongye gongsi guanyu gaishan gaoji zhishifenzi gongzuo tiaojian de jiancha baogao, 
August 20, 1956, B88-1-187-1, State-run Shanghai Medical Industry Company, SMA. 
530 Shanghaishi renmin weiyuanhui wenyi bangongshi guanyu gaishan gaoji zhishifenzi gongzuo tiaojian de 
qingkuang baogao, October 15, 1956, B9-2-62-32, Shanghai Municipal People’s Committee Literature and Art 
Office, SMA. 
531 Shanghai Political and Economic Summary No. 11, August 17-September 15, 1956, CPR10, 256.  
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of them, ironically, dealt with housing problems of their own; 22 had issues with the 
environment and/or location of their homes, while 8 complained about their long commutes 
(over 7 kilometers). All lived in housing units of 4 to 9 residents total, while the average number 
of rooms in any given Shanghai housing unit ranged from 2 to 4.532 The housing problem was 
only partially corrected, meaning that many intellectuals continued to face problems. A surgeon 
at the Shanghai Children’s Hospital, Ma Anquan, compained that his wife and children had to 
live in nearby Suzhou because his apartment was not big enough to accommodate all of them, for 
example.533 Even by November, some intellectuals were having to send sick children to live with 
their grandparents because of cramped living conditions that were both unconducive to 
children’s recover and conducive to the rapid spreading of disease.534 
 Intellectuals experienced real changes to their lives over the course of the year. The vast 
majority saw salary increases, some improvements to their housing situations, better access to 
necessary materials for research and study, better accommodations for rest and relaxation while 
on the job, reduced time spent in meetings or on administrative work, improved access to health 
care, and more opportunities to pursue interesting hobbies outside of work. These improvements 
are a testament to the energy of intellectuals over the previous several years, demanding that the 
government carry out many of these very changes. Even despite these advancements, however, 
ambiguities persisted. Limited supply meant that many intellectuals still went without better 
housing, and some benefits—such as transportation—only went to those privileged to work for a 
vital economic sector, like heavy industry. All intellectuals continued to work long hours under 
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considerable stress. The case of the actor Zhou Xiaofang illustrates the continuing ambiguities 
surrounding intellectuals’ lives. Zhou was hard-pressed for funds, having to pay for bus fare to 
get to work instead of relying on a shuttle service from his overseeing danwei. Moreover, he 
lived in cramped housing quarters alongside several other performers. Suffering from a urinary 
infection, Zhou began peeing blood (xiaobian chuxue) during a performance on December 15. 
Despite his pleas to stop the show, his bosses forced him to continue to perform. Over the course 
of the show, Zhou continued to visibly lose blood on stage until the entire performance had to be 
cancelled. Attendance was down dramatically at future events.535 For Zhou and many other 
intellectuals, the changes of the year were welcome but fell short of everything they may have 
wanted. 
 
A Socialist State Built on Knowledge Capital 
 The People’s Republic of China was never just a revolutionary state. The CCP’s vision 
for China included both collectivization and practical development. The production gains 
throughout the first decade of Communist rule are a testament to the focus on the latter. As the 
first Five-Year Plan was winding down throughout 1956, the government began to envision how 
to best continue and solidify the gains of the previous five years. In addition, the state had 
managed to survive a litany of existential threats. Politicians could now turn to imagining how 
China might fit in a world of competing nuclear superpowers and plenty of non-aligned nations 
desiring to stay out of the conflict. The first steps in humanity’s reach for the stars had begun; 
only a year later, the Soviet satellite Sputnik would successfully orbit Earth. For the PRC to 
adapt to both a more secure internal environment as well as transformations in the external 
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world, the government realized that knowledge capital was essential to the continued growth of 
the socialist state. This meant a change in the discourse of intellectuals, as state media 
increasingly lauded the contributions of intellectuals to national economic growth. Although 
previous criticisms of intellectuals as elitist or out-of-touch did not disappear, this notion only 
became one element of the broader national conversation regarding intellectuals. In addition, the 
government invested in more facilities and supplies needed by intellectuals for research, 
recruited more knowledge-workers, and laid plans to use intellectuals to expand popular 
knowledge.  
 Several changes at the start of 1956 heralded the beginning of a new age in the 
imagination of state planners. Party documents began to refer to intellectuals’ duties, 
collectively, as representing a “vital mission” (zhuyao renwu) within the broader scheme of 
national construction. The government’s plans to surpass the steel production of Britain and 
match that of America, for example, could only be accomplished through the exploitation of 
expertise.536 In order to get full use out of China’s intellectual class, however, they would have to 
be outfitted with better materials than Chinese factories could turn out at this juncture. In early 
1956, the national Trade Ministry announced that it would begin negotiating a series of trade 
deals with foreign countries in order to requisition a better supply of the latest scientific 
technology.537 Although the hard sciences certainly received priority, the state was interested in 
all levels of academic production. The Shanghai government directed local research institutions 
to establish social science research teams, made up of experts in philosophy, economics, history, 
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education, and language and literature. The city also planned to expand its intellectual workforce 
by 2200 in three years, which included 200 new scientists, 500 university professors, 500 
medical professionals, 750 engineers, and 200 arts and literature specialists.538 Even still, 
Shanghai did not lose sight of the ultimate goal of harmonizing cross-class relations between 
intellectuals and the masses. The municipal government also announced plans for a monthly 
lecture series, whereby a scientific expert would deliver an oral primer on the latest 
developments in the world of Chinese science for interested cadres and workers.539 Especially for 
cadres, these lectures might help them better understand and appreciate the work of the 
intellectuals they oversaw.  
 The plans to recruit more knowledge-workers built upon existing trends, whereby 
intellectuals’ professions were something of a growth field. At just a single heavy industry—
Tianyuanhua Factory—the staff of engineers had expanded from 68 to 204 from 1949 to 1955.540 
And in the second fiscal quarter of 1956 alone, the government offered jobs for 315 new medical 
professionals.541 As previous chapters have shown, the education system across the country had 
expanded significantly over the previous few years. In Shanghai, the school system expanded 
incredibly quickly; enrollments in higher education doubled between 1954 and 1956.542 Across 
the nation, more students were going to school and completing their degrees than ever before 
Potential problems might have arisen if this influx of young people into the education system 
could not find work relevant to their degrees, as many scholars from the first few decades of the 
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twentieth century experienced. It seems that the PRC had managed to avoid this potential pitfall 
through expanding the scale of knowledge work in line with enrollment increases. Even for 
recent graduates who were not assigned as medical professionals or engineers, they could still 
find work through new institutions of knowledge. The Shanghai government established new 
medical libraries in early 1956 to accommodate medical research, for example.543 Nationwide, 
the Central Committee called for investments in new bookstores, libraries, and museums.544 
Staffing these new institutes provided yet another job outlet for new graduates. 
 The new national zeitgeist of triumphalism was reflected in a pair of People’s Daily 
editorials in mid-January. On January 13, Ji Xianlin, chair of the Eastern Languages and Culture 
Department at Beijing University, reflected on his experiences during the first half-decade of the 
PRC. Ji declared near-universal support for the CCP among intellectuals, noting that the 
Communists had been able to transform China into a burgeoning world power after decades of 
perceived failure from previous regimes. Although Ji acknowledged the oft-repeated criticism 
that intellectuals needed to learn both humility and how to work in the service of the masses as a 
whole, he also defended the older generations of intellectuals, noting that they could not be 
blamed for reflecting the views and behaviors from when they grew up.545 Although Ji’s editorial 
no doubt exaggerated on several points—it seems unlikely that support for the party-state was 
almost universal among intellectuals—it reflects a new spirit of triumphalism among the 
educated and a belief that older intellectuals had found a way to channel their expertise in 
productive ways. Zhang Wei, chair of the Civil Engineering Department at Qinghua University, 
echoed this triumphalist spirit in a January 18 editorial describing his and his colleagues’ 
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research into new types of construction materials—steel, wood, and cement—that would render a 
more traditional focus on bamboo construction obsolete.546 Like Ji, Zhang focused on the “vital 
role” of older intellectuals vis-a-vis national construction. For these professors, and perhaps for 
many of their readers, the future represented a period of promise, where cadres, intellectuals, and 
the state could work in harmony to achieve national greatness. 
 Partially exemplified by supply requisitions, the necessity of expanding knowledge 
capital meant increased contacts with a global scholarly community. Along with new domestic 
duties, intellectuals saw a rise in supplemental work duties. Cities receiving foreign scholars 
would sometimes call on local intellectuals to entertain these guests. In Shanghai, a delegation of 
foreign experts (the country or countries of origin was/were not named) was set to arrive in 
March 1956. Intellectuals were expected to “entertain” (zhaodai) them while they were not in 
meetings or conferences. However, in an effort to preserve Chinese intellectuals’ time, the city 
instituted a policy whereby a single individual would be capped at six guest assignments per 
year.547 Meanwhile, the city clarified previous plans for periodic lecture series. For the purpose 
of “advancing scientific and cultural activity” (jinxing kexue wenhua huodong), scientists and 
professors of science had to deliver periodic lectures around local “clubs” (julebu).548 At the 
beginning of April, lecture responsibilities expanded to include technicians and engineers. These 
intellectuals were tasked with taking time off from the factory to visit Shanghai universities in 
order to give a practical perspective on the possibilities offered by the sciences.549 Even as 
intellectuals saw reductions in administrative work, meetings, and political study sessions, these 
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gains may have been offset by new expectations of entertaining foreign scholars and delivering 
lectures for the masses. 
 Signs emerged around the same time of an overall increase in intellectual productivity, 
even outside vital economic sectors. The Shanghai Children’s Press had increased publishing 
output to a rate of about 500 books per year, with (non-specific) increases announced for the 
following year.550 Similarly, the Shanghai Tea Leaf Company had experienced rising rates of 
production, with future increases to be expected due to high demand from other countries. 
Although no specific figures were given in a report to the municipal government, one technician 
working for the company suggested that their instruments would have to be updated in order to 
meet production quotas.551 
 Although a number of specialized libraries had been established by this point, the city 
established the Library of Science and Technology on February 19. New urban museums, like 
the Shanghai Natural Museum, were slated for construction. The Shanghai Library also made 
available a greater number of ancient texts and collections for public viewing. This massive 
undertaking involved a flurry of new hirings for intellectuals with expertise in classical literature, 
painting, calligraphy, and relics; as such, the height of the intellectuals’ heyday corresponded to 
a flourishing of classical Chinese culture.552 The citywide library system saw a budgetary 
increase of about 50% for 1956 to accommodate the planned expansions. Not all expansions of 
intellectuals’ facilities occurred at the municipal level, however, with the construction of over 
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25,000 square meters’ worth of laboratory space between six local universities by April.553 In 
May, plans to increase library collections were given concrete numbers. The local Ministry of 
Culture announced a plan to requisition a total of 700,000 new materials in total across all 
municipal libraries, while 60,000 older texts would be made available to the public.554 
Interestingly, the local Literature and Art Office was placed in charge of new procurements for 
all materials—scientific, medical, or cultural.555 This may exemplify the science bias of the CCP; 
the workload for improving scientists’ access to necessary materials was disproportionately 
shouldered by cultural specialists. Overall, collection expansions and new construction on 
institutions of knowledge made visible the broader changes underway regarding the status of 
intellectuals. 
 Changes during the second half of the year reflected a growing sense of security from the 
state in a tumultuous world. The Chinese Academy of Sciences had been increasing its 
procurements steadily over the course of the year; supplies increased by 58% in the first quarter 
of 1956, 46% in the second quarter, and 34% in the third. Many of the purchases for new 
equipment went to capitalist countries, despite China’s general preference for the socialist bloc 
or the non-aligned movement. Even still, the state encouraged the academy to purchase as many 
supplies as possible from Chinese sources. In Shanghai, this meant that three local firms (one 
focusing on telegraphs, two focusing on scientific instruments) took over the contracts for the 
local branch of the Academy.556 Chinese engineers and technicians no doubt benefitted from the 
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switch. Meanwhile, the CCP continued to maintain its rhetoric on the value of intellectuals—
even older ones. In late August, officials suggested that “academic and scientific research can 
only strengthen the leadership of the party” in response to questions about admitting older 
intellectuals as party members.557 Internal reports criticized tendencies toward “empiricism” or 
“formalism” within the ranks of the party, blaming these errors for an “unsoundness” in the 
party’s “democratic life.” Most significantly, the national government changed its tune regarding 
the Soviet Union; officials suggested that Chinese intellectuals could learn by studying foreign 
scholars from all over the world, not exclusively Soviet intellectuals.558 Even during the later 
months of the year, the party showed no sounds of reversing course. If anything, it showed an 
increasing willingness to question old dogmas to support the work of China’s intellectual 
community. 
 By the end of the year, intellectuals inhabited a very different world than that of previous 
years. Libraries, museums, and laboratories had either already been constructed or were in the 
process of being built all around them. The traditional primacy given to manuals and texts from 
the Soviet Union had been replaced by a new willingness from the state to purchase supplies 
from across the world—even from capitalist countries. Researchers engaged in lively dialogues 
with foreign scholars traveling to China, and had opportunities to get more Chinese interested in 
intellectual pursuits through periodic public lectures. University enrollments were increasing, as 
were available jobs for knowledge-workers. In nearly every way, the Chinese government 
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demonstrated its understanding of the role that intellect could play in the construction of Chinese 
socialism. 
 
Opening the Gates: Party Admittances for Intellectuals 
 One of the most common complained leveled by intellectuals against the CCP was the 
party’s “closed-doorism” (guanmenzhuyi); that is, it was significantly more difficult for older 
intellectuals who had received degrees before 1949 to successfully gain admission into the party. 
Things had changed somewhat over the previous three years (see Chapter 4), although famous 
cases of senior intellectuals gaining party membership were the exception rather than the norm. 
Things changed in 1956. Across China, cadres were expected to dutifully put forward greatly 
expanded lists of recommendations for party admittance among their intellectual staff members. 
This was a nationwide phenomenon, with People’s Daily articles describing hundreds of 
admissions for intellectuals from all corners of the nation. In Shanghai, over a thousand 
intellectuals made successful applications to join the CCP, with plans to expand that number by a 
factor of six made for the future. Over the course of the year, however, the Communist Party had 
to respond to critics that the government was not exercising due diligence in admitting so many 
older scholars. As such, the year also saw the emergence of a more formalized set of guidelines 
for gaining party membership. 
 In Shanghai, the city government began the year without a real sense of how many local 
intellectuals had gained admission into the ranks of the CCP. The municipal government 
estimated that 7% of local “high-level” intellectuals (gaoji zhishifenzi, as opposed to “general” 
intellectuals, or yiban zhishifenzi) were CCP members at the start of the year. The municipal 
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government hoped to see that number increase to 11% by the end of the year.559 The first few 
weeks of the year represented a period in flux, where danwei were tasked with submitting names 
for possible party membership—significantly more than before—without a firm understanding of 
proper criteria for admission. As such, the municipal government circulated a series of 
qualifications developed by the First Bureau of Commerce, which forward intellectuals’ 
applications if they (1) had a university degree, (2) several years (unspecified) of work 
experience, (3) showed the ability to work independently, (4) had assisted in some form of 
research project. An intellectual’s political background, of course, also played a major role in 
whether they had their applications submitted or not.560 It seems that Shanghai intellectuals were 
keen on submitting party membership applications; at Shanghai Fifth Hospital, for instance, over 
77% of medical personnel submitted applications. Only about 30 individuals ultimately had their 
applications accepted, however.561 Although Shanghai, with its high population of intellectuals, 
was naturally the epicenter of the rush to apply for CCP membership, other cities followed suit. 
In Chongqing, the city government had already approved 142 new party membership 
applications from intellectuals by January 9.562 
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 The haphazard process in January called for a more rigorous plan for admissions. As 
such, the Shanghai city government published a chart of admissions targets for all local 





Current Party Members New Accepted Party 
Members, 1956-1957 
Estimated Accepted Party 
Members, post-1957 
Individuals Percentage Individuals Percentage Individuals Percentage 
Grand Total 92,678 5,493 5.9 6,596 7.0 12,089 13.0 
High-level 9,794 477 4.9 1,117 11.0 1,590 16.0 




732 49 6.7 75 10.0 124 17.0 
High-level 129 4 3.1 20 15.0 24 18.0 




37,526 2,385 6.4 2,900 7.7 5,285 14.0 
High-level 2,316 112 4.8 352 15.0 464 20.0 
General 35,210 2,273 6.5 2,548 7.0 4,821 13.5 
(3) Medical 
Personnel 
23,286 333 1.4 745 3.0 1,078 4.6 
High-level 2,213 21 1.0 132 6.0 153 7.0 





16,545 1,435 8.7 1,870 11.0 3,305 20.0 
High-level 3,653 191 5.2 435 11.8 626 17.0 




14,589 1,291 8.9 1,006 6.9 2,297 15.8 
High-level 1,483 149 10.0 178 12.0 327 22.0 
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General 13,106 1,142 8.7 828 6.0 1,970 14.7563 
These guidelines provided a useful tool for danwei in Shanghai. The targets also demonstrate the 
continuing emphasis on science and engineering, as well as a surprising hesitancy to admit 
medical personnel into the party. Most significantly, these plans show an awareness of 
inequalities between high-level and general intellectuals, and show that the government was 
interested in rectifying these inequalities in favor of general intellectuals. Admitting general 
intellectuals into the party apparatus was one way of securing educated youth’s loyalty to the 
CCP as they embarked on their careers. 
 Although these numbers represented a general guide, the city was more than willing to 
increase them—especially for specific, prestigious institutions. In the later part of February, the 
Shanghai government actively began soliciting the most prestigious universities—schools like 
Fudan, Tongji, or Jiaotong Universities—for recommendations. Schools were expected to 
distinguish between “high-level” intellectuals, which tended to mean tenured professors, and 
general intellectuals, which referred to assistant professors, teaching assistants, students, and in 
some cases even campus workers.564 One of the most important factors in whether an 
intellectual’s membership application might be forwarded to the city or not was how they had 
performed during the Thought Reform Campaign; those who were designated with the label 
“activist” (jijifenzi) were naturally much more likely to have their materials forwarded. Jiaotong 
University nominated 516 of these activists for party membership, which included 353 students, 
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103 professors, 32 administrators, and 28 campus workers. In general, universities classified 
nominees into three political categories: (1) those whose political histories did not have any 
serious problems, (2) those whose political histories did not have any serious problems, but were 
generally short and may require more thorough inspection, and (3) those with “complicated” 
political histories that may require further background checks. Unsurprisingly, the overwhelming 
number of nominees were in the first category, although presumably some intellectuals in the 
second two categories also had their applications forwarded.565 Among these top-level 
universities, the municipal government to increase party membership dramatically: from 4.98% 
to 25.1% among professors, from 12.5% to 32.8% among assistant professors, from 29.3% to 
39.5% among administrators, from 4.6% to 16.4% among students, from 9% to 19% among 
recent graduates, and from 8.8% to 16.5% among others (which included campus workers, for 
example).566 Given that these percentages were much higher than for educational personnel as a 
whole, it appears that a good deal of favoritism was in play. 
 Although the number of admittances elsewhere in the country were not as high as in 
Shanghai, other cities and provinces continued admitting intellectuals into the CCP over the 
course of the year. A People’s Daily report on March 12 noted that 77 intellectuals in Gansu 
Province, 44 in Guangdong Province (22 of those coming from the city of Guangzhou), and 23 in 
Chongqing had recently been accepted into the CCP. In many of these cases, new admittees 
tended to be older intellectuals who had participated vigorously in Thought Reform.567 The 
province of Heilongjiang continued the trend by admitting 50 intellectuals on March 27.568 On 
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April 2, the city of Xi’an announced 114 new admissions for intellectuals, while Shenyang 
announced 30, Changchun 228, and Nanjing 198. For some of these newly-admitted 
intellectuals, admittance was predicated on successful completion of courses of study ranging 
from Pavlovian Theory to Marxism-Leninism to even Russian.569 Others ended up having to 
move as a result of their successful applications; in Chongqing, for example, 140 intellectuals 
moved to Chengdu to accept positions working in the Chengdu Municipal Government.570 These 
heady rates of admission did not necessarily translate over the entire country. In Yunnan 
Province, intellectuals and cadres had a particularly strained relationship. No professors at 
Yunnan University made any attempt at joining the CCP, citing concerns about adding too much 
to their workload and falling behind in their studies. There were only 13 party members in total 
at Yunnan University, all of whom were teaching assistants or low-level lecturers rather than 
tenured professors.571 It is reasonable to conclude that most cities and provinces were following 
Shanghai’s lead, although not always at the same scale as in Shanghai. Moreover, exceptions like 
Yunnan certainly existed. 
 The national government did not step in directly until mid-April, at which point the 
Central Committee issued a report on the state of intellectual admittances around China. The 
government estimated that there were almost 4 million individuals who were classified as 
intellectuals by that time. Party membership was quite low, however—usually hovering around 
4-5%.572 An internal investigation revealed that lower-level party members were sometimes 
responsible for holding up the application materials of intellectuals under their purview; the 
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Central Committee called for an end to this practice as well as the party’s general “closed-door” 
tendencies more broadly. The government estimated that the rate of party membership for 
intellectuals would rise to about 5.6% over the course of 1956, and urged local branches to 
increase that to a full 10% by the end of 1957 (which would include a 17% rate of admittance for 
high-level intellectuals). Although the events of the following year represented a significant 
policy reversal, the Central Committee envisioned a future of steadily increasing party 
membership well into the next decade. The report proposed a 20% admittance target for 
intellectuals by 1962, which would include 30-35% of high-level intellectuals.573 The national 
government added considerable legitimacy to the process of admitting intellectuals into the 
party—and further frustrated cadres who were skeptical of the whole process. 
 In Shanghai, an enthusiasm for accepting intellectuals’ membership applications led to 
much higher rates of admission than expected. The February plan suggested increasing the total 
number of party intellectuals in Shanghai from 5,493 to 6,596—a modest increase of 1,103 
intellectuals. This goal had been eclipsed by more than double, however, with 2,339 new 
intellectuals having been admitted by mid-October. 1,812 of these were students, suggesting that 
gaining admission into the CCP was particularly coveted among young scholars, who may have 
understood the career benefits of CCP membership. Overall, however, students were slightly less 
likely to be party members than their professors. At Shanghai universities, 13.24% of 
administrators and staff were party members, followed by 12.06% of faculty, and finally 10.2% 
of students.574 Amusingly, a non-insignificant number of applications were denied not because of 
a lack of expertise or improper ideological credentials, but instead because the applicant had not 
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followed the proper submission guidelines (bufuhe guiding de zuofa). The Shanghai government 
issued a blistering condemnation of cadres for their resistance to the process, suggesting that 
“many of our comrades are unwilling to engage or fear intellectuals. They do not understand 
their thoughts, their work, or their lives.”575  
 The first step in a membership application was to check any confession materials the 
intellectual submitted during Thought Reform. Although the overwhelming majority of 
intellectuals did submit confessions (see Chapter 3), there were some cases where intellectuals 
managed to avoid doing so. If the intellectual had been “honest and forthcoming” regarding 
previous ideological errors, they usually passed this first round of inspection. If a review of their 
confession materials raised any suspicions, party officials were generally discouraged from 
confronting the intellectual directly so as to “avoid causing unnecessary apprehensions.” In cases 
where a review of confession documents proved inconclusive, investigators would instead turn to 
cadres overseeing the intellectual applicant and seek out supplementary information about the 
candidate’s work and political history. A good number of applicants had their applications 
denied for having contacts with others under suspicion; for example, known rightist intellectuals 
or foreigners.576 This meant that intellectuals who had returned to China from overseas at the 
outset of the Communist period may have faced additional, and perhaps undue, scrutiny. 
Although intellectuals certainly had to pass through a number of hurdles in order to be accepted 
into the ranks of the Communist Party, statistics suggest that the rate of admissions went far 
beyond what the Shanghai government had originally envisioned. 
 It is not clear whether other cities and provinces matched up with the rates of successful 





CCP over the course of the year. On one hand, this may have weakened the traditional strength 
of the minor democratic parties, such as the Democratic League, among the intellectual 
community. On the other, the trend was no doubt highly beneficial for individual intellectuals. 
Those who gained party membership had better life prospects, could make valuable connections 
with government officials, and could expect to exercise at least some influence over local policy. 
When winds shifted from favoring intellectuals to a new wave of intense scrutiny during the 
Anti-Rightist Campaign, party memberships proved enduring. As the following chapter will 
show, relatively few intellectuals lost their party memberships during the course of the Anti-
Rightist Campaign. As such, party admissions were one of the best ways of institutionalizing the 
gains made by intellectuals during their heyday. 
 
From Resentment to Resistance among the Cadres 
 As the previous chapter showed, low-level cadres had grown increasingly resentful of 
intellectuals, their “privileged” status, and their supposed arrogant attitudes. As such, nationwide 
efforts to improve the lives of intellectuals, and even admit them into the CCP (thus making 
them comrades of the cadres) provoked a backlash among these low-ranking party members. 
Even as the national government, in addition to many municipal and provincial governments, 
promoted new policies to favor intellectuals, the state was still reliant on cadres to actually 
implement policy. As such, cadres possessed a good deal of agency in how to actually met out 
benefits for intellectuals. In some areas, cadres were able to hold up the reform efforts 
indefinitely—often provoking rebukes from the municipality overseeing them. Over the course 
of the year, the national government ultimately calculated that it could not afford to totally ignore 
the criticisms from the cadre class. Moreover, it is likely that some of the concerns raised by 
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cadres—such as the rushed process by which thousands of intellectuals were admitted into the 
party—were actually taken seriously by the state. As such, both national and sub-national 
governments began to emphasize the continuing importance of thought rectification during the 
second half of the year. Cadre resistance was ultimately effective at dampening the reform 
movement. 
 At the beginning of 1955, cadres had participated in a brief national campaign to study 
Marxist materialism and reject bourgeois idealism (see Chapter 4). This represented a sea change 
in which cadres, alongside intellectuals, became targets of thought rectification work. There were 
signs in early 1956 that signalled that such a trend might continue; for example, a set of 
instructions from the Shanghai Textile Industry Committee called for cadre investigations (shen 
gan) alongside the usual work of rooting out counterrevolutionaries.577 The idea that cadres 
might be under suspicion—alongside the hated counterrevolutionaries, even—appears to have 
emerged from the changed national climate in 1956. The Shanghai Education Bureau offered a 
similar injunction to cadres employed in the schools and universities, noting that they would now 
be required to participate in political study sessions alongside intellectuals.578 It is unclear how 
these new policies would be carried out, given that the city was reliant on cadres themselves for 
policy implementation. A speech by Chen Yusan, assistant director of the city’s Ministry of 
Culture, however, gives clues. Chen noted that there was a growing divide between 
“administrative” cadres (xingzheng ganbu) and “vocational” cadres (yewu ganbu), suggesting 
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that lower-tier cadres may have been punished by ranking officials within the danwei.579 It 
appears that the Shanghai government, at least, had become increasingly frustrated by low-level 
cadres, and was willing to pass more policies designed to humble them. 
 The situation outside of the city was quite different. The suburbs of Shanghai nominally 
reported to the municipal government, but it appears that suburban cadres enjoyed considerably 
more flexibility in implementing policy—as well as more independence from the city in general. 
As such, suburban cadres around Shanghai represent an early sign of growing resistance to 
intellectual reforms. A report from the Suburban Work Committee acknowledged that China’s 
level of scientific achievement was low, but blames it on “the insufficient work of the 
intellectuals” rather than a lack of support from the government. The report continued to criticize 
suburban intellectuals, bemoaning their laziness in continuing their political education. These 
suburban cadres were aware that they themselves had a “low level of culture,” but resented 
intellectuals for being highly sought-after (chidekai).580 The assistant secretary of the Suburban 
Work Committee, Wan Jingliang, captured the resentment of cadres in a speech about national 
politics: “After Comrade Zhou Enlai’s speech, ‘A Report Concerning the Issues Facing 
Intellectuals,’ many of my comrades believed that Shanghai remained a city that focused mostly 
on intellectuals.”581 It appears that resentment for intellectuals was frequently expressed in 
person; another report from the northern suburbs said that “many comrades see intellectuals and 
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do not treat them with kindness—on the contrary.”582 Even at the local level, changing municipal 
policies only meant so much when cadres outside the city limits remained steadfast in their 
opposition to intellectuals. 
 Frustration with intellectuals as well as policies designed to benefit them extended well 
beyond the suburbs of Shanghai. Most famously, provincial officials in Yunnan were extremely 
frustrated with intellectuals in their area. A report from January 10 to the national government 
blasted local intellectuals, more than a third of whom the provincial government regarded as 
retrogressive or reactionary. Only about 5% of Yunnan intellectuals had even applied to join the 
CCP. Meanwhile, doctors in Yunnan were recalcitrant in refusing to study traditional Chinese 
medicine.583 The provincial government of Guangdong too expressed its frustration with 
intellectuals, describing them as “irritable” (jizao) and “rough” (cubao), and frequent violators of 
the government’s policies.584 The Guangdong Provincial Government had developed a punitive 
set of measures toward intellectuals, whereby the local Public Security Bureau would submit a 
list of names of intellectuals with most “erroneous” political views each week. The Guangdong 
government then forced these intellectuals into extra study sessions. The punitive actions taken 
by the province were often unfair; in one instant, a university professor named Lin Shukui had 
been detained for several days simply because of an anonymous reactionary tract that had been 
published from someone at his school. An investigation revealed that Lin had never participated 
in counterrevolutionary activities or joined a reactionary political party. After Lin was released 
from prison, however, his salary was cut by a third without any reason given.585  
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 It is likely that provincial governments were more antagonistic toward intellectuals than 
either municipal governments or that national government (at this time). This may be due to the 
fact that provinces represented not just cities, where intellectuals congregated, but a considerable 
amount of rural territory where anti-intellectual resentment may have been higher. The PRC state 
commissioned a report on the treatment of intellectuals around the country in late January, 
revealing a number of problematic behaviors in the provinces. In Liaoning Province, for 
example, cadres had refused to appoint intellectuals to management positions in factories or 
mining companies. Cadres in Henan Province criticized intellectuals for the “rushed and 
muddled” (mangluan) process by which they underwent thought rectification. And in Anhui 
Province, cadres had held up government funds to assist intellectuals’ research projects. One 
cadre described all older professors as “corrupt.”586 The only city mentioned in the report was 
Tianjin, where cadres from a working-class background frequently snubbed intellectuals. Cadres 
“would shake [intellectuals’] hands,” the report said, “but would not have a deep discussion with 
them.” Even outside the provincial governments, many cadres nationwide expressed some 
degree of contempt for intellectuals. A frequent attitude was that “intellectuals may know their 
ABCs, but what practical use does that have?”587 Resentment for intellectuals had turned, in 
some cases, to outright resistance (such as holding up assistance funds for intellectuals)—a 
practice that had spread nationwide. 
 As Shanghai moved to convene public conferences to focus on the issues troubling 
intellectuals, cadres occasionally used these meetings as opportunities to voice their own 
frustration. At a conference in early March, for example, cadres in heavy industry brought in a 
number of factory workers who complained about the easy lives of the engineering staff. The 
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workers said that engineers could sit and enjoy the breeze during the summer, or warm 
themselves by a fire in the winter—meanwhile, they had to labor on the factory floor in 
significantly worse conditions.588 In many cases, cadres refused to eat with intellectuals at meal 
breaks during conferences.589 The Shanghai government was well aware of the problem, and 
focused on changing attitudes among rising cadres at the local party school. Administrators at the 
school cited a common attitude among cadres, saying “you can’t speak to intellectuals because 
they’re extremely unapproachable. We should just cast them aside.” Instead, school 
administrators said, cadres should learn to trust intellectuals and understand that they were 
capable of transformation.590 It is unclear how cadres perceived these rebukes from the municipal 
government, but if anything it may have hardened anti-intellectual sentiments. 
 In the suburbs of Shanghai, cadres continued to attempt to halt the reform movement in 
its tracks. Suburban cadres were frustrated by intellectuals’ seeming apathy toward political 
study; intellectuals saw thought rectification as “a mere formality” at this time.591 Cadres around 
Shanghai also reported that their primary duty was to “work earnestly to provide ideological 
education to both the masses and party members,” implying that they saw little need to ease up 
on the pace of political study efforts. Moreover, it appears that suburban cadres rarely read the 
instructions from the city on improving intellectuals’ livelihoods, and therefore were completely 
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in the dark about what changes were expected.592 The Suburban Work Committee thus revealed 
a potentially effective strategy to halt reforms: simply ignoring them. It is unclear how 
widespread these practices may have been, although an investigation from the national 
government from mid-April revealed that a common practice across China was for cadres to 
refuse to forward the application materials from intellectuals under their purview to higher 
authorities for possible party membership (see the previous section of this chapter). As such, it 
was clearly not uncommon for cadres to take active steps at resisting changes in national or 
municipal policy. 
 During the middle months of 1956, cadres tried directly petitioning the national 
government to consider revising its policies toward intellectuals. An anonymous letter from May 
21 argued against the tendency to accept intellectuals into the party so quickly; the author 
claimed that intellectuals had yet to demonstrate an earnest devotion to political study. The 
author noted that over 1000 intellectuals across China had joined the CCP during the previous 
three months, and that appropriate background checks had rarely made into these new party 
members’ political beliefs.593 A Beijing cadre, Wen Yueqiao, penned an editorial in People’s 
Daily on May 29 that echoed the anonymous report from May 21. Wen criticized the “rushed” 
(cangcu) process by which intellectuals were given party membership, noting that local 
governments frequently failed to follow standard procedures of admission and completely 
neglected ideological background checks.594 Another People’s Daily editorial on June 22, this 
one from a cadre working the Harbin Municipal State-run Food Industry named Liu Peizhi, 
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criticized both the few surviving private businesses and intellectuals from Harbin. Liu noted that 
both were driven by “fame and profit” (mingli), and called for a deepening of thought 
rectification work.595 As such, cadres became increasingly bold in airing their criticisms of 
intellectuals. They believed that appealing to the public might ultimately force the government to 
change course—a correct calculation, as it turned out. 
 Although the Anti-Rightist Campaign did not begin until the following year, the cadres’ 
protests did have some effect on policy. In Shanghai, instructions from the city increasingly 
emphasized the continuing importance of thought rectification during the second half of the year. 
A municipal report from late August reiterated the importance of improving intellectuals’ 
livelihoods, but also urged cadres to “continue carrying out political thought work,” noting the 
necessity of promoting Marxism-Leninism. Indeed, the city included five new political 
documents that it expected local intellectuals to study.596 These moves may have emboldened 
cadres. Although cadres had to submit reports on intellectuals’ living and working conditions in 
their danwei (see the first section of this chapter), some began using these reports as spaces to 
express frustration about their intellectual staff members. Cadres in the 501 Factory complained 
that their engineers were mostly ex-Guomindang members who had made plans to escape to 
Taiwan...until they missed their boat (yinwei ban kai diao le). Cadres from the 736 Factory stated 
that “before liberation, our [engineers] stood on the heads of the workers and oppressed them.” 
One cadre argued that most intellectuals came from a landlord family, and as such had “exploited 
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the blood and sweat of the poor” to fund their education.597 Cadres also complained that it was 
relatively easy for intellectual to avoid submitting confessions back during the Thought Reform 
Campaign. And for those who did, few had received penalties for lying. Other cadres argued that 
intellectuals had become a “favored” class, due to the accumulation of benefits and funding for 
scientific research and new supplies—all while cadres’ own standards of living had stagnated. 
One cadre focused on the problem of generational privilege, noting that one of the engineers in 
their factory was the child of a famous science professor at Shanghai University.598  
 The Anti-Rightist Campaign began due to changes in national government policy, to be 
sure. However, the role that low-ranking cadres’ protests and resistance played in forcing the 
government to recalculate is an important and under-acknowledged factor behind the start of the 
campaign. For cadres, who had remained steadfastly loyal to the Communist Party for years, it 
was incendiary to see intellectuals gain a wealth of new privileges while they themselves felt no 
better off at the end of 1956 than at the beginning. The CCP had come to power via its promises 
to tackle the inequalities that underlay Chinese society—inequalities that were inextricably 
intertwined with the formation of the intellectual class (see Chapter 1). Cadres had clearly 
become more, not less, resentful of intellectuals during the course of the decade. In 1956, that 
resentment translated to outright resistance to the reform efforts from above. Cadres could hold 
up funds for intellectuals as well as intellectuals’ applications for party membership. Although 
the state and local governments were clear in mandating improvements to intellectuals’ standards 
of living, cadres could just as easily ignore these mandates and deny intellectuals any new 
livelihood advancements.  
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 Chinese intellectuals’ collective status reached its zenith during the decade in 1956. All 
levels of government, having listened to intellectuals’ activism in previous years, turned their 
attention to improving the livelihoods of the scholarly community. Intellectuals saw salary 
increases, a reduction in working hours (including new stipulations about the maximum amount 
of time that could be spent on political study or meetings during the work week), new 
transportation services, housing upgrades, and improved access to food and health care. For 
overworked and underappreciated intellectuals, these reforms represented a breath of fresh air. 
The Chinese government furthermore offered an expansive vision for the promise of knowledge 
capital, investing in new bookstores, libraries, museums, and scientific laboratories. The state 
encouraged intellectuals to make new contacts with foreign researchers from across the globe—
not just those in socialist countries. And the CCP finally opened its doors to intellectuals by 
admitting thousands into the party; it is likely that roughly 1 out of every 10 intellectuals was a 
party member by the end of the year. All these changes only inflamed dormant feelings of 
resentment for intellectuals that had been rising among the cadre class, however. Cadres became 
bolder in expressing their criticism of intellectuals, often focusing on uncertainties regarding 
scholars’ ideological beliefs. Cadres also ignored directives to improve intellectuals livelihoods, 
held up funds for research, and refused to pass on party membership applications. Although the 
state and local governments reprimanded such behavior, they showed some signs of recalculation 
by the end of the year. Documents from later 1956, reflecting cadres’ criticism, called for a 
renewed focus on studying Marxism-Leninism. 
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 This chapter has ignored the issue of free speech that has tantalized previous scholars of 
the period, instead focusing on practical issues such as livelihood improvements and party 
membership. A shift in focus helps to better reveal the logic beneath the dramatic shift in 
government policy the following year. Even though the state, and Mao Zedong, were no doubt 
concerned about the prevalence of stringent critiques of the CCP and its leadership among some 
intellectuals, cadre resentment was equally problematic. Moreover, it is not clear at all what issue 
free speech may have played in provoking such a backlash. Instead, the causes of cadre 
resistance were more related to the livelihood improvements and practical advantages accrued by 
intellectuals during 1956. Whereas a relatively small minority of intellectuals actually spoke out 
against CCP rule, these improvements in standards of living were widespread—except in cases 
where cadres had simply ignored instructions from above! Free speech, while not a non-issue, 
cannot explain the causes for the changes in 1957 by itself. Instead, it was the broader heyday of 
the intellectuals—as well as cadres wondering when their heyday might come—that takes center 
stage in this account. 
  
238 
CHAPTER 6: A PARTIAL BACKLASH, 1957 
 Intellectuals entered 1957 at the apex of their prestige and privilege in the PRC period. 
The majority of intellectuals had seen their standards of living rise across the board. The state 
was more invested in their research than ever before. And the Communist Party had, at long last, 
opened its doors to the intellectuals by admitting them into its ranks. The seeds of the 1957 
backlash had already been planted, however, as low-level cadres came to resent the advances 
made in intellectuals’ lives—advances that had often been denied to them. Privileging the 
intellectual class at the expense of the CCP’s most loyal supporters was not a sustainable policy; 
at some point, cadre resentment (and even active resistance) would force the government to 
recalculate. That recalculation came in 1957 in the form of the Anti-Rightist Campaign. 
Nominally, the campaign was directed against “right-wing” intellectuals who had criticized the 
CCP too strenuously under the auspices of the Hundred Flowers Campaign (which called for a 
right to free speech and free criticism of the government). To be sure, some intellectuals did 
cross red lines by not only criticizing party policy, but also questioning the Communists’ right to 
rule. In a public editorial in late May, a professor at Renmin University named Ke Peiqi issued a 
direct challenge to the party-state: “The ‘I-am-the-state’ attitude you hold cannot be 
tolerated...You must not be arrogant and conceited, you must not distrust the intellectuals. If you 
do well, fine; if not, the masses will knock you down, will kill the Communists, and overthrow 
you.”599 Of course, not all intellectuals who criticized the state were so explicit in calls for 
overthrowing the regime.600 Still, state tolerance for free speech had revealed genuine antipathy 
for CCP rule. 
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600 For a comprehensive look at documents written by intellectuals critical of the CCP, see MarFarquhar, The 
Hundred Flowers Campaign and the Chinese Intellectuals. 
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 Of course, the Anti-Rightist Campaign silenced not only the true critics, but also genuine 
supporters of the regime who had not been circumspect enough in speaking out. Notable 
examples of genuine party supporters who were attacked during the campaign include the 
professor Yue Daiyun and the People’s Daily editor Deng Tuo.601 Even though the Anti-Rightist 
Campaign began to target actual supporters of the CCP, the cases of Yue and Deng are not 
necessarily representative of the broad experiences of intellectuals in 1957, however. 
Government documents show that the state was only generally concerned with a small minority 
of intellectuals that it had labelled “rightists.” The vast majority, the party-state still maintained, 
were either faithful progressives or, more likely, a malleable centrist faction. The overriding goal 
of the Anti-Rightist Campaign was to promote a broad-based unity between the progressive and 
centrist camps. Of course, the logic behind these ideological labels was often dubious at best. 
And it is probably true that many so-called “centrists” ultimately sided with their leftist 
colleagues over their “rightist” ones not out of genuine belief, but instead to avoid the kinds of 
scrutiny and punishment that had befallen their wayward colleagues. Despite all this, I maintain 
that 1957 was an incredibly complex year in the history of the politicking between intellectuals, 
cadres, and the party-state. The majority of intellectuals were not directly targeted by the Anti-
Rightist Campaign, nor did they see the benefits they had accrued during the previous year (see 
Chapter 5) disappear. In many cases, the same reforms already underway proceeded unaffected 
by the crackdown. The Anti-Rightist Campaign was undeniably transformative for society and 
cruel to its targets; nevertheless, it represented only a partial backlash to the intellectuals’ heyday 
of yesteryear. 
 
601 For an account of Yue Daiyun’s epic story, see Yue and Carolyn Wakeman’s famous To the Storm: The Odyssey 
of a Revolutionary Chinese Woman (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), especially 1-53. For an account 
of Deng Tuo’s experiences in the Anti-Rightist Campaign, see Cheek, Propaganda and Culture in Mao’s China, 
167-187. 
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 Traditionally, scholars have laid the responsibility for the inauguration of the Anti-
Rightist Campaign squarely at the foot of Mao Zedong, who was caught off-guard by a flurry of 
anti-party criticism from intellectuals as the result of the Hundred Flowers Campaign and 
became paranoid that intellectuals sought to undermine the regime’s authority.602 I do not 
disagree with any of these assessments; rather, I seek to broaden out the treatment of the Anti-
Rightist Campaign in a number of ways. First, I argue (primarily in Chapter 5, although I also 
cover the topic in the present chapter) that intellectuals as a whole were generally supportive of 
the CCP. Second, and more significantly, I suggest that the campaign was the result of both top-
down decision-making as well as pressure from rank-and-file cadres. My treatment of the Anti-
Rightist Campaign is meant to add on to the current scholarly understanding of the campaign, not 
refute it.  
 This chapter approaches the year as a whole, picking up as the reform efforts to improve 
intellectuals’ living standards continued. Due to a combination of factors—notably, resistance 
from an emboldened class of lower-level cadres—the reform efforts had begun to stall out in 
early 1957. As the previous chapter has shown, livelihood reforms were never egalitarian, often 
privileging intellectuals employed in the most vital sectors of the economy. Many other 
intellectuals began to wonder when they could experience the full array of benefits that industrial 
engineers, for example, had accrued. This sense of frustration at a stalled reform effort coincided 
with directives from above encouraging intellectuals to air their views freely. As such, many 
intellectuals spoke out with renewed vigor during the middle months of the year. While other 
intellectuals were offering major critiques of CCP rule, plenty other intellectuals drew attention 
 
602 Arguably the most famous coverage of the Anti-Rightist Campaign comes from Theodore Chen’s Thought 
Reform of the Chinese Intellectuals and Frederick Teiwes’ Politics and Purges in China. Additionally, Merle 
Goldman provides some treatment of the topic in Literary Dissent in Communist China.  
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to matters of practical importance in their daily lives—all while maintaining their firm support 
for the regime. A variety of factors—influence from cadres on the ground, in addition to 
exposure to vitriolic critiques from some intellectuals—forced the state to recalculate and launch 
the Anti-Rightist Campaign. I examine both the emerging narrative of a vast right-wing 
conspiracy to challenge the CCP as well as the ways in which certain benefits for intellectuals 
were actually upheld and even strengthened by the end of the year. The logic of carrying out a 
partial backlash meant that the state had to not only punish its perceived enemies, but also secure 
the support of the majority of intellectuals. For scholars who had successfully threaded the 
needle of airing their views without making themselves targets of the state, 1957 was not so 
different from 1956. 
 
The Reform Effort Deferred: The Limits of Livelihood Improvements for Intellectuals 
 It was no secret that the cadres overseeing intellectuals had come to look down on the 
scholar class. They had achieved some successes by the end of the previous year by holding up 
some intellectuals’ applications to join the CCP, and had forced the government to institute more 
rigorous standards for application acceptances (see Chapter 5). In 1957, cadres pushed further in 
an effort to stall out the reform movement. Cadres could often revoke pay increases that had 
passed the previous year, or reapportion salaries within the danwei to favor themselves at the 
expense of intellectual employees. For low-ranking party members, stripping intellectuals of 
some pay increases felt like righteous retribution for scholars who had increasingly ignored 
political study and who, in cadres’ words, “ate meals with choice ingredients” (chi babao fan).603 
Increasingly, intellectuals identified cadres themselves as the root of the problems in their daily 
 
603 Zhongguo fangzhi gonghui shanghaishi weiyuanhui guanyu liumian zhishifenzi wenti de cailiao, 1957, C16-2-
186-80, China Spinning and Weaving Union Shanghai Municipal Committee, SMA. 
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lives. Resistance from the cadre class alone did not produce the stall in the reform movement in 
totality, however. Pragmatic necessity too meant that city governments had to triage resources, 
often in ways that left some intellectuals out in the cold. Particularly for older intellectuals, 
unemployment had never been fully ended during the height of the work assignment program at 
the beginning of the decade. While young scholars were advancing their careers in the most 
favored positions and seeing advancements in their living standards, older intellectuals began to 
complain of unequal outcomes based on age. In sum, these issues demonstrated that the reform 
efforts of 1956 had created a climate of expectation that was only partially fulfilled. 
 At the beginning of the year, reports began emerging that described unfulfilled 
obligations to the intellectual community. At the Number Two Steel Factory in Shanghai, for 
example, a report from January 5 revealed that less than half of the engineering staff (only four 
persons out of a total of thirteen) had seen housing improvements during the previous year. 
Others were still waiting better accommodations. In the case of overall salary improvements, a 
number of engineers had asked the overseeing danwei to find employment opportunities for their 
spouses to supplement their own income. No progress had been made on these job 
assignments.604 In other cases, cadres had simply stopped following the new policies from the 
1956 reforms. At one Shanghai chemical factory, cadres had abruptly stopped holding face-to-
face meetings with intellectuals, and instead returned to making proclamations via the factory 
intercom system or public bulletins.605 The factory’s intellectual staff complained about the 
reversion to the old policies; they much preferred the face-to-face meetings that had taken place 
 
604 Zhonggong Shanghai dier gangchang weiyuanhui guanyu 1956 nian zhishifenzi de zhengzhi gongzuo zongjie, 
January 5, 1957, A46-1-13-19, Chinese Communist Municipal Government of Shanghai Iron and Steel Industry 
Committee, SMA. 
605 Zhonggong shanghaishi xuhui quwei tongzhan bu gongzuo bu bianyin de “qingkuang fanying” 1957 nian dier qi, 
January 17, 1957, B76-3-141-2, Shanghai Municipal Chemical Industry Office, SMA. 
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the previous year—moreover, they complained that the quality of the intercom system, which 
used imported technology from the Soviet, was quite poor and difficult to listen to! The factory 
cadres seemed to have used intercom broadcasts to antagonize intellectuals. In one particularly 
egregious example, intellectuals noted that the ranking administrator publicized that he had 
increased his own monthly salary by 30 yuan, which was much higher than the raises any of 
them had received (and some intellectuals still had not seen any raises at all).606 Whether due to a 
lack of resources or a sense of emboldened resistance to the reforms, cadres had not been able to 
deliver on the full range of improvements intellectuals had expected by the start of 1957. 
 In other cases, factory administrations tried to disguise the real conditions for intellectual 
staff members under rosy pronouncements. At the Shanghai Asia Iron and Steel Factory, cadres 
described the state of affairs as “the best of all possible worlds” (jinshan jinmei) in a report to the 
municipal government. It is unclear why this language was used, however, when well over 10% 
of their intellectual staff had been classified as retrogressives for a slew of reasons—“negative 
antagonism” (xiaoji de duikang), a mindset of pursuing “individual interests” (geren liyi), or a 
lack of diligence in one’s work (gongzuo shang bu anxin).607 The staff expressed frustration 
about having their CCP membership applications denied. In the case of one engineer, Liu 
Shuyuan, the factory administrators had refused to submit his materials to the municipal 
government without giving a reason. “I’ve been working at this factory for five years,” Liu 
complained, “and I fear that the leadership doesn’t know what kind of person I am...it feels like I 
have been forgotten.”608 Based on other examples from the factory, it is likely that Liu had not 
demonstrated enough enthusiasm during the mobilization campaigns earlier in the decade. One 
 
606 Ibid. 
607 Zhonggong yaxiya gangtiechang weiyuanhui guanyu zhishifenzi gongzuo qingkuang de baogao, January 9, 1957, 
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of his colleagues, He Derang, was described as having exhibited an intense loyalty to the regime. 
As a result, the cadres were more than willing to recommend her for party membership.609 The 
case of He Derang was a testament to the genuine concern the CCP displayed for educated 
women—so long as their ideological credentials were impeccable. 
 Indeed, if there was a bright spot for intellectuals at this juncture, it was undoubtedly for 
female scholars. The government clearly had an interest in championing the progress at 
integrating intellectual women into the workforce; a People’s Daily editorial came out on March 
6, 1957 that refuted the old adage that “female wisdom is not equal to that of men” (nüzi zhihui 
buru nan). The article also noted that half of all high-level chemical researchers were women by 
that point. Employment trends pointed to a sharp increase in the employment of female 
intellectuals in teaching, the arts, and medicine, with some early signs of progress in fields like 
geology, the hard sciences, mathematics, and biology.610 To be sure, female intellectuals were 
just as vulnerable to the Anti-Rightist Campaign as their male colleagues; at the same time, they 
undoubtedly advanced far more than male intellectuals when the 1950s as a whole are 
considered. At the same time, it is unlikely that older female intellectuals were able to make 
much progress due to their age. An editorial from a Beijing intellectual, He Siyuan (a male), 
noted that the regime had stopped short of providing full employment for older intellectuals 
despite progress for younger and middle-aged intellectuals during the early 1950s. He argued 
that older intellectuals’ practical knowledge—most notably, knowledge of foreign languages—
could prove quite useful to the state.611 As such, age appears to have still been a limiting factor 
for intellectuals, regardless of gender. 
 
609 Ibid.  
610 Ding Baofang, Zai gaodeng jiaoyu he kexue shiye zhong: Beijing nü zhishifenzi you zhongyao gongxian, March 
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 In Shanghai, surveys from March reveal the successes and limitations of the reform effort 
for intellectuals. According to one report, a full 70% of intellectuals employed in the education 
industry had received some kind of wage increase. That being said, a wage increase alone did not 
necessarily translate to a fully secure standard of living; problems persisted in terms of a lack of 
availability among various consumer goods and foodstuffs, as well as an overall lack of 
quality.612 Although the 70% rate of wage increases is impressive, there is no definitive evidence 
that every intellectual who had received a wage increase could expect the new salary rate to 
continue into 1957 and beyond. Also, the statistics are limited in that they only related to 
education personnel, without corresponding percentages for engineers, medical personnel, artists, 
or researchers. Moreover, a wage increase did not necessarily have to be substantial to be 
counted as such; a later study showed that the average salary increase was about 16.34% of their 
1955 salaries.613 Of course, intellectuals also benefited in ways beyond salary hikes; for example, 
housing improvements (which may have included rent deductions) were not factored into the 
16.34% figure. Intellectuals had also managed to wield a considerable degree of influence in the 
city, with a full 40% of delegates to the Shanghai People’s Congress being composed of non-
CCP intellectuals.614 There were already signs in mid-March that the city was in the process of 
reassessing its policies toward intellectuals; the municipal government announced the foundation 
of the Shanghai Pedagogical Association, which focused on spreading the study of Marxism-
Leninism among educators.615  
 Intellectuals themselves had taken note of the limits of reform by late March. One famous 
intellectual, Luo Longji (the vice-chairman of the China Democratic League; later targeted as a 
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rightist in the latter half of the year) praised the party’s successes in improving intellectuals’ 
working hours, library materials, scientific instruments, and assistance from young researchers. 
Nevertheless, he pointed to a continuing “lack of mutual comprehension” (gemo) between 
intellectuals and their overseeing cadres.616 In some cases, cross-class resentment from the cadres 
had real implications for intellectuals’ salaries. In general, cadres tended to use a rating system 
(pingji zhi) to determine how much an intellectual would get paid per month. Intellectuals had 
begun to realize that the rating system unfairly privileged an intellectuals’ political background 
over work performance, as well as CCP members over other party members or unaffiliated 
intellectuals.617 Though no data is available on the disparity in wages between various political 
classifications (progressive, centrist, and retrogressive), many scholars had come to believe that 
the lion’s share of the benefits had gone to the progressive faction. Meanwhile, a representative 
to the National People’s Congress named Li Boqiu discussed the state of intellectuals in 
Shanghai and Guangzhou in a speech on March 25. Li suggested that wage increases had only 
gone through for about two-thirds of intellectuals, and also noted that hospitals and clinics were 
still in the midst of significant shortages of medicine and supplies.618 For its part, the national 
government seemed to be relatively uninterested in pressing forward with the reform efforts of 
1956. A People’s Daily article suggested that the government’s attention had been refocused on 
population pressure in the major cities; the editorial called on older intellectuals to return to their 
ancestral villages in order to alleviate urban population pressure. Retired intellectuals could still 
 
616 Luo Longji, Jiaqiang dang yu feidang zhishifenzi de tuanjie, March 23, 1957, ARC. 
617 Ibid. 
618 Shanghaishi renmin weiyuanhui bangongting guanyu zhuanfa quanguo renmin daibiao dahui Li Boqiu daibiao 
guanyu zhishifenzi wenti de shicha baogao de han, March 25, 1957, B123-3-884-1, Shanghai Municipal First 
Bureau of Commerce, SMA. 
247 
work in advisory roles in rural areas, the author said.619 It thus seems likely that the national 
government was unaffected by reports of continuing issues facing intellectuals, and was satisfied 
with the progress already made. Other issues seemed more pressing. 
 One benefit intellectuals appreciated in 1956 was a reduction in political meetings. As 
such, the resumption thereof during 1957 caused considerable consternation among the scholarly 
community. In Shanghai, intellectuals complained that cadres started infusing political study—
which included calls for criticism and self-criticism—into the old face-to-face meetings where 
cadres would check on intellectuals to make sure they were happy with their living and working 
conditions. Perhaps in response to cadre resentment for the livelihood improvements intellectuals 
experienced during 1956, these meetings often called on intellectuals to reflect on the “comfort 
and ease” (anyi) of their lives, as well as criticize their class arrogance (zigao zida; literally, 
“thinking of oneself as tall and great”).620 For their part, Shanghai intellectuals felt that cadres 
had become willfully ignorant of the issues that still affected them; they called on their 
administrators to “investigate the realities of their lives” (xiama kanhua; literally, “get off one’s 
horse to look at the flowers”). Intellectuals felt that cadres “loathed” (hen) them, and that they 
would treat anyone who had any kind of connection whatsoever to the old Guomindang regime 
harshly. Some factories even reverted wages back to the 1955 level, causing intellectuals to 
criticize the CCP for going back on its word (chuer faner).621 For Shanghai intellectuals well 
versed in the political modus operandi of the Communist Party, they realized that a new 
rectification movement was on the horizon. The Shanghai Municipal Government had begun 
 
619 Jiejue chengshi renkou yongji de yige banfa: zeng zhenwu jianyi zhengfu jiangli tuixiu de ganbu, zhishifenzi, 
gongren zai ziyuan he keneng tiaojian xia, jinliang huidao nongcun juzhu. Zhe dui ge fangmian dou you haochu, 
March 18, 1957, RR. 
620 Shanghaishi jidian gongye ju guanyu zhishifenzi taolun “xuanchuan gongzuo huiyi baogao” de qingkuang, April 
10, 1957, B173-4-96-1, Shanghai Municipal Machine-building and Electrical Industry Management Office, SMA. 
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reining in the ongoing Hundred Flowers Campaign (where the free airing of views was referred 
to, metaphorically, as “blooming”), saying, “First, there should be a limited scale of ‘blooming’; 
after that, we believe that some more ‘blooming’ can occur. But we want to avoid any sudden 
outbursts of ‘blooming’ all at once.”622 Across the board, intellectuals saw many of the gains of 
1956 begin to evaporate. 
 Much of the attention drawn to the continuing problems experienced by intellectuals was 
accomplished through older intellectuals speaking out—in general, older intellectuals seemed to 
take greater advantage of the more liberal national climate than their younger colleagues. At the 
same time, older intellectuals also may have had more to complain about. They argued that the 
party had only gleaned a superficial understanding of their actual beliefs during the Thought 
Reform Campaign of 1952, and had not updated their information since. They suggested that 
cadres were overeager to mechanically apply labels like “counterrevolutionary” or “anti-party,” 
which could irrevocably hinder the rest of a scholar’s career.623 Some older intellectuals, such as 
the engineer Du Guangzu (who worked at Huasheng Factory in Shanghai), may have been old 
enough to retire; Du’s children were grown adults, after all. Still, Du refrained from retiring out 
of a belief that he was a “good-for-nothing” (hunhun) who could not do much else besides work 
at the factory. The working conditions at Huasheng had become grim, however. Wages had 
actually been cut during 1955, meaning that any wage increases at best probably would not 
exceed what intellectual staff members were making in 1954. Despite promises of raises, nothing 
actually happened. Du and his colleagues had therefore become increasingly skeptical of their 
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cadres, saying that “the stairs creak but no one comes down” (zhi ting louti xiang, meijian ren 
xialai)—that is, that the administration was all talk and no action.624 
 By mid-year, the nation was mostly gripped in the drama of the Anti-Rightist Campaign; 
as a result, there was little work being done to assess the actual living and working conditions of 
intellectuals. A handful of documents after May are revealing, however, and demonstrate that a 
sense of stalled reforms persisted for many intellectuals over the course of the entire year. In 
mid-June, the Shanghai Ministry of Higher Education noted that it was having difficulties 
finding jobs for graduates. Danwei around China were under instructions to “economize” 
(jieyue), meaning that they were often hesitant to add new staff members. As a result, the 
Shanghai Municipal Government tried to absorb some 1957 graduates in order to ease pressure 
on other industries, although these efforts still fell short of what was needed.625 The PRC State 
Council acknowledged the lack of opportunities for recent graduates in mid-July, drawing 
attention to four defects in the existing system of work assignment: (1) not enough attention was 
paid to students’ political histories, (2) gaps between students’ academic specializations and the 
practical needs of society, (3) too short a time frame for assigning a suitable job, considering the 
short time-span of the summer vacation, and (4) the refusal of some students to accept a job offer 
from the government.626 To try and fix the problem, the State Council proposed a number of 
changes: the work assignment program would begin drawing plans well before graduation, and 
would advise schools on the most at-need professions. The State Council also called for more 
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quality professors in the sciences in order to increase the overall scientific literacy of the 
intellectual population. University danwei would also have to look for opportunities to involve 
students in manual labor in order to give them a broader array of professional qualifications. 
Lastly, the State Council called for an end to the unofficial practice of universities letting 
unemployed students (including those who had refused their job assignments) to continue to live 
in university dorms until they had found some source of employment.627 
 It appears that the problem of unemployment for recent graduates continued into the 
following year. The Shanghai Municipal Government announced plans to devote a considerable 
budget—698,816 yuan—to help unemployed intellectuals find work in 1958. Although 
considerable, that sum was only about half of the city’s budget for assistance to support 
currently-employed intellectuals, at 1,272,061 yuan.628 For intellectuals who had finally had the 
opportunity to pursue a degree thanks to the party’s expansion of the education system, facing 
potential unemployment was no doubt considerable evidence of the limits of reform. Even 
employed intellectuals still had complaints, however; Shanghai doctors complained about a new 
policy of assigning them to work in different districts from where they lived (huaqu yiliao). 
Although doctors were appreciative of new cultural opportunities, such as the local Philharmonic 
Orchestra, they complained about boring, repetitive performances that were targeted to a lay 
audience instead of them.629 Meanwhile, the prestige gained by medical personnel during 1956 
had largely disappeared during 1957. There was a highly-publicized incident where a combat 
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veteran was denied treatment at the First People’s Hospital, causing other PLA members to 
criticize the Shanghai health care system for long waits.630  
 For all these reasons, intellectuals had come down from the heady months of the previous 
year. A good deal of the promises made from the national party, as well as provincial and 
municipal governments, had either not materialized yet or had even been retracted by resentful 
cadres—bold moves that typically went unpunished by ranking party members. At the same 
time, we should be careful not to overstate the case. As the previous chapter has shown, there 
was a wealth of significant and measurable benefits for intellectuals that was already underway. 
The idea of a “stalled-out” reform movement is marginal to the general trend of livelihood 
improvements. As the final section in this chapter will explore, many intellectuals were able to 
solidify the gains of 1956 even during the frenzy of the Anti-Rightist Campaign. That being said, 
however, the goal of this section has been to demonstrate that there was a sense, among a 
sizeable number of intellectuals, that the benefits they were expecting had not come through. 
Moreover, the manner in which the reform movement began to fizzle out represents a microcosm 
of larger political forces; cadres were emboldened by some of their successes in slowing down 
reform efforts already, and accordingly pushed forward at the beginning of 1957. Overseeing 
party branches may have been aware of low-ranking cadres’ intransigence, but they showed little 
appetite to intervene. That boded even less well for intellectuals. 
 
A Cacophony of Views: Intellectuals Speak Out 
 Intellectuals’ sense of frustration coincided with political changes at the top. Mao Zedong 
himself had invited the intellectuals to freely offer criticism of state policy via a speech on 
 
630 Ibid.  
252 
February 27 detailing the “contradictions” between classes.631 Thus began the zenith of the 
Hundred Flowers Campaign. To be sure, some intellectuals used the perceived shift to a more 
liberal political climate in order to levy severe criticism of the CCP regime. In many other cases, 
however, intellectuals used the opportunity to draw attention to their continuing class problems 
(both real and perceived), as elucidated in the previous section. This is not to suggest that the 
majority of intellectuals’ freely-aired views in early and mid-1957 were apolitical, but rather that 
little evidence exists of overt and widespread anti-party sentiments among intellectuals. Thus far 
in the decade, intellectuals had generally found ways to cooperate with the new regime in tacit 
return for benefits, from prioritizing intellectuals in the nationwide work assignment programs to 
targeted class benefits in 1956. For the majority of intellectuals, they probably had little reason to 
think that drawing national attention to their continuing issues would elicit a different response 
from the party center than such strategies had at the beginning of the decade or in 1955.  
 At the beginning of the year, intellectuals still had plenty of access to and influence with 
sympathetic municipal governments. A pair of speeches in early 1957 by Shanghai intellectuals 
to the city’s municipal committee showed that intellectuals were aware of the changes in the 
national environment and began to try and solidify support from high-level party institutions. 
One of the speeches, by Xu Zhongnian, complained about the “mean-spirited” treatment of 
intellectuals by cadres and countered that intellectuals had proved their loyalty to the CCP. He 
acknowledged that there were still right-leaning intellectuals, but expressed a faith in their 
capability for political transformation: “even reactionaries can become revolutionaries!”632 He 
asked the Shanghai government for more patience, noting that intellectuals were “particularly 
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sensitive about their reputations” (aimianzi). Xu concluded his speech by calling for a “Three 
Intentions Policy,” including more attentiveness to the needs of intellectuals, more patience in 
waiting for wayward intellectuals to undergo ideological transformation, and an overall 
perseverance in the party’s broad policies for intellectuals.633 A speech from Gao Hongzhang 
discussed the plight of older intellectuals (Gao himself was over 60 years old), whom Gao 
credited for the advancements already accomplished in critical sectors like scientific research. 
Gao cited the old idiom that “great strength can cultivate new energy through the full utilization 
of old teachers” (dali peiyang xinseng liliang, chongfen liyong lao jiaoshi).634 Although Xu and 
Gao’s speeches had no measurable effect on municipal policy, the fact that the city government 
was still actively soliciting intellectuals views was indicative of the still-favorable climate in the 
early months of the year.  
 Although most intellectuals did not begin speaking out in earnest until May, there were 
some criticisms published earlier. Two doctors from Tianjin, Wan Fuen and Zhang Jizheng, 
argued that the Communist Party had not paid adequate attention to medical professionals, and 
called for a “doctor-nurse alliance” to better advance their interests. Both Wan and Zhang were 
members of the CDL, and on the basis of their own personal experiences argued that non-CCP 
intellectuals were given unequal treatment by cadres. They also criticized the Youth League for 
eroding the authority of experts by providing young scholars with an “insulated” education.635 Of 
course, calling for such an alliance may have been quite dangerous, politically, given that it 
would not have been a stretch to suggest that Wan and Zhang were advocating for the formation 
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of a new, unlicensed political party. Other early criticisms stopped short of such statements. A 
writing by Chen Yousong, deputy director of the Education Department at Beijing Normal 
University, criticized the over-reliance on the Soviet model in reforming Chinese education. 
Chen argued that the Thought Reform Campaign, as well as subsequent injunctions to continue 
political study, represented an “incalculable waste of both time and energy” (langfei le xuduo ren 
de shijian jingli buxuan).636 On the other hand, Chen praised the government’s successes at 
combating unemployment among intellectuals, although noted that some intellectuals had been 
awkwardly placed in unsuitable jobs (xuezu shilü). Chen also argued that younger students (who 
had opportunities to work as teaching assistants for their professors) had become increasingly 
suspicious of the faculty, which hampered the ability of older intellectuals to properly cultivate 
young scholars’ intellects.637 
 The floodgates opened in May, however. A torrent of letters arrived in Beijing from 
intellectuals around the country interested in airing their views on continuing problems in their 
working and living conditions. Dong Weichuan, vice-provost of Beijing Normal University, 
argued that the party committee at the school was made up of cadres who had a poor 
understanding of the realities of university work, and therefore could not serve as effective 
administrators. Dong instead proposed that the faculty should instead govern the school system 
(jiaoshou zhi xiao).638 In a second letter, Dong described his “persecution” during the Three-Anti 
Campaign by individuals “without qualifications” who had denounced him (mei zige kongxu 
wo), thus coming off as somewhat haughty. He also argued that education reforms had led to a 
significant amount of reshuffling among university faculty between various “sister schools,” 
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which often upended the lives of professors required to move. Dong concluded his second letter 
by arguing that intellectuals had view representatives they could truly rely on; even the 
democratic parties (such as the Jiusan Society) that nominally represented intellectuals had 
coerced intellectuals into undergoing self-criticism along with CCP directives.639 Other 
criticisms took the form of big-character posters (dazibao) splayed around campus. A second-
year student at Guangxi Normal University, Zhang Zou, criticized the inequalities between the 
ruling class and the people, and suggested that intellectuals should struggle against such 
inequalities.640 
 One of the more common complaints from intellectuals was regarding the overall 
primacy of ideology in their professional lives. Various professors working at the Beijing 
Institute of Steel and Iron submitted a jointly-written letter to the state that called for an end to 
thought rectification work. Zhang Cungen argued that an intellectual’s love for their country was 
not correlated to a conviction in Marxism-Leninism; Kong Qingfu, meanwhile, argued that the 
superiority of American science over Soviet science meant that studying Marxism-Leninism did 
not produce tangible breakthroughs. Wu Shugao, meanwhile, defended older intellectuals by 
saying that a career of long and careful research (as opposed to political studying) could lead to 
national academic successes.641 Another joint criticism, this time from both professors and 
students at Xiamen University, again criticized thought work. Chen Jin (a student of economics) 
argued that frequent meetings and study sessions got in the way of “real” work and research. Wu 
Jianhua (a student of history) argued that many intellectuals had “gone mad” (fafeng) due to the 
excesses of the Thought Reform Campaign. One student, Zhu Tong (in foreign languages) went 
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further than his classmates in decrying the overt killing of some intellectuals by the PLA during 
the civil war.642 Although provocative, Zhu’s criticisms were not echoed by any others, who 
instead highlighted areas for possible reform and collaboration. Another letter from Jing 
Zhenhua, a professor of oceanography at Shandong University, explained that older Chinese 
scientists had been trained to avoid ideology in the interest of seeking unbiased truth. Jing turned 
the frequently-used idiom “thinking of oneself as tall and great” (zigao zida) against the cadres, 
arguing that they were the real arrogant ones. Jing concluded similarly to Dong Weichuan in 
arguing for “democratically-run schools” (minzhu ban xiao).643 
 The idea of a “democratically-run school” was echoed, both explicitly and implicitly, by 
others.644 Wu Xianpei, a professor at Chongqing Normal University (who had been involved in 
disseminating anti-Soviet materials before 1949, and was thus under some suspicion by the local 
authorities), revealed that the administration of his school had instituted an unfair system where 
wages were based solely on CCP membership as opposed to the quality of work. He also rejected 
the ideological classification scheme promulgated by the regime, saying that the overwhelming 
majority of those targeted as counterrevolutionaries were, in fact, decent, moral people. Wu 
argued that that party’s frequent shifts in policy toward intellectuals was like “a slap in the face, 
followed by a piece of candy” (yige erguang, yikuai bingtong).645 To add substance to his 
arguments, Wu brought up an example from Lu County in Sichuan where a professor had been 
accused of corruption. After an investigation revealed no conclusive proof, cadres instead 
targeted the professor’s wife. She later hung herself after enduring a gruelling interrogation and 
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public embarrassment. Even still, Wu was careful to note his support for the overall leadership of 
the CCO—just not its low-ranking cadres.646 Chen Shiwei, vice-principal of Lanzhou University 
(in Gansu Province), criticized the idea that cadres without any background in higher education 
could effectively administer the university system. With the majority of president, provost, or 
principal positions at Chinese universities now held by cadres, the CCP had an enormous 
foothold in the university system. Chen suggested that these cadres were only out for themselves, 
and had ignored Communist doctrines such as the mass line.647 
 Chen Shiti, a biology professor at Chongqing Medical School, was also concerned about 
the broader relationship between the cadres and the masses. Chen argued that a form of 
“estrangement” (gehe) existed between cadres and those they oversaw. This represented an 
interesting rhetorical strategy; Chen was explicitly identifying intellectuals with the “masses,” 
thus symbolically refuting cadre criticisms of elitism or arrogance among intellectuals. At the 
same time, Chen himself may have been guilty of some degree of haughtiness; one of his other 
criticisms related to the lower qualifications among the contemporary crop of teaching assistants, 
who too often “spoke without thinking” (xinkou kaihe).648 Chen was also in a unique position 
due to his religious identity as a Christian. He criticized the government had discriminated 
against Christianity due to its links to Western imperialism. In particular, Chen pointed out the 
disparities in the state’s religious policies; the government had created a new holiday with 
respect to Islamic tradition, whereas no such holiday had been established in accordance with the 
Christian tradition.649 Another Chongqing intellectual, Feng Kexi, criticized the general lack of 
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free expression. Feng argued that, after Thought Reform, many intellectuals had begun policing 
themselves about what they did and did not say in public. He acknowledged—and praised—CCP 
efforts to raise the standards of living for intellectuals, from diet to housing to even clothing 
options. But Feng also said that these material things did not make for a fulfilling life in of 
themselves. Feng concluded his remarks by reminding the authorities that intellectuals, 
especially in Guomindang-controlled territory, had often risked their lives to assist the CCP in 
coming to power. The government therefore owed them, in Feng’s view.650 
 Other intellectuals felt that the party’s reforms had left the education system 
unrecognizable from the pre-1949 era. Yang Zhaolong, a professor in Shanghai, discussed the 
generation gap between young and older intellectuals in a speech on May 4. Yang suggested that 
young intellectuals placed unrealistic and stress-inducing demands for political purity on their 
older colleagues. Yang also bemoaned the level of influence the CCP had over the next 
generation of intellectuals; for the first time in China’s history, young intellectuals had been 
cultivated more by the state than by their mentors.651 Chen Yanzhi, director of the Shenyang 
chapter of the CDL, echoed other criticisms of low-ranking cadres in a speech on May 8. “The 
knowledge possessed by intellectuals is not anything extraordinary,” Chen said, quoting a 
common cadre saying, “all we’d need is a concentrated effort, and we could grasp it as well.” In 
addition to criticizing cadres, Chen also expressed dismay regarding the prevalence of crash 
courses and night classes for the working classes. These supplementary courses were often too 
rigorous for enrollees, who often had little more than a primary school education, according to 
Chen.652 An editorial in People’s Daily on May 10, from a non-CCP intellectual named Li Yue, 
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criticized intellectuals who had managed to gain CCP membership during the reforms of 1956. 
Li said that intellectuals who had gained party membership were no longer willing to accept any 
criticism from their unaffiliated colleagues. “There are some comrades who have braved enemy 
gunfire who have nevertheless taken a step back from the gateway to criticism and self-
criticism,” Li said. Gaining party membership was generally based on a desire for career 
advancement than a genuine belief, he argued.653 
 Criticism of the cadre class continued as the month wore on. Hu Ming, director of the 
Russian Language Department at Beijing Normal University, complained that intellectuals who 
were not favored by the cadres tended to have either modest or no wage raises during 1956. Hu 
expressed the idea that intellectuals felt like they “had a job, had responsibilities, but had no 
power” (youzhi, youze, wuquan).654 A collaborative document from professors at Xi’an Normal 
University appeared the following day, which criticized cadre leadership even while praising the 
CCP broadly. The professors described an incident where cadres had carried out a bizarre 
reorganization of Xi’an Normal and Shaanxi Normal University, whereby the former would 
specialize in physics and geography while the latter would focus on biology and chemistry. The 
reorganization forced many intellectuals to pick up and move. Other academic departments, 
especially the humanities, had been unfairly downsized.655 The professors also complained about 
the unfair arrest of a teacher at Xianyang Middle School, Shu Longyuan, who had been 
incarcerated on September 10, 1954. Shu had worked as a translator in the Guomindang Defense 
Department before liberation, and had been antagonistic to CCP rule ever since. Despite this, 
Shu’s academic credentials were outstanding, meaning that his crime was one of belief only (he 
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took no direct actions to oppose the CCP’s leadership). The Xi’an professors compared Shu’s 
arrest to the crackdown on communist and communist-sympathetic intellectuals during the 
1940s.656 
 Other intellectuals in the northwest were chafing against stringent censorship policies. 
Qiu Shiming, a professor in the Art History Department at Northwest School for the Arts, 
described his personal difficulties in finding a venue to publish criticism of the cadres. He had 
written an article criticizing the heavy-handedness of his department head, but his colleagues had 
completely ignored it. He instead tried to publish his criticism via Fine Arts, a local magazine. 
The editorial board rejected the article, saying that it was unrealistic for Qiu to expect that the 
department be run without any errors.657 One of Qiu’s colleagues, Xu Taotian, described older 
intellectuals as “old slaves” (lao nucai) who had been completely neglected by the CCP. The 
majority of party membership acceptances had gone to younger intellectuals, much to Xu’s 
chagrin. Xu also noted that many younger intellectuals had received higher wage raises and fast 
promotions when compared to their older colleagues.658 An associate professor of physics at 
Shandong University, Liu Hongbin, echoed Xu’s frustrations about the uneven process of 
applying for party membership. Liu revealed that many Shandong intellectuals who had been 
admitted into the CCP had actually come from a petty capitalist background, despite the 
government’s rhetoric—presumably because they were younger and therefore untarred (or less 
tarred) by association with the Guomindang. Overall, however, Liu was satisfied with the 
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government’s outreach to youths; he noted that he and his wife were convinced that the party 
would take care of their son in the event that anything were to happen to them.659 
 Increasingly, intellectuals speaking out demonstrated a variety of positions on the role of 
the CCP; some maintained that the leadership was generally correct, but policy had been warped 
by problematic implementation by the cadres. Others instead suggested that problems ran to the 
top. Ren Yongzhong, a professor in Shenyang, was in the former camp. He complained that 
cadres had stripped medical schools of critical instruments under the belief that they were 
“wasteful” during the Three-Anti Campaign; hydroelectric boards had been converted into hot 
plates, for example. Still, Ren maintained that “the party’s policies are correct, and Chairman 
Mao’s instructions are clear”—the fault lay in the cadres on the ground.660 A professor in 
Shaanxi, Yuan Yaoting, was less sanguine about the CCP, which he accused of wanting to “do 
everything by itself” (baoban daiti), thereby crowding out the minor democratic parties. Yuan 
also described a bleak economic situation for non-CCP intellectuals. Nearly all university 
professors were reliant on the incomes from spouses in order to make ends meet; however, CCP-
affiliated intellectuals’ spouses invariably had an easier time finding sideline economic 
opportunities than non-party ones. Another professor, Zhou Yao, stopped short of criticizing the 
national government, however. The main problem according to Zhou was that cadres had not 
adequately protected research time; Zhou was forced to come into campus on Sundays just to 
keep up with his research projects.661 The provost of a university in Guangzhou, Chen Ziming, 
argued that non-party intellectuals had virtually “given up.” Some of Chen’s colleagues in the 
sciences explicitly blamed the national Ministry of Education for the lack of government support 
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for research; they said that research academies were now better places to work than academia.662 
These criticisms were unique in that they put the lion’s share of the blame on the institutions of 
national government. 
 Previous chapters have noted that there was a particularly tense relationship between 
intellectuals and cadres in Yunnan Province. As expected, Yunnan scholars thus used the 
opportunity to express their many complaints with their overseers. Du Fenshui, deputy director 
of the Yunnan chapter of the CDL, had insight into the geographic differences in how party 
members treated democratic party representatives. Du described several instances where he was 
traveling to conferences in Beijing; officials from the central government had always made time 
to meet with him despite their busy schedules. However, cadres in the Yunnan government 
frequently snubbed Du and his colleagues.663 Qin Zan, who worked for the Kunming branch of 
the Jiusan Society (another one of the minor democratic parties), agree with Du’s assessment. 
Ranking cadres in Yunnan generally did a good job in carrying out the state’s policies, in Qin’s 
view. Meanwhile, middle- and low-ranking cadres typically looked for any excuse to treat 
intellectuals harshly.664 Yang Ming, a direct colleague of Du Fenshui’s, analyzed the problem in 
terms of class background. Cadres directly supervising intellectuals tended to come from an 
agricultural or military background, and thus had little understanding of academics’ work. Yang 
suggested that the state might consider furthering the program of admitting intellectuals as 
members in order to allow for intellectual cadres to manage non-party intellectuals.665 
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 The democratic parties as a whole had a difficult time responding to the shifting political 
winds. On one hand, they owed their continuing existence to the whims of the CCP, in essence—
on the other, however, they were tasked with representing their members (many of whom were 
intellectuals). Representatives from the minor parties met at a conference in Wuhan on May 23 
to discuss how best to react to the outpouring of intellectual criticism—and sometimes dissent. 
Representatives noted that the parties had always supported the government’s mobilization 
campaigns, from Thought Reform to Suppress the Counterrevolutionaries. At the same time, 
representatives also felt that too much of state policy had been derived from the Soviet model, 
which had placed undue burdens on Chinese intellectuals.666 The representatives both 
acknowledged the “preferential treatment” (youdai) of intellectuals but also that intellectuals had 
found some of the reforms wanting; they still felt that the state was not fully invested in 
supporting research, for example.667 As such, the democratic parties had a difficult task during 
this period: echoing intellectuals criticisms while not pushing back too much against state policy. 
These ambiguities were sometimes reflected among democratic party members. A member of the 
Tianjin branch of the CDL, Yan Lichuan, accused another CDL member (Li Limin) of being a 
rightist in a letter on May 24. Li was working as the department chair of the Fine Arts 
Department at Tianjin Normal University, and also had a position at Tianjin Pictorial 
Magazine.668 This may suggest that Yan Lichuan was simply looking to advance his own career 
by accusing a superior of rightist behavior—an action that clearly went beyond the bounds of the 
Communist Party. Democratic party members were adapting to the politics of the new era. 
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 Other intellectuals made suggestions or criticisms regarding the day-to-day operation of 
universities. Fu Zhongsun, a professor at Northwest University, argued that cadres paid too much 
attention to student agitation and not enough to the professoriate. In a personal example, Fu 
describes the firing of his friend Zhang Peihu from the university after he had been targeted by 
student radicals. Fu described the student body as more like “fiction writers” than experienced 
journalists when it came to making big-character posters. Moreover, Fu noted that professors 
rarely had the time to respond in-depth to accusations on the posters, thus allowing faulty 
information to stay up for long periods of time.669 A report from several intellectuals at the 
Beijing School of Political Law in June praised the CCP for its work in increasing wages, but 
also exposed issues with the fairness of exam policies. One professor, Du Ruji, described getting 
pressured by cadres to bump exam grades for party-affiliated students (either full members, 
Youth League members, or radical activists) who had failed. Du attributed this issue to cadres 
not understanding the serious role of examinations within academia.670 A lecturer at South China 
Normal University, Huang Yiqiu, complained that he was required to teach 12 classes per 
week—while his department head (installed by the party branch in charge of the school) only 
had to teach 7. Huang also explained the drawbacks of the expansion of the education system, 
which had burdened intellectuals with huge class sizes, lower average achievement levels from 
students, and a dwindling supply of tutors. Despite the old maxim of “respect for the teacher, 
love for the student” (zunshi aisheng), Huang said that students in the mid-1950s saw faculty as 
little more than strangers (luren).671 
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 Some intellectuals wrote highly personal accounts of the hardships they had endured 
during the 1950s. He Tingjie, a professor at Beijing Normal University, described himself as an 
“activist” during the Thought Reform Campaign, having dutifully attended and participated in 
every political meeting his university held. However, He had become disillusioned with the 
immense workload expected by the new regime. He described working 12-hours days on the 
regular, with very few breaks during the workday. Eventually, He began vomiting blood due to 
the stress and had to take an extended leave from the university.672 Upon returning, He was 
targeted during the Suppress the Counterrevolutionaries Campaign, although for unclear reasons; 
indeed, when He pressed him on the issue, his supervisor told him that he was neither a 
counterrevolutionary nor a “bad element” in reality. Again, He contracted a stress-induced 
disease: bacterial tracheitis, causing him to “piss in his pants every day” (mianku meitian dou 
yao niao shi). Over time, He lost his enthusiasm for the rectification campaigns and begun to see 
the cadres as “hired thugs” (dashou).673 In another case, Wu Zhaofa, the head of the Biology 
Department at Beijing Normal, filed a complaint about one of his teaching assistants, Zhao 
Youxia (a man “without virtue nor any ability,” according to Wu!). Apparently, Zhao had been 
put in charge of making a list of faculty who would be given the opportunity to travel to the 
Soviet Union for study—a great honor that could also be highly beneficial for one’s career. Zhao 
ended up putting his own name on the list while snubbing Wu.674 
 Although many of the intellectuals who spoke out were older professors, students would 
occasionally join in through the writing of big-character posters. Although some students used 
posters to hurtle accusations of being a “rightist” at others, some used them to offer criticisms of 
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state policy. One poster at Zhejiang University—titled “Return My Professors!”—complained 
that the government was removing the best professors from universities and funneling them into 
research institutes. One famous geologist, Zhu Kezhen, had been reassigned to the Academy of 
Sciences in 1955, for example. The anonymous writer of the poster suggested that the most 
renowned scholars at Zhejiang University had been “scattered among other schools” (fensan dao 
qita xuexiao zhong qu).675 A student at East China Normal University, Lu Chongdun, reported on 
the reasons why he and his classmates were using big-character posters to criticize the 
government: they were fed up with a lack of choice regarding their majors, the inflexible copying 
of Soviet education policies, discrimination against teachers in primary and secondary schools, a 
lack of good wages for intellectuals more generally, the infringement on the dignity of the 
professoriate, and the party’s authoritarian manner of assigning work after graduation.676 
 Not all intellectuals used the opportunity to levy criticism at the party at all; some instead 
turned on their colleagues and criticized the criticizers. Xu Xiangong, for instance, complained 
that intellectuals were “proud and aloof” (zizun guao), and argued that non-party intellectuals 
were not offering proper respect to the authority of the cadres (Xu was the vice provost of 
Zhongshan University). Xu still encouraged the government to work through the minor 
democratic parties in reforming these wayward intellectuals, however.677 The president of the 
Academy of Sciences, Guo Moruo, praised the leadership of the government, calling the party 
the “train engine” (huochetou) of China. When interviewed about the danger of right-wing 
intellectuals speaking out, an interviewer asked Guo whether the old idiom “do not blame the 
speaker, instead take not of what they say” still applied. Guo only responded, vaguely, that 
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“speakers who say innocent things are innocent, speakers who say guilty things are guilty.”678 
The president of Wuhan University, Li Da, criticized right-wing intellectuals for using the 
moment as a pretext for attacking the state. Li said that rightists had begun criticizing the party 
after a famous sociologist named Fei Xiaotong published his influential essay, “The Early Spring 
Weather of the Intellectuals” (zhishifenzi de zaochun tianqi), although Li defended Fei 
personally. Li argued that the goal of the Hundred Flowers Campaign was to help intellectuals to 
organically advance their own thinking through a more liberal national climate; however, the 
campaign had been “distorted” (waiqu) by rightists seeking to discredit Marxism-Leninism and 
the entire socialist system more generally.679 
 This section has exposed a wide array of views from a wide array of Chinese intellectuals 
in 1957. That said, some broad themes certainly exist. The vast majority of intellectuals still 
maintained their faith in the leadership of the CCP, but criticized the inability (or refusal) of low-
level cadres to carry out the policies proposed by the state. Of course, it is possible that some 
intellectuals were being disingenuous; they only praised the CCP out of a fear of reprisals, in 
other words. There is little reason to think that every intellectual, or even the majority, who 
insisted on their continued loyalty to the regime was lying, however. Intellectuals had long 
offered tentative support for the CCP during the civil and the first half of the decade. For its part, 
the state had usually passed policies responsive to the needs of intellectuals. There was little 
indication that this time might be different, from intellectuals’ perspectives. Another relatively 
consistent theme is the importance attached to practical affairs like wages, support for research, 
and working hours. Intellectuals’ primary objective in the Hundred Flowers Campaign was to 
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solidify the practical livelihood improvements that had begun the previous year—not to bring 
about a new era of free-speech liberalism or challenge the authority of the CCP. 
 
The State’s Recalculation: The Flow of the Anti-Rightist Campaign 
 If the intellectuals were reasonable in their belief that they would not be punished for 
speaking out, that begs the question of why the party chose to respond in a dramatically different 
way than they had when intellectuals first began drawing attention to shortcomings in the 1953-
1955 period. To be sure, intellectuals did push much further than they had earlier, perhaps 
emboldened by earlier successes. A nontrivial number of intellectuals did seem to offer support 
for the overthrow of the CCP—even if these voices were dwarfed by those loyal to the regime. 
Nevertheless, the majority of intellectuals were more focused on further improvements to their 
standards of living and dutifully professed their loyalty to the party than not. Why the 
recalculation, then? Other scholars have provided various answers: Jung Cheng and Jon Holliday 
have suggested that the entire Hundred Flowers Campaign was a Maoist trick to lure out the 
subversives, Roderick MacFarquhar instead theorized that Mao himself was caught off guard by 
the scale of resistance to CCP rule, while Merle Goldman instead posited that the CCP’s modus 
operandi was a period of liberalism followed by rectification.680 In truth, scholars cannot be 
certain what possessed the party leadership, and Mao more specifically, to turn against free 
expression so suddenly. Joel Andreas has offered two other insightful conclusions regarding 
Mao’s decision to initiate both the Hundred Flowers and Anti-Rightist Campaigns: first, Mao 
was genuinely concerned with the problem of “bureaucratism” among the cadres, and second, 
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that Mao was nevertheless unsympathetic to the haughtiness of the intellectuals.681 Building off 
of Andreas’ argument, I suggest that the party as a whole had mostly sided with the intellectuals 
against their own cadres over the course of the decade. During Thought Reform, the national 
government had mostly tried to rein in cadres excesses (see Chapter 3); afterward, the state 
forced cadres to study alongside intellectuals (see Chapter 4); during the reforms of 1956, the 
state encouraged preferential treatment of intellectuals over the cadres (see Chapter 5). However, 
that position became untenable heading into the second half of 1957. Cadres represented the base 
of the Communist Party, and they had become increasingly dissatisfied with the situation. As 
such, despite real concerns about the cadre class, the party leadership realized that it could only 
afford to side against them so much. The Anti-Rightist Campaign represents the state’s attempt 
at solidifying the loyalty of its low-ranking cadres. 
 During the first few months of the year, the government fielded an increasing number of 
reports describing the extent of intellectual material privilege as a result of the previous year’s 
reforms. A report at the end of January noted that intellectuals affiliated with the minor 
democratic parties had begun ignoring the directives of the cadres in some localities. Moreover, 
they had found ways of circumventing the directives of the cadres to study Marxist-Leninist 
texts.682 Neglecting ideological reform would certainly have seemed problematic to the national 
government, which had insisted on the continuing importance of political study even in the midst 
of livelihood reforms during 1956. A report in early March (from the Central Committee’s “Ten-
Member Group for Intellectuals’ Problems”), had discovered that Beijing intellectuals had seen a 
wealth of new luxuries, from the semi-reasonable like exclusive dining halls or clubs to the 
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questionable like billiards tables or even yachts. The report also criticized intellectuals who had 
successfully joined the CCP during the previous year, noting that they had generally neglected to 
keep up with ideological rectification work once their applications had been accepted.683 A third 
report in early April, this time from an investigator in Yunnan, revealed the new luxuries enjoyed 
by Yunnan intellectuals (even despite a fractured relationship with the cadres). They had 
guaranteed housing, free theater tickets provided by their schools, and stipends specifically for 
luxury foodstuffs (fushipin). Even those living within one li (about 500 meters) from their school 
enjoyed a free bus service. In one particularly egregious case, a professor in the History 
Department of Yunnan University had misappropriated conference stipends while traveling to 
Beijing to get a hemorrhoid removed—thus using up 500 individuals’ worth of monthly medical 
stipends!684 These early reports show why the national government may have been 
unsympathetic to the argument that intellectuals required further improvements to their standards 
of living in order to do their work effectively. 
 Thus far, the party-state had typically seen intellectuals as absolutely vital to national 
reconstruction. However, a survey of several Shanghai engineers revealed a more complex 
picture on the ground. The survey focused on four individuals: Zhu Jiafeng, Du Guangzu, Liu 
Xiqi, and Zhou Qi. Zhu, who had studied in Germany for five years before returning to China to 
work as an inspector at an aircraft repair facility, was a ranking engineer at Shanghai Piston Ring 
Factory (previously named Detai Internal Combustion Factory). The survey revealed that Zhu 
had used his position’s stature to try and promote friends to other high-level positions, despite an 
abject lack of qualifications. Moreover, Zhu was a Christian, and had rarely come in to work on 
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Sundays (which would have probably been the expected norm).685 Du Guangzu, meanwhile, was 
entering advanced age (his degree, from MIT in the US, was from 1921). Du had worked for 
universities in Hunan Province, Nanjing, Beijing, and Shanghai before leaving academia to work 
at Huasheng Factory. Du was generally referred to as “Old Tutor” (laofuzi) by his colleagues. At 
the same time, his productivity had begun to suffer due to his age. The report recommended 
either encouraging him to retire or move back to academia.686 Both Liu Xiqi (who had previously 
worked for the sprawling Guomindang bureaucracy) and Zhou Qi were also older engineers, and 
had assistant managerial positions at Dazhong Factory. Coworkers saw Liu as lazy; his son 
worked in a nearby factory, for example, and Liu would leave work for hours at a time to go see 
him. The two men were described as “having many ideas but producing no results.”687 In all 
cases, it was work performance as opposed to ideology that dogged these three intellectuals 
(Liu’s connections to the Guomindang were ignored, tellingly). In reading the survey, the 
government may have wondered exactly why all these three were receiving preferential 
treatment on the basis of their expertise. 
 Things began to change in May. In the middle of the month, Mao Zedong himself offered 
his own thoughts on the state of the national discourse. Mao struck a surprisingly moderate tone; 
he acknowledged that there were “dogmatists” within the CCP that had committed errors in 
carrying out state policy. Nevertheless, he said that those who were criticizing dogmatism were 
doing so at the expense of “revisionism.” Both dogmatism and revisionism should be criticized 
equally, in Mao’s view. The chairman revealed his preferences, however, when he said that the 
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faction that had ignored revisionism while only criticizing dogmatism were “linked in countless 
ways” (qiansi wanlü) to capitalism. Mao then went on to criticize a rightist faction within 
academia for turning the “centrist faction” (zhongjianpai) against the CCP. Although critical of 
the intellectuals, Mao still noted that the focus in cracking down on wayward intellectuals should 
be mobilizing them for socialist construction rather than only punishing them, per se.688 Mao’s 
speech had a noticeable effect on the ground. Shortly after, the situation in Shanghai changed 
dramatically. Much like during the Thought Reform Campaign, intellectuals were again expected 
to spend long hours in struggle sessions for criticizing each other as well as themselves.689 
National bureaus like the Irrigation Works Department saw the changing winds and altered 
course. The department held a conference for its intellectual employees on May 22, which 
focused mostly on national bureaucrats criticizing intellectuals. According to the conference 
leaders, intellectuals had mistakenly seen themselves as “a cut above others” (gaoren yideng).690 
The days of special privileges for intellectuals were winding down.  
 Although the government may have initiated the Anti-Rightist Campaign, the backlash 
against intellectuals was not exclusively a top-down phenomenon. Shifting messages from the 
state encouraged other actors on the ground to change their own behavior, which in turn forced 
the national government to take a harder line. Student activism took off in late May; at Lanzhou 
University, for example, the campus was decorated with a wealth of big-character posters by the 
end of the month. Student activists often used these posters to encourage their professors to 
engage in the campaign by asserting their loyalty to the state via their own big-character posters. 
Others were more confrontational; one student at Lanzhou confronted the professor Zhou Muxi 
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(the chair of the Mathematics Department), jeering, “fuck you, I hope your kids beat you up!”691 
Perhaps in an effort at self-preservation, the minor democratic parties too began to alter course in 
the middle of the year. The Jiusan Society held a conference on June 15 that focused on 
criticizing the liberal ideas of “rightist” intellectuals. This particular conference focused on Chu 
Anping (a Jiusan member), the editor-in-chief of Guangming Daily, who was targeted as a 
rightist at the end of the month.692 The largest tonal shift from government documents did not 
appear until late into June, when Beijing disseminated a set of instructions calling for local 
governments to “strike while the iron is hot” (chenre datie). Every danwei would be required to 
submit a list of names of “genuine” rightists—this meant intellectuals actively opposed to the 
government, as opposed to those who may be dissatisfied with the regime but still accepting of 
its leadership (who were instead considered centrists). Although the process of cutting down on 
political study had never fully taken off, the instructions from late June called for a full 
resumption of formal thought rectification work along the lines of the Thought Reform 
Campaign.693 At least to some extent, the national government was building on the energy and 
resentment from below. The Anti-Rightist Campaign fed on itself. 
 At the same time, the national government rarely lost sight of the main goal of the 
backlash: convincing the centrist intellectuals to join forces with progressive intellectuals and 
defend the regime from their right-leaning colleagues. Further instructions from the Central 
Committee give play to the multifaceted objectives of the Anti-Rightist Campaign. A set of 
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instructions on June 29 called on all local party organs to expose rightist thought, both in order to 
demonstrate the “malicious” intent of the rightists but also to demonstrate the danger of 
associating with rightists—this, in essence, was a coded threat to centrist intellectuals. At the 
same time, the instructions also informed cadres that their main goal was to simply persuade 
centrist intellectuals that denouncing rightists was the right thing to do. Cadres were expected to 
form better connections with the centrist faction as well as their representatives.694 A piece by 
Mao Zedong in early July again demonstrated the twin goals of the campaign. Mao blasted 
intellectual elitism: “the person who believes that the masses cannot speak reason, that they must 
be compelled to obey and cannot be persuaded...that person is not a genuine communist.”695 He 
also suggested that rightist intellectuals had been able to “sneak into” (hunru) both the CCP as 
well as the Youth League. At the same time, the document was still an olive branch to the 
centrist faction. “It is incorrect to give out serious punishments for small crimes,” Mao said, 
although “it is also incorrect to give out small punishments for serious crimes.” He showed some 
awareness of the continuing problems intellectuals faced in their working conditions, calling for 
an end to “selfish departmentalism” (benweizhuyi). Although Mao defended the death penalty, he 
nevertheless expressed hope that only a small number of rightists would actually die over the 
course of the campaign.696 The national government clearly was taking the threat of right-wing 
intellectuals seriously—but that alone was only part of the Anti-Rightist Campaign. Genuinely 
persuading centrist intellectuals to support the regime, and further improving their livelihoods, 
was also on the agenda. 
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 In July, various cities and provinces reported on the steps they were taking to carry out 
the campaign. The Shanghai government estimated that 4.77% of secondary school teachers 
were “genuine” rightists (as opposed to 24.28% leftists and 70.94% centrists), suggesting that 
relatively few Shanghai teachers faced serious scrutiny at this juncture. The report described 
centrist intellectuals as those who were willing to accept CCP control of politics, but not of 
culture, education, science, or technological research.697 Shanghai planned a three-step plan for 
carrying out the backlash: (1) continuing the Hundred Flowers Campaign, although introducing 
centralizing tendencies by having each district nominate only one or two loyal intellectuals to air 
views at official party conferences, (2) transforming the Hundred Flowers Campaign to focus on 
using free expression to expose and criticize rightist intellectuals, and (3) carrying out 
rehabilitative political study among rightist intellectuals, focused on the study of Mao and Zhou 
Enlai’s writings.698 In Beijing, the municipal government proposed a similar plan whereby each 
danwei affiliated with higher education would submit a list of names of suspected rightists. 
These lists were non-binding, however, and the municipal government called on each danwei to 
provide materials proving that the listed individuals were in fact rightists before they could be 
officially labelled as such. Danwei within the school system and local industries, as well as 
student groups, would also be asked to submit lists of names in the future. The Beijing report 
was somewhat about what would happen if a danwei did not name any rightists—the document 
simply says that the municipal government will “seek truth from facts” (shishi qiushi) in such 
cases.699 The Yunnan Provincial Government followed in Shanghai and Beijing’s footsteps, 
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calling for representative conferences and asking local danwei to submit names of rightists. The 
Yunnan government had a higher estimate of rightists, however; the province determined that 
21% of democratic party intellectuals were rightists, in addition to 8-12% of university 
professors and 3.5% of university students. Branches of the minor democratic parties in 
Kunming and Gejiu had already been asked to expel 384 members for rightist beliefs.700 
 Much like with Thought Reform, there were limits to the rectification campaign. Even as 
the list of names of rightists around the country had nearly doubled by July 9, going from an 
initial estimate of 4000 genuine rightists to over 8000, only about 3% of those 8000 had actually 
been accused by name. Generally, an intellectual seen as guilty of having severe rightist beliefs 
would have their names published either in a newspaper or other local media. The Central 
Committee encouraged local branches to increase that 3% to 10%, but still said that 90% of 
genuine, accused rightists should face no more than a small amount of criticism from their 
danwei. Moreover, the national government insisted that “ample evidence” (zhengju chongfen) 
be collected before an intellectual had their name published in the media.701 Around the same 
time, the Beijing city government attempted to clamp down on the overly harsh treatment of 
rightist intellectuals. The city described several recent occurrences where rightists were berated 
and denounced at a conference; overly punitive or harsh criticism was denounced as “rough and 
cruel” (cubao) by the city.702 The city also explained that public denunciations were not effective 
at satisfying the broad goals of the Anti-Rightist Campaign: “[public denunciations] cannot 
effective refute rightist viewpoints, educate the masses, or exercise one’s own political thinking, 
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and they can even drive a wedge between the centrist masses and the left.” The city criticized 
universities that forbade rightists from speaking or putting up big-character posters as well as 
activists who called out rightists by name in the middle of campus via loudspeakers (although the 
report nevertheless praised their political energy).703 The evidence suggests that the state was not 
wholly interested in a frenzied attack on the rightists, and instead encouraged local activists and 
party branches to act strategically. 
 At the same time, the case should not be overstated. The national government was still 
interested in punitive measures for rightists. A report from the Beijing government suggested that 
the city believe that right-wing intellectuals had managed to infiltrate both the Youth League and 
the Communist Party, and accused these rightists of “inciting, organizing, leading, or conspiring 
with anti-party and anti-socialist elements.” The report also suggested, without evidence, that 
some of these rightist intellectuals had supplied sensitive information to other non-party rightist 
intellectuals, therefore giving them more ammo for their attacks on the state.704 Unlike the 
previous report’s calls for caution, this document endorses expelling rightist intellectuals from 
the party and/or the Youth League. About 110,000 intellectuals had joined the CCP by mid-
1957, and the Beijing government estimated that up to 10% of these recent admittees might be 
rightists. As such, they would have to be expelled pending an investigation.705 The Central 
Committee, meanwhile, had become concerned about the spread of right-wing thought among 
university students. Universities in Beijing had estimated that about 6% of the graduating class 
of 1957 were rightists, as opposed to 64% centrists and 30% leftists. The national government 
therefore encouraged universities to bring in students over the summer for further rectification 
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work, which may have included physical labor in a factory or in a nearby village.706 For 
university graduates that had been found to be rightists, they were still allowed to apply to have 
their case reviewed by a local party branch. Although they could not be given a work assignment 
while their case was under review, they were not forbidden from finding work on their own. And 
while they could not receive a formal wage, the government allowed for suspected rightists to 
receive some minor subsidy funds.707 Perhaps one of the most surefire ways to avoid ideological 
problems was through changing the class composition of the universities. The Central 
Committee praised the case of Renmin University, where 90% of the student body had come 
from a working class or military background. Unsurprisingly, about half of Renmin graduates 
had already made successful applications to join the CCP.708 
 Over the course of the summer, universities and other intellectual-heavy institutions 
began applying national directives to ferret out the rightists. From mid to late July, the Academy 
of Sciences in Beijing held a number of conferences designed to refute the Democratic League’s 
culture of excessive tolerance for right-wing scientists. Only about a third of the conference 
attendees were either classified as leftists or had membership in the CCP, meaning that the focus 
was on the coveted centrist faction. Party investigators surveyed these centrist intellectuals to see 
how they perceived the conferences. In general, they seemed satisfied with the agenda and 
approved of the state’s directives against rightists. Centrist intellectuals seemed to believe that 
there was both logic and evidence behind the punishments for right-wing intellectuals. Others 
believed that the conferences were evidence of the CCP’s care for and belief in the importance of 
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the intellectual class as a whole.709 Of course, it is possible many of these opinions were given 
under duress (no “centrist” was identified by name in the survey, moreover). Still, it appears that 
intellectuals were genuinely divided politically, and those belonging to the “centrist” faction 
escaped punishment from the authorities. There is at least some evidence that the centrists were 
not particularly sympathetic to right-wing intellectuals, either. In the universities, reports 
described a large-scale campaign by rightists to criticize the party; walking through campus, one 
would undoubtedly see big-character posters, anonymous messages left on classroom 
blackboards, or flyers posted in student dorms all denouncing the CCP’s leadership.710 At East 
China University, party officials and party-sympathetic students and faculty pushed back via the 
same tactics. One anonymous blackboard message argued that the Hundred Flowers Campaign 
was intended to support “all kinds of expression” (zhongzhong de fang), not just anti-party 
speech.711 As such, leftists had begun the task of criticizing the criticizers, often by adopting their 
same methods. 
 By the start of the fall semester, the Anti-Rightist Campaign was well underway. 
According to a report on conditions in Beijing, 7511 rightists had already been brought to the 
municipal government’s attention as a result of the campaign. 3529 (about 47%) had faced 
criticism in some form or another, although it is unclear if further punishments had been applied. 
Although the majority of rightists were found in the Beijing university system, the majority of 
intellectuals in Beijing schools were not rightists. Of a total of 113,213 persons employed in 
academia in the city, only 4,230 had been found to be rightists—constituting less than 5% of the 
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total. Of the graduating class of 1957, only 6.1% were identified as rightists.712 The numbers 
were different, albeit not exceedingly so, in Shanghai, where 1,353 total right-wing intellectuals 
had been identified. This included 797 students (2.6% of the total student population in 
Shanghai), whereas a full 13.5% of the professoriate had been identified as right-wing.713 
Rightist influence in Yunnan Province seemed higher, with the vice-provost of Yunnan 
University giving a speech that directly denounced the leadership of the CCP (officials described 
his speech as “a cake with white arsenic frosting”; tangyi pishuang). Even still, the numbers 
were not terribly higher in the province as a whole. By September, 331 Yunnan intellectuals had 
been identified as rightists, which represented 4% of the total intellectual population of the 
province. 18.1% of Yunnan professors had been accused, whereas the graduating class that 
summer was composed of 10% rightists.714 To be sure, the campaign upended the daily 
operations at universities across China. Nevertheless, the number of targets generally remained 
small. 
 One of the main effects of the Anti-Rightist Campaign was the pushback against the 
democratic parties, thus enshrining the CCP’s supreme authority. At a conference for democratic 
party-affiliated intellectuals in mid-September, party officials began pushing back directly 
against the “diluting” (chongdan) effect that the democratic parties had on the CCP’s authority 
by accepting and insulating right-wing intellectuals. Party officials at the conference explained 
that their task was to encourage centrist intellectuals to support the Communist Party above all. 
They also encouraged centrist intellectuals to continue making “good-natured” (shanyi) 
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criticisms of working conditions to their danwei.715 The democratic parties clearly read the 
writing on the wall, and changed course in the interest of securing their very survival. Officials 
from these parties met in Shanxi Province in late September, and acknowledged that they had 
become havens for anti-CCP intellectuals. They pledged to do better in rooting out rightists 
within their ranks.716 Intellectuals who belonged to the democratic parties were generally 
confused about their status during this period—despite the official line that these parties were in 
the process of transformation from bourgeois capitalist parties to socialist ones, they still felt as 
though they were written off by the cadres as irredeemably bourgeois. Debate between various 
political factions continued through the end of the year; at a Democratic League conference in 
Tianjin, some intellectuals wondered why being a bourgeois party was such a bad thing, whereas 
leftist intellectuals criticized the rightward drift of the party. In their view, overall membership 
rates were falling, whereas most of the recent admittees were rightist intellectuals.717 
 Perhaps the most significant consequence of the Anti-Rightist Campaign—one with 
policy implications lasting through the rest of the decade—was the growth of a frustrated, 
pessimistic attitude within the government regarding the status of intellectuals. The decade thus 
far had been a testament to the CCP’s firm belief that scholars, even older ones, could transform 
into true socialist intellectuals. Although rightists in general made up fairly small percentages of 
the intellectual population, the “need” for the Anti-Rightist Campaign convinced national 
politicians that the earlier Thought Reform Campaign had little lasting effects. As such, new 
ideas emerged regarding the necessary steps for a real, lasting class transformation of the 
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intellectuals. Jiang Nanxiang, president of Qinghua University, foreshadowed official policy 
shifts toward the end of 1957 (and especially in 1958-1959; see Chapter 7) in his commencement 
speech for the graduating class that summer. He specifically encouraged graduates to respect the 
working class by assisting in agricultural or industrial production and argued for the benefits of 
physical labor in terms of graduates’ political consciousnesses.718 It is unclear if Jiang was in 
contact with national political figures; however, his calls for manual labor became reality quite 
soon. Party officials first began openly proposing the merits of “sending down” intellectuals 
(particularly students) to the countryside to assist in agricultural production at a conference in 
mid-September. These officials acknowledged that Thought Reform was incomplete, and that a 
bureaucratic, top-down campaign could only accomplish so much.719 Transformative hard labor 
would be the key to finally unlocking the intellectuals’ potential, party officials believed. 
 The Central Committee offered its official endorsement of the plan to have intellectuals 
engage in physical labor en masse in mid-October. Urban schools could help with industrial 
production, the Central Committee advised, whereas rural schools could help with agriculture. 
The state was well-entrenched by this point; the bureaucratic process of beginning the sending-
down campaign was a testament to state entrenchment. Rural schools coordinated with county 
governments to find students and faculty opportunities to visit various nearby villages, while 
urban schools coordinated with municipal governments to find factories in need of extra hands. 
Local government had to report on the progress of the new campaign to prefectural and 
provincial governments, which would then inform the Central Committee.720 The Shanghai 
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government began to push for intellectuals to go to the nearby countryside during the fall 
semester. While there may have been some enthusiasm for being sent down among some 
intellectuals working in government bureaus, the majority of students found it difficult to adapt 
to rural life without their families or comforts. Although the first intellectuals to be sent down 
were mostly young, the city pushed older intellectuals to engage in physical labor as well. Part of 
the first wave of sent-down intellectuals included 25 academic department heads from around the 
city.721 The campaign expanded fast; by the end of the year, a total of 3000 intellectuals had left 
the city for the villages.722 
 A report from the Shanghai Education Bureau reflects on the enormous changes of 1957 
from an official perspective. Previous optimism about the intellectual class had dimmed; now, 
the main government focus was on training a new generation of “working-class intellectuals” 
(gongrenjieji zhishifenzi). The bureau echoed criticisms of the current generation of intellectuals, 
and denounced the belief that “the working class cannot become leaders in science and 
technology.”723 For workers and peasants, becoming an intellectual was a prime opportunity for 
real social mobility. Shanghai cadres working in factories, mines, urban enterprises, or nearby 
villages were instructed to look for promising candidates for schooling among their workers. The 
city announced plans to send 200,000 workers to trade schools and 100,000 workers to receive a 
secondary school education over the course of the following decade. Meanwhile, in order to 
better improve access to education among the peasantry, the education bureau called for the 
strengthening of rural schools.724 By the end of 1957, 68.7% of secondary school students had 
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come from a working class background. The city planned to have that number increase to 85% 
by 1962. Inequalities still persisted, however; at top-ranked schools, only about 51% of the 
student body had come from a working class background. The city set a more achievable rate of 
80% for these schools by 1962. At universities, only 34.1% of students had come from the 
working class—and the city did not feel comfortable setting a target of over 55% for 1962. In 
order to accomplish these grand aims, Shanghai reallocated various grants to explicitly favor 
children of workers and peasants. In addition, students who were categorized as having some for 
of “familial struggle” (jiating you kunnan de) were given additional subsidies for attending 
school.725 Although the process of transforming the class characteristics of the intellectual 
population was clearly already underway, the CCP felt that the realities exposed by the Anti-
Rightist Campaign required the process to be expedited. 
 Until 1957, the national government, in addition to many municipal governments 
(especially Shanghai) had generally championed intellectuals and delivered policies responsive 
to their needs. However, all levels of government became aware of the need to recalculate over 
the course of the year. Low-level cadres resented what they saw as officially-sanctioned 
privileges given to the intellectuals; increasingly, higher-level party officials became sympathetic 
to that view over the course of 1957. Far from grateful for the advancements of 1956, many 
intellectuals demanded more and more. Some even attacked the foundations of CCP rule. The 
state therefore launched the sweeping Anti-Rightist Campaign. Far removed from the optimistic 
motives behind Thought Reform, the Anti-Rightist Campaign turned the tactics of right-leaning 
intellectuals against them. Big-character posters and campus pronouncements denounced their 
behavior. Conferences criticized both right-wingers as well as the organizations that had shielded 
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them—primarily, the democratic parties. Contradictions persisted, however, with the national 
government usually urging lower branches to avoid overly punitive measures. Still, national 
officials could hardly shake a feeling of pessimism regarding the ability of the intellectuals to 
truly gain a working-class consciousness. As such, a new, radical solution emerged: sending 
intellectuals down to the countryside or to urban factories for physical labor. Over the course of 
the fall semester, thousands of intellectuals were part of the first wave of scholars participating in 
manual labor. Meanwhile, cities like Shanghai began drawing up concrete plans to promote 
workers and peasants going to school and becoming intellectuals in their own right. The year 
thus revealed the unsustainability of the previous state policies regarding intellectuals. 
 
Exposing Rightist Activity 
 Although the Anti-Rightist Campaign was conducted in a much different manner from, 
and under different motives than, the Thought Reform Campaign, some similarities emerged 
over the course of the year. Much like during Thought Reform, the CCP used confessions as a 
way of forcing intellectuals to reflect on their “errors” and pledge to do better in the future. 
Unlike during Thought Reform, however, when confessions were usually submitted to the local 
Public Security Bureau and then simply collected dust, confessions during the Anti-Rightist 
Campaign were used actively to root out other right-wing intellectuals. In some cases, 
confessions from intellectuals who had previously spoke out—for example, Dong Weichuan and 
He Tingjie—were used by the authorities to delegitimize the issues these intellectuals identified. 
Ultimately, the CCP used confessions to propose a new narrative of a broad, right-wing 
conspiracy to dethrone the CCP using various umbrella organizations in and outside academia. 
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Rooting out this right-wing intellectual activity justified increased scrutiny of the authorities over 
intellectual activity. 
 The first major confession of the campaign came from Chu Anping (editor-in-chief of 
Guangming Daily). Much of the suspicion surrounding Chu came from his contacts with Luo 
Longji (vice-president of the Democratic League), identified as one of the top rightists in China. 
Chu had been a student of Luo’s, and had even invited the older man to his wedding in 1934. 
Chu then met Luo while studying abroad in Britain in 1937. After taking a job at Guangming 
Daily in the lead-up to liberation, Chu was visited by Luo and asked to provide a job for Zhang 
Bojun, a friend of Luo’s who had worked for a Sichuan newspaper during the war. In Chu’s 
telling, Luo and other rightists were able to publish right-wing stories through Guangming Daily 
through their contacts with Zhang Bojun. Chu argued that, despite his lack of judgment in 
admitting Zhang, he was innocent; he was busy working on a series of articles describing 
military operations in Xinjiang.726 Another accused rightist, Li Dejia (a history professor at 
Yunnan University), also confessed to illicit dealings with Luo. Li said that he had met Luo 
during a conference in Beijing during the fall of 1950. They shared their similar political 
opinions over a number of meals. Apparently, Luo convinced Li to covertly organize right-
leaning intellectuals in the Yunnan area; in return, Luo would encourage the local branch of the 
CDL to provide political cover for Li and help advance his career.727 The CCP essentially used 
the confessions of Chu and Li to run an ideological sting operation on Luo Longji, who 
ultimately had to submit his own confession. Luo was charged with being a rightist on the basis 
of his anti-communist activities both before and after liberation. In the 1930s, Luo had organized 
various anti-communist political parties in Tianjin, which including urging youth members to 
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enlist in the Guomindang military. After liberation, Luo had encouraged the new regime to ally 
with the United States, and had even petitioned Washington for millions of dollars in 
reconstruction aid. After Thought Reform, Luo had decided that intellectuals could “function as 
rivals” (fenting kangli) to the Communist Party, and used his position in the CDL to organize 
right-leaning intellectuals and disseminate information critical of the state.728 
 Although Luo Longji was certainly one of the highest-profile targets of the Anti-Rightist 
Campaign, other confessions exposed similar “networks” of right-wing intellectuals. Dong 
Weichuan, who had previously published several criticisms of the CCP, submitted a confession 
in mid-July that described his contacts with others at Beijing Normal University. Dong 
elucidated a series of conversations with a colleague named Zhong Jingwen, who complained 
about the gap in the living arrangements of the professoriate and the cadres. Dong also became a 
close acquaintance of Tao Dayong (an editor of China Vocational Press) after both being invited 
to dinner at the house of one of the university’s vice-provosts. Both Tao and Dong were CDL 
members. Tao became increasingly urgent in encouraging Dong to speak out. Once the Hundred 
Flowers Campaign swept campus, Dong began to see other professors—He Tingjie and Luo 
Zhifu—frequently taking the bus to campus for the sole purpose of “looking at the big character 
posters.” For these men, the new era of free expression was the second coming of the May 
Fourth-era intellectual activism.729 Perhaps in part due to the information provided by Dong, a 
local newspaper published an exposé of He Tingjie, partly perhaps as a refutation to the criticism 
made by He several months earlier. The article denounces He for being misleading about his 
political history; he had actually joined the Guomindang in 1929, and wrote an article calling for 
military operations against the CCP base in Yan’an. He was an active supporter of Jiang Jieshi’s 
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policy of “pacifying the interior before resisting foreign aggression” (rangwai bi xian an nei). He 
Tingjie had also taken a job with the Guomindang military directly in 1938.. Although most of 
these problems come from before liberation, He had, problematically, kept all this information 
hidden from the authorities during Thought Reform.730 
 Although older intellectuals were the primary targets of the Anti-Rightist Campaign, 
students too submitted confessions describing the spread of rightist beliefs among youths. A 
student of history at Yunnan University, Li Jingyu, confessed to using big-character posters and 
anonymous essays to express his “hatred” of the CCP during the Hundred Flowers period. Li had 
become radicalized after meeting a fellow student, Yang Yougeng, who was working on a piece 
for the school magazine defending political groups that had been labelled as “reactionary.” Li 
was intrigued by Yang’s beliefs, and had begun skipping his allotted rest period to discuss 
politics with Yang in the other student’s dorm room. Li, Yang, and other friends plotted to break 
into and destroy the university’s stored files collected during the Suppress the 
Counterrevolutionaries Campaign as a means of protest.731 Right-wing students in the Hanyang 
district of Wuhan had been organized by a professor, Wang Jianguo, who invited them for 
extravagant dinner parties at his house. Wang used his students for force a coup in their school, 
calling for the forced retirement of several cadres in the administration and the elevation of 
Wang as the new president. Students began to riot in the streets after successfully forcing out the 
cadres. The riots were only broken when a mob of workers and peasants flooded the campus to 
declare support for Mao and the CCP.732 Meanwhile, students at Tianjin Normal University 
confessed to using an English language reading group as cover for right-wing activities. The 
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group would translate and circulate materials critical of socialism as well as the communist bloc. 
Although it appears that the overwhelming majority of accused rightists were male, a report on 
the situation at Tianjin Normal noted that “women’s excellence in the field of exploitative art is 
no less than that of men,” and described how several female students had done translation work 
of illicit materials.733 
 Although academia was the epicenter of the Anti-Rightist Campaign, non-academic 
intellectuals were also targeted by the authorities. Chen Qian, a member of the Sichuan branch of 
the China Federation of Literary and Art Circles, was accused of being a rightist and submitted a 
confession on August 3. Chen was extremely critical of state control over art production, calling 
regulations “dogmatic.” He further stated that “no writings, songs, or dramas have been produced 
that could rival the May Fourth era.” Chen occasionally wrote pieces in defense of other 
suspected or accused rightists, such as his colleague Liu Shahe. Chen also confessed to meeting 
Liu and other right-wing artists in a public park to drink tea and discuss their work—as well as 
politics.734 The Shanghai filmmaker Mei Duo submitted a confession on September 25 
describing a conspiracy between himself and an editor of Wenhui News to publish articles from 
other rightists. Mei pushed for the publication of an article about filmmaking from one of his 
colleagues, Zhong Dianfei, who had already been accused of being a rightist. Despite this, Mei 
urbed the Wenhui editorial board to publish Zhong’s article regardless.735 A professor at Beijing 
Film School, Sun Mingjing, submitted a confession on October 10 describing his previous 
antagonism toward state film regulators. Sun also described his fractured relationship with the 
cadres at the school: “Socialism and Thought Reform may have ‘saved’ you,” he said, “but you 
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have in turn let socialism down by linking socialism and bureaucratism together.” He also 
confessed to authoring a number of big-character posters critical of the CCP.736 
 Some of the confessions also cast a negative light on the democratic parties, allowing the 
state to further limit their influence. For example, a professor of Chinese at Beijing Normal 
University, Peng Hui, submitted a confession at the end of the year. Peng was a member of the 
women’s committee in the Beijing chapter of the CDL, meaning that her confession was used to 
condemn the Democratic League more broadly. Her supposed crimes were not particularly 
severe: she had renounced her CCP membership back in 1934 after her husband was arrested by 
the Guomindang and threatened with execution, but had rejoined in 1950. At Beijing Normal, 
she had spoken out against the cadres and advocated for “democratically-run schools” (minzhu 
banxiao), as others did.737 Although Peng’s “errors” seem relatively minor, her position was used 
to further stigmatize the minor parties. People’s Daily also ran editorials criticizing the CDL for 
admitting suspected or accused rightists like Zhang Luo. Overall, applications to join the CDL 
had been increasing over the course of 1956 and 1957; however, there is good reason to suspect 
that many of these new applications were from political targets. One CDL member, Xue Yinong, 
criticized the organization, noting that “comrades targeted during the Suppress the 
Counterrevolutionaries Campaign seem especially enthusiastic” to join the CDL.738 During the 
first half of 1956, the Qingdao branch of the CDL had admitted 42 new members, 14 of whom 
had previously been political targets; in 1955, 16 new members had been admitted, 10 of which 
were previous targets.739 
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 Many of these examples discuss coalitions or networks of right-leaning intellectuals. To 
be sure, however, the Anti-Rightist Campaign inarguably targeted plenty of loyal intellectuals 
too. Yue Daiyun, a professor at Beijing University, was a notable victim of the campaign after 
she had proposed starting a new magazine on campus with other like-minded colleagues 
(technically, starting a new magazine may have violated the spirit of PRC laws against non-
sanctioned political organizations). Yue did not even follow through on creating the magazine, 
but was still denounced by other professors and students—many of whom she had previously 
criticized as rightists as recently as 1955! Despite her clear, professed loyalty to the regime, she 
was stripped of her party membership.740 Yue’s account shows that many accusations were not 
genuine, and instead reflected attitudes of careerism or simple petty revenge among other 
colleagues. An editor of People’s Daily, Deng Tuo, was expelled from his job at the outset of the 
Anti-Rightist Campaign due to personally invoking Mao’s wrath—for pushing back against the 
Hundred Flowers Campaign. Deng had predicted (correctly) that the criticisms would become 
increasingly stringent; at the time, this simply made Mao angrier. As the state prepared to launch 
the Anti-Rightist Campaign, Deng had prevented some of his colleagues from publishing articles 
that might expose them to accusations of being a rightist. As such, Deng was dismissed. He spent 
much of the next few turbulent months in quiet solitude with his family.741 The cases of Yue and 
Deng show that the Anti-Rightist Campaign cannot only be understood as a logical pushback 
against anti-CCP intellectuals; indeed, petty politicking among colleagues produced a number of 
bogus accusations that ultimately tarred plenty of loyal intellectuals with the “rightist” label. 
 The state used Anti-Rightist Confessions to promote a new narrative regarding the 
intellectual community. Whereas state pronouncements for much of the previous decade had 
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championed the intellectuals and their ability to transform, the government now took a more 
cynical view and used these confessions as a means of promoting a darker vision of intellectual 
life. Many of these confessions are fantastical, and perhaps embellished—describing shady 
conspiracies among right-leaning intellectuals to meet, discuss their politics, and develop plans 
to foster resistance to the state. In many cases, these confessions took on the character of a sting 
operation, with minor and mid-level targets being forced to submit confessions that would in turn 
allow the authorities to assemble “evidence” against high-value targets like Luo Longji. 
Although there is no doubt some truth to the stories exposed by these confessions, the cases of 
Yue Daiyun and Deng Tuo show that the Anti-Rightist Campaign took on a very different 
character from previous rectification movements. In an effort to vilify the intellectuals, the state 
was certainly willing to let plenty of its own be thrown under the bus. 
 
Solidifying Intellectual Gains 
 Central to this chapter’s argument has been the assertion that the Anti-Rightist Campaign 
was only a partial backlash—even as it swept up innocent, pro-CCP intellectuals in its wrath, the 
campaign left the overwhelming majority of intellectuals untouched. Even those who were 
labelled “rightists,” more often than not, faced little real punishment beyond minor criticism. 
Even as the state began to lose its previous sympathies for the intellectual class, it still realized 
that its priorities of production increases and scientific advancement could not occur without the 
input from intellectuals. As such, solidifying some of the gains from 1956 is just as much a part 
of the story of 1957 as is the Anti-Rightist Campaign. Although there is little evidence that the 
scale of livelihood increases seen in 1956 continued into 1957, the CCP identified several ways 
in which it could continue to cultivate intellectuals and provide for their needs. The admittance 
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of qualified intellectuals into the CCP continued unabated, despite protests from some cadres at 
the end of 1956. The government also continued to invest in research materials and scientific 
instruments, sometimes even increasing sums from their 1956 levels. For the majority of 
intellectuals, 1957 represented the institutionalization of the gains they had made during the 
previous year. 
 Only a few weeks after the official launch of the Anti-Rightist Campaign on June 8, the 
Central Committee released a supplemental set of instructions regarding intellectuals’ treatment. 
The document notes that the party, at all levels, had not given enough attention to offering 
political opportunities to high-level intellectuals. Because so many of these scholars were not 
CCP members, the report argued, rightists had used the opportunity to advocate for the 
overthrow of the regime from ranking positions within academia. “We must open the door for 
intellectuals,” the instructions concluded, “and not close it in front of them.”742 In some ways, 
the state was able to use the Anti-Rightist Campaign to offer further justifying its plans for 
admitting intellectuals as members; it would be a pragmatic move to limit the potential influence 
of rightist intellectuals, officials argued. Even as the campaign began to heat up, the regime 
showed no interest in closing off all criticism whatsoever from intellectuals. In an editorial in 
People’s Daily, a Beijing intellectual named Cao Shujing explained his view that there were two 
types of intellectuals: those who harmed the party and the country (wu dang wu guo) and those 
who supported both (wei dang wei guo). The former, Cao argued, “only praise and never 
criticize, while the party’s organizations trust, encourage, and promote them. The party finds it 
difficult to connect with the other kind of intellectual, and therefore frequently rejects—and even 
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attacks—them.”743 The fact that Cao’s article was published in state media represents an 
endorsement of sorts by the regime; in fact, they may have agreed with his argument that 
offering faithful criticisms of the state was in line with an intellectual’s duties. 
 Reports from the fall showed that efforts to admit intellectuals into the CCP did not lose 
much strength despite the ongoing Anti-Rightist Campaign. In late August, The Beijing city 
government revealed that a total of 389 high-level intellectuals had been admitted as party 
members over the course of the previous year. The city as a whole was home to 6829 high-level 
intellectuals, with a full 21.8% of them having party membership by the fall of 1957. There was 
still some evidence of the political situation; the data distinguished between “lecturers” (jiangshi) 
versus full professors (jiaoshou), with the former having a membership acceptance rate of 29.9% 
and the latter having a smaller on of 13.8%. Moreover, the city called on its bureaus to pay 
attention to political beliefs as well as service and work history.744 In the city of Nanjing, 53 
intellectuals had been admitted—although smaller, cities outside of Beijing and Shanghai did not 
have the same density of scholars among the urban population. One admitted Nanjing intellectual 
explained their choice to apply as such: “I realized that we are facing serious problems, and I 
could best propose solutions from within the party.”745 In Tianjin, meanwhile, 25 intellectuals 
had been admitted into the party at the start of the fall alone. The report from Tianjin described 
these intellectuals as facing a backlash from their colleagues who denounced their “toadyism” 
(paima).746 In mid-October, the Shaanxi Provincial Government announced that it had recently 
accepted 28 new high-level intellectuals as members. The province praised the new admittees for 
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“firmly holding their positions” (zhanwen lichang) in the face of the rightist attack on the party. 
Jin Zhongyuan (a lecturer in the Irrigation Department at Xi’an Jiaotong University), for 
example, overcame personal medical issues in order to initiate the Anti-Rightist Campaign at his 
university. And Lü Guangzu (an engineer at Northwest Spinning and Weaving Supervisory 
Office) was a consistent critic of right-wing politics even during the liberal Hundred Flowers 
period.747 As such, the Anti-Rightist Campaign afforded loyal intellectuals more opportunities to 
advance their careers. 
 In Shanghai, the intellectual-dense city had to strike a more conciliatory tone with the 
local scholarly community even in the midst of the Anti-Rightist Campaign. Foreign observers 
still based in the city described a “fierce” campaign against right-wing Shanghai, but also noted 
that there was no evidence that any intellectuals in Shanghai had been subjected to physical 
violence or had been removed from their positions by the end of August (it is unclear if this 
changed later, or if these observers were simply not privy to the full extent of the campaign).748 
The Shanghai government, meanwhile, continued to support local intellectuals’ efforts to join the 
CCP, in line with other major cities. In some factories, the rate of party membership among 
engineers was approaching the targets proposed by the city in February 1956 (see Chapter 5).749 
The city government, meanwhile, released a new list of criteria that cadres should use to evaluate 
applications for promising intellectuals that reflected the changed political climate. The city 
emphasized five key characteristics: (1) having a clear political history, (2) supporting the 
leadership of the CCP, which included having participated in previous mass campaigns, (3) 
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providing the necessary background information, which included information on family 
members and their political histories, (4) having an accomplished career, and (5) being 
forthcoming and self-critical about any shortcomings they may have.750 Although practical 
requirements for membership had not disappeared entirely, the new set of qualifications 
emphasized politics to much starker degree than in 1956. Still, the fact that many workplaces had 
hit the targets (or even exceeded them) originally proposed in early 1956 suggests that Shanghai 
intellectuals, overall, benefitted roughly as intended in a net sense. 
 As the fall wore on, cities began to evaluate the state of the Anti-Rightist Campaign. The 
data is relatively consistent with the idea of a partial backlash; the majority of intellectuals were 
not targeted by the campaign. In Beijing, about 4.3% of all academics had been identified as 
rightists by the end of September, with only 23% of them being classified as “extreme right-
wingers” (that is, those who were the best candidates for official punishment). These numbers 
reflected divides among academics: 15% of full professors had been accused, as opposed to 6.7% 
of teaching assistants, 4.3% of students, and only 1.56% of party-affiliated intellectuals. These 
numbers suggest that, in general, younger intellectuals were better able to weather the storm than 
their older colleagues.751 Moreover, the Beijing government recommitted itself to fixing some of 
the issues intellectuals faced in their day-to-day lives. The city agreed with intellectuals that 
some cadres had been paying themselves unfairly high salaries, and also announced plans to 
carry out a “rechecking” (fucha) of materials collected during the Suppress the 
Counterrevolutionaries Campaign and exonerate any intellectuals who may have been unfairly 
targeted. Beijing also announced budgetary increases for schools and universities to facilitate 
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both teaching and research. The municipal government would continue to survey leftist and 
centrist intellectuals to gather their opinions and advice on policy.752  
 As the Anti-Rightist Campaign continued, various city governments were put in an 
awkward position. Previous policies from 1956 to improve intellectuals’ livelihoods were still 
technically on the books, despite the vastly changed political circumstances in late 1957. In 
November, for example, the Shanghai government took steps to clarify that all previous 
directives still stood. The city government also praised budgetary increases for library materials 
at the Academy of Sciences from 70,000 yuan in 1955 to 300,000 yuan in 1956, and called for 
further increases in the ensuing years. On average, Shanghai had increased the budget for 
importing foreign scientific instruments by 30 million yuan every year from 1952 to 1957.753 As 
such, extended benefits for intellectuals even during the Anti-Rightist Campaign went beyond 
just party membership acceptances. Shortly afterward, the PRC State Council approved plans for 
further research investments across the country. This would include an increase of nearly 5 
million new library books and scientific materials; back in 1950, only 200 chemical reagents 
were available for use in research, whereas 4000 were available by the end of 1956. The State 
Council pushed for further increases in the following years. The report from the State Council 
showed awareness of the ongoing rectification movement, noting that many right-wing 
intellectuals had used instrument or library shortages as a means of critiquing the entire socialist 
system. The plans, in part, represented an effort by the national government to refute these 
claims and assert the state’s continuing care for the intellectuals.754 
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 At the end of November, the Department of Higher Education, part of the PRC Ministry 
of Education, conducted a nationwide survey of the results of the Anti-Rightist Campaign. 
Overall, 3.5% of university intellectuals (including faculty, students, and staff) had been labelled 
rightists—presumably, only a small number of them ever faced serious punishments. Much as in 
previous reports, the survey revealed a high degree of differentiation among academics; 6% of 
teachers and lecturers had been classified as rightists, in comparison to 10-15% of tenured 
professors and associate professors.755 The department also examined the class background of 
those who had been identified as rightists. According to them, 37.5% of right-wing intellectuals 
had come from an “exploiting class” background.756 Although this did not represent a majority of 
rightist scholars, previous increases in intellectuals coming from a working class background 
suggest that exploiting-class-background intellectuals were overrepresented among rightists, 
unsurprisingly. As such, the department endorsed measures to continue changing the class 
character of the intellectuals. The Ministry of Education, in light of the department’s work, 
announced plans to double its education assistance funds. 70% of the funds were to be used to 
identify promising candidates for schooling among peasants and industrial workers.757 Even 
though most intellectuals were not categorized as rightists, the national government still clearly 
felt a need to further reengineer the class composition of the intellectual community—even while 
many of the loyal intellectuals saw expanded benefits. 
 Up to this point, there has been little data on what punishments, exactly, rightists as a 
whole might have faced (despite several gripping case studies in the form of Deng Tuo and Yue 
Daiyun). Two reports from Beijing in December reveal likely outcomes for less prominent 
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rightist intellectuals. The PRC Ministry of Propaganda had exposed 59 rightists among its staff, 
which included artists, literati, news affiliates, and editors. Of these 59, 2 were expelled from the 
party (all 59 were originally CCP members), 11 were assigned remedial physical labor, 8 were 
allowed to continue their employment with period check-ups by higher officials, 10 were 
removed from their current jobs—but would be given an alternative job assignment, and 28 were 
demoted but allowed to continue in their work.758 The report also includes demographic data. 
These 59 rightists were overwhelmingly male; only 2 female intellectuals were included. There 
was no correlation between a place of origin (included an urban versus rural background) and 
being labelled a rightist. Age-wise, the vast majority were in their 40s, although one was as 
young as 22 while another was as old as 68.759 A week later, the Beijing Municipal Government 
announced punishments for 31 rightists working for the city. 3 were expelled from the CCP, 2 
were assigned supervised physical labor, 2 were allowed to continue their employment with 
periodic check-ups, 3 were removed from their positions but given alternative jobs, 12 were 
allowed to continue teaching duties but were stripped of other academic assignments and had 
their salaries cut, 2 were allowed to continue teaching duties but did not have their salaries cut, 1 
was entirely exempted from punishment, 4 were arrested, and 2 were stripped of their party 
membership and subjected to additional supervision by the authorities.760 Although these 
punishments seem overly draconian, it is important to place them in context. Such punishments 
were only applied to a tiny fraction of intellectuals; even then, the worst punishments (being 
stripped of party membership, arrest, or forced physical labor) were applied to a minority of the 
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accused. Moreover, even intellectuals removed from their jobs had opportunities to be rehired; in 
a controversial case at the Central School of Drama, two rightist professors (Li Zongjin and Feng 
Fasi) were rehired after initially being thrown out of the school.761 
 This section has shown why we should not draw any hasty conclusions about the overall 
political relationship between the intellectuals and the Communist Party as a result of the Anti-
Rightist Campaign. The initiation of the campaign certainly upended the lives of intellectuals, 
who once again had to attend frequent study meetings and criticism sessions. Only a fraction 
were ever targeted by the campaign, however. And while the majority may have been 
disappointed that previous policies capping meeting time (such as the Five-Sixths Policy in 
Shanghai, for example) did not survive the tumult of 1957, they could still enjoy opportunities to 
apply for party membership and further investments from the government into their research 
projects. For the small minority of intellectuals who had been labelled rightists, most 
experienced some criticism and that was it. A minority of the minority faced substantial 
punishments, although the most common punishment was probably some form of demotion or 
salary cut. Arrests were exceedingly rare, as were ejections from the CCP. A decent number of 
accused rightists were assigned hard physical labor, although even non-rightist intellectuals 
would join them in the villages and the factories during the coming years. The most normal 
experience for intellectuals during 1957 may have included some frustration, to be sure. 
However, the benefits many intellectuals saw in 1956 did not totally disappear, and in some 
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 1957, in sum, included a number of multifaceted developments for intellectuals. Among 
the scholarly community, there was a real sense that many of the gains during 1956 were starting 
to stall, sometimes thanks to cadre intransigence. Many saw their salary benefits disappear, for 
example, while other promises never materialized. This sense of frustration coincided with 
national efforts to encourage more freedom of speech, with Mao directly asking intellectuals to 
criticize the party. Although many intellectuals voiced their frustrations over the stalled reform 
efforts, some used the opportunity to challenge the CCP’s authority more directly. A small 
minority voiced support for the overthrow of the CCP (or a real democratic sharing of powers 
with the minor parties). The state was surely spooked by the latter, but more importantly had 
come to realize that it could only side with the intellectuals against its own cadres for so long. As 
such, the CCP bowed to pressure from the rank-and-file and launched the Anti-Rightist 
Campaign to place intellectuals under far more scrutiny. Using tactics reminiscent of Thought 
Reform, the Anti-Rightist Campaign revealed, in some cases, right-wing networks of scholars 
operating inside and outside academia. These rightists often used front organizations to cover 
their real activities: encouraging resistance to the state and distributing anti-CCP materials. But 
the state clearly overreached in trying to ferret the genuine rightists out. Clearly pro-communist 
intellectuals suffered as a result of the campaign for bogus or trumped-up “errors.” The majority 
of intellectuals—the “leftists” and “centrists”—actually saw progress on some of the concerns 
they had raised at the beginning of the year. The national government support efforts to further 
increase rates of party membership among intellectuals, and such efforts continued through the 
end of the year. The government also announced plans for purchasing more foreign books and 
instruments, as well as deepening investments into research. The heyday may have been over, 
but progress continued. 
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 That is not to say that 1957 did not see any major changes. The year, with all its drama, 
represented the end of a sense of optimism from the state regarding the ability of intellectuals to 
genuinely transform themselves. Even as the government allowed more scholars to join the CCP, 
it made plans to further increase the percentages of intellectuals who had come from a working-
class background. The government had always been interested in investing in the next generation 
of intellectuals—both pro-CCP youth as well as workers and peasants who were given 
opportunities to get a degree after liberation. But these plans gained urgency in the wake of the 
Anti-Rightist Campaign. The current crop of intellectuals might be useful for the state in 
achieving further production increases and broader economic successes, but the state had become 
cognizant that a gap between the intellectuals and the government would continue. Moreover, the 
state began to wonder what steps could possibly help older intellectuals gain a working-class 
consciousness, if years of political study had not produced the sweeping changes the CCP had 
hoped for. Slowly, new plans emerged: having students and professors engage in hard labor 
alongside peasants and factory workers, so that they could appreciate the lives of the masses. 
Having intellectuals contribute to production with their own hands might be what was needed for 
a genuine breakthrough—a Great Leap Forward. 
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CHAPTER 7: WORKER INTELLECT AND INTELLECTUAL WORK, 1958-1959 
 It had been almost a decade since the Communists set up the new regime in Beijing, and 
the question of how intellectuals would fit into the new China remained unresolved. The state 
had been generally responsive to the concerns of its intellectual class up until the second half of 
1957, even as it harbored concerns about the linkages between intellectual status and 
generational economic privilege; intellectuals were literal symbols of the inequalities the 
Communist Party had pledged to root out as it stormed its way to victory. However, a deluge of 
resentment and resistance from the cadres—alongside a lack of sympathy from the party elite 
regarding intellectuals’ criticisms made during the Hundred Flowers Campaign—forced the 
government to recalculate. And thus, as the Anti-Rightist Campaign began to wind down in 
1958, the “intellectual problem” remained. A People’s Daily editorial published on February 25, 
1958 offered a new imagining of how intellectuals might best serve the new society, however. 
The article explained that what the nation really needed were “red experts” (hongyouzhuan), with 
supreme technical and ideological qualifications.762 Although the idea of a “red expert” certainly 
sounded impressive, that was hardly a new idea. What was new, starting in 1958, were two 
primary strategies the state used to accomplish this. First, the government encouraged 
intellectuals to go “down to the countryside and up to the mountains” (xia xiang shang shan) to 
participate in hard labor alongside the peasants and industrial laborers. Second, the state would 
double down on its strategy of providing formal education for the working class and for the 
children of peasants and workers.763 
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 Of course, these two strategies were in of themselves not particularly new. Intellectuals 
had been encouraged to participate in labor earlier during the decade. A good number of scholars 
even volunteered for work in the villages during the Land Reform adjustments of 1950 and 1951 
(see Chapter 2). And the state had expanded access to education through a wider array of 
schools, more enrollments, and worker-focused “spare-time schools” with evening classes and 
remedial technical training.764 The scale of these policies expanded rapidly during 1958 and 
1959, however, as the entire country moved in a wildly utopian direction under the auspices of 
the Great Leap Forward. Changes in how intellectuals were perceived coincided with new, 
radical agrarian policies meant to build off of the partial collectivization underway since the 
early years of the decade.765 Although the Great Leap Forward has usually been seen primarily as 
a set of policies focused on rural production and breakneck-paced industrialization, the Great 
Leap also included new policies focused on intellectuals. The state imagined that a strong effort 
could force older intellectuals to finally come around and embrace a proletarian class 
consciousness, all while a new generation of intellectuals could emerge from the working classes 
and their children. Many intellectuals formed ranks around the state and offered support for the 
Great Leap. Even the disgraced former editor of People’s Daily, Deng Tuo, made a forceful case 
for the Great Leap through 1958 and 1959.766 Other rising names in the intellectual world like 
Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, Wu Zhipu, and Qian Xuesen all endorsed the Leap; as such, 
intellectuals bear some degree of responsibility for the resulting famine alongside central 
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government officials.767 As such, the state’s doubling down efforts at producing intellectual 
generational change were very much part of the broader policies that shook the nation at its ten-
year anniversary.  
 Previous scholars of intellectual policies have typically ended their studies at the end of 
the Anti-Rightist Campaign.768 I instead argue that the state’s effort to “proletarianize” 
(laodonghua) the intellectuals and educate the workers represents the natural conclusion of the 
story of Chinese intellectuals during the 1950s. As such, I am in line with Joel Andreas’ 
examination of the “red engineer” generation.769 However, whereas Andreas approaches the red 
experts from the perspective of competing social factions of political versus cultural capital, I see 
state policy as indicative of the failures of previous efforts at winning over the intellectuals; after 
the dust had cleared from drama and politicking of 1950-1957 between intellectuals and the 
state, all that was left was the promise of generational change. And even then, the national 
government never fully gave up on older intellectuals. Having these scholars participate in hard 
labor was seen as the only means left at achieving real transformation after nearly a decade of 
abstract political study had not produced the desired results.  
 I approach the final years of the 1950s from four perspectives. First, I look at the data 
collected by the state in the wake of the Anti-Rightist Campaign to assess the continuing impacts 
that the crackdown had on the scholarly community. I have previously argued that the campaign 
targeted a very small minority of the overall number of Chinese intellectuals (see Chapter 6); the 
data collected from 1958 and 1959 largely bears out these conclusions. Moreover, the state’s 
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analysis of the Anti-Rightist Campaign shows why national officials began moving away from 
pervious policies that emphasize political study and sporadic rectification movements (such as 
Thought Reform, the Three-Anti, and the Anti-Rightist Campaigns). They began to doubt the 
effectiveness of previous strategies. Second, I examine the phenomenon of intellectuals 
participating in factory and village work. Although the “down to the countryside and up to the 
mountains” movement might be described as “forced labor,” I instead show that intellectuals 
were still able to freely express frustrations and grievances, which were sometimes met with 
actual policy changes from above. Third, I look at the expansion of policies designed to support 
workers and their children obtaining formal degrees and thus becoming “intellectuals” in their 
own right. Building off of this, my fourth line of analysis looks at generational change: how 
young scholars attitudes began to diverge from their elders, and how young intellectuals paved 
the way for later upheavals during the 1960s and beyond. 
 
The Fallout from the Anti-Rightist Campaign 
 To be sure, some intellectuals were unfairly targeted and oppressed due to a sweeping 
crackdown from above during the Anti-Rightist Campaign (see the previous chapter’s 
examination of the cases of Deng Tuo and Yue Daiyun). That being said, however, the Anti-
Rightist Campaign was at most a partial backlash to intellectual overreach. The majority of 
intellectuals received no real punishment, and even those who were targeted as “rightists” rarely 
faced more than mild criticism from their colleagues. Although the crackdown did not cease at 
the end of 1957, the state began to collect data on the scale of the crackdown as well as its 
effectiveness. This collated information largely bears out my previous conclusions: the 
overwhelming majority of intellectuals escaped any real punishments for their political beliefs 
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during 1957. The state did continue the search for rightists and meted out punishments 
accordingly over the course of 1958 and 1959, although not at the scale of the previous year. 
Ultimately, the state’s assessment of the Anti-Rightist Campaign added fuel to the perspective 
that a new approach was needed to transform China’s intellectuals. 
 A reporter from People’s Daily, Han Ming, conducted an investigative report of 
university professors during the waning months of 1958 and the first weeks of 1959. He 
published his findings on January 18, which revealed broad, national statistics on what scholastic 
activities university professors were involved in at the end of 1957. According to Han’s report, 
30% of university intellectuals had teaching duties, 10% were engaged either in scientific 
research or translation work, 15% were engage either in library research or assistant teaching 
work, 3% were engaged in administrative work, 7% were in the process of moving to a different 
university, 4% were in the process of moving to work in a secondary school, 5% were preparing 
to start new research projects, 5% were preparing to enter an administrative position in a local 
government branch, 15% had fallen seriously ill or were preparing to retire, while only 3% were 
undergoing review for serious political errors.770 The report shows that a meager amount (3%) of 
intellectuals were under active suspicion for being rightists at the start of 1958. Even then, it is 
unlikely that all intellectuals within that 3% faced serious punishment. At the same time, other 
data points may suggest possible punishments. For example, being transferred to a different 
university (7%) or transferring to a secondary school teaching job (4%) may have included some 
professors who were demoted as a result of the Anti-Rightist Campaign. Even if we add these 
percentages together, however, we are only left with 14% of university intellectuals who may 
have been involved as targets in the Anti-Rightist Campaign—still a small fraction, clearly. Han 
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Ming himself seemed to think his data was evidence of incomplete ideological transformation; 
he called for more work to rectify intellectual thought and criticized the university-led means of 
political study during the Thought Reform Campaign.771 As such, the article seemed to anticipate 
the new campaign to promote physical labor. 
 Despite the limited nature of the Anti-Rightist backlash, it seemed that there were 
certainly voices that wanted the campaign to go further. A People’s Daily editorial on February 
7, 1958 derided the intellectuals’ “stinking pretensions” (choujiazi), and criticized the use of 
intellectuals to fill government posts. The author claimed that the state’s use of intellectuals was 
simply a return to China’s dynastic past, where literati-bureaucrats dominated the levers of 
political power.772 The heated rhetoric of the editorial did not match the political reality on the 
ground, however; foreign observers suggested that the Anti-Rightist Campaign was significantly 
less violent than previous crackdowns on the bourgeoisie. Accused rightists, such as the national 
Minister of Transportation, Zhang Bojun, were often allowed to remain at their posts.773 
Punishments may have increased somewhat during February; reports from Shanghai describe the 
arrest of about 100 rightists in the first half of the month—although it is unclear how many of 
these rightists were intellectuals. There is some evidence that female intellectuals may have 
received disproportionate punishment relative to their male colleagues, despite the state’s 
intentions to promote gender equality. The Shanghai Women’s Federation removed several 
members of its standing committee for expressing rightist viewpoints, which was a step beyond 
what happened to many male intellectuals.774 Moreover, it appears that the state began to dismiss 
 
771 Ibid. 
772 Dadiao zhishifenzi de choujiazi: gan dang laodong renmin de xiaoxuesheng, February 7, 1958, RR. 
773 Wilson, China: Annual Review for 1957, January 24, 1958, CPR10, 710. Zhang ultimately left his post several 
months later, during 1958, however. 
774 Shanghai Political and Economic Summary No. 3, February 1-February 16, 1958, in China: Political Reports, 
1911-1960, Volume 11: 1958-1960, edited by Robert L. Jarman (Cambridge: Archive Editions, 2001) [hereafter 
CPR11], 28. 
309 
some rightist high-level government ministers by the end of February.775 These instances show 
the contradictions and ambiguities inherent in the Anti-Rightist Campaign. Even nearly a year on 
from its inception, the campaign was little clearer in how far it would go. 
 More of the inequalities of the campaign were revealed in March. In general, reports 
showed that intellectuals in senior positions were disproportionately punished for being rightists, 
with a newer generation of younger intellectuals moving in to take these available jobs.776 As 
such, the campaign was in some ways cover to actively facilitate generational change. A report 
from the end of the month demonstrated that primary and secondary school teachers also faced 
disproportionate punishments in comparison to university professors, who were seen as “high-
level” intellectuals. The Central Committee urged schools in Beijing to dismiss a full 70% of 
primary school teachers and half of secondary school teachers who were classified as rightists. 
Rightist primary and secondary school teachers who were not dismissed were expected to 
participate in physical labor, and would be permitted to return to their jobs after a semester-long 
probation should they show evidence of ideological progress. Upon returning to their jobs, 
rightist teachers would have to confess in public in front of a school assembly.777 The Central 
Committee’s interests here were probably multifaceted. On one hand, the state clearly saw 
lower-level intellectuals as less inherently valuable, and therefore encouraged education bureaus 
to focus punishments on them. On the other hand (and perhaps more importantly), the Central 
Committee desired to open up as many new spots within the school system as possible to a new 
generation of intellectuals. Also included in the report was a directive to have schools force 
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elderly or sickly teachers into retirement or into a different line of work.778 These instructions 
indicated that the government proposed comprehensive policies designed to usher in younger 
teachers—of which dismissing rightists was one of several strategies. 
 The continuing efforts to root out rightists put the democratic parties in an awkward 
position. At the height of the Anti-Rightist Campaign, the minor parties had come under 
criticism for shielding rightists and serving as a platform for intellectuals to express anti-CCP 
views. As a means of political survival, intellectuals in the democratic parties felt that it was time 
to shift course. In mid-April, two intellectuals in Tianjin—Fang Xianzhi (vice-chairman of the 
Tianjin chapter of the Jiusan Society) and Zhang Guofan (chairman of the Tianjin chapter of the 
Democratic League)—announced that they had “handed their hearts” (jiao xin) over to the 
Communist Party. In a joint statement, Fang and Zhang called on their parties’ members to do 
the same. Ultimately, 1838 Tianjin democratic party members (many of whom were 
intellectuals) affirmed their steadfast loyalty to the regime.779 A coalition of democratic party 
officials, led by Fang and Zhang, surveyed party-affiliated rightists and described their errors. 
According to the report, 20% of democratic party members had errors in regard to the relation 
between the CCP and the masses; for example, not trusting the CCP’s leadership, or rejecting the 
idea that “the layman can lead the expert.” 6.7% rejected the socialist system entirely; they 
wanted Soviet-style economics with American-style freedoms. 20.5% had critiqued the CCP’s 
use of mass mobilization campaigns. 5.9% expressed disagreement with actual government 
policies. 6.4% had errors in their opinions on international politics—the most common being 
“worshipping America” (chong mei). 25.8% were classified as “bourgeois individualists” for 
being primarily motivated by fame and profit. Only 15% of Tianjin democratic party members 
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were error-free.780 Nonetheless, it appears that Fang and Zhang’s efforts to affirm loyalty to the 
regime had already achieved successes by the end of the month. A full 27.5% of bourgeois 
intellectuals in their parties had “turned left” (zuozhuan) in their thinking and behaviors as a 
result of the “give our hearts to the CCP” campaign.781 The Central Committee endorsed these 
efforts in a set of instructions in July, which affirmed that the government saw the democratic 
parties as partners in national construction. The Central Committee also explicitly favored letting 
democratic parties carry out further thought rectification on their own. At the same time, central 
political officials also called for more “integration” (jiehe) of the CCP and the minor parties’ 
rectification efforts, although no concrete measures were discussed.782 
 Cities continued the work of ferreting out rightist intellectuals into the midyear. In 
Shanghai, for example, the Public Works Management Office called for further searches for 
“bourgeois intellectuals” to receive some kind of punishment or dismissal. The criteria for 
determining who was or was not a “bourgeois intellectual” were nonetheless vague. The 
management office made reference to qualities such as an “oppositional mood” or feelings of 
“combativeness” toward the CCP. Anyone who spoke out against the political campaigns of the 
early 1950s naturally came under a great deal of suspicion. Some intellectuals still had warm 
feelings for the Guomindang; the management office contrasted feelings that the GMD “could 
not do without [them]” (shaobuliao wo), whereas the CCP saw them as disposable (shaodeliao 
wo).783 Even still, Shanghai made efforts to avoid the heavy-handedness of earlier campaigns. 
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sessions for bourgeois intellectuals.784 Meanwhile, the city government of Shijiazhuang (capital 
of Hebei Province) announced that it had uncovered 1156 rightists living within the city. Only 71 
of these rightists ultimately had their information forwarded to he local Public Security Bureau, 
however; meanwhile, 6 had committed suicide due to constant harassment. Of the rightists who 
had been criticized in public, 38.36% seemed to demonstrate a sincere desire to improve, and 
diligently carried our new work assignments while accepting criticism from their colleagues. 
48.94%, meanwhile, were contrite in public but were under suspicion for expressing doubt 
behind the scenes; for example, they frequently complained about any new work assignments 
they received. 11.89% were seen as completely unrepentant. One example of the final category 
was the engineer Li Gennian, who was accused of sleeping on the job at his factory and 
constantly complaining about being hungry. In addition, Li criticized the Great Leap Forward 
(somewhat presciently) as a “stage of death” (yaoming tai).785 
 At the end of the year, the city of Shanghai announced a new round of investigations 
(shencha) into local intellectuals, relating to both their ideological beliefs as well as whether they 
had proper technical qualifications. Any association with a reactionary political group would be 
grounds for serious concern and scrutiny. However, the city called on cadres to distinguish 
between “ordinary members” (yiban chengyuan) of these right-wing groups and “core members” 
(guganfenzi).786 There is some evidence that this latest round of investigations was not as 
intrusive as previous efforts, such as during Thought Reform or the zenith of the Anti-Rightist 
Campaign. Cadres generally carried out these investigations behind the scenes, as opposed to 
through invasive criticism or struggle sessions. Moreover, only intellectuals with clear evidence 
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of counterrevolutionary activities would be asked to submit new confessions—as opposed to 
Thought Reform, when almost every intellectual had to submit a confession. Cadres would ask 
intellectuals under scrutiny to submit new documents after their investigations had produced 
tangible evidence of political errors. After submitting the confession, the cadres would decide 
whether further disciplinary action would be appropriate.787 As with other efforts to target 
rightists, few intellectuals who submitted new confessions ever saw any meaningful punishment 
beyond that. The vast majority of information (including the confessions) collected during the 
investigations was never used—the city mandated that it would instead be stored in local 
archives.788 
 In mid-February 1959, the Shanghai government began to evaluate the actual 
effectiveness of the Anti-Rightist Campaign, as well as its various offshoots that continued 
throughout 1958. The city was troubled by its findings. Intellectual antipathy or resistance to the 
CCP had actually increased over the course of 1957 and 1958, with many Shanghai scholars 
describing “suffering hardships” (chikui) as inherent to socialism. Many had begun referring to 
party cadres as “blockheads” (shagua). For their part, cadres were equally resentful of the 
intellectuals; one said, “the 1956 party policies on intellectuals were right-wing for giving 
intellectuals preferential treatment, so intellectuals started to get cocky. The Anti-Rightist 
rectification campaign let us vent our anger.”789 It is remarkable to see cadres denouncing CCP 
policies, but the quote is evidence of the delicate line the state had to walk to appease both 
intellectuals and its cadres. But the cadres seemed to reject even the government’s latest 
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approach to managing intellectuals by cultivating a new generation of red experts. The cadres in 
Shanghai criticized students for being passionate about politics only during mobilization 
campaigns; afterward, they seemed to cool off quickly. Cadres saw young students as “arrogant” 
(zigao zida) much like their older counterparts.790  
Data on the effectiveness of the Anti-Rightist efforts is inconclusive. In one report, the 
city claimed that the percentage of intellectuals classified as leftists or center-leftists rose from 
the 20s to the 30s; moreover, 40% of all campus personnel were supportive of the campaign, in 
contrast to 50% having a middle-of-the-road attitude and only 10% in opposition.791 A different 
report came to a different conclusion, however. The second report stated that before the Anti-
Rightist Campaign, university faculty could be broken down as 14.7% leftist, 22.1% center-
leftist, 44.5% centrist, 10.3% center-rightist, and 7.4% rightist. After the campaign, they could be 
broken down as 23.5% leftist, 16.2% center-leftist, 38.2% centrist, 10.3% center-rightist, and 
11.8% rightist.792 Even if the number of leftists had increased, most of the change came from 
center-leftists moving further right, without much change among centrists. And the number of 
rightists had actually increased.  
 The CCP thus began to turn its attention toward promoting new strategies for reforming 
intellectuals: participation in physical labor, either in the countryside or in the factories. The state 
began to reassess its decade-long strategies of heavy-handed mobilization and rectification work 
through political study and criticism sessions during the rest of 1959. The few official 
pronouncements from the state regarding rectification show the regime in the middle of a shift in 
its policy approach. In mid-April, the Shanghai government released a statement suggesting that 
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a good number of intellectuals who had received party membership during the 1956 and 1957 
reforms were under scrutiny for “insincere” beliefs. The report called for more work to be done 
among recently-admitted party intellectuals, but without many specifics.793 One of the effects 
was that the city sharply curtailed rates at which intellectuals would be admitted into the party. 
Data from the summer months of 1959 shows that only 1 out of every 100 new party admittees in 
Shanghai was an intellectual.794 Overall, however, gaining party membership during previous 
years generally afforded intellectuals to weather the Anti-Rightist storm. Even exposed rightists 
who retained their party membership typically did not experience much social stigma or criticism 
from media or the masses.795 Perhaps in a conciliatory effort, the government announced plans in 
late 1959 to remove the label of “rightist” from around 1000 intellectuals nationwide.796 Taken 
as a whole, these sparse developments suggest that the state had largely moved on from its 
previous policies regarding intellectuals. Cultivating the next generation now received 
paramount importance from the party center. 
 Although the Anti-Rightist Campaign had begun to wind down by the start of 1958, it 
continued to echo through the year with a series of dismissals and offshoot investigations that 
targeted intellectuals. Nothing from 1958 changes the overall picture of the Anti-Rightist 
Campaign as a partial backlash, however. Only a small minority of intellectuals ever received 
serious punishments, and arrests were exceedingly uncommon. The state also promoted less 
invasive means at carrying out rectification work, and even let the minor democratic parties take 
the lead in organizing new study efforts and criticism sessions. Part of this may have been due to 
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a continuing sense of fatalism regarding the ability of older intellectuals to transform, which had 
arisen during the previous year (see Chapter 6). If anything, evidence collected regarding the 
effectiveness of the Anti-Rightist Campaign was middling at best. And some evidence suggested 
that the primary increases in the number of leftist intellectuals came from the center-leftist 
intellectuals—all while the number of rightist intellectuals may have actually expanded. As a 
result, the regime began to promote a new approach that emphasized cultivating a second 
generation of PRC intellectuals, drawn from the working classes and the current crop of left-
wing youth. To the extent that older intellectuals still had a chance to transform, it would come 
from the fields and the factories rather than through study sessions. 
 
Down to the Countryside, Up to the Mountains 
 If the titanic efforts made to help intellectuals transform since liberation no longer 
seemed sufficient to the task, then, the party began to wonder, what could actually produce the 
desired results? The main efforts of the state during 1958 and 1959 were centered around 
spurring working-class people to receive formal educations and become intellectuals in their own 
right, thus cultivating a new generation of left-wing youth and newly-educated workers. But that 
still left the older intellectuals in an awkward place. The government thus began a new push—a 
last-ditch effort—to get older, established intellectuals to undergo thorough thought rectification. 
This was the “down to the countryside and up to the mountains” campaign, which involved 
sending intellectuals to villages near their cities or factories within them to assist in productive 
activities alongside laborers and peasants. Experiences varied, of course, especially depending on 
whether an intellectual had been labelled a rightist during 1957. Rightists like Yue Daiyun (who, 
of course, cannot be considered right-wing under any objective criteria) generally spent many 
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long months in the countryside apart from their families. Other established intellectuals might 
only perform physical labor during the day, followed by return trips to their cities of residence. 
As such, having intellectuals participate in physical labor was not primarily a punitive measure, 
but rather an opportunity for genuine reform and reflection on intellectuals’ class privilege.  
 Some intellectuals, especially students, had begun to participate in physical labor during 
breaks in the academic year. Many intellectuals had participated in agricultural labor during the 
Land Reform Campaign, meaning that “sending-down” policies were hardly new. They were 
applied at a much higher scale starting in 1958, however. In a People’s Daily report on January 
8, a party journalist described the new government policy of having intellectuals supplement 
agricultural or industrial production. Although the majority, at this juncture, were young recent 
graduates, the article expressed the state’s plans to expand participation further over the course 
of the next two years. The primary objective was “raising [intellectuals’] consciousnesses” (tigao 
juewu), not punishment for right-wing beliefs (although that too would later become part of the 
campaign).797 Much as the CCP began to increasingly let the minor democratic parties shoulder 
more responsibility for organizing normal thought rectification work, the state also relied on the 
minor parties to promote the new efforts. Deng Chumin, now vice-chairman of the national 
Democratic League (Deng had previously been a prominent supporter of the Thought Reform 
Campaign during 1952; see Chapter 3), made a forceful case for the benefits of physical labor, 
which he saw as the natural conclusion to the decade-long process of thought rectification, which 
included both the Thought Reform and Anti-Rightist Campaigns. Intellectuals should “recognize 
their class attributes, resolve to let their airs go, participate in physical labor, thoroughly 
transform themselves, and make a great leap forward in both thinking and politics from the old 
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stage to a new one,” Deng argued.798 It is striking that Deng used the phrase “great leap forward” 
in reference to further ideological remolding among the intellectuals. This shows that the mass 
movement was all-encompassing, and that spurring rural and steel production was just one facet 
of a broader, collective “leap.” A People’s Daily editorial, submitted by staff members of a 
Shanghai research institute, confirmed that the final transformation of the intellectual class into 
“red experts” was in fact one of the primary facets of the Great Leap Forward.799 
 With the new policy set, the state began further involving the democratic parties in 
promoting physical labor for the intellectuals. At the beginning of March, the Jiusan Society held 
a conference declaring its unequivocal support for the government’s latest initiative. Jiusan party 
leaders urged all members—many of whom were intellectuals—to strive to become both red and 
expert. Moreover, the Jiusan Society also asked that intellectuals “give their hearts over to the 
[Communist] Party” (ba xin jiaogei dang) and learn from the experiences of the peasantry and 
industrial workers through physical labor. The Jiusan Society also pledged to transform its 
membership base into 80% leftists within the next five years.800 Around the same time, the 
United Front Work Department, a bureau within the national government that oversaw the 
relationship between the CCP and the minor democratic parties, released a report criticizing the 
common belief among intellectuals that “expertise should be prioritized over redness” (xian 
zhuan hou hong).801 The department went on to cite an ongoing “competition” between scientists 
in Shanghai and Tianjin over which community could first transform, completely, into red 
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experts. Both groups of scientists pledged to complete their transformation within five years.802 
Although the democratic parties had taken a hit during the Anti-Rightist Campaign, they 
remained influential among the broader intellectual community even through the end of the 
decade. As such, the state’s new policies had to work in concert with the democratic parties. 
 In the early months of 1958, intellectuals had not yet begun their forays into the villages 
and the factories en masse yet. However, there were other examples of intellectuals’ work 
becoming drawn into the wider Great Leap Forward maelstrom. In mid-March, the Shanghai 
government released a report on intellectuals’ work within the city. The municipal government 
had recently laid plans to specifically promote machinery, electric appliances, and ships—and in 
all three cases, intellectual expertise was seen as key to hitting new production targets. In 
contrast to documents from 1957 expressing a growing sense of skepticism about the intellectual 
class, these documents adopted the conciliatory language of previous years, calling for “close 
cooperation” (miqie hezuo) between the intellectuals and the city government.803 In order to 
promote its new manufacturing goals, the city established a number of “small groups” within the 
municipal bureaucracy to draw up plans for machinery, electronics, and shipbuilding. These 
groups would coordinate with research departments (most predominantly, several professors at 
Jiaotong University) and sometimes even employ professors as advisers. The groups also 
established connections with prominent researchers and engineers across China. The groups’ 
efforts produced a centralizing effect, where research teams across Shanghai would coordinate 
the sharing of instruments, research data, and laboratory facilities to increase efficiency.804 
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Meanwhile, other academic departments around the country drew up plans to have professors 
assist the Great Leap Forward in ways beyond participating in physical labor. One Yunnan 
professor began teaching classes that described new methods for fertilizer and manure use; 
another traveled around the province to visit a number of peasant co-ops and conduct 
experiments on high-yield methods of crop cultivation.805 To hit the Great Leap Forward targets, 
all hands were on deck. 
 The state also began to publicize cases where “centrist” intellectuals had undergone 
transformation into genuine leftists. One such intellectual was Wang Junheng, a professor of 
geography at Beijing Normal University, who explained his thinking at the end of 1957 as such: 
“after the Anti-Rightist Campaign, I still had doubts whether the rightists were genuinely anti-
party or anti-socialist.”806 Wang had originally come from a landowning family, although his 
birth status did not irrevocably tar his reputation with the party. He explained that he had been 
troubled by the denunciations from the Thought Reform and Three-Anti Campaigns, but did not 
speak out against either movement and still vocalized his support for the Communist Party. He 
was labelled as a centrist for a lack of conviction that rightist intellectuals were truly “enemies,” 
however. After 1952, he had received tenure at Beijing Normal, and he had received the same 
salary as someone with a high level of political achievement (gao de zhengzhi). Wang saw his 
professional treatment as evidence of the CCP’s good graces.807 Wang’s political history was 
somewhat complicated. He described his disillusion with the old Guomindang regime, blasting 
their corruption and mismanagement. He even called for Jiang Jieshi’s overthrow. Nevertheless, 
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he took no concrete actions of resistance against the Guomindang, and even believed rumors that 
the Communist rebels were “burying people alive” or “splitting families up.” Wang’s opinions 
began to change after liberation, although he still expressed private misgivings about Land 
Reform. His son enlisted in the military in advance of China’s entry into the Korean War, an 
action Wang supported publicly but about which he still had inward doubts.808 Wang’s case 
represented an olive branch to intellectuals who may have been open to the CCP regime but 
skeptical of its excesses. He was evidence that becoming a red expert was an opportunity open to 
all intellectuals. 
 Although the majority of intellectuals who participated in physical labor did not leave 
until 1959, an initial wave of scholars left for the villages during the course of 1958. As previous 
documents note, intellectuals engaged in hard labor were overwhelmingly recent graduates at 
this point. But two older intellectuals who had worked in the villages reported on their 
experiences to the Shanghai Municipal Government in a pair of speeches before the end of the 
year. One of them, Xu Shanxiang, discussed the new party slogan of “educating the masses and 
proletarianizing the intellectuals” (gongnong qunzhong zhishihua, zhishifenzi laodonghua), 
although Xu still argued for caution, noting that many workers and peasants still lacked the 
formal expertise to become leading scholars overnight. Xu also noted that Soviet intellectuals in 
critical industries, such as iron and steel production, tended to be genuine experts as opposed to 
recently-educated, politically orthodox former workers.809 The second speech, by a scholar 
named Zhao Shuwen, was more optimistic about his experiences. He described going to the 
villages as “an opportunity to eat, live, and work alongside the peasantry.” He was impressed by 
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the villagers’ hard-working attitude and bravery.810 Zhao spent about four months in total in the 
countryside, and had taught a total of 90 hours’ worth of classes. Meanwhile, he had tried to 
learn as much as he could about agricultural production techniques. He did exhibit a bit of 
trademark intellectual haughtiness in his speech; he notes that he was able to grasp these 
agricultural techniques quite quickly, while the peasants “could not compare” to his expansive 
pool of knowledge. He described having to fall back on farming metaphors to get the peasants to 
understand high-minded philosophical concepts. Zhao had gone so far as to recommend several 
improvements to the peasants’ techniques based on his own knowledge of geography. Other 
intellectuals working alongside him were highly critical of these suggestions, accusing him of 
ignoring the peasants’ wisdom and of not having studied geography “systematically.”811 
Although both Xu and Zhao were polite, both expressed some reservations about the 
experiences. 
 Their skepticism was generally ignored. In 1959, the state began sending waves of 
intellectuals to the villages and the factories. The first document that discussed mass sending-
down policies comes from early March, when the majority of professors or teachers at some 
schools began doing menial labor during the day. The problem, from the perspective of the CCP, 
was a sharp decline in rates of participation in political study sessions. Whereas 80% or 90% of 
academic intellectuals participated in political study at the beginning of the decade, a survey 
suggested that attendance rates had fallen as low as 34% in some schools.812 As such, party 
officials began embracing a new strategy by doubling down on previous policies of having 
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intellectuals work in the factories and the villages. Unfortunately, my data does not contain 
specific numbers relating to how many intellectuals were sent down. Nonetheless, we can infer 
that many more intellectuals were sent down starting in 1959 relative to 1958, when documents 
suggest that most sent-down intellectuals were students. Documents from 1959 describe 
intellectuals being sent down as coming from various ideological camps, and from various age 
groups. Although sending-down techniques were used as punishment for right-wing intellectuals, 
even centrists and leftists were also expected to partake during the first half of 1959.  
 Intellectuals who arrived in the countryside around Shanghai still felt comfortable airing 
criticism regarding the new policies. One Shanghai professor, working in a nearby village, asked 
“can instructors not be instructors anymore?” Some female professors described the unique 
hardships that they faced due to their new work. In one case, a female intellectual who was on 
her period asked her supervisor for a break so she could attend to herself, but the cadre in charge 
of her work team simply “refused to acknowledge her” (buzhi kefou). The Shanghai government 
stepped in and criticized the cadre’s actions, stipulating that women should be allowed to return 
to school in matters of personal hygiene.813 These instances reveal that the harsh climate of the 
Anti-Rightist Campaign did not persist into subsequent years; intellectuals once again felt 
empowered to speak up about their issues, and had their cases taken seriously by the 
government. Much like during Land Reform (see Chapter 2), the evidence tends to suggest that 
intellectuals were genuinely affected by their experiences and returned to school the following 
semester with altered viewpoints. For intellectuals sent to the countryside, they partook in the 
“three autumn jobs”—harvesting, ploughing, and sowing. Reports estimate that, upon returning 




physical labor, in contrast to 59.6% of those who simply “went with the flow” (suidaliu) and 
17% who were actively opposed. By the end of the year, however, those numbers had shifted to 
53.2% in support, 38.3% who went with the flow, and only 8.5% who were actively opposed.814 
As such, intellectuals’ experiences in the field seemed to weigh on them over time, and may have 
produced the kinds of transformation that previous thought rectification efforts had not. 
 The experiences of Yue Daiyun give a personal account of what it was like to have been 
sent down to the countryside. In one sense, Yue is atypical: her being sent down was actively in 
response to her “errors” exposed during the Anti-Rightist Campaign. As such, she was sent on a 
train to the village of Zhaiting, a rural area still within the greater Beijing municipal area.815 She 
began her stay by participating in grueling labor: carrying water from the village wells to public 
basins, hauling clay from the nearby mountains down to the village, and carrying rocks for 
construction. She typically ate a bland, meager diet of gruel and steamed buns. In general, those 
sent down for being rightists were often given the most physically demanding jobs, whereas 
other intellectuals typically participated in less gruelling activities such as cart-building.816 Even 
after a day’s worth of work, Yue still had other duties: “at sunset I felt so exhausted after this 
first day of strenuous labor that I could hardly move my legs after the final trip down the 
mountain. Having eaten a quick dinner, I wanted to do nothing but collapse on the kang [a heated 
earthen or brick structure used for sleeping throughout much of north China], but just then the 
gong sounded, signaling the start of a compulsory meeting in the primary school.”817 Over time, 
however, Yue began to adapt to life in Zhaiting. She became physically stronger, and adapted to 
her new diet regimen. The sharp words of the cadres ceased to bother her; if anything, she found 
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herself making friends with some of the villagers, who seemed to care very little that she had 
been labelled a rightist.818 Although Yue’s case is not necessarily representative of most sent-
down intellectuals, it is telling that she came to enjoy her life and work in the countryside. It is 
probable that those without political baggage might have adapted even faster. As such, it 
becomes easier to take the statistics cited earlier—that over half of intellectuals seemed 
supportive of the sending-down policies—at face value. 
 An obvious question emerges, however, given the timeframe during which most 
intellectuals were sent down. The Great Leap Forward had engendered new realities throughout 
rural China that produced mass famine, and that ultimately were response for the deaths of 
between 20 and 45 million (predominantly rural) Chinese. Given that many intellectuals had 
been sent to the countryside around the same time frame, this begs the question regarding the 
extent to which intellectuals experienced the famines. Of course, there is no data available in 
Chinese archives relating to intellectuals’ open discussions of the famine. Again, however, Yue’s 
memoir can shed light on the topic. Yue notes that the famine settled in at Zhaiting during the 
fall of 1959, and describes being forced to forage for fruit seeds up in the nearby mountains 
(away from the prying eyes of the cadres) along with other villagers and sent-down rightist 
intellectuals. Problematically, Zhaiting barely had enough food to even keep its livestock fed; 
Yue was placed in charge of finding a solution, and ultimately relied on a rice husk powdered 
mix to keep the starving pigs alive.819 Yue describes villagers suffering from constipation, bodies 
swelling from malnutrition, and elderly peasants generously sharing their little food with sent-
down intellectuals out of sympathy. Although she says that “many more people had died in 
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Zhaiting that year [1959] than usual,” she does not cite specific numbers.820 In some ways, Yue 
may have been both worse off and better than other intellectuals. On one hand, she was required 
to stay in the countryside for the duration of the worst famine months (the second half of 1959, 
leading into 1960), whereas other documents suggest that most intellectuals had been brought 
back to the cities by the fall of 1959. At the same time, she spent her time in the countryside near 
enough to a major city (Beijing) that she may have escaped some of the worst conditions. 
 To be sure, famine conditions were devastating across wide swaths of rural China. Many 
of the hardest-hit counties were located in a diverse array of provinces: Anhui, Henan, or 
Sichuan. But even Shandong Province, situated between Beijing and Shanghai, experienced its 
fair share of misery. In many of these areas, cadres insisted on unrealistic procurement quotas, 
starving villagers en masse and forcing them to eat bark for bare sustenance. Peasants who spoke 
out or resisted were often executed. The death rates in these provinces during the famine years 
generally eclipsed 10%.821 Although the Great Leap famine was primarily based in rural China, 
the villages immediately surrounding large cities were not immune. A number of counties 
immediately surrounding Chongqing, for example, have been reported to have experienced 
severe rates of starvation.822 Given the contentious nature of the Great Leap famine, in addition 
to the famous secrecy of Chinese archives, estimating the total number of deaths is an extremely 
fraught process.823 As such, estimating the number of intellectuals who may have experienced 
the famine—or even perished during the disaster—is nearly impossible. Given the proximity of 
many intellectuals to the famine, however, questioning how many died remains an important 
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question, albeit one that this present study cannot answer. We can reasonably speculate that a 
good number of sent-down intellectuals probably died or nearly starved, given the timeframe. 
Moreover, the onset of severe famine may explain in part why the state sought to return 
academics to their schools during the fall semester of 1959, to insulate them from the crisis 
(excepting the rightist intellectuals, who may have been required to stay in the villages for much 
longer). 
 Of course, not all intellectuals were sent to work in the countryside, or in a factory. That 
did not mean intellectuals who stayed at their jobs were unaffected by the triumphalist national 
mood, however; as part of the larger Great Leap Forward policies, hospitals in Shanghai began 
pledging to make a “great leap” in terms of the number of patients they say per day. One doctor 
reported that his hospital used to see a total of 475 patients every day, on average, before 1959. 
After the onset of the Great Leap Forward, however, the hospital began seeing an average of 
1300 patients per day—although the doctor did not mention whether there had been staff 
increases to help with these expanded duties.824 Although, based on statements from intellectuals 
working in the countryside, it appears that some ability to voice concerns had returned after the 
Anti-Rightist crackdown, intellectuals as a whole still kept any concerns about the Great Leap 
Forward to themselves. The democratic parties took the fore, offering vigorous support for both 
the Great Leap as well as the sending-down initiatives. The minor parties called on all 
intellectuals to recognize their “special privileges,” and to channel their patriotic energy into 
mass support for the Great Leap.825 In a pair of People’s Daily editorials in the spring of 1959, 
various intellectuals voice their reflections on and support for state policy. The philosopher Feng 
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Youlan argued in an April 25 editorial that he had used to believe that “redness” would take 
comparatively little time to cultivate, relative to genuine expertise. Now, however, he argued that 
he had come to appreciate the tremendous effort required to become both red and expert.826 
Another editorial, by the scholars Chen Piyang and Tang Chuanchi, lionized the speed of 
production increases the CCP had engendered. They also argued that the Great Leap Forward 
represented an opportunity for intellectuals to undergo lasting thought rectification.827 
 The CCP used the fortieth anniversary of the start of the May Fourth Movement as a 
pretext for voicing their approval of the intellectuals after a contentious Anti-Rightist Campaign. 
One editorial praised the intellectual activists who began organizing secret societies or study 
groups in the aftermath of the May Fourth protests, and argued that supporting the CCP and its 
policies was the natural extension of this activist energy.828 The Shanghai Association of 
Philosophy Societies and Science Institutes published a follow-up document that explored the 
historical relationship between intellectuals and the Communist Party. The document praised 
intellectuals for ushering in an era of “new democratism” in the aftermath of the May Fourth 
protests, and noted that intellectuals were responsible for the founding of the CCP. At the same 
time, the document warned intellectuals to avoid the pernicious influence of right-wing, liberal 
scholars such as Hu Shi, who had led them astray from their previous revolutionary class spirit. 
Looking forward to the Great Leap, the document suggested that intellectuals, in assisting the 
mass production efforts, could reclaim their previous prestige from the May Fourth period.829 
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These pronouncements were not just empty words; the CCP had become more attentive to 
intellectuals and their views than they had previously, although far from the level of 
responsiveness the government demonstrated in 1956. At the beginning of June, the national 
government invited leading economists from around China to attend a conference to present their 
views on the piece-rate wage system and advice on how to best determine labor value under a 
socialist system.830 The extent to which these economists’ views were actually taken seriously or 
even implemented is unclear, but the conference demonstrates that the state was, once again, 
actively listening to the intellectuals. 
 This renewed closeness between the party and the intellectuals persisted into the summer 
and the fall. On July 20, for example, the Shanghai government held a conference with 
intellectuals and allowed them to freely criticize the city’s policies toward its intellectuals. 
Common complaints included an overemphasis on thought rectification, as opposed to fostering 
a culture of unity between scholars and the state. Others complained that the CCP rarely 
rewarded “good” behavior from intellectuals, whereas bad behavior was punished stringently.831 
It is telling, for example, that intellectuals of all political classifications had been deployed to the 
countryside or the factories, despite the small percentage of actual rightists. The government did 
make concerted efforts at a return to normalcy for most intellectuals during the second half of 
1959, with foreign observers described the summer as unusually relaxed in comparison to the 
frantic political activity of previous academic breaks. In addition, many intellectuals, at least in 
Beijing, were seemingly able to enjoy full weekends off from work.832 In the lead-up to the fall 
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semester, the national government actually put out a set of instructions encouraging schools to 
focus on “normal” content as opposed to overly political or ideological material. Moreover, 
school administrations were asked to ensure that students and faculty could enjoy normal 
summer holidays in the future.833 Given the rise of pessimistic attitudes toward the intellectuals 
in previous years (see Chapter 6), these new policies may seem surprising. Whatever their faults, 
however, intellectuals’ expertise were still vital to the state’s Great Leap Forward production 
efforts. The practical need for intellectuals had not dissipated, despite the enormous political 
changes that marked the decade. 
 For their part, it is unclear if intellectuals were won over by any of these new policies. In 
assessing the campaign to have intellectuals participate in physical labor, the Shanghai 
government noted several problems. On one hand, intellectuals who expressed enthusiasm for 
the new policies were “motivated by principles and ideology rather than practicality” (wuxu). As 
such, the city felt that intellectuals still did not “get it”—and resolved to do better at explaining 
the practical benefits of the campaign.834 Even intellectuals who had worked in the factories as 
opposed to the famine-wracked villages still experienced hardships, moreover. One woman had 
contracted pulmonary tuberculosis (huan feibing) due to her work. In addition, she had been 
working late one evening when a large downpour kept her unable to leave and return home until 
very late. Her ordeal had caused a significant worsening in her condition.835 Overall, intellectuals 
ended the 1950s in a state of relative unhappiness. Their social status had almost certainly fallen 
with respect to previous eras of Chinese history, and they felt increasingly isolated from the 
younger generation of intellectuals, who by-and-large were far more supportive of CCP policies 
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than they were, and who treated them with suspicion and contempt.836 Despite official 
pronouncements of goodwill, the state nonetheless continued to promulgate mass scrutiny of the 
intellectuals class through popular musicals such as Third Sister Liu, which portrayed 
intellectuals in a disparaging light.837 
 Once the dust had settled from the Anti-Rightist Campaign, new questions abounded 
regarding the status of the older intellectuals. The government seemed less willing to believe that 
older intellectuals were capable of genuine transformation, but it had to try; as such, the “down 
to the countryside and up to the mountains” campaign represented a last-ditch effort to get older 
intellectuals to undergo the kind of remolding expected of them by the party. Although it is 
difficult to get much sense of how many intellectuals were ultimately sent to the factories and the 
villages, documents suggest that a considerable number experienced physical labor in some 
fashion. Intellectuals would be expected to learn from the peasants and workers as they labored 
alongside them, all while teaching classes in order to help transform their new colleagues into 
working-class intellectuals. Those sent down to the countryside probably experienced the Great 
Leap famine, and a good deal may have perished (although it is perhaps almost impossible to 
calculate). The democratic parties, shaken from the criticism they received during the Anti-
Rightist Campaign, offered their full-throated support for all these policies. The state nominally 
began to re-incorporate intellectuals into public life by meeting with famous scholars and 
soliciting advice on how to implement Great Leap Forward policies, but it appears that older 
intellectuals on average had become considerably disillusioned with CCP rule a decade after 
liberation. It did not have to be this way; the first half of the decade, including Thought Reform, 
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represent a genuine political negotiation between intellectuals and the state, which tended to be 
responsive to the concerns raised by the scholarly community. Even despite the limited nature of 
the Anti-Rightist backlash, the bonds of trust between older intellectuals and the state had been 
severed. Moving forward, the CCP would have to rely on a new generation of intellectuals to 
provide the expertise it needed. 
 
Cultivating Mass Intellect 
 In contrast to the system of hierarchical, Soviet-style schools the Chinese state had 
crafted from 1952-1957 (see Chapter 3), tensions with the Soviet Union encouraged the PRC to 
“sinify” Chinese education by encouraging more local specialization and reviving the study of 
Chinese traditions (such as medicine).838 Another form of divergence from the Soviet 
educational model was through China’s efforts to dramatically expand educational opportunities 
to workers and farmers. Of course, such efforts were not wholly new in 1958. For most of the 
decade, the state had been using spare-time schools for workers and peasants, which provided a 
remedial education that could be used as a springboard to a secondary school or college degree. 
In addition, the vast expansion of the education system created a wealth of opportunities for the 
children of the working class to receive a formal education. Despite these policies already in 
place, it is clear that the government began to double down on these efforts starting in 1958 and 
continuing through the end of the decade. In part, this was due to a declining sense of optimism  
regarding the older generation of intellectuals’ capacity for ideological transformation. 
Additionally, the idea of transforming workers and peasants into scholars reflected the heady 
utopianism of the Great Leap Forward period. The CCP began drawing up a set of policies 
 
838 Hayhoe, China’s Universities, 92-94. 
333 
designed to give the working class, as well as young students from a working-class background, 
advantages to assist them in receiving a formal education. As previously discussed, one method 
was to have the intellectuals sent to the countryside or the factories teach classes in the evening, 
although this was only the beginning of the wider effort to create a true class of proletarian 
intellectuals.  
 Cadres themselves tended to come from a working-class background, and thus were 
naturally at the forefront of the new state initiatives. At the start of the year, the Shanghai 
Education Bureau announced new plans to help local cadres attain an education, usually through 
spare-time schools or taking “special classes” (tebie ban) that the city offered specifically for 
cadres and family members.839 Cadres often had few opportunities to follow the normal 
trajectory of attaining a degree; many had schedules packed with work and meetings, and 
therefore did not have ample time to study or thoroughly review class materials. It would have 
been very rare for cadres to try and take an entrance examination for higher education, and any 
who did typically performed poorly. These less-than-stellar results were not from a lack of effort, 
however; it appears that cadres made up around 60% of the enrollments in Shanghai spare-time 
classes.840 Considering that spare-time schools had been around since the beginning of the 
decade, their track record at producing successful college applicants was especially dismal. The 
city was undeterred, however, and announced new policies in late January that required local 
universities to admit anyone with a degree from a spare-time school directly, without any 
requirements of taking the entrance exams. Applicants who had come from normal secondary 
schools still had to take these exams, however.841 These changes signal an institutional shift 
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away from providing assistance to the working class and toward directly advantaging workers in 
order to correct for past inequalities in educational outcomes. 
 Other major municipalities followed Shanghai’s lead during the first half of the year. In 
late May, Tianjin announced new policies whereby state-run enterprises operating in the city 
would be required to established word-study programs. Workers would have to accept a pay cut 
in order to attend these work-study classes, although the cuts would probably not have been 
severe—a People’s Daily article estimated the average cut in wages at about 6.25%.842 In 
Beijing, the city government went beyond the spare-time school model and established 
“accelerated secondary schools” (xucheng zhongxue) specifically for workers and peasants. 
These accelerated programs offered three-year degree courses, and—given the state’s sweeping 
definition of “intellectual”—meant that workers could quickly become official intellectuals in a 
matter of years. These accelerated programs were quite popular, boasting 22,200 enrollments by 
the summer of 1958.843 Although these efforts, in concert, were aimed at combating generational 
inequalities, a rural/urban divide persisted in terms of access to remedial education. Whereas 
urban workers often had a full array of spare-time classes, accelerated programs, or special 
classes, rural peasants were often reliant on receiving informal supplementary education from 
sent-down professors. Moreover, there were gaps in terms of the quality of teachers who were 
sent to the villages or urban factories; in general, it appears that the most qualified intellectuals 
invariably ended up in the factories as opposed to the countryside.844 As such, remedial 
education initiatives may have disproportionately advantaged industrial laborers in contrast to 
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rural peasants. This went beyond the remedial education movement; in general, rural intellectuals 
who had already received a formal education at the outset of the PRC period fared significantly 
worse than their urban counterparts. Although available documentary evidence is currently 
lacking, there is some evidence that rural intellectuals were disproportionately targeted as 
rightists during the 1957 crackdown in contrast to their urban colleagues.845 As such, the 
remedial education movement was rooted in continuing rural/urban inequalities. 
 Shanghai took the lead in pushing the envelope on educating workers through the end of 
the year. In October, Shanghai schools and universities began forming special connections with 
local factories, nearby agricultural cooperatives, and handicraft production shops. These 
relationships were somewhat akin to the “sister school” phenomenon, in the words of foreign 
observers; workers and peasants were given the ability to take classes at their corresponding 
school or university, whereas students were expected to do physical labor in their school’s 
associated factory, shop, or co-op.846 In an end-of-the-year report, the city announced that its 
programs for remedial worker education had been quite popular thus far. Over 6200 Shanghai 
laborers were enrolled in a spare-time school at that time, whereas a full 1,090,000 workers had 
taken classes within the formal school system.847 In order to cultivate public support for remedial 
education programs, the city made a pragmatic pitch; workers who already had career experience 
in the factories could only benefit from additional scientific or technological expertise. This in 
turn meant that formally educated workers could be critical in spurring further production 
increases.848 Unlike in Beijing, where workers typically took pay cuts in order to attend remedial 
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classes, workers in Shanghai did not get any time off from their regular workdays; on the 
contrary, the city announced a plan to increase the average working hours from 7 to 7.5 in 1959. 
This meant that Shanghai workers who attended a remedial education program, where the 
average time spent was three hours per day, were either working or studying nearly half of the 
day.849 
 With more and more workers and peasants attaining formal degrees, the party’s plans to 
admit intellectuals into the CCP could increasingly draw from this new pool of intellectuals as 
opposed to older scholars. In January 1959, People’s Daily announced that a total of 16,000 
party admittances had been approved across the cities of Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Guangzhou, 
and Shenyang. Many of these 16,000 were intellectuals, suggesting that the CCP had reversed 
course again from its more skeptical attitude toward admitting intellectuals during 1957 and 
1958. That being said, these numbers mask a changed reality on the ground; in fact, more than 
80% of intellectual admittances had gone to either former workers or students from a working-
class background.850 This meant that the state could tout its numbers without actually opening its 
doors to admittances of older scholars as fully as it had in 1956. As 1959 wore on, plans to 
continue the push for remedial education showed little signs of dying down. In early April, the 
PRC State Council announced new plans for spare-time schools across the nation. Moving 
forward, they would gradually transition into part-time schools, which would include technical 
job training in addition to general education classes. Still, part-time schools would not be as 
intensive as full-time secondary schools, allowing workers and peasants to continue doing time 
at their jobs.851  
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 There is little hard data on what kinds of workers might have participated in these 
remedial education programs, although a report from the Shanghai Education Bureau does allow 
for some speculation. Factory jobs in Shanghai, at the very least, tended to be a young man’s 
game; at one factory, a full 82.5% of its 3213 employees were described as being in the “prime 
of their lives” (qingzhuangnian).852 Receiving an education clearly opened doors, allowing for 
both career advancement as well as possible candidacy for CCP membership. As such, the 
prospects of remedial education might have been especially attractive to young workers. 
Moreover, the push to have current students and teachers partake in physical labor inadvertently 
may have inspired some workers to pursue remedial education. At the Shanghai Bicycle Factory, 
a relatively congenial atmosphere existed between the workers and the intellectuals sent to work 
there. Sometimes informally, intellectuals would even help the factory’s workers cultivate 
academic skills such as arithmetic, furthering the sense of goodwill between classes.853 As such, 
exposure to intellectuals in academia may have been a source of inspiration to some workers, and 
they also may have informally picked up skills that might have helped them advance faster in 
remedial education courses. Although speculative, we do know that factories perceived remedial 
education as quite beneficial to production, and began contributing funds toward the construction 
of new part-time schools in Shanghai by the end of the decade.854 
 Although the idea of remedial education was far from new, efforts to educate the working 
masses gained new urgency due to a confluence of factors in 1958. Efforts to expand and 
formalize remedial education programs occured at both the national and municipal levels, and 
continued steadily over the course of 1958 and 1959. Schools and factories (or village co-ops) 
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began to establish special “sister” relationships to facilitate the easy transferral of students, 
faculty, and workers between them. Additionally, spare-time schools—which had already 
become quite popular—began to expand their academic offerings and became part-time schools 
in their own right. By the end of the decade, the percentage of students from a working class 
background in China’s universities had to 48%, while that number was even higher in secondary 
schools at 75.2%.855 These programs were popular enough that factories began to directly invest 
into new school construction. Although remedial education was quite popular (in some areas, 
millions of workers were able to pursue formal degrees thanks to the reforms) and served as an 
effective way of redressing generational inequalities, there were still gaps between rural peasants 
and urban workers. Factories often received a disproportionate share of the most qualified sent-
down intellectuals, who may have played a large role in encouraging workers to pursue remedial 
education. Nevertheless, remedial education at the very least proved to be a significant step 
forward in the CCP’s plans to educate the masses. 
 
The Next Generation: The Ascendance of Revolutionary Youth 
 Much like the party’s initiative to provide remedial education for workers, thereby 
transforming them into proletarian intellectuals, the idea of raising a generation of revolutionary 
young intellectuals was not new.856 As previous chapters have shown, the CCP always showed a 
fair amount of concern for ensuring that students, recent graduates, and young professionals were 
provided with ample opportunities—and that they grew up with the proper revolutionary 
mindset. After the tensions between the party and the older generation of intellectuals exploded 
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in 1957, however, party initiatives to cultivate a new generation were given added weight. Even 
if the party backed off from the height of the Anti-Rightist Campaign and still relied on the 
expertise of older scholars, neither the state or the wider intellectual community could return to 
the cooperative politicking of the earlier 1950s. As such, ensuring that China had an ample pool 
of academically credentialed, politically loyal youth became a paramount goal of the state.  
 In some respects, the twin goals of cultivating a new generation of young intellectuals 
and a new class of proletarian intellectuals cannot be separated. The dramatic expansion of 
education system, along with exponentially increasing enrollments, meant that non-elite youths 
had unprecedented opportunities to receive a formal education in the 1950s. Indeed, the state 
announced at the beginning of the 1958-1959 academic year that enrollments had doubled the 
numbers from the 1957-1958 academic year.857 Nationally, enrollments in higher education 
jumped from 155,000 total in 1949 to 660,000 by 1959; in secondary schools, from 1,496,000 to 
8,520,000; and in primary schools, from 23,683,000 to 86,400,000.858 In early January, the 
Shanghai government released estimates that a full 70% of all young intellectuals would be from 
a working class background within the decade.859 Even for the children of elites, this meant that 
they were attending school alongside plenty of other youths without the kind of privileged 
socioeconomic backgrounds they had enjoyed, and therefore they were exposed to a broader 
range of perspectives than the older generation of intellectuals. Due to shifts in education and 
cultural policies, young intellectuals grew up with mastery of simplified Mandarin characters, 
unlike the older generation. Young intellectuals who took the lead in educating peasants and 
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workers were significant conduits through which the Chinese language itself changed.860 Much 
like their parents were heavily involved in activism in the wake of the May Fourth Movement, 
the next generation of intellectuals sought to bridge the gap between the academy and the masses 
in the nation’s interests. Art students were performing revolutionary plays in from of working-
class audiences in urban theaters, medical students would volunteer in rural clinics, all while 
schools began to develop closer relationships with factories to give students practical work 
experiences.861 Although this kind of student-led activism seems hardly new, there was one 
crucial difference. Previously, elite intellectuals saw themselves as having the unique ability to 
serve the public through leadership; by 1958, that impulse had been tempered by actual exposure 
to the working class. Moving forward, learning would go both ways. 
 Well in advance of the exodus of the older generation of intellectuals to the factories and 
the villages, educated youths were participating in physical labor in force. An estimate from late 
April 1958 suggests that 22,000 Shanghai students set to graduate at the end of the spring had 
plans to go work in rural Hubei and Anhui Provinces.862 Considering these estimates were 
provided by the city, it suggests that all of them voluntarily “enlisted” in the campaign to go to 
the countryside. In reality, it is doubtful that all students going down to the villages did so 
willingly—a mix of genuine revolutionary zeal, peer pressure, and institutional encouragement 
from their schools and the government were all important factors. What is less uncertain is the 
sheer scale of student participation in physical labor. The national government released a report 
in mid-July that estimated that 82% of 1958 graduates, nationwide, had gone into productive 
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activities after graduation, either in co-ops or factories.863 Even this high figure may be 
underestimating the total involvement of students with the Great Leap Forward, however. Even 
those who did not engage in hard labor may have mobilized in other ways. For example, music 
students began to produce a slew of folk songs praising the leadership of the Communist 
Party.864 It may be easy to write off these patriotic activities as evidence of political pressure 
from above, but other evidence suggests that a great many students were true believers in the 
regime. For example, two-thirds of 1958 graduates were either members of the Youth League or 
full-fledged CCP members.865 Considering the career benefits provided by political affiliation 
with the party, it is certainly possible that cynical careerism may have driven some of these 
students to apply for membership. But with numbers that large, there is more than enough room 
for many true believers. 
 Participating in physical labor went all the way to the top of China’s hierarchy of elite 
universities. At the prestigious Qinghua University, elite students began to work on developing a 
working-class consciousness even before graduation, through the university’s late-1950s policy 
of “real knives and guns” projects required for a degree. Students in engineering would draw up 
plans for reservoirs or other public projects, as well as for new machinery and technology. After 
graduating, Qinghua students then had the opportunity to work directly in realizing their projects 
through participation in construction labor.866 During the spring of 1958, 6500 intellectuals from 
Qinghua (mainly students) journeyed to the outskirts of Beijing to begin construction on a new 
reservoir project, hauling earth via wheelbarrows for much of the workday. Others traveled far 
and wide to assist farmers in harvesting crops. The Qinghua administration also invested in the 
 
863 Wilson, Telegram No. 379, From Peking to Foreign Office, July 15, 1958, CPR11, 221.  
864 Shanghai Political and Economic Summary No. 16, August 17-August 31, 1958, CPR11, 152. 
865 Shanghai Political and Economic Summary No. 15, August 1-August 16, 1958, CPR11, 146. 
866 Andreas, Rise of the Red Engineers, 53. 
342 
construction of on-campus factories, allowing students to work in industry without having to 
leave their dorms.867 And while the free expression of the older generation had been significantly 
curtailed during the Anti-Rightist crackdown, Qinghua students still clearly had the ability to 
engage in spirited debate with each other. The campus newspaper was filled with student-written 
editorials centered on big questions like what the role of a prestigious institution like Qinghua in 
an egalitarian society should be, how material goods should be most efficiently allocated under 
socialism, or what the utility of manual labor to intellectuals was.868 The revolutionary mood 
among students was all-encompassing, from new people’s universities to established municipal 
colleges to elite institutions like Qinghua. 
 Young intellectuals could also engage with lively debates through the magazine Chinese 
Youth (zhongguo qingnian), an official publication from the Youth League. Although the issues 
published during 1956 and early 1957 probably allowed for a greater range of free expression, 
debate did not cease in 1958 and 1959. Writers could not criticize party policy directly, but there 
were a decent number of articles describing the personal effects that government policies may 
have had on their lives. For example, some letters to the editor described a feeling of 
discouragement about their abilities or a sense of skepticism about the value of all-out heroic 
sacrifice. Invariably, these doubts were met with exhortations to continue the struggle; however, 
this shows that the magazine publishers were more interested in providing encouragement for 
youth rather than chiding them if they were not fully onboard with the Great Leap Forward.869 
Overall, however, the message of the magazine had undergone significant shifts from the earlier 
years of the decade. Whereas triumphalist articles of the early 1950s saw a socialist utopia 
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around the corner, articles in 1958 and 1959 were more measured in tone. Without vigorous and 
continuing action by the masses, China risked turning away from the revolutionary project. The 
magazine was littered with stories about students and young faculty going to the factories and 
villages for work, helping to popularize the idea among others. These actions were no longer just 
necessary for raising one’s consciousness; they were necessary for national survival.870 It is 
impossible to fully assess the effect of the magazine on the students of the 1950s, but the 
popularity of the magazine is indicative of its wide influence. For impressionable youth, 
devoting all their energy to the continuing project of building socialism would be the crusade of 
their generation, and a way to realize their status as intellectuals.871 Unlike the older generation, 
however, that came of age in the aftermath of the May Fourth Movement, the way forward 
seemed quite clear to young intellectuals of the 1950s. Differing views on the proper course of 
national salvation helped further divide the new and old generations of intellectuals. 
 Heading into 1959, young intellectuals were kept busy with packed schedules. In 
Shanghai, a report gives a portrait of how university students spent most of their days. Although 
students were allocated a full 8 hours of sleep, plus an additional 4 for meals and leisure, they 
were expected to be working for the other 12 hours of the day—both studying as well as doing 
physical labor.872 Things changed in the early months of 1959, however, as an increasing number 
of older faculty began to join students in the factories and the villages. Students played a 
significant role in urging their professors to also partake in manual labor. The Shanghai 
government saw the city’s student community as “buzzing with activity” (rehuo chaotian), 
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whereas many older intellectuals in the city were “resigned to mediocrity” (ganji zhongyou).873 
Student activists would still frequently use big-character posters to criticize rightists, and, 
through association, the entire older generation of professors at their school. One poster in 
Shanghai asked, accusingly, “the quality [of instruction] has fallen for certain—what is the basis 
for this?” Other activists offered encouragement for professors who were going to the 
countryside; one blackboard message celebrated professors “vigorously soaring into the open 
country” (ganjin chongtian de ye laoshi). Other activists simply wrote the common “Go! 
C’mon!” (jiayou! jiayou!) on classroom blackboards.874 The Shanghai government observed 
these instances with approval, hoping that “a democratic equality between professors and 
students is taking shape, step-by-step.”875 The CCP’s dreams of a technically-proficient, 
ideologically left-wing generation of intellectuals seemed in reach. 
 Young intellectuals also enjoyed greater opportunities to air their views in public. Ever 
since 1956, city governments had been using conferences and meetings with representatives 
from local intellectuals in order to better solicit the views of the scholarly community, and foster 
state-intellectual cooperation. There were signs that students and recent graduates began to 
attend these meetings in 1959, however, in a clear sign of institutional recognition for 
generational change. At a Shanghai conference in early April, a student at Number Two Medical 
School in Shanghai, Zheng Ping, had the opportunity to attend and talk about his own 
experiences in the countryside. Zheng said that he, like many students, only half-heartedly 
participated in previous political campaigns, memorizing slogans without really comprehending 
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them (siji yingbei).876 Zheng’s speech was in many ways reminiscent of a coming-of-age story; 
he describes, for example, his ideological growth as he came to realize that many of the teachers, 
mentors, and professors he had previously admired were rightists. His own views began to shift 
during his work in the countryside, where his classmates criticized his injection technique while 
treating the peasantry (apparently, the shots Zheng gave hurt more than they were supposed to). 
Zheng blamed an “individualist mindset” for his poor technique.877 Fresh from the countryside, 
Zheng offered a forceful defense of the sending-down policies, as well as the CCP’s “both red 
and expert” model for intellectuals. He said that he had passively inherited ideas about “chasing 
fame and fortune” from his parents and the older generation of scholars, and that hands-on work 
in the villages had finally forced him to confront these notions.878 
 By the end of the year, it seemed that young intellectuals were in ascendance across 
China. Some prestigious research institutes drew a majority of their employees from the youth 
population, for example.879 But the changes went even farther than that. At the end of the year, 
and during the first few months of 1960, the CCP began to encourage students participating in 
physical labor to return to their places of origin (if they were in the countryside). The expansion 
of the education—most notably, the shift from spare-time schools to part-time schools for the 
working class, as discussed in the previous section—meant that more and more teachers were 
required. Students previously engaged in manual labor made for a natural pool of new teachers. 
Even those staying in the countryside might shift from agricultural production to teaching in a 
rural school.880 Students still enrolled in universities saw education as a career path with decent 
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prospects; despite the state’s push to increase the population’s scientific literacy, only 21% of the 
graduating class of 1960 had engineering degrees, and a full third of engineers instead went on to 
become teachers instead.881 Even despite the intensity of the Great Leap Forward and the 
resulting famine, enrollment increases continued every year, ranging from 10% to 20% per year 
during the end of the decade across all levels of educational institutions. The state had achieved 
near-universal primary school enrollment for children once they turned 7.882 The education 
system expanded in part by feeding on itself, transitioning recent graduates into teaching roles. A 
new generation of red experts would hopefully, in the state’s view, produce more red experts. 
 Young intellectuals were the CCP’s best hope for red experts; older intellectuals seemed 
to lack the ability for full transformation, as the events of 1957 had showed. Moreover, a 
decade’s worth of seismic shifts in education policy had produced a full-fledged mass education 
system, with the children of workers forming the majority of students in both primary and 
secondary schools. Even if universities had not quite caught up, they could be expected to in the 
coming years. Students made up the first wave of sent-down intellectuals in order to fully 
inculcate revolutionary values in the new generation; although certainly not all became 
committed true believers over night, there is some evidence that intellectual youths were 
genuinely affected by their experiences in the countryside and the factories—much like their 
professors had been during Land Reform. They did not stay in their new places of work 
indefinitely, however; continuing enrollment increases and other shifts (like the movement to 
transform spare-time schools for workers into part-time schools) meant that the demand for new 
teachers was higher than ever before. Recent graduates made for ideal candidates for teaching 
jobs. With both impeccable academic and ideological credentials, young intellectuals could be 
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counted on to continue to push forward the CCP’s efforts to produce genuine red experts. As 
such, students inherited a revolutionary system from a decade of politicking between older 
intellectuals and the party-state. More than that, however, they made it their own. Young 
intellectuals were filling prestigious research positions, attending conferences alongside their 
older colleagues, and making up the bulk of the education workforce by the end of the decade.  
 
Conclusion 
 The first decade of the People’s Republic’s existence ended with the question of how 
intellectuals would fit into the new society still unanswered. In recognizing that its previous 
policies were not sustainable, the state provided new answers that would continue to reshape the 
lives of intellectuals heading into the next decade. The Anti-Rightist backlash gradually lost 
strength. Only a small percentage of intellectuals were targeted as rightists; even then, only a 
small percentage of these “rightists” were punished severely. Even those who lost jobs might 
regain them at a later date. Although the Anti-Rightist Campaign was somewhat limited in scope, 
it unraveled the close relationship between the state and (older) intellectuals. Moving forward, 
the CCP began to question whether its previous policies promoting thought rectification were all 
that effective. More sweeping alternatives to thought reform emerged in 1958 and 1959, with 
intellectuals being sent to the factories or the countryside for manual labor alongside the working 
class. In addition, the state expanded its efforts to offer remedial education programs to workers 
and peasants. Some universities began waiving exam requirements for admission if an applicant 
was a worker or a peasant, for example. The popular spare-time schools transformed into part-
time schools, expanding curricula and offering a path to a formal education. As such, the state 
sought to have intellectuals work while cultivating the intellect of workers. These policies were 
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designed to promote both ideologically and academically proficient intellectuals. But the most 
important change was the ascendance of a new generation of young intellectuals, inculcated with 
the party’s message and its values during their formative years. Students tended to make up the 
bulk of the sent-down intellectual population until the early months of 1959, after which they 
gradually returned to their places of origin. A decade’s worth of education policy shifts—in 
addition to recent changes—meant that students’ skills were in higher demand than ever before. 
As young intellectuals began to replace the older generation as teachers, engineers, or prestigious 
researchers, the CCP hoped that this new generation of red experts might reproduce itself. 
 The 1958 and 1959 years thus represented a period of significant change—alongside 
important continuities. Previous chapters have shown that, even as intellectuals and the state 
engaged in a series of political negotiations regarding the former’s status and professional 
treatment, the cadre class began to grow resentful of what they saw as institutional privilege for 
the scholarly community. Although the state’s recalculation in the form of the Anti-Rightist 
Campaign was an attempt, in part, to alleviate the frustrations of the cadres, the partial nature of 
the campaign meant that the full range of cadre concerns went unanswered. The 1958-1959 
years, with reports of even fired rightists getting their jobs back, meant that cadre frustrations 
seemed to have little lasting political influence. To the extent that the state developed new 
policies with the cadres in mind, it came in the form of remedial education programs, which 
sometimes but not exclusively benefitted cadres (as well as their offspring)—by offering the 
promise of becoming an “intellectual.” The message of the end of the decade was clear: 
institutional favoring of intellectuals was here to stay. That did not mean that intellectuals 
themselves experienced no change, however. A generational gap had slowly been growing over 
the previous years, with younger intellectuals seemingly showing greater willingness to embrace 
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the Communist Party and its policies than older scholars. The gap widened dramatically in 1958 
and 1959, with some student activists beginning to feel more comfortable levying criticism at the 
professoriate and urging them to participate in manual labor. 
 The following year, the CCP declared victory in its ten-year endeavor to transform the 
intellectuals. At a June 1, 1960 meeting of the National People’s Congress, speakers 
triumphantly declared that the era of the bourgeois, exploitative intellectual had finally come to a 
close. The party’s decade-long efforts had culminated in the “proletarianization” of the 
intellectual class, while offering unprecedented opportunities for education among the working 
classes.883 In some respects, this celebratory mood was appropriate. PRC politics had been 
transformative, producing changes that empowered both students and workers while at least 
exposing older intellectuals to (if not always convincing them of) alternative perspectives. 
However, this study has instead offered a different model for how intellectuals, the state, and its 
cadres engaged in politicking during the PRC’s first decade. Intellectual support for the CCP was 
crucial in its formative early years; scholars were more supportive of the Korean War than the 
masses, for example. In return, the CCP found it necessary to design policies to reward 
intellectuals and respond to their concerns. This close cooperation continued despite the CCP 
takeover of the school system, although such moves introduced a third actor: low-level cadres, 
who were often more hostile to intellectuals than national political figures. Cadre resentment 
turned to active resistance when the state began to disproportionately favor intellectuals during 
the reforms of 1956. Even though the Anti-Rightist Campaign reflected cadre hostility, the 
crackdown did not go as far as cadres would have liked. And by the end of the decade, the 
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intellectual community and the state remained as close as before—even if the demographic 
profile of the intellectual class had changed. The end of the decade was not a moment of triumph 
for the CCP and its intellectual policies, but rather a testament to the tense politicking between 




 The People’s Republic exited its first decade of existence at the height of a brewing 
catastrophe. The Great Leap Forward had led to severe famine in the countryside, with millions 
having perished by 1960 (the exact number being debated, although estimates generally range 
from 20 to 45 million). The CCP could not ignore the deadly failure of the Great Leap for long, 
and sought to swiftly correct course in the early 1960s. Mao Zedong, arguing that the failure of 
the Great Leap was due to shoddy investigations during the planning phase, declared 1961 to be 
the year of “investigative research.” Accordingly, the State Planning Commission, headed by Li 
Fuchun, was tasked with recruiting prominent Chinese economics to staff a task force to 
recommend various economic policy shifts that could correct the Great Leap Forward and 
prevent another round of famines in the future. The task force of economists ultimately produced 
a report on the Great Leap failure several hundred pages’ long, and recommended a variety of 
policy changes. Although few economists were willing to attack the fundamental character of the 
Chinese economy, there was some degree of tolerance for more radical critiques. One task force 
member, Sun Yefang, argued that the statistical methods China used for assessing material 
growth were fundamentally flawed.884  
Although the task force’s recommendations were not fully implemented until after Mao’s 
death in 1976, this episode is a testament to both the changes and continuities that defined the 
1950s. On one hand, intellectuals had only a partial ability to influence state matters—as had 
been the case for much of the previous decade. It seems clear that high-ranking party officials 
took the economists’ report seriously, although there was little political will to actually try to 
implement anything. As such, intellectuals had about the same amount of political influence as 
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they had over the course of the 1950s; they had the opportunity and freedom to criticize state 
policy, but there were few guarantees that the state would listen to them. On the other hand, the 
fact that intellectuals were able to at least attempt to set the policy agenda represented a 
remarkable shift from the pre-liberation years, where party officials largely drew up policies on 
their own. To the extent that intellectuals were able to partake in policymaking, it was usually to 
offer their endorsements of CCP imperatives, such as land redistribution (see Chapter 1). 
Intellectuals had thus been able to assert themselves and curry a greater degree of influence in 
the political establishment than they had at the beginning of the 1950s. Even if political 
representatives had declared that 1960 represented the end of the “bourgeois intellectual,” it was 
clear that influence went both ways. The party’s attempts to transform intellectuals had thus 
opened the doors for intellectuals to try and transform the party. Even if their attempts at 
enacting institutional changes were not ultimately successful in the 1960s, they would get their 
chance again a decade later. 
However, changes underway during the 1950s under the surface would continue to 
reshape Chinese education, politics, and society for decades. The CCP made little secret of its 
preference for young intellectuals, who had little memory of China’s pre-revolutionary past and 
who received their formal education largely after the formation of the PRC. The state’s efforts to 
empower the new generation created a rift within the intellectual community between younger 
and older scholars, whose interests and worldviews were sometimes in conflict. I do not wish to 
attribute the widening of the generational gap to any nefarious “divide-and-conquer” strategy 
from the CCP. The logic of education expansion simply meant that the demand for a new 
generation of intellectuals was extremely high, and it was clear that young intellectuals had more 
natural affinity for the CCP’s agenda than their older counterparts. With declining levels of trust 
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in the party on the part of older intellectuals, they began to look toward their younger colleagues 
with suspicion. Students and younger faculty were often allies in extending the reach of the state 
on campus, and they were often behind accusations of being “rightists” or “anti-party” that were 
levelled at older intellectuals during the Anti-Rightist Campaign. Additionally, political efforts to 
expand education access to the working class meant that the intellectuals who came of age in the 
1950s had very different socioeconomic experiences from older intellectuals. No matter the 
CCP’s attentions, its education policies in the 1950s exposed clear generational fault lines. 
 
Reimagining Intellectual-State Cooperation 
 Intellectuals’ cooperation with various Chinese states extends back by a good many 
centuries. Service in the imperial-era bureaucracy was one of the defining characteristics of 
intellectual life in China, until the twentieth century. However, the linkages between the 
bureaucracy and the intellectual class gradually eroded in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, until they were eliminated entirely at the dawn of the twentieth. One way of 
understanding intellectuals’ class interests in the 1900s, across multiple different political 
circumstances, is their push to recreate the ties between the scholarly community and the organs 
of governance that had existed previously. During the 1920s, many intellectuals flocked to 
Guangzhou to assist the Guomindang as it prepared to mount a campaign to reunify China. After 
the GMD had successfully taken power, a good number of intellectuals then moved to Nanjing to 
assist the new government.885 However, the GMD regime embraced a strategy of severe 
suppression in the 1940s, imprisoning or even executing intellectuals who had expressed 
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sympathy for the Communists. As such, intellectuals soured on the GMD and the prospects for 
future collaboration with the Nanjing government.  
 All that changed with the Communist victory in late 1949. Intellectuals generally found 
the new regime amenable to their views and interests, and assisted the state in carrying out its 
earliest agrarian collectivization drives in 1950 and 1951. In the early years, the CCP sought to 
develop close ties with prominent intellectuals, inviting them into the inner political circles of 
Beijing and allowing them significant influence in the new government.886 However, the new 
government’s care for intellectuals went beyond a small number of famous, “high-level” 
intellectuals. One of the most pressing urban issues Beijing faced in 1950 and 1951 was the 
unemployment crisis, necessitating the formation of new work assignment programs that linked 
up city dwellers with suitable jobs. Although intellectuals were not necessarily harder hit, 
collectively, by the unemployment crisis, the CCP went further in helping them by setting up 
specific municipal bureaus to assist intellectuals find jobs. Those who were not assigned to 
academia instead found good jobs as engineers, technicians, medical professionals, or producers 
of culture. In general, a spirit of cooperation existed between intellectuals and the state in the 
early 1950s, which may explain, in part, why intellectuals accepted the CCP’s takeover of the 
education system and its new policies on thought reform. Although intellectuals could get away 
with neglecting political study or refusing to write a “confession” in theory, few did. By the end 
of 1952, the state had sweeping control over China’s schools—a feat that had been accomplished 
in part thanks to the acquiescence of the intellectuals. 
 When intellectuals found themselves unsatisfied with their new arrangements—for 
example, being dissatisfied over wages, housing, or the amount of “power” they had in their jobs 
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relative to their responsibilities—they turned to the cooperative relationship they had built with 
the CCP in order to address these problems. From 1953 to 1955, intellectuals began to voice their 
misgivings about their working and living environments to party officials, sometimes through 
group meetings or occasionally through the writing of letters to municipal (or even national) 
figures. Beijing was relatively sympathetic to intellectuals at this juncture, and often sent 
representatives to various schools and universities around the nation to get a better sense of the 
problems intellectuals were facing. When the national government responded to intellectuals 
concerns in 1956, it made efforts to comprehensively address intellectuals’ needs, from housing 
to wages to transportation. In addition, the state went a step further by launching new initiatives 
aimed at increasing available materials at libraries and museums, as well as expanding funds for 
research equipment and laboratory space. The party even made efforts to remove one of the main 
barriers between intellectuals and the state in the form of actual party membership. From late 
1955 onward, many intellectuals were given the opportunity to apply for CCP membership, thus 
becoming “establishment intellectuals.”887 The reforms from the middle of the decade suggest 
that both intellectuals and the state continued to build on the cooperative relationship begun 
during the early 1950s, and that intellectuals were able to strategically utilize this relationship in 
order to successfully advance their interests. 
 Cooperation did not mean the same thing as fully reconstructing the intellectual-state ties 
from the imperial era, however—a reality that became apparent in 1957, when the state enacted a 
partial crackdown on intellectuals during the Anti-Rightist Campaign. Among intellectuals, there 
was a sense that the 1956 reforms had only partially addressed their issues (and they were 
 
887 The topic of “establishment intellectuals” is covered in Goldman et. al.’s edited volume China’s Intellectuals and 
the State, Hamrin and Cheek’s edited volume China’s Establishment Intellectuals, as well as Cheek, The Intellectual 
in Modern Chinese History, 130-147. 
356 
generally correct; writers and artists, for example, had seen few improvements in their 
situations). To encourage the CCP to continue pushing forward with the reforms, intellectuals 
relied on the same strategies they had used previously: petitioning government officials, raising 
issues in meetings, and even writing articles or editorials in public media thanks to the 
liberalization of expression. Although some intellectuals used this opportunity to directly 
challenge the CCP’s legitimacy to rule, it is my sense that this represented a small sliver of the 
total population of intellectuals. Most were more broadly concerned with solidifying the gains of 
1956. The Anti-Rightist crackdown only targeted a small fraction of intellectuals as “rightists,” 
accordingly, although even then it is clear that the state’s criteria for determining who was a 
“rightist” were arbitrary and unreasonable. For the majority of intellectuals, there were actually 
signs that the state was making efforts to continue pushing forward with the 1956 reforms; in 
particular, regarding research investments and access to party membership. The end of the 
decade brought another sign that cooperation had its limits, as the state launched new initiatives 
to have intellectuals participate in hard labor in the villages or the factories. Intellectuals had thus 
made a good degree of progress at reforging the state-scholar linkages of the imperial era, but 
limits to those successes existed—a pattern that continued into the 1960s. 
 In truth, the project of building the modern Chinese state was a project that had been 
underway for nearly a century and a half, extending back into the Qing years and encompassing 
a wide variety of governments—Qing, warlord, Guomindang, and finally Communist. The 
success of the Communists was due, at least in part, to the party-state’s successful management 
of its relationship with the intellectual class. The Communist Party rejected the full utilization of 
intellectuals as scholar-bureaucrats as seen in the early Qing, while still looking after their 
livelihoods, as the Qing did not after the elimination of the civil service exams. The CCP also 
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held back from the scale of repression the GMD had used to cajole intellectuals in the 1940s. 
Considering the various attempts at restructuring the Chinese state, some scholars have 
suggested that China suffered from “state involution” in the early twentieth century, where 
expenditures on new bureaus were greater than new revenues collected.888 Although discussions 
of state involution have usually focused on rural China, a similar question could be posed 
regarding urban China: did the massive state investments into education produce any tangible 
benefits? Although this study has not focused on the question of revenues, I suggest that the CCP 
helped ensure its longevity through its policies on education and intellectuals. The party-state 
had managed to establish a system that could continue to employ intellectuals, all while ushering 
in social change by expanding access to education. Intellectuals loyal to the regime could in turn 
spread its message to large incoming numbers of young students. Intellectuals managed to get 
quite a lot in return, to be sure, although the price of pro-intellectual reforms was participation in 
a system that undergirded the new regime. 
 
The Survival of Institutional Inequalities 
 Despite the CCP’s roots as a relatively small movement for radical, educated youth, the 
path to power necessitated a recalculation in its appeal. During the late 1920s and 1930s, the 
CCP shifted toward representing the interests of peasant populists rather than young, intellectual 
leftists. As such, Chinese Communism diverged sharply from the Soviet model and instead 
attempted to present itself as the successor to previous peasant uprisings, such as the mid-
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nineteenth century Taiping Rebellion.889 The CCP recruited heavily from poor, war-ravaged 
villages in the Chinese north during World War II, with these recruits becoming the backbone of 
the party’s cadre corps after the revolution. During the waning years of the civil war with the 
Guomindang, the CCP faced new challenges as a result of its battlefield victories: holding and 
commanding China’s large, coastal cities. Rural cadres struggled with urban administration, to 
the point that the CCP initially had to rely on former Guomindang officials to administer urban 
areas. Alternatively, the PLA would manage some cities as a sort of military occupation 
government. Over time, however, the new party-state gradually made inroads into denting the 
power of the urban elite. Corporations were taken over, while the state managed capital. Unlike 
private businesses, however, the “other” urban elite—the intellectuals—proved far more 
problematic for the CCP’s egalitarian aims. Knowledge capital could not be so easily 
redistributed; even if the schools could be placed under CCP control and limits placed on the free 
expression of intellectuals, their work and research was still critical to the practical aims of the 
state. As such, the question of intellectuals’ place in the new society necessarily involved a 
stalling out of the redistributionist project—something the cadres were well aware of, and 
rebelled against. 
 The first interactions between cadres and intellectuals occurred as a result of the party’s 
moves to assert control of the education system in 1952, alongside the Thought Reform 
Campaign. By allying with pro-CCP elements within schools and universities, the party 
gradually managed to install its cadres in administrative positions across China’s academic 
system. At first, cadres’ new jobs involved simply centralizing previous practices. Intellectuals 
and students had already been engaging in reformative self-study; however, these sessions would 
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now be directed by cadres, who in turn required intellectuals to submit “confessions” as a part of 
the Thought Reform Campaign detailing their political histories, ideological positions, and 
potential areas for future improvement. The cadres also used study sessions as opportunities to 
vent their class grievances against the intellectuals. The national government received multiple 
reports (and complaints from intellectuals) about overly harsh treatment and criticism from the 
cadres. The central government even had to issue new instructions during the second half of 
1952 reprimanding cadres for their treatment of intellectuals, and expressly prohibited the arrest 
of intellectuals for any right-leaning beliefs or the use of violence as punishment. My study sees 
these tensions as the logical outcome of the CCP system. It could not afford to alienate the 
intellectuals, but it had nevertheless empowered those who saw intellectuals as clear social 
“haves” in contrast to their own social upbringings. Avoiding a culture clash was impossible. 
 Nonetheless, the CCP decided to avoid addressing the issue for much of 1953 and 1954. 
Cadres and intellectuals’ working relationships, however, continued to deteriorate. The central 
government only began to address the problem in early 1955, and even then it did so cautiously. 
The government’s plan was to have intellectuals and cadres participate jointly in a new political 
campaign, focused on promoting Marxist materialism. Having both intellectuals and cadres 
participate as equals yielded few tangible results, however, and the pressure to provide real 
reform for the intellectuals only mounted on the central government. In 1956, the central 
government instructed its cadres to assist in improving the livelihoods of intellectuals. From a 
cadre perspective, intellectuals’ concerns amounted to demands for unequal privilege from a 
class whose collective status had never truly been brought down to size. Cadres’ reaction was to 
be expected: they resisted the new policies where possible. Refusing to carry out the central 
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government’s new reform initiatives was the best way for the rank-and-file to send a message to 
Beijing that its agenda for intellectuals was unacceptable to them.  
 The Anti-Rightist Campaign was as much a concession to the cadres as it was a response 
to intellectual overreach. But even if cadres may have supported a hypothetical Anti-Rightist 
Campaign, they were less than enthusiastic about the actual outcomes. Relatively few 
intellectuals were actually targeted, and punishments were usually relatively benign. The party-
state followed up with a campaign to have intellectuals participate in hard labor, but that did little 
to address the status of the intellectuals as cultural elites. The most significant moves the central 
government made to address cadres’ continuing concerns in the 1950s was its policies on 
encouraging workers, peasants, as well as working-class children to go to school and earn formal 
degrees. Even if cadres themselves might never become elites in their own right, their children 
had new opportunities to upend a self-perpetuating system of class privilege. By the end of the 
decade, the central government had shown a general unwillingness to address issues of inequality 
related to intellectuals. For low-ranking cadres, the message was clear: the path to advancement 
was not through an equalization of status with the intellectuals, but through an inter-class 
merging effort. 
 The CCP began to popularize its vision of future generations of intellectuals as “red 
experts” toward the end of the 1950s. For cadres and intellectuals on the ground, realizing these 
aims was the story of class convergence, described adeptly by Joel Andreas.890 Cadres’ children 
would make up the backbone of the future class of intellectuals, thus ensuring the proper 
“redness” of the next generation. Intellectuals would in turn provide the necessary instruction to 
cadres’ children, ensuring their expertise. Andreas describes this process, which played out 
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during the late 1950s and the 1960s, leading up to the Cultural Revolution, as the convergence 
between cultural elites (the intellectuals) and political elites (the cadres). I see this process—the 
natural outcome of the political drama of the 1950s—as a tacit acknowledgement of the limits of 
egalitarianism under the CCP. Even if the Communist government had made strides in 
addressing landholding and gender inequalities, the statebuilding project stopped well short of a 
truly egalitarian, classless utopia. Indeed, the CCP institutionalized urban-rural inequalities 
through the advent of the hukou (household registration) system, which heavily restricted 
intranational migration from the villages to the cities—all while the new government’s tax 
regime involved a heavily extractive flow of material from rural China to urban areas.891 A 
decade on from its military victory over the Guomindang, the Communist Party had solidified its 
position at the apex of Chinese politics—at the cost of affirming institutional inequality.  
 
The Beginnings of Intergenerational Enmity 
 The CCP did not, of course, introduce the idea of a generational divide into the ranks of 
the intellectuals. However, the evolution of intellectuals and intellectual policies during the 
1950s had enormous implications for a gradual social change underway since the beginning of 
the century. Under the old Confucian model of educational attainment, students’ jobs were to be 
students and students only. Learning, not politics, was the sole priority of the young, aspiring 
Chinese scholars of yesteryear. Only after students received their degrees and entered the formal 
organs of government would they finally have an opportunity to shape politics. This model came 
undone in the early twentieth century with the collapse of the civil service examinations, and 
young intellectuals responded in kind. In a series of demonstrations beginning on May 4, 1919, 
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students from Beijing University flooded the streets of the capital to protest Japanese seizure of 
the Shandong Peninsula (as well as the ratification of these moves at Versailles). The 
demonstrations morphed into a much larger movement, however, where students would give 
impromptu street lectures calling for mass action against the corrupt warlord government of the 
city. Even after the resulting “May Fourth Movement” came winding down in the capital, 
students continued to pursue political activism and radicalism. The May Fourth Movement thus 
represented a break with the past; students had now become associated with a certain brand of 
political action, and they had far more options—even expectations—for speaking out than they 
had during the long imperial era.892 Outside the capital, some young intellectuals continued to 
press forward, organizing strikes, publishing radical critiques in student-run magazines, and 
creating secret societies.893 
 Therefore, the CCP inherited social circumstances that were already in flux. Predictably, 
the party-state sought to centralize and control the means of discourse among students, replacing 
previous campus magazines with an umbrella publication known as Chinese Youth. In addition, 
the party-state sought to mobilize students and young intellectuals via the creation of the Youth 
League.894 Events in the early years of the People’s Republic suggested that students who came 
of age in the 1950s had a good deal of affinity for their new government. Students were often the 
backbone of public support for intervention in the Korean War, and a good number were willing 
to back up their words with action by enlisting in the military. Although students who enlisted 
were only rarely deployed to the front lines, serving in Korea was still hazardous even to 
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logistics officers. Older intellectuals, by contrast, tended not to speak out against the war to any 
significant extent but were much more likely than students to “admire America” (chongmei). 
Even the intellectuals who had been active politically in the May Fourth period were now well 
into middle age and more often politically liberal than radical, and as such saw more in the US 
system to emulate than the new generation of intellectuals. The CCP’s connection with educated 
youth proved critical to the success of its takeover of education; government instructions to 
cadres often instructed them to form alliances with student activists as well as local Youth 
League chapters in order to accomplish their objectives. Although older intellectuals did not 
resist the CCP takeover of their schools, they came to have a tense relationship with their new 
administrators. From 1950-1952, the most pressing issues of the new era found older and 
younger intellectuals more politically divided than previously. 
 During the middle years of the decade, when older intellectuals began to employ new 
strategies of political engagement, they focused on issues pertaining to their generation. Many of 
the primary concerns raised by intellectuals were less relevant for students: wages, a lack of 
career advancement opportunities, support for research projects, or the ability of (explicitly) 
older intellectuals to apply for CCP membership. If anything, some of the complaints leveled by 
older intellectuals included veiled criticism of the newer generation. For example, professors 
might complain about the explosion of class sizes, whereas some criticized the current batch of 
students for not offering them due respect and being largely unmotivated. Due to the 
popularization of education, schools and universities were crowded with the kinds of youth who 
might have never had the opportunity to receive an education until the CCP’s reforms. In 
contrast, older, established intellectuals usually tended to come from a well-off socioeconomic 
background. Even if intellectuals’ concerns did not necessarily address the needs of younger 
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scholars and students, the new generation did not speak out or oppose the proposed reforms. As 
such, the intellectual class presented itself as, largely, a unified front in the middle of the decade. 
Intellectual solidarity thus forced the party-state to the negotiating table. Much like the concerns 
intellectuals raised, however, the government’s reforms in 1956 and the first half of 1957 largely 
benefitted older intellectuals. 
 Some of the tensions brewing between generations of intellectuals exploded during the 
Anti-Rightist Campaign. Sometimes, savvy students used accusations of being a “rightist” to 
target professors who they felt had wronged them, while junior faculty accused older colleagues 
they saw as impediments to their own careers.895 Students began to voice concerns about the 
political “conservatism” of their teachers and professors, and often wrote messages offering 
support for sending older faculty to the countryside as a means of continuing ideological reform. 
From a student perspective, they had been participating in hard labor long before the party-state 
decided to extend the policy to include older intellectuals—what did their instructors have to 
complain about? As the “down to the countryside and up to the mountains” campaign began to 
wind down, the CCP doubled down on its policies of encouraging social change within the 
intellectual class. Entrance standards to universities were waived based on socioeconomic 
background, allowing more working-class children to successfully enroll in a college degree 
program. As the education system began to expand, the CCP was reliant on the new generation 
of intellectuals to staff the new schools. Given their political loyalism to the CCP, as well as their 
zeal, they could be counted on to inculcate the regime’s values in the generation following them 
as well. Although fault lines had existed between generations of intellectuals for some time, the 
1950s saw the actual splitting of intellectual solidarity along age lines. 
 
895 Yue Daiyun describes this very thing happening to her in To the Storm, 29-32. 
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Toward and Beyond the Cultural Revolution 
 Statebuilding in the 1950s was a collaborative process, involving input from intellectuals, 
cadres, and the party leadership. Naturally, any kind of large-scale politicking would produce a 
system of unsustainable compromises and internal contradictions. Although the political drama 
surrounding intellectuals had begun to die down by the early 1960s, it emerged again with a 
vengeance in the second half of the 1960s with the onset of the Cultural Revolution. By then, 
however, one key feature of the 1950s had disappeared: the general spirit of solidarity among the 
intellectuals. Whereas scholars had generally put up a united front during the 1950s, 
strengthening their negotiating position with the party-state, intellectuals were divided sharply by 
age and class by the time of the Cultural Revolution. Older intellectuals and their overseeing 
cadres had entered into a marriage of convenience, Andreas has shown, fashioning a new class of 
political-cultural elites that had become entrenched by the late 1960s.896 Students and younger 
scholars, meanwhile, had very different political worldviews and assumptions than the older 
generations. Whereas the 1950s features foreshadowings of the kind of revolutionary zeal that 
animated left-wing, educated youths, the Cultural Revolution channeled these frustrations into a 
cataclysmic mass movement that reshaped modern China. 
 The standard understanding of the Cultural Revolution in the West has been articulated 
best by Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals’ Mao’s Last Revolution: an account that 
highlights the all-too-familiar chaos of the Cultural Revolution—radicalized students beating 
their professors, attacking anyone suspected of being a “rightist,” overthrowing local 
governments, or smashing relics from China’s past.897 Although not incorrect, this portrayal of 
 
896 Andreas, Rise of the Red Engineers, 87-130. 
897 See MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, Mao’s Last Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006). 
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the Cultural Revolution is incomplete and obscures its historical roots. As Elizabeth Perry and Li 
Xun have shown, radical students (known as Red Guards) sought to build a real alliance between 
the intellectuals and the working class, with Red Guards overthrowing local CCP bureaus in the 
interest of placing workers themselves in charge. Red Guards may have unleashed chaos, but 
they did have quantifiable political goals and had a genuine belief in the broader project of 
building socialism.898 Yiching Wu has gone further, suggesting that the Cultural Revolution 
represented an earnest outpouring of public anxieties over the bureaucratization of the 
revolutionary state. Rebel students sought to seize on the potentialities offered by ideological 
Maoism, Wu argues, in the face of an increasingly hierarchical, stratified political system. 
Radical youths perceived that China’s communist revolution was on the brink of failure by the 
late 1960s, and that only concerted action could revive the governing rationale of the CCP.899 
Common to these more nuanced takes on the Cultural Revolution is the sincere belief among 
young intellectuals was that they were doing whatever it took to save socialism in China. My 
own study has traced how intellectual youths inherited that mission through the politics of the 
1950s. 
 In a political sense, the Cultural Revolution may have come to an end by the end of the 
decade; party officials, especially Mao, were no longer calling on radical activists to overthrow 
local organs of CCP governance. The military had managed to quell the most severe outbreaks of 
unrest, and the unruliest Red Guards had been exiled to the countryside to temper them. For the 
intellectuals who had fully embraced the Cultural Revolution, however, the movement did not 
end—it simply morphed. Former Red Guards returning from the countryside played significant 
 
898 See Perry and Li Xun, Proletarian Power: Shanghai in the Cultural Revolution (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 
especially 7-29. 
899 See Yiching Wu, The Cultural Revolution at the Margins: Chinese Socialism in Crisis (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2014). 
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roles in the Democracy Wall movement in the late 1970s, placing up big-character posters on a 
wall on Beijing University’s campus calling for elections, formal human rights, and a series of 
liberalizing reforms.900 Although the leadership that took power after Mao’s death probably had 
little intention of giving in to intellectuals’ demands for democracy, the broader reformist energy 
of intellectual activists in the 1980s served the state’s modernizing efforts—for a time. The 
unsustainability of the intellectual-state cooperation in the 1980s came to a head in the summer 
months of 1989, when students from across China journeyed to Tiananmen Square in the 
interests of promoting further reforms.901 The Tiananmen Square protests were almost exactly 
alike the protests that spawned the Cultural Revolution, even down to the venue—except for one 
crucial difference. Rather than embracing the students’ desires for reform, as Mao had (perhaps 
to a fault), the CCP instead closed its doors and sent in the military. For the first time in the 
history of the PRC, the state had rejected any political engagement with its intellectuals. The 
prospects for future intellectual-state cooperation—a defining trait of the first four decades of 
PRC history—were crushed beneath the treads of PLA tanks.  
 After 1989, many traditional aspects of intellectual life in China were reevaluated. The 
post-Mao party-state increasingly turned away from employing intellectuals as advisers or 
bureaucrats, thus perhaps severing the idea of a “public scholar” that has been central to the 
meaning of what it means to be a Chinese intellectual for so long. Modern, educated Chinese 
have sometimes began to question whether the label of “intellectual” still applies; some have 
begun instead preferring the term “scholar” (xuezhe), for example. Intellectuals remain divided 
 
900 Merle Goldman describes the evolution from Cultural Revolution activists to democracy activists in From 
Comrade to Citizen: The Struggle for Political Rights in China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), 
especially 25-50. 
901 Although many Tiananmen Square activists were interested in Western-style democracy, others were interested 
in practical livelihood improvements—much like their forebears in 1956. See Craig Calhoun, Neither Gods nor 
Emperors: Students and the Struggle for Democracy in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994). 
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among ideological lines. Some intellectuals have begun criticizing the CCP’s embrace of 
economic neoliberalism, suggesting that the government has abandoned even the good parts of 
Maoism. Others continue to push for liberal democratic rights, along the lines of students who 
participated in the Democracy Wall movement or the Tiananmen Square protests. Others have 
even begun to embrace a form of Chinese nationalism, advocating for a revival of Chinese 
militancy and aggressiveness on the international stage. Aggrieved ethnonationalism from some 
educated Chinese has provided an academic justification for the assertiveness of Xi Jinping’s 
government.902 Intellectuals are hardly a monolith in contemporary China, although the extent to 
which they engage the modern Chinese state has been significantly curtailed. 
 But if this study is any indication, Chinese intellectuals have been adept at finding new 
methods of political engagement in a variety of different circumstances. Intellectuals have both 
weathered—or even embraced—the advent of the Maoist state, the Cultural Revolution, the 
modernizing reforms of the 1980s, and the post-Tiananmen crackdown. The contemporary 
Chinese state faces its fair share of problems, such as tremendous material inequality, ethnic 
tensions between Han and non-Han peoples, as well as articulating China’s place in the world. 
Contemporary Chinese intellectuals express a wide array of opinions, often in conflict with each 
other, on how best to deal with the issues of the present. As has always been the case, the China 
of the present is ripe with internal contradictions that promise future instability. We are waiting 
to see how the current crop of intellectuals will rise to the occasion.  
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